

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

Volume I of *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* examines the origins and early years of the conflict. In the first comprehensive historical reexamination of the period, a team of leading scholars shows how the Cold War evolved from the geopolitical, ideological, economic, and sociopolitical environment of the two world wars and the interwar period, and discusses how markets, ideas, and cultural interactions affected political discourse, diplomacy, and strategy after World War II. The chapters focus not only on the United States and the Soviet Union, but also on critical regions such as Europe, the Balkans, and East Asia. The authors deal with the most influential statesmen of the era and address issues that mattered most to people around the globe: food, nutrition, and resource allocation; ethnicity, race, and religion; science and technology; national autonomy, self-determination, and sovereignty. In so doing, they illuminate how people worldwide shaped the evolution of the increasingly bipolar conflict and, in turn, were ensnared by it.

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THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF THE
COLD WAR

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Origins

★

Edited by
MELVYN P. LEFFLER
and
ODD ARNE WESTAD



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Contents

List of illustrations page viii

List of maps x

List of graphs xi

List of contributors to volume I xii

Preface to volumes I, II, and III xv

Note on the text xviii

1 · The Cold War and the international history of the twentieth century 1

ODD ARNE WESTAD

2 · Ideology and the origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962 20

DAVID C. ENGERMAN

3 · The world economy and the Cold War in the middle of the
twentieth century 44

CHARLES S. MAIER

4 · The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952 67

MELVYN P. LEFFLER

5 · The Soviet Union and the world, 1944–1953 90

VLADIMIR O. PECHATNOV

6 · Britain and the Cold War, 1945–1955 112

ANNE DEIGHTON

7 · The division of Germany, 1945–1949 133

HANS-PETER SCHWARZ

Contents

- 8 · The Marshall Plan and the creation of the West 154
WILLIAM I. HITCHCOCK
- 9 · The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, 1944–1953 175
NORMAN NAIMARK
- 10 · The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945–1956 198
SVETOZAR RAJAK
- 11 · The birth of the People's Republic of China and the road
to the Korean War 221
NIU JUN
- 12 · Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945–1960 244
SAYURI GUTHRIE-SHIMIZU
- 13 · The Korean War 266
WILLIAM STUECK
- 14 · US national security policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy 288
ROBERT J. McMAHON
- 15 · Soviet foreign policy, 1953–1962 312
VOJTECH MASTNY
- 16 · East Central Europe, 1953–1956 334
CSABA BÉKÉS
- 17 · The Sino-Soviet alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954–1962 353
SHU GUANG ZHANG
- 18 · Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962 376
DAVID HOLLOWAY
- 19 · Culture and the Cold War in Europe 398
JESSICA C. E. GIENOW-HECHT
- 20 · Cold War mobilization and domestic politics: the United States 420
LAURA McENANEY

Contents

21 · Cold War mobilisation and domestic politics: the Soviet Union	442

DAVID PRIESTLAND

22 · Decolonization, the global South, and the Cold War, 1919–1962	464

MARK PHILIP BRADLEY

23 · Oil, resources, and the Cold War, 1945–1962	486

DAVID S. PAINTER

<i>Bibliographical essay</i>	508

<i>Index</i>	552

Illustrations

1. 'Liga Natsii: Kapitalisty vsekh stran, soediniates'!' by Viktor Nikolaevich Deni, 1919. A Soviet cartoon of French, American, and British capitalists treading on starving workers, under the banner "Capitalists of all countries, unite!" Poster Collection, RU/SU 1968, Hoover Institution Archives	<i>page 24</i>
2. "Is This Tomorrow": popular American cartoon showing an imagined future of the United States. Catechetical Guild Educational Society of St. Paul, Minnesota, 1947	37
3. Winston Churchill, Harry S. Truman, and Iosif Stalin at Potsdam. © Corbis	71
4. George Marshall and Dean Acheson. © Bettmann/Corbis	78
5. Ruins of the northern Soviet city of Murmansk, June 1942. © Corbis	91
6. Viacheslav Molotov and Iosif Stalin at the Yalta conference. © Bettmann/Corbis	99
7. Ernest Bevin and Clement Attlee at the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in London, 1946. © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis	113
8. Housewives queuing for potatoes in London, 1947. © Keystone/Getty Images	118
9. British troops moving through Port Said, Egypt, during the 1956 Suez crisis. © Bettmann/Corbis	128
10. Soviet soldier directing traffic in bombed-out Berlin, 1945. © Yevgeny Khaldei/Corbis	146
11. Konrad Adenauer. © Roland Witschel/dpa/Corbis	152
12. Walter Ulbricht. © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis	153
13. Marshall Plan freight cars arrive at the German town of Furth im Wald. © Bettmann/Corbis	165
14. Hungarian election posters, 1947. © Bettmann/Corbis	187
15. Communists shot by the government during the Greek Civil War, 1949. © Bettmann/Corbis	206
16. Josip Broz Tito, the leader of Yugoslavia, dancing with people in Dalmatia, 1950. © Bettmann/Corbis	210
17. Shanghai, 1948: queuing to exchange depreciated paper money for gold at a local bank. © Henri Cartier-Bresson/Magnum Photos	232
18. The chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong. © Wu Yinxian/Magnum Photos	237

List of illustrations

19. General Douglas MacArthur of the United States and Emperor Hirohito of Japan meet in the US embassy in Tokyo, September 1945. © Bettmann/Corbis	246
20. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. © Bettmann/Corbis	270
21. President Syngman Rhee of South Korea and US general Douglas MacArthur. © Corbis	275
22. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles meet to discuss foreign affairs. © Bettmann/Corbis	291
23. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and President John F. Kennedy. © Bettmann/Corbis	305
24. Soviet leaders at Stalin's funeral. © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis	313
25. Nikita Khrushchev showing the Supreme Soviet photos of Soviet military installations taken by the US U-2 spy plane before it was shot down in 1960. © Bettmann/Corbis	326
26. Nikita Khrushchev angered at a press conference in Paris during the 1960 summit meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower. © Bettmann/Corbis	327
27. Hungary 1956: a man burning a picture of a statue of Lenin. © Bettmann/Corbis	349
28. A Soviet engineer conferring with Chinese colleagues, Wuhan, 1956. © Bettmann/Corbis	356
29. Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong: a difficult toast during the 1959 meeting in Beijing. © Dmitri Baltermants/The Dmitri Baltermants Collection/Corbis	369
30. Mushroom cloud over Nagasaki, 1945. © Bettmann/Corbis	377
31. Soviets watch ICBMs parade along Red Square on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, 1969. © Jerry Cooke/Corbis	396
32. Kirov Ballet School, Leningrad (St. Petersburg), 1958. © Jerry Cooke/Corbis	402
33. American jazz musician Louis Armstrong at a bookstore on rue de l'Odeon in Paris's Latin Quarter, 1948. © Interpress/Sygma/Corbis	414
34. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy delivering a "report" on Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, 1952. © Bettmann/Corbis	429
35. Children test the escape hatch of their family's bomb shelter in Bronxville, New York, 1952. © Bettmann/Corbis	439
36. Women welders chatting, USSR, 1962. © Dmitri Baltermants/The Dmitri Baltermants Collection/Corbis	459
37. New housing in Novosibirsk, 1958. © Erich Lessing/Magnum Photos	461
38. Leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement. © Bettmann/Corbis	482
39. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refinery, Abadan, 1955. © Bettmann/Corbis	499
40. Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard M. Nixon at dinner with King Saud of Saudi Arabia, 1957. © Bettmann/Corbis	506

Maps

1. Soviet territorial expansion at the end of World War II	<i>page</i> 89
2. The division of Germany into occupation zones	138
3. Europe divided, 1949	190
4. The Balkan states after World War II	199
5. Cold War East Asia and the Korean War (inset)	242–43
6. Decolonization in Africa and Asia since 1945	478

Graphs

1. The Cold War as a Fordist competition: crude steel output, 1945–1970	<i>page</i> 55
2. Industrial production in countries receiving Marshall aid, 1947–1950	161
3. US–USSR/Russian nuclear stockpile, 1945–2002	389

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Preface to volumes I, II, and III

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Cold War has gradually become history. In people's memories, the epoch when a global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated international affairs has taken on a role very much like that of the two twentieth-century world wars, as a thing of the past, but also as progenitor of everything that followed. As with the two world wars, we now also have the ability to see developments from the perspectives of the different participants in the struggle. Declassification, however incomplete, of a suggestive body of archival evidence from the former Communist world as well as from the West makes this possible. The time, therefore, is ripe to provide a comprehensive, systematic, analytic overview of the conflict that shaped the international system and that affected most of humankind during the second half of the twentieth century.

In this three-volume *Cambridge History*, the contributors seek to illuminate the causes, dynamics, and consequences of the Cold War. We want to elucidate how it evolved from the geopolitical, ideological, economic, and sociopolitical environment of the two world wars and the interwar era. We also seek to convey a greater appreciation of how the Cold War bequeathed conditions, challenges, and conflicts that shape developments in the international system today.

In order to accomplish the above goals, we take the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* (CHCW) far beyond the narrow boundaries of diplomatic affairs. We seek to clarify what mattered to the greatest number of people during the Cold War. Indeed, the end of the conflict cannot be grasped without understanding how markets, ideas, and cultural interactions affected political discourse, diplomatic events, and strategic thinking. Consequently, we shall deal at considerable length with the social, intellectual, and economic history of the twentieth century. We shall discuss demography and consumption, women and youth, science and technology, culture and race. The evolution of the Cold War cannot be comprehended without attention to such matters.

The *CHCW* is an international history, covering the period from a wide variety of geographical and national angles. While some chapters necessarily center on an individual state or a bilateral relationship, there are many more chapters that deal with a wider region or with global trends. Intellectually, therefore, the *CHCW* aspires to contribute to a transformation of the field from national – primarily American – views to a broader international approach.

The authors of the individual chapters have been selected because of their academic standing in the field of Cold War studies, regardless of their institutional affiliation, academic discipline, or national origin. Although the majority of contributors are historians, there are chapters written by political scientists, economists, and sociologists. While most contributors come from the main research universities in North America and Britain – where Cold War studies first blossomed as a field – the editors have also sought to engage scholars working in different universities and research centers around the globe. We have included a mixture of younger and more established scholars in the field, thereby seeking to illuminate how scholarship has evolved as well as where it is heading.

The *CHCW* aims at being comprehensive, comparative, and pluralist in its approach. The contributors have deliberately been drawn from various “schools” of thought and have been asked to put forward their own – often distinctive – lines of argument, while indicating the existence of alternative interpretations and approaches. Being a substantial work of reference, the *CHCW* provides detailed, synthetic accounts of key periods and major thematic topics, while striving for broad and original interpretations. The volumes constitute a scholarly project, written by academics for fellow academics as well as for policymakers, foreign affairs personnel, military officers, and analysts of international relations. But we also hope the *CHCW* will serve as an introduction and reference point for advanced undergraduate students and for an educated lay public in many countries.

The present *Cambridge History* was first conceived in 2001 and has therefore been almost ten years in the making. It has been a large, multinational project, with seventy-three contributors from eighteen different countries. We have met for three conferences and had a large number of hours on the phone and in conference calls. Most chapters have been through three, if not four, different versions, and have been read and commented upon – in depth – not only by the editors, but also by other participants in the project. In the end, it was the spirit of collaboration among people of very different backgrounds and very different views that made it possible to bring this *Cambridge History* to completion in the form that it now has.

While the editors' first debt of gratitude therefore is to the contributors, a large number of others also deserve thanks. Jeffrey Byrne, our editorial assistant, did a remarkable job organizing meetings, keeping track of submissions, and finding maps and illustrative matter, all while completing his own doctoral thesis. He has been a model associate. Michael Watson, our editor at Cambridge University Press, helped keep the project on track throughout. Michael Devine, the director of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, worked hard to set up the conferences and provide essential funding for the project. At the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), the wonderful administrative staff of the International History Department, the Cold War Studies Centre, and LSE IDEAS provided help far beyond the call of duty; Arne Westad is especially grateful to Carol Toms and Tiha Franulovic for all the assistance rendered him during a difficult period when he juggled the *CHCW* editorship with being head of department and research center director.

Both editors are grateful to those who helped fund and organize the three *CHCW* conferences, at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri; at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas; and at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Besides the Truman Library director, Michael Devine, we wish to thank the director of the Johnson Library, Betty Sue Flowers, the director of the History and Public Policy Program at the Wilson Center, Christian Ostermann, and the director of the National Security Archive, Thomas S. Blanton. We are also grateful to Philip Bobbitt, H. W. Brands, Diana Carlin, Francis J. Gavin, Mark Lawrence, William Leogrande, Robert Littwak, William Roger Louis, Dennis Merrill, Louis Potts, Elspeth Rostow, Mary Sarotte, Strobe Talbott, Alan Tully, Steven Weinberg, and Samuel Wells.

Being editors of such a large scholarly undertaking has been exhausting and exhilarating in turn (and roughly in equal measure). The editors want to thank each other for good comradeship throughout, and our families, students, and colleagues for their patience, assistance, and good cheer. It has been a long process, and we hope that the end product will serve its audiences well.

Melvyn P. Leffler
and
Odd Arne Westad

Note on the text

All three volumes use the simplified form of the Library of Congress system of transliteration for Cyrillic alphabets (without diacritics, except for Serbian and Macedonian), Arabic, and Japanese (modified Hepburn), Pinyin (without diacritics) for Chinese, and McCune-Reischauer (with diacritics) for Korean. Translations within the text are those of the individual contributors to this volume unless otherwise specified in the footnotes.

The Cold War and the international history of the twentieth century

ODD ARNE WESTAD

Historians have always believed that good sources make for good studies. When Lord Acton was planning the *Cambridge Modern History* a hundred years ago, his view of the massive enterprise was much influenced by the sudden and extraordinary access to historical archives that came about in the 1890s. In his instructions for contributors to the vast effort which he organized but never saw completed, Acton wrote:

In our own time, within the last few years, most of the official collections in Europe have been made public, and nearly all the evidence that will ever appear is accessible now. As archives are meant to be explored, and are not meant to be printed, we approach the final stage in the conditions of historical learning. The long conspiracy against the knowledge of truth has been practically abandoned, and competing scholars all over the civilised world are taking advantage of the change.¹

Many optimistic historians of and in the twentieth century believed that the events of the 1990s made for a breakthrough in historical knowledge similar to that which Lord Acton and his colleagues had perceived a hundred years before. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars began gaining access to the formerly secret archives of states and governments all over the world – not just because of the fall of authoritarian and secretive Communist regimes, but also because many political leaders in many parts of the world believed that “freedom of information,” as it is now often called, had become an integral part of good governance. While very often producing as selective and partial a documentation as that of the nineteenth century had turned out to be, the new access to information in the 1990s meant real advances for historians, especially those attempting to understand events of the late twentieth century.

¹ Lord Acton to contributors to the *Cambridge Modern History*, March 12, 1898, Acton Archives, Cambridge University Library, Cambridge, UK.

But while John Acton believed in a progressive and positivist version of history, which met “the scientific demand for completeness and certainty,” the blood-soaked trail of the past hundred years has led scholars toward more skeptical attitudes in their research. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, historians’ evidence tends to be more multiform and their research questions more varied than could have been imagined four generations ago. Fields of human activity and sections of humanity that merited barely a mention in the first edition of the *Cambridge Modern History* have now become large fields of study in their own right. Some of the boundaries of class, ethnicity, and gender are being dismantled. The methodologies for the study of history have become more diverse and its communities more international. As a result of this increasing diversity, knowledge has become less certain, and the space for conflicting interpretations much broader.²

The *Cambridge History of the Cold War* is defined by such skepticism and contention. Very few of our contributors believe that a “definitive” history of the Cold War is possible (or indeed that it should be possible). But a heterogeneous approach creates a strong need for contextualization, what Acton thought of when he called upon his team to “describe the ruling currents, to interpret the sovereign forces, that still govern and divide the world.”³ We need to place the Cold War in the larger context of chronological time and geographical space, within the web that ties the neverending threads of history together. First and foremost we need to situate the Cold War within the wider history of the twentieth century in a global perspective. We need to indicate how Cold War conflicts connect to broader trends in social, economic, and intellectual history as well as to the political and military developments of the longer term of which it forms a part.

This chapter attempts to position the Cold War in the history of the twentieth century along some of its main axes: political and economic history, the history of science and technology, and intellectual and cultural history. It is not an extensive placing of the period within the greater whole – for that, one needs to continue reading until one has finished the last chapter in volume III.

2 For some of these discussions, see Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

3 Acton to contributors to the *Cambridge Modern History*, March 12, 1898, Acton Archives, Cambridge University Library, Cambridge, UK. Acton, who has sometimes been lampooned as a very English academic – one who sought contributors to his *Modern History* primarily from the senior common rooms of Oxbridge colleges – was in fact among the most international historians of his time both in terms of orientation and background (he was born in Naples of a French mother and did most of his training in Munich, thereby speaking four languages with ease).

By looking at the Cold War in its multiple contexts, we hope to better understand its long-term causes and also, perhaps, to get a better grasp of its outcome and consequences. But, in order to do so, it is necessary to begin with a look at that small patch of the century's intellectual history that the study of the Cold War itself has tried to fill.

History and historians

The term "Cold War" was first used by the British writer George Orwell in 1945 to deplore the worldview, beliefs, and social structure of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and the undeclared state of war that would come to exist between them after the end of World War II. "The atomic bomb," Orwell found, may be "robbing the exploited classes and peoples of all power to revolt, and at the same time putting the possessors of the bomb on a basis of equality. Unable to conquer one another they are likely to continue ruling the world between them."⁴ It was a new world system, Orwell found, dualistic, technology-based, in which nuclear terror could be used against those who dared rebel. To the author of 1984, the systemic aspects of the Cold War showed dark portents of the future.

Historians first took up the term "Cold War" in the late 1940s when attempting to explain how the wartime alliance between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union had collapsed. In the first postwar decade, the term was mostly used by American historians as a synonym for what they saw as Soviet leader Iosif Stalin's confrontational policies from the latter stages of World War II on. The Soviet Union waged cold war against the West (meaning, mostly, the United States and Britain), while the West was seen as defending itself and the values it believed in. The Cold War, in other words, was imposed on the rest of the world by the Soviet leader and the tyrannical Communist system he had created.⁵

Throughout the Cold War, the main view of the conflict among historians both in the United States and in Western Europe remained colored by the anti-Stalinist approach. Deeply influenced by the wars against other authoritarian collectivist projects – Germany, Italy, Japan – that had just ended, this orthodox Western interpretation of the causes of the Cold War contains both a definition and a timeline. The Cold War means a period of Soviet

⁴ George Orwell, "You and the Atomic Bomb," *Tribune*, October 19, 1945.

⁵ For key accounts representative of these various interpretations, see the bibliographical essay.

aggression that was initiated by its growing power in the latter stages of the war and which had become doctrine by 1947. Most early historians, not only in the United States, but also in Western Europe, believed that this period would last as long as Stalinists were in command in Moscow. Though in no way uncritical of Western policies – both the United States and Britain were often blamed for not confronting Soviet policies strongly and early enough on the main issues and for inflexibility and lack of cooperation on minor points – the anti-Stalinist interpretation places the blame for the Cold War squarely on the Soviet Union and, increasingly from the early 1950s, on what is termed “Communist ideology” (meaning, in most cases, the anticapitalist agenda of the Soviet state).

The change from emphasizing Stalin to emphasizing Communism as the main cause of the Cold War can easily be seen as part of the rollback of the wartime cooperation between Right and Left inside the West itself. While the Cold War was initially viewed as a security emergency, by the 1950s it had become a battle of global alliances and of political ideas. Wartime cooperation had been an aberration, many historians working in the 1950s thought. The normal pattern was one of confrontation between Communism and its enemies, as had been the case in the interwar period. Even among the few left-wing historians writing on the Cold War in the 1950s – more in Europe than in the United States – the breakdown of the wartime alliance had become a confrontation of superpowers, each imposing their will and their political systems on Europe.⁶

With the expansion of the Cold War to the Third World in the 1960s – and especially with the American defeat in Vietnam – radical historians in the West gained a wider audience for their critique of the US role in the conflict. Still staying within the original political agendas of interpretation, these critics argued that the United States, with its increasingly global anticollectivist agenda, had caused and perpetuated the Cold War to at least as high a degree as the Soviet Union had. To some of them, the American government’s motives were driven by the economic needs of the United States as the global capitalist superpower. To others, Vietnam proved that the United States was simply not suited to pursue change abroad, and that it should rather concentrate on a progressive political agenda at home, rectifying injustices based on race, gender, education, and income levels. Though always a small minority among historians, these anti-imperialist revisionists managed to shift the

6 For an overview, see for instance André Fontaine, *Histoire de la Guerre froide*, vol. I, *De la révolution d’octobre à la guerre de Corée* (Paris: Fayard, 1967).

debate somewhat back in the direction of Orwell's initial idea of the Cold War as a globalizing system.⁷

By the mid-1970s, as superpower détente seemed to take hold, the view of the Cold War as a system had a breakthrough among Western historians. The most comprehensive challenge to the anticollectivist approach during all of the Cold War was the "realist" approach, which – inspired both by Realist thinking in the social sciences and by the evident longevity of the conflict – saw Soviet–American rivalry primarily as an interest-driven clash of the strategic security needs of great powers. In their behavior, the Soviet and American governments were not strikingly different from each other or from other great powers in history. The key concept for Cold War realists was "power," and, implicitly at least, "balance of power" – a global system in which the strategic arms race and formal or informal alliances had moved the Soviet–American relationship toward a high degree of stability and predictability.⁸

Always more popular in Western Europe than in the United States, Cold War realism foundered – as did its Realist cousin in the theory of international relations – on the way the Cold War ended. Instead of slow, gradual change or war – the two outcomes of the conflict that Cold War realism seemed to point toward – the "balance of power" itself collapsed as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the disappearance of the Communist "pole" seemingly happened mostly because of domestic political changes in the late 1980s. With the Soviet–American confrontation ended and the ideological civil wars in the West during the Reagan/Thatcher era fading, historians for the first time began studying the Cold War as a distinct period of history.⁹

Helped by their own training and by the widening access to source materials, the cohort of historians who came of age in the 1990s began

7 The term "revisionist" is used for by far the most eclectic grouping of Cold War historians, ranging from the (then) Marxist David Horowitz's *The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1965) via Thomas G. Paterson's *Soviet–American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), which emphasizes broader aspects of US expansionism, to the moderate "corporatist" version in Michael J. Hogan's *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

8 It is easy to see how the deemphasizing of ideological conflicts is connected to the emergence of détente in superpower relations; see Jan-Werner Müller's chapter in volume III. For the most influential statement of Realist principles, see Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), and, for a discussion, Campbell Craig, *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

9 For an attempt at rescuing Realism as a tool for understanding the Cold War, see William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, 19, 3 (Winter 1994/95), 91–129.

emphasizing a more international and multidisciplinary approach to Cold War history. Very often – in spite of varying overall interpretations – they focused on the role of ideas, ideologies, and culture, in stark and deliberate contrast to the approach of their realist predecessors. While undoubtedly an intellectual response to the new knowledge of how the Cold War ended, this focus was also highly influenced by changes in the national historiographies, especially in the United States, where cultural and social studies had been ascendant for more than a generation.¹⁰

A significant subset of the international post-1991 historiography is what one could possibly call Cold War “conceptualism,” from the belief that each group involved in the conflict had sets of concepts or ideas which defined and constituted them.¹¹ These notions, Cold War conceptualists think, were very much products of the minds that shaped them, but they were not mere words or empty phrases, as the more extreme relativists claim. The key concepts in the Cold War had deep significance for the participants in the conflict. Often (though not exclusively) focusing on ideologies and patterns of thought, conceptualist historians tend to see a much wider variety of human agendas and processes of change intermingled in the conflict we now call the Cold War.¹² These agendas and processes center most often on domestic

10 For overviews of the debate on ideologies, see Nigel Gould-Davies, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics during the Cold War,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1, 1 (Winter 1999), 90–109, and Mark Kramer, “Ideology and the Cold War,” *Review of International Studies*, 25 (1999), 539–76.

11 When being tempted by the term “conceptualism” I am thinking more of Immanuel Kant than of art history (even though Christo’s *Iron Curtain* [1962] may be relevant: it consisted of a barricade of oil barrels in a narrow Paris street which held up traffic; the artwork was of course not the barricade itself but the resulting traffic jam).

12 Some of the texts I have in mind are Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), which connects superpower politics to 1960s youth rebellions; Chris Endy, *Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), which shows how leisure travel was fashioned politically; Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), which combines social and political history to give an overview of Soviet–German interaction; John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999), which does the same for Japanese–US dealings under the occupation; Juliane Fürst (ed.), *Late Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention* (London: Routledge, 2006), which defines generational shifts in the Soviet Cold War; Detlef Siegfried, “*Time Is on My Side*”: *Konsum und Politik in der westdeutschen Jugendkultur der 60er Jahre* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), which does the same for West Germany; and Robert A. Ventresca, “The Virgin and the Bear: Religion, Society and the Cold War in Italy,” *Journal of Social History*, 37 (2003), 439–56, which shows how the Cold War influenced Catholic devotional practices. In political science, Elizabeth Wood’s *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) places emotions at the center of Cold War battles, while in

developments, but also on generational experience and, in some cases, on international or even transnational or “imagined” communities.¹³ In a manifestation pleasing to those who look for historiographical dialectics, some Cold War conceptualists have a sharp reductionist approach to the larger role played by the conflict, seeing it as one of several “grand events” of the late twentieth century, linked to – but perhaps not as important as – decolonization and Asian economic resurgence. If the Cold War was ever a hegemonic discourse, then the reduction of it by historians who still claim to study the conflict is a nice twist of the historiographical tail.¹⁴

Among students of the Cold War outside Europe and North America, new perspectives are emerging, which will – eventually – merge with the historiographical debates in and on the West (here, of course, including Russia). As much of this work turns out to be undertaken by social scientists as by historians. In China, for instance, a popular world-history approach sees the Cold War as part of a long-term “Europeanization” of the world, as a period in which international rules and regulations were set up to preserve the global predominance of Europeans after they had taken control of the globe by force over the span of three centuries, settling three continents in the process. In Africa (and in parts of the Middle East), some scholars see the popularity of socialism and a Soviet alliance after independence first and foremost as a means to protect the patterns of the past from an onslaught by the ideas, and the economic practices, of the West. At the local level, at least, the language of Marxism was sometimes used to justify established customs and practices; it was a defensive measure more than a revolutionary one.¹⁵

anthropology Heonik Kwon's *Ghosts of War in Vietnam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) does the same for the physical and spiritual presence of departed souls. A good overview of the “conceptual” turn in Cold War studies is Patrick Major and Rana Mitter (eds.), *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History* (London: Cass, 2004).

13 The latter expression, of course, is Benedict Anderson's, from *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

14 For examples emphasizing demographics and food, see Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), and Nick Cullather, “The Foreign Policy of the Calorie,” *American Historical Review*, 112 (2007), 337–64. See also Matthew Connelly's chapter in volume III.

15 For China, see Liu Jinzhi, *Lengzhanshi: 1945–1991* [History of the Cold War, 1945–1991] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 2003); on Africa and the Middle East, see for instance Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Pantheon, 2004). See also Elizabeth Schmidt, “Cold War in Guinea: The Rassemblement Démocratique Africain and the Struggle over Communism, 1950–1958,” *Journal of African History*, 48 (2007), 95–121.

It has been clear for some time that the world regions in which there were clear connections between Cold War issues and other definitory contests – the Arab–Israeli conflict in the Middle East, the India–Pakistan tug-of-war in South Asia, and the contention created by US dominance in Latin America – are where the fluidity and hybridity of Cold War ideologies are easiest to observe. Perhaps, over time, historians of these parts who are *not* primarily preoccupied with studying the Cold War (or its immediate effects) will help develop patterns for how the different segments of twentieth-century international history can be put together in ways that incorporate the Cold War but do not attempt to subsume all other incongruities under it. Like some newer approaches to studying the contest itself from within, such attempts at seeing the conflict from its edges, as one part of much bigger histories, is perhaps the best way for the future to make sense of it all.¹⁶

Given the uncertainties that still surround the study of the Cold War, any placing of it within its wider context must be cautious and careful. In the three sections that follow, the main issue is therefore to suggest ways in which the wider implications of the Cold War may more readily be seen, along the axes of politics and economics, science and technology, and culture and ideas. The account is undoubtedly influenced by where the historiography stands today (not least because its author has helped edit the seventy-two contributions to this *Cambridge History*), but also by a need to see connections and relationships between the literature on the Cold War and the wider historical literature at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Politics and economics

The historical background for the Cold War was created by the expansion of capitalist economies in ever-widening circles from the West European and North American cities in the nineteenth century. While offering plentiful opportunities for people to change their own lives, the new economic system also created recurrent social and political crises, such as the depressions of the 1890s and 1930s, which were followed by World Wars I and II. Given the many underlying strengths of the economic system, it is reasonable to believe that the utopian and authoritarian alternatives to liberal capitalism – such as National Socialism, Fascism, and Communism – would not have stood

16 See, for instance, Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); on India, see Joya Chatterji, *The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947–1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

a chance of mass popular support if not for these crises. Instead, by the middle of the twentieth century, for many people capitalism had become synonymous not with progress, but with wars and economic collapse.

The effects of the two great wars of the twentieth century did more than anything else to shape the Cold War. In addition to the impression of systemic crisis that the wars created, they removed, through the destruction and economic decline that they caused, much of the primacy that the main West and Central European powers had held in international affairs. The wars also led to an unprecedented emphasis on national security, in which domestic surveillance and international intelligence gained a significance never seen before. Perhaps most important of all, the losses suffered by the powers involved in the wars convinced two generations of leaders that lack of military preparedness and political determination in the future had to be avoided at all costs. After World War II, especially, the lesson many statesmen and ordinary people believed they had learned was that weakness and irresolution unavoidably lead to war.

The great wars of the twentieth century contributed decisively to the creation of the modern state. Without the increase in the cohesion, the strength, and the reach of the state that took place in the first half of the century, the form of rivalry that the Cold War took would have been impossible. The sheer expense of the conflict, both military and civilian, would have destroyed states if they had not already been primed for the effort. Also, without the experience of two world wars, states would not have been able to mobilize their citizens for a war that had few big battles and little visible heroism. The extraordinary loyalty to the state was primarily based on the measures governments had taken to curtail the chaos of the market and provide some form of security for its citizens. For all countries, including the United States, which saw fewer such efforts than other nations, the acceptance of the sacrifices that were needed to fight the Cold War was contingent on the social services and educational opportunities offered by the state.

While similar in terms of the state emphasis on big projects, civilian as well as military, the United States and the Soviet Union symbolized two modern extremes in the way politics was conducted domestically. In the United States there were many centers of power, and even though the president's administration always held the upper hand, the legislature, the courts, and the state governments had significant autonomous influence both on specific decisions and on how politics was conducted. In addition, military leaders and the heads of big companies had their own voice in decisionmaking. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, politics was extremely centralized, in theory and

very often also in fact. Intended from the very beginning to be a one-party dictatorship, the Soviet system during Stalin's terror of the 1930s developed only one universal center of power: the Communist Party Politburo and its general secretary. In most periods, except in the late 1960s and again in the late 1970s, one man at the top had the final say in all matters that were presented to the party leadership. With the abolition of the market and with no independent seats of power, the Soviet Union deliberately presented itself as the antidote to capitalist chaos and confusion. All countries that had to reestablish themselves after the cataclysms of the first half of the century were presented with these two forms of government as ultimate alternatives.

The combination of capitalist crises and world wars was a key factor in the collapse of the European colonial empires, a chain of events that decisively influenced the Cold War, especially in its later stages. By 1945, it had become clear both in the colonial periphery and in the capitals of the imperial centers that colonialism in its late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century form had to go: in Europe, there was neither the political will nor the economic strength to keep it going, and in the colonized countries resistance was on the rise. The United States took a strong interest in what should happen in the colonial territories right from the beginning of the Cold War era. Its purpose was both to abolish European colonialism – a form of government that most Americans found objectionable – and to influence the Third World to follow the US example in politics and economics. Increasingly, in the 1950s, with the strengthening of the radical Left and of Soviet influence in the Third World, a key US motive also became to secure these countries against Communism and alliances with the Soviet Union.

By the 1960s, the emergence of new states had done much to intensify the rivalry between the superpowers, and for the rest of the Cold War Asia, Africa, and Latin America stood at the center of the conflict – a key reason, in the view of many historians, why the Cold War lasted as long as it did. The Cold War in the Third World was not just a battle for influence between Washington and Moscow; it was a struggle within the new states for the future direction of their polities and their societies, a conflict between the two versions of Western modernity that socialism and liberal capitalism seemed to offer. The globalization of the Cold War that these struggles led to both intensified the superpower conflict through international interventions and increased the cost of the competition, while destroying many of the societies in which the battles were carried out.

As was shown in the Third World throughout the Cold War, the military power and the international involvement of the United States always far

exceeded that of the Soviet Union. The whole of the twentieth century – the Cold War included – was characterized by the rise of the United States, as it gradually became the key state in the international system of states. In terms of its economy, already by the late 1940s the United States produced fully half of the world's manufactured goods, was the world's largest capital exporter, and dominated the world's financial markets. And even though its relative economic position was never again as supreme as it had been right after the end of World War II, the centrality of its role became increasingly obvious toward the end of the Cold War. It is hard to exaggerate the consequences of this US ascendancy: for the first time in more than three hundred years the most powerful country on earth was located outside Europe, with values and ideas that in most cases originated in the "old world," but which still – over time – had become recognizably different from their source.

As we have seen, this consistent US preponderance has led some historians to conclude that the Cold War was really an American project for achieving global hegemony, rather than a competition between two superpowers. But even though Soviet capabilities overall were more on the scale of Britain and France than on those of the United States, the militarization of the Soviet economy and its society made it a formidable opponent in international affairs. First and foremost it constituted the other superpower as a result of its oppositional ideology: it was the only great power that throughout the Cold War steadfastly opposed US objectives and refused to be integrated into the global capitalist economy. By doing so it carved out a primary role for itself in international affairs, at great expense to its own development over time.

Science and technology

The growth of science and of technological knowhow throughout the twentieth century shaped much of the format for the Cold War. To many people, the conflict was about the products of the new science, and first and foremost about nuclear weapons and the threat their use posed to all humanity. The remarkable level of investment both superpowers made into research and technology gives credence to this view. But, as in the earlier conflicts of the century, the relationship between science, political ideology, and social structure is a complex one, in which these fields of human activity influence each other. Science did not create the Cold War, but it helped shape it into a distinctive conflict, and into one that was more dangerous and harder to end than other great-power rivalries in history.

Most Cold War science has its starting point in one of the two main discoveries of the early twentieth century: the Cambridge physicist Ernest Rutherford's reporting on the structure of the atom in 1911 and the Columbia University biologist Thomas Morgan's outline of the hereditary role of genes the following year. Together with breakthroughs in technological innovation, such as Guglielmo Marconi's sending radio signals across the Atlantic in 1901 and Orville and Wilbur Wright's flying of the first aircraft on the beaches of North Carolina in 1903, the beginning of atomic and genetic science furnished many of the means of competition that fueled the Cold War and made it into a global phenomenon. By 1945, all of the basic building blocks for the scientific cultivation of the Cold War were in place and already fitted into the political purposes for which the American and Soviet systems wanted to use them.

The increase in energy supplies available for industrial production and industrial-scale destruction was at the core of the Cold War; it could be said that energy drove the conflict in more than one sense. Oil and nuclear power increased the potential for military production, but cheap energy also promised a new life for ordinary people, by making industrial jobs more widely available and less burdensome, and by making goods cheaper. For the United States, especially, access to inexpensive energy became both a Cold War aim (through US control of the Middle East oil supplies) and an aim of the development of science. For both superpowers, the production of nuclear weapons defined their military capabilities and the state of the rivalry between them. While the Cold War arms race was not structurally different from earlier arms races between great powers, the destructive energy that it quite literally contained made its significance greater relative to diplomacy and strategy.

Other main applications of the advances in science and technology in the early part of the century were in transport and communication. By the 1940s, the United States could project its military power all over the globe through its navy and its air force. Twenty years later the Soviet Union could do the same. The combination of cheap energy and radio communications allowed the superpowers to keep large navies at sea at any time, or in bases abroad. It also, of course, allowed them to build nuclear missiles and guidance systems to train on each other and each other's allies. But, especially in the capitalist world, many of the advances in transport and communication were also put to civilian use, such as in the globalization of air traffic, entertainment through television, and the internet. The global market revolution of the late twentieth century, which did much to end the Cold War, would have been impossible without these advances.

Third, the advances in biology and medicine contributed strongly to the Cold War competition of social systems. The twentieth-century invention of health care that influenced people's daily lives – such as vaccinations, reproductive health, and infant care – meant that achieving the right form of modernity was literally a matter of life or death. In Europe in the 1940s and 1950s, and later on in the Third World, the competition between socialism and capitalism was as much about which system could deliver better health care as about principles of liberty or justice. In agricultural production, most countries were eager to replicate the gains made by the Soviet Union and the United States in the early part of the Cold War through crossbreeding and artificial selection, even though the Soviets were long held back in genetics by the politically motivated resistance against “Mendel-Morganism.”

The expansion of science and technology motivated the unprecedented increase in school and university education that took place during the Cold War. Both the United States and the Soviet Union placed education at the center of their social systems in a way never before seen among great powers. Instead of educating just an elite, both countries tried to achieve a higher level of modernity – and advantages in their Cold War competition – by educating more of their populations to a high level of knowledge. By the 1960s, they also educated large numbers of young people from other countries, especially from Europe and the Third World. Even though many of these students returned to their countries with social and political ideas that were very different from the ones their hosts had intended, the expansion and internationalization of education helped create a global intellectual agenda, in which ideas were more easily transferable – and transmutable – than ever before.

Culture and ideas

The Cold War was a clash of ideas and cultures as much as a military and strategic conflict. Different from the nationalist projects in Europe and East Asia that had led to war in 1914 and 1937–39, the ideas put forward by the American and Soviet contenders in the Cold War were universal in nature – they were supposed to be valid for all peoples at all times now and forever. By 1945, these ideas – individual liberty, anticollectivism, and market values on the US side; social justice, collectivism, and state planning among the Soviets – had hardened into ideologies, in which universalist political ideals mixed freely with older and more specific cultural traits. The elites of both countries believed that the future was theirs, because the world was unavoidably moving in the direction of the aims they themselves had set.

Much of the reason why such a faith could persist for as long as it did (or does, in the American case) has to do with the common lineage that the two ideologies represent. Against traditions of privilege, heritage, family, and locality, both Soviets and Americans offered a modern and revolutionary alternative, in which people could reinvent themselves and help create a new world. In the American case, this alternative meant the globalization of the US immigrant perspective, in which people could choose the communities to which they wished to belong. On the Soviet side, it globalized the Bolsheviks' hatred for "old Russia," which they considered backward and underdeveloped. For Americans and Russians – and for many people around the world who came to share one or the other of these visions – the global Cold War agenda was to change the world in the image of their ideas.

Many of the core ideas of the Cold War originated with two of the great thinkers of the nineteenth century, Karl Marx and Charles Darwin (albeit often in a form that neither would have recognized as his own). From the reading of Marx came the idea that the development of societies was hierarchical and that the struggle between social classes was a fundamental aspect of the "old societies" the moderns wanted to leave behind. These concepts of historical transcendence had a remarkable degree of influence on politicians and social scientists East and West during the Cold War, be it as a promise or as a specter. Darwin's biological philosophy was in the twentieth century twisted even further from its origin than was Marx's social philosophy. To many, Darwin's theory of natural selection could be thought to mean that human society operated according to the same rules as nature – that societies which filled the biological and ecological space open to them would thrive, while those that did not would fail. The struggle to produce more and better goods as well as the faith in continuous growth and expansion for one's own society (or form thereof) were based on the pseudo-Darwinian approaches of the early twentieth century.

The political principle of the developmental hierarchy of societies and the economic principle of maximizing industrial production were the twin ideas that connected Soviet and American modernity. The responses to these Marxian and Darwinian challenges were, however, as distinct as they could possibly be between states that shared a common background. Not only were the state formations themselves very different, as noted above, but the ideologies that drove them in some cases emphasized the opposite responses to the challenges of modernity. In the perception of American elites, a modern society based on individual opportunity and the market represented the top of the hierarchy of societies, while the struggle between classes was seen as

a thing of the past, and domestic attempts at returning to class-based politics were feared as anachronistic attempts at polluting American freedom. Success in production was dependent on the defense of that freedom against trade unions, recent immigrants, and the political Left. In the Soviet Union, class struggle was also seen as having come to an end, but only because the Communist Party elites believed that the working class had taken political power and begun creating its own state based on social justice and collective enterprise. While in other countries the struggle between classes was still the vehicle of progress, the advances in production that had taken place inside the Soviet Union had been dependent on the masses being led by the Communist Party within the framework set by the socialist state.

While the ideologies of American and Soviet elites stayed remarkably intact during the Cold War, entry into the elites was probably more open in social terms in these two countries than in most others. The domestic ideological hegemony that the elites preserved may in part explain the social inclusivity – it made it easier for individuals to willingly seek inclusion and it made the entry ticket in many cases no more than political and social conformity. But while American elites had to seek a wider legitimacy for their projects within a democratic political system, Soviet elites of course had no such constraints, meaning that over time they became increasingly removed from their country at large. While both sets of elites at times feared the people they were at the helm of, the Soviet elites undoubtedly feared their people more. And while elites in both countries saw themselves as managing the troublesome transition to full-fledged industrial societies on behalf of the people, the Soviet Communists mistrusted their countrymen to the extent that they regularly resorted to terror in fulfilling their mission.

These differences in domestic roles and methods were of crucial importance when Soviet and American elites were spreading their message of progress abroad. While the United States, because of its democratic politics at home, was able to forge diverse and pluralistic alliances with elites in Europe and East Asia – alliances that contributed decisively to its predominance during the Cold War – the Soviet alliances failed spectacularly, from Germany to China to Eastern Europe. While American leaders managed to develop strong and functioning transnational institutions together with European Social Democrats or Christian Democrats, and with Japanese conservatives, the Soviets could not even manage links with foreign Communist Parties. In the postcolonial countries these differences played less of a role, since neither Moscow nor Washington – except in their most messianic moments – foresaw real alliances growing out of their links with weak,

underdeveloped states. In such relationships the superpowers should lead by the strength of their ideals and by their power to intervene when necessary.

Since the beginning of the Soviet–American rivalry, the main imagined competitors of both ideologies were constructed as “narrow” nationalism and “unreasonable” religion. While advancing modernity would, over time, do away with these relics of the past, the Soviet and American role was to identify and support those local elites that would help abolish local concepts of nation and religion the fastest. Ironically, since toward the end of the Cold War the Soviet Union was increasingly fueled by Russian particularism and the United States by American evangelicalism, their support for the steamroller of modernization in the Third World (capitalist or socialist) never faltered as the number of its enemies increased. In countries such as Ethiopia or Iran, the superpower interventions supported wars against the identities and beliefs of the great majority of the local population.

Some of this warfare took place on screens or through the airwaves. The Cold War influenced all forms of popular culture, film, and television.¹⁷ By implicitly portraying their own societies as victors in a global struggle, US and Soviet films had a significant influence on the views of their own populations and those of people abroad. By the 1980s, this particular contest for hearts and minds was won by the United States, as US programming filled television schedules across the world. Especially in those states where access to US television programs and film was somehow restricted – by state control or by lack of means – accidental or illicit viewing gave an even stronger sense than in other circumstances of the plenty and beauty of life in the United States. Contrasting the image of a fictional United States with known repression and poverty at home was one of the main inspirations in the rebellions against Communism in 1989.

The cultural Cold War also influenced the physical organization of people’s lives, through the schemes intellectuals designed for the social control and improvement of the populations at large. Both suburbia and the collective farm resulted from ideas of better ways of organizing society, through moving people away from the identities they had grown up with, be it among immigrants in American working-class neighborhoods or peasants in Russian villages. Likewise, Soviet and US city planning took on striking similarities in architecture and planning ideals as a result of the need to regularize and quantify. In linking high modernism in architecture and city planning to defense needs and mobilization of labor resources, the Cold War

17 See Nicholas Cull’s chapter in volume III.

became the apotheosis of twentieth-century modernity, visually as well as socially.

While Cold War projects promised progress, their politics in many cases meant rule by experts. In both East and West, national security and national development were regarded as far too important to be left to democratic control. In its Stalinist perversion, the very term “democracy” came to mean party domination. But in the West, too, key projects integral to the Cold War were exempt from democratic control: bases, bombs, shelters, and surveillance were the domains of unelected officials or officers. In many countries this rule by experts extended far into the civilian sector: dams, bridges, highways, and border zones had plans and purposes that were withheld from parliaments and local authorities. While political participation expanded in the West – and in parts of the Third World too – Cold War elites often constituted themselves as representatives of the people’s interests, thereby subverting the very ideals that they claimed to fight for. This abrogation is one legacy of the Cold War that people in the twenty-first century will struggle with for some time to come.

Change

Understanding the place of the Cold War within the overall history of the twentieth century is very much about understanding global processes of change. The latter half of the century, in which Soviet–American rivalry shaped the international system of states, grew out of a first half during which wars and crises had made many question the very promise of modernity. The superpowers’ post-1945 models of development seemed, each in its own way, to rescue two key aspects of that promise: individual freedom and social justice. Indeed, the attempts of the superpowers to go beyond control of the international system and toward influencing global social and economic change bear witness to the centrality, for each of them, of changing other people’s lives into an image of their own. The intensity of the conflict between them was created by each side’s (and its supporters’) conviction that they represented the last, best hope for the rescue of a rational, transcending modernity from the horrors of war and nationalist conflict.

But at the same time as the placing of the Cold War within a larger twentieth-century context helps explain the centrality of the conflict during its heyday, it also helps in understanding its demise. Three key shifts in human societies originated in the first decades of the century, but were coming to

fruition only in its final decades. Together, these shifts changed the world to a sufficient degree for the Cold War to become obsolescent.

The first, quite simply, is the right to vote. Restricted by gender, privilege, and race in the nineteenth century, by the late twentieth century voting rights had spread to a very large number of people across the globe, most often followed by widening political participation and the building of democratic institutions. Even though constricted and often undermined by economic forces, the vote is a powerful weapon of the weak, which can transform states and societies (although not always – as one could have wished for – in the direction of less conflict and more cooperation). The attainment and exercise of voting rights undid Communism in Eastern Europe, and continue to break systems of control and servitude on a global scale.

The second, plainly put, is the triumph of the capitalist market. As Karl Marx foresaw in the middle of the nineteenth century, the expansion of capitalism has led to an increase in both conflict and cooperation on a global scale. Alongside the worldwide growth of industrial society throughout the twentieth century, the centers for capital and production have shifted from Europe to the United States to East Asia, widening the stakes of everyone involved in the global economy. Economic globalization, developing throughout the twentieth century (though, tellingly, with its most rapid expansion at the beginning and the end thereof), led to the gradual integration of global elites in the quest for economic gain. Tied to the centers by similar patterns of consumption, information, and communication, the Third World outpost of this system created a potential both for further economic growth and for growth in global social inequality.

The third fundamental change that defeated the Cold War was the end of colonialism. Although resistance to colonial rule was on the increase throughout the century (the first nationalist organizations in the main Third World countries were all formed between 1900 and 1914), it was in the aftermath of World War II that the system as such broke down. In the thirty years after 1945, seventy-five new countries were created out of colonial territories, a process that changed international politics forever. While the final battles against colonialism and the first attempts at constructing new states sometimes favored oppositional ideologies and alliances with the Soviet Union, by the late twentieth century most newly independent countries were moving toward market economies and more inclusive political systems.

These changes privileged those societies that were poised to take advantage of them, but seriously challenged those that were not. The Soviet Union, in this sense, was among history's losers, as was the Cold War international

system itself. Even though the attempts in the 1990s at strengthening international society and preventing unilateral interventions ultimately failed, numerous trends from the late Cold War era point toward such attempts being relaunched in the future. One is the continued growth of nationalism, which makes understandings between states a *sine qua non* for the absence of war. Another is the changing role of the state itself in a world increasingly dominated by markets. And a third is demographic and ecological changes, in which the combination of an aging population in the industrialized world and a mounting number of global ecological challenges pushes us toward a policy of compromise.

The Cold War conflict forms a significant part of the history of the twentieth century and is an important ingredient in most of its other parts. Its course and content were shaped by a continuum of international history reaching even further back in time, certainly to the social upheavals of the middle of the nineteenth century and perhaps to the French and American Revolutions two generations earlier. As an ideological confrontation with two powerful states at its center, the Cold War defined patterns of alliance, models of state-building, and discourses on society on a global scale during the fifty years between the US entry into World War II and the Soviet collapse in 1991. And, by threatening the world with annihilation through massive use of nuclear weapons, it created one of the most fundamental aspects of the human condition toward the end of the century: fear of the future and a rising uncertainty about that perfectibility of humankind which the opening of the twentieth century had seemed to promise. The end of the Cold War provided an opportunity for dealing with some of these fears and uncertainties. But it did not end history, or even that part of it which the bloody twentieth century had birthed.

Ideology and the origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962

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Russia's Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 triggered a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States that would last much of the twentieth century. In its early years, each side aimed to transform the other. American–Soviet conflict became global only in the 1940s, at which point it shaped the international system and every nation in it. In addition to competition over markets or territories, this new form of struggle – the Cold War – was at its root a battle of ideas: American liberalism vs. Soviet Communism.

The ideologies animating the Cold War had centuries-long pedigrees, emerging by the early twentieth century as powerful and compelling visions for social change. These ideologies – explicit ideas and implicit assumptions that provided frameworks for understanding the world and defining action in it – were not antithetical to material interests, but often shaped the way foreign-policy officials understood such interests. Ideologies were lenses that focused, and just as often distorted, understandings of external events and thus the actions taken in response.

Ideologies in conflict and in common

Though American leaders typically proclaimed their immunity from ideological temptations, this self-perception ignored a rich tradition of American thought and policy that developed, defined, and acted upon a clear set of ideological premises. The foreign policy of the United States, like so much else in that country, drew on a long tradition of liberalism originating in the ideas of John Locke. As the etymology suggests, Lockean liberalism was, at its core, a theory of liberty, one that viewed liberty as defined for the individual, based in law, and rooted in property. The Declaration of Independence paraphrased Locke in proclaiming human beings “endowed by their Creator” with rights to “life, liberty and [where Locke had

emphasized property] the pursuit of happiness.” Liberty could be protected only by a system of laws in a polity guaranteeing popular sovereignty. A government, furthermore, should provide only formal freedoms (protecting the rights of property and participation), not substantive ones (equality of condition).

American liberalism evolved beyond Locke’s ideas. It was progressive, implying that liberty was on a forward march and equating the spread of American influence with the spread of liberty. American liberalism saw this march as steady and gradual; too-rapid change was likely to result in tyranny or mob rule. It had an important economic basis; the spread of liberty could be measured by the spread of market economies allowing the free exchange of goods. American liberalism’s focus on formal equality meant, in the international realm, an emphasis on structures of statehood rather than on power differentials that might restrict nominal sovereignty.

Racial hierarchy touched all aspects of American liberalism in both its domestic and foreign-policy aspects. The notion that rising American influence was tantamount to the rise of liberty, for instance, led directly to the claims that westward expansion was both providential and inevitable – as the term “Manifest Destiny” suggests. American liberty was destined to grow; the fate of Native Americans, therefore, was to yield to the greater civilization, even if that meant extinction: would the United States “check the course of human happiness,” one Congressman asked in 1830, merely to save the “wigwam of the red hunter?”¹ Many peoples were seen as unworthy of the blessings of liberty. The liberal defense of black slavery rested on claims that the slaves were unfit to rule themselves. And racial hierarchies applied globally. Repulsed by the wave of South American independence movements in the early nineteenth century, John Quincy Adams declared that “You cannot make liberty out of Spanish material.”²

Political scientist-turned-president Woodrow Wilson, writing at the dawn of the American rise to world power, incorporated these strands of liberalism into his notion of politics. Wilson saw American history as a guide to the world’s future. His national history was a story of ordered liberty gradually attained; he celebrated the founding generation as “statesmen,” not “revolutionists,” noting George Washington’s “passion for order.”

1 Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 202.

2 Cited in Michael Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 59.

Writing in 1902, in the aftermath of the Spanish–American War, Wilson described the United States’ ultimate aim as the liberation of Cuba from Spanish tyranny, setting it on the path to “self-government.” But self-government, he warned, was a thing of “infinite difficulty” and best not come too soon. Wilson saw liberal democracy as the endpoint of history, but appropriate only at advanced stages of development; democracy, he had noted earlier, “is poison to the infant but tonic to the man.” On this scale, Russians, like Cubans, were immature – “a people dumb and without knowledge of speech” in matters political.³ These views found full expression in Wilson’s expansive global vision in the aftermath of World War I. Wilson sought a liberal world order much like his vision of the American Revolution, ordered liberty gradually attained – with self-determination for those ready to assume such obligations.

Soviet ideology is much easier to describe and analyze than its American counterpart. Soviet leaders proclaimed their ideology obsessively, trumpeting slogans on stationery and street corners alike. Even as domestic and foreign policies shifted, Soviet ideological claims remained constant; each shift had an explanation rooted in what came to be called Marxism-Leninism (or, from the 1930s through the 1950s, Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism). Especially before the mid-1960s, Marxist ideology was a key part of the framework in which Soviet foreign and domestic policy were made. The trove of once-secret documents declassified in the 1990s make clear that Lenin and his successors did not use ideology as mere cover for *raisons d’état*; in the apt words of one skeptical historian: “There was no double-bookkeeping.”⁴

The starting point for Soviet ideology is Karl Marx’s theory of capitalism. Capitalism, for Marx, relied on exploitation: the ruling bourgeoisie paid workers as little as possible in order to maximize profits. In spite of its dominance over society, the bourgeoisie faced eventual extinction; the laws of history dictated that capitalism would create its own gravediggers. The crisis would begin with declining profits, whereupon the bourgeoisie’s responses would only exacerbate the problem. Mechanization would increase overproduction; reducing wages would spark workers’ protest; overseas expansion would feed rivalries between capitalist states. Lenin paid particular attention to the historical necessity of imperialism, which he sarcastically celebrated as “the highest stage of capitalism” – that is, the stage just before

3 Arthur Link (ed.), *Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (hereafter PWW), 69 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966–94), V, 71; XII, 218; XVIII, 87.

4 Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 9.

its collapse. Capitalism would ultimately fall before a proletarian revolution that ushered in the age of Communism. Marx viewed history as a predetermined process ending in human liberation – in the form of Communist society.

What did these theories of history and freedom mean for Soviet ideology? First, Soviet ideology was deterministic: bourgeois and proletarian alike had little choice but to obey history's iron laws. Second, Communism dismissed liberalism's emphasis on gradual change; "revolutions," Marx had it, "are the locomotives of history." Third, Soviet ideology rejected capitalist institutions as creatures of the ruling class; the state was, in Marx's words, the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie." The political rights that stood at the center of American liberalism were, to Marxists, charades that helped maintain capitalist rule. Bourgeois democracy, sneered Lenin, offered democracy only to the bourgeoisie. The dismissal of bourgeois institutions shaped Soviet notions of foreign relations, too. Relations between governments served only the class interests of the respective national bourgeoisies. Soviet leaders would deal instead with other nations' revolutionary forces.

That American and Soviet ideologies were set in direct opposition to each other ensured disagreement between the two countries. But other nations with antithetical visions of social organization had in the past maintained diplomatic relations. What made this conflict an ideological one – and ultimately into the Cold War – inhered in the nature of the ideologies themselves. Soviet and American ideologies were both universalistic; they both held that their conceptions of society applied to all nations and peoples. Both nations prided themselves on their modernity, seeking to supplant what they saw as the moribund traditions of Europe – and ultimately to transform Europe itself. Both nations, furthermore, subscribed to progressive ideologies; they portrayed history as an irreversible march to improvement, which they defined as the spread of their own influence. Each side feared the advance of the other as a step backward. Americans understood Soviet expansion as a direct blow to the gradual spread of freedom, while Soviet observers saw American expansion as proof that the final crisis of capitalism was near. Both ideologies, finally, exhibited a tension between determinism and messianism. Leaders on each side believed that history itself was on their side, but at the same time exhibited a certain impatience with the workings of history; neither side was willing to stand aside and let history take its course. Thus, both countries equated the growth of their own power with historical progress. For this reason, the USA and the USSR represented new



1. A Soviet cartoon portrays the League of Nations with French, American, and British capitalists treading on starving workers, under the banner "Capitalists of all countries, unite!"

forms of international politics. Proclaiming their universalism and messianism, they each sought to transform the whole world as a means to social progress. With such broad aspirations, permanent coexistence was impossible.

The crucible of World War I

Both Soviet and American leaders proclaimed the novelty of their respective views of international politics during World War I and the postwar settlement. Indeed, historians have convincingly argued that the two ideologies emerged in direct competition with each other. Both Wilson and Lenin wrote obituaries for an international system divided into imperial blocs, centered in European nation-states, and maintained through secret and self-interested diplomacy. They promoted, respectively, liberal and radical transformations of the international system, seeking to overthrow the one in place since the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

Consistent with their messianic ideologies, both Wilson and Lenin prematurely declared victory over the old order. Russia's new leaders declared their revolution the first step in a global surge, and immediately began operating with a new form of international relations. Lev Trotskii quipped, upon being named the Bolsheviks' first people's commissar for foreign affairs, that his duties should merely be to "issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world and then shut up shop."⁵ Soviet foreign policy rejected traditional diplomatic relations and would be oriented to the world's workers, not its statesmen. The Third (Communist) International, or Comintern (1919–43), institutionalized this approach, working for revolution in the developed nations of Western Europe and North America. Wilson, meanwhile, sought a reconfiguration of the international system along messianic liberal lines: "liberalism is the only thing that can save civilization."⁶ Enumerating his Fourteen Points in January 1918, Wilson invoked the "common interest of mankind" to demand "mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity" for all states as well as the expansion of free trade.⁷ These guarantees – and the Fourteen Points in general – aimed to find a middle ground between Right (nationalism/imperialism) and Left (Bolshevism) by promoting a liberal internationalism.

While neither Wilson nor Lenin succeeded in eradicating the old diplomacy rooted in imperialism and nationalism, they presented powerful ideological challenges to the old order – and to each other. True to Trotskii's dictum, Lenin wrote not to the American president but to American workers, expressing his misguided confidence that they would rise against the bourgeoisie.

5 Leon Trotsky, *My Life* (New York: Scribner's, 1930), 341.

6 PWW, LXVI, 154.

7 PWW, XLV, 522–24.

Until they did so, he wrote, Russian revolutionaries were in a “besieged fortress, waiting for other detachments of the world socialist revolution to come to our relief.”⁸ The Soviets hoped these detachments would arrive in 1919, as revolutionary insurrections sprang up in Bavaria, Vienna, and Budapest. The wait, however, would be long indeed; by year’s end, the revolutionary tide in the West had subsided, leaving Russia’s Bolshevik regime global in principle but isolated in practice.

In 1921, the Comintern belatedly acknowledged that the 1917 revolution had not led to the overthrow of world capitalism, and concluded that different tactics were in order. Revolutionaries, it declared, must turn their energies to supporting Soviet Russia, which alone was carrying the socialist banner. The imminence of the revolution was a particular problem for American Communists; as the most advanced capitalist economy, the United States should theoretically have been closest to revolution. Lenin acknowledged the complexity, though, in his letters to American workers: a socialist revolution in the United States was not imminent, and thus socialism and capitalism would coexist for a time. The many defeats for American labor and radicalism in the 1920s made the *a priori* logic of an imminent revolution seem even less suitable. American Communists debated the “American exception” from Marx’s laws of revolution. The Comintern’s American Commission adjudicated the dispute; its head, Stalin, criticized those Americans who ignored the fact that the principal features of capitalism were identical in all countries. Marx’s laws of revolution allowed no “American exception.”

In the decade after the Bolshevik Revolution, then, the implications of Soviet ideology became clear: aspiring to world revolution, it sought to unite progressive forces in the developed world under its control. Since the USSR was the beacon of revolution, the long-term goal of world revolution came with a short-term goal of building up the USSR. Anything that strengthened the bastion of world revolution, therefore, would advance world revolution.

American leaders, meanwhile, saw the Russian Revolution as a threat to liberty. The strands of American liberalism – formal liberty, gradually attained; popular sovereignty; racial hierarchy; and market-based individualism – shaped American responses to Russian events. Understanding Bolshevik power as mob rule, American leaders decried Bolshevism alternately as a catalyst of murder and repression and as an inevitable descent into anarchy. President Wilson saw Russians as guided by irrational impulses rather than detached rationality; as with his encomiums to the founding fathers, popular

8 *Lenin on the United States* (New York: International, 1970), 348.

sovereignty was orderly. Thus, Wilson's praise of Russia was tinged with condescension; his famous war address in April 1917 praised Russians' "natural instinct" for democracy – not their rational hopes for it.⁹ Wilson and his administration spent more time, however, describing baser Russian instincts, ones that revealed Russia's political immaturity and danger to the advance of liberal democratic civilization. From the point of view of American policy-makers, then, the Russian Revolution had two problems: it was Russian and it was a revolution.

Wilson also saw the Russian problem in a broader ideological context, in which the Bolsheviks were interfering with human progress. "Bolshevism is a mistake," he told one interlocutor, "and it must be resisted as all mistakes are resisted. If let alone it will destroy itself. It cannot survive because it is wrong."¹⁰ He also opposed Allied intervention in Soviet Russia – though only months later he reluctantly approved American actions against Bolshevik rule. Wilson convinced himself that only American military aid and troop deployments in Russia would keep history on the proper path. The United States, then, fought Soviet Russia in the name of ordered liberty, national sovereignty, and gradual progress.

Wilson's messianic liberalism appeared not only in the White House but also among some of its sharpest critics in the 1910s. A circle of writers and diplomats led by Progressives were such firm believers in historical progress that they could imagine only a bright future for Russia, in spite of all the available evidence. Bolshevism, in this analysis, was a necessary phase before the inevitable normalization of the country. No evidence to the contrary could shake American liberals' conviction that Russia would soon conform to the American model.¹¹

Interwar to World War II: searching for convergence

Barring any changes in the USSR, though, the United States adopted an official policy of nonrecognition. The announcement came in 1920, only months after the troops had departed. Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby declared that the US government could not recognize Soviet Russia because of the Comintern's aim of world revolution. A lack of diplomatic relations, however,

⁹ PWW, XLI, 524.

¹⁰ PWW, LXVI, 154.

¹¹ Christopher Lasch, *The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).

did not impede an increasing range of American–Soviet interactions in the 1920s, interactions which revealed Americans’ hopes that the Soviet Union could become a liberal state like the United States. American observers optimistically greeted Lenin’s announcement of the “New Economic Policy” (NEP) in March 1921. NEP reduced state control of the economy to the “commanding heights,” allowed market forces freer play, and encouraged the use of economic concessions with foreign firms.

Soviet agreements with American firms during NEP revealed both ideologies in action. American governmental officials saw no contradiction between diplomatic nonintercourse and unofficial economic relations; what made free markets free, after all, was their distance from governmental authority. At the same time, many observers saw NEP as proof that the Soviet Union was quickly evolving toward capitalism. One business periodical celebrated NEP-era Soviet Russia as “a great capitalist experiment – perhaps the greatest of modern times.” Henry Ford expressed this aspect of American market ideology most succinctly: Communist theory, he declared upon opening a Ford plant in the USSR in 1929, “makes little difference ... for in the long run facts” – economic facts – “will control.”¹² By recognizing the need for markets, the Soviet Union was heading the American way. At the same time, Soviets celebrated the economic agreements as proof of the iron laws of capitalism; Lenin boasted to a comrade that they showed how capitalists contributed to “the preparation of their own suicide.”¹³ American relief during the Soviet famine of 1921–23 revealed similar ideological dispositions. Many American officials hoped that their efforts would reconstruct Russia right out of Bolshevism; aid would be a crucial step in the transformation of Soviet Russia into a normal capitalist system. The Soviets, meanwhile, saw the relief program as an opportunity to learn American economic and industrial techniques – even from committed anti-Bolsheviks like Herbert Hoover.

By the late 1920s, as the Soviet Union abandoned NEP for its first Five-Year Plan, Americans remained captivated by the Soviet experiment but for different reasons. They celebrated the application of American technology, even if used to catch up with and surpass the United States in industrial production. American enthusiasts embraced the plans because they represented an effective if brutal means of transforming a backward agricultural economy into a modern industrial nation. The stock-market crash of 1929 only spurred further

12 Cited in Peter Filene, *Americans and the Soviet Experiment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 111, 118, 121.

13 Iu. Annenkov, “Vospominaniia o Lenine” [Recollections of Lenin], *Novyi zhurnal*, 65 (1961), 147.

interest in Soviet planning, sending hundreds of fact-finders and thousands of American engineers and workers to the USSR in the early plan era (the 1930s). Most enthusiasts celebrated Soviet practices, not Communist doctrine. New Dealer Stuart Chase, for instance, lauded Soviet economic planning but dismissed the relevance of Marxist theory; John Dewey did the same for Soviet education.

The Depression that wracked the capitalist world in the 1930s gave further hope to those looking for signs of American–Soviet convergence. The New Deal in the United States represented a step away from the individualist and free-market orientation that had defined American liberalism. As New Deal agencies moved toward “organized capitalism,” with a stronger government role in the economy, their operatives looked with envy at the Soviet central-planning apparatus. At the same time, the Soviet turn toward “socialism in one country” suggested to many observers that the USSR was abandoning its global aspirations in favor of “normal” economic development within its own borders. Nor was the convergence solely economic; Americans saw Stalin’s social policies in the mid-1930s as a rejection of revolution and a return to normality – what one sociologist termed the “Great Retreat” from ideology. Ambassador Joseph Davies led the charge in claiming that Communism had given way to human nature and common sense under Stalin; he was not the only American searching desperately for normality in the increasingly repressive Stalinist system.

The Soviet vision of the interwar United States was a perfect inverse. Irrespective of the 1920s boom, the Comintern announced the arrival of Communism’s “Third Period,” which took as its central premise that the revolution was nigh. Under such circumstances, Communists needed to be especially vigilant against other leftist parties that might mislead the proletariat. The practical effects of this policy were minimal outside the precincts of the far Left, which were roiled by Communist obstreperousness. The 1929 crash bolstered Comintern claims, as the Soviets interpreted the growing economic crisis in the West to mean that the capitalist system was on its last legs. Stalin gleefully contrasted the economic fortunes of the USA and USSR. In 1928, there had been a “halo around the United States” amidst “triumphant hymns of prosperity.” Two years later, economic crisis reigned in the capitalist world. “Things,” Stalin gloated, “have turned out exactly as the Bolsheviks said they would.”¹⁴ Given capitalism’s crisis, Soviet leaders reasoned,

¹⁴ Iosif Stalin, *Sochineniia* [Works], 16 vols. (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1946–49 and Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1967), XII, 235–37.

companies would be looking to new markets, including the USSR, to sell their goods. Stalin was right. Many American business leaders promoted diplomatic recognition as the first step toward increasing commerce with the Soviet Union; liberal ideas, they argued, would follow free trade.

Not just economic but also geopolitical concerns led to US-Soviet diplomatic recognition in 1933. Adolf Hitler's ascension in Germany that year initiated a sequence of events that would have a profound effect on the American-Soviet relationship. Hitler's rise demonstrated the vigor of supposedly archaic forces of racial nationalism; the old order continued in spite of liberal (Wilsonian) and radical (Leninist) challenges. The Soviet Union used a variety of diplomatic tools against Nazism, seeking a collective security agreement that would isolate Germany by uniting Western powers against it. The Comintern promoted a "Popular Front" against Fascism, with the aim of uniting once-reviled leftists (including even some New Dealers) against the Nazi threat. Germany responded in kind, signing the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan and Italy (1936). The United States and the Soviet Union also shared concerns over Japanese expansion into Manchuria. The United States, meanwhile, remained neutral in European conflicts through the 1930s. The threat on the Right brought together – temporarily at least – liberal (American) and radical (Soviet) challenges to the old order, deferring direct confrontation.

Before the war against Nazi Germany began, however, another Soviet reversal created international upheavals. The August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact quickly replaced the Popular Front against Fascism with a new strategy, a nonaggression pact (along with a secret division of Poland). Soviet leaders defended the agreement on ideological grounds; since capitalism led inevitably to Fascism, the argument went, there was no reason to single out Fascism. Soviet leaders claimed instead that the cause of world revolution was best served by treating all capitalist countries with equal disdain and by seeking advantage (in this case, buying time for a military buildup) in whatever alliances it could establish. The next two years were difficult ones for Western Communists; the post-pact party line that all forms of capitalism – Fascist or not – were a threat did not play well with the many radicals attracted to the Popular Front against Fascism. The Soviet foreign minister defended the pact by reminding the world's radicals that the interests of the USSR were identical to the interests of world revolution, but few Western radicals were convinced. As a result, the pact amounted to an earthquake: the structures of the Popular Front were flattened and radical intellectuals fled the scene in droves; few such refugees ever returned. The pact also increased Western doubts about Soviet ideology, even among those once sympathetic to the

Soviet cause; how could an ideology be capacious enough to promote a broad alliance against Fascism (the Popular Front) at one moment and a nonaggression pact with the most dangerous Fascist power the next? Many such doubts were rendered moot by Nazi Germany in 1941.

The German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, followed by the German declaration of war on the United States in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor that December, brought the USA and USSR together. The Grand Alliance, as Stalin noted, did not deny ideological differences, but sought to work together on common aims. By 1943, the Comintern, the Soviet organ of world revolution, closed its doors, a sign that world revolution was not imminent. The CPUSA (Communist Party of the United States of America) followed Moscow's cue, changing its name to the Communist Political Association and softening its rhetoric. Indeed, Soviet authorities played up national and even nationalistic themes over internationalist ones during the war, suggesting perhaps that the alliance, however grand, was primarily tactical. American optimism about the USSR – and its ostensible similarities to the United States – also ran high. Pitirim Sorokin, a Russian émigré sociologist at Harvard, wrote *Russia and the United States* (1944), which pointed toward a future convergence between his birthplace and his current residence. While Sorokin's book did not represent official opinion, President Roosevelt cited approvingly the notion of American–Soviet convergence. This illusion would not survive long past the war itself.

From bipolar to global conflict

The defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 cleared the stage for the expansion of American–Soviet ideological conflict into a global cold war. Each side concluded, according to its own ideological dispositions, that the specter of Nazism outlasted Hitler. Americans saw the Soviet Union as totalitarian – just like Nazi Germany. And the Soviets, who saw Fascism as the logical outcome of capitalism, saw the United States as moving on the path toward Fascism most recently trodden by Germany. The resounding defeat of Nazi Germany represented, furthermore, a broader defeat for the old order of nationalism and imperialism that Wilson and Lenin had so powerfully (but unsuccessfully) attacked in the aftermath of World War I. With the final defeat of a conservative alternative, the radical and liberal visions of world order faced off against one another.

The factors making the Cold War a *war* related to longstanding ideological differences combined with common features of the two ideologies (universalism,

messianism, and determinism). Believing itself the end of history, and believing that historical progress was itself inexorable, each side expected to conquer the other and the rest of the world. But what made the Cold War *cold*? The Cold War did not center on direct conflict between the two superpowers because the two were not focused on the immediate transformation or conquest of the other. Of course, other chilling factors went beyond the ideological: a desire to avoid total war after the devastating experience of World War II and the development of atomic weapons. But even in the earliest years of the Cold War, when the United States had a nuclear monopoly, it did not seriously contemplate an attack. And, even at their most reckless, Soviet leaders never came close to contemplating a nuclear first strike.

The emergence of two distinct worlds – the “Free World” and the “Socialist Bloc” – represented not a rejection of messianism, only the temporary reduction of its sphere of operation. While each side maintained its belief that history would eventually create the ideal global society, each side also acknowledged that such a society might be a long time in coming. Soviet authorities continued fulminating against capitalism but held few serious thoughts that the United States would soon go Communist. Recognizing the short-term viability of the capitalist world economy did not mean that Marx’s “locomotive of history” had been derailed or was running on the wrong track; it would just make an extended station stop so far as the United States was concerned. For its part, the American foreign-policy apparatus had given up, for the time being, on converting the USSR to capitalism.

World War II loomed large in American and Soviet views of each other. First, the defeat of Nazism contributed to the decline of racial nationalism and imperialist expansion as international forces. Second, the military victory of the Soviet Union over Germany demonstrated that it had become sufficiently modern and powerful to repel the Nazi war machine. The dream that the USSR was evolving toward liberal capitalism seemed all the more unrealistic after the hard-won victory in World War II. “Totalitarian” societies such as the Soviet Union, scholars argued, had reached the end of internal historical development; they were no longer susceptible to internal transformation according to the laws of history. Totalitarianism could be dislodged only through military defeat. Soviets, too, rethought the future of the capitalist world, as Eugen Varga, the influential Soviet economist, suggested that capitalism had won a temporary reprieve from imminent crisis as a result of the New Deal and the war. These modifications did not affect the ultimate ideological goals, only the timeframe for their fulfillment. Each of the two

universalist ideologies still maintained the assumption that the other would end up in the dustbin of history – but also the expectation that victory would be only in the distant future.

With no hopes of transforming the antagonists themselves, the American–Soviet conflict became a bipolar one in which the poles themselves were off-limits. Cold War conflict took place over membership in the “Free World” and the “Socialist Bloc,” but not over who would lead each side. Thus the story of the Cold War was the story of boundaries, establishing the outer limits of each sphere of influence and competing for those who had not yet pitched their tents in one camp or the other. This situation did not make the Cold War less ideological, but more so. The conflict was ideological precisely because the two sides measured their own positions in terms of their ability to replicate their social systems around the world. Yet, at the same time, the superpowers pursued ideological aims in the broadest possible terms. They tended to see every conflict as black and white – or perhaps as red vs. red-white-and-blue – and thus to give a great deal of leeway to allies who did not fit their ideological precepts. Soviet leaders worked with “bourgeois” or military regimes in the name of furthering Communism and world peace, while American leaders supported dictators and cartels in the name of democracy and free trade. The world became a sort of oversized scorecard measuring the relative success of each social system. The Cold War was fought on neutral ground or, more precisely, to make neutral ground less so.

As an ideological conflict, the Cold War would be defined by four features. First, it would be marked by competition to win new adherents to one or the other economic and social system. Both sides maintained empires, as John Lewis Gaddis noted, but of a very different sort. In Europe, the United States led an “empire by invitation” while the USSR ruled an “empire by imposition.”¹⁵ Second, the principal locus of American–Soviet conflict would undergo geographic shifts from one region to another, as nations committed themselves to one camp or the other. The Cold War first divided Europe and then moved on to Asia, Latin America, and eventually Africa. As it did so, the distinction between empires of invitation and imposition blurred; the Soviets were often more “invited,” and the Americans more “imposing,” in the Third World. Third, economic production and technological advance would be key instruments in American–Soviet competition. Direct economic competition between the superpowers underwrote the expansion of influence around the world, but also demonstrated the superiority of an economic system. Finally,

¹⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 284–86.

the Cold War revolved around understandings of the enemy (and the world) that were deeply rooted in each ideology. Soviet leaders, believing imperialism to be the highest stage of capitalism, saw American globalism as a desperate effort to stave off collapse. For their part, most American officials explained Soviet expansion as a single-minded ambition for world revolution. And with this mutual projection came the conviction, strongly held on both sides, that the antagonist was denying present realities and interfering with a future that would inevitably lead to its own demise.

From war to Cold War

These features of ideological conflict took shape in the crucial years of 1946 and 1947. The winter of 1946 was a long and cold one – not just in terms of European weather, which made the reconstruction of that war-ruined continent all the more pressing, but in the climate of international relations as well. In February 1946, Stalin struck a confident tone during a speech in the “Stalin Electoral District” in Moscow during the sham election campaign of 1946. In this unconventional campaign speech – how could he lose in a district named after him? – Stalin drew lessons from World War II. Like incumbents everywhere, Stalin recited accomplishments under his rule, extolling the USSR’s new status as a modern economic and military power; the war demonstrated that “the Soviet social order” is “superior to any non-Soviet social order.” Yet, Stalin continued, the USSR could not rest on its laurels; it must prepare for future conflict. The recent war had been the “inevitable result” of the capitalist system, proving once again Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism’s iron law: capitalism meant war.¹⁶ The speech attracted wide attention in the United States; Justice William O. Douglas called it a “declaration of World War Three.”¹⁷ This sharp reaction revealed as much about American predispositions as it did about Soviet dispositions. Stalin waved neither an olive branch nor an unsheathed sword at the United States; he wanted the USSR to prepare for war by increasing production – not just of military materiel, but also of consumer goods. Economic strength would mean not just military power but also an improved standard of living. Both would be essential tools in the upcoming ideological struggle.

Stalin’s speech marked a new phase of American–Soviet relations. The mood of this new era was best articulated by US diplomat George F. Kennan, then working in the Moscow embassy. His famous “Long

¹⁶ Stalin, *Sochineniia*, XVI, 6–7.

¹⁷ Cited in Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), 134.

Telegram” simplified Soviet postwar politics to a version of two camps. Kennan quoted Stalin’s statement that there were only “two centers of world significance,” adding that the Soviet leader was “committed fanatically to the belief” that there could be no “permanent *modus vivendi*” between them. The gravest danger, the American warned, came in the ideological nature of Soviet power; it seems “inaccessible to considerations of reality,” instead preferring to select “arbitrarily and tendentiously” a few facts “to bolster an outlook already preconceived.”¹⁸ Yet the gloomy Kennan sounded a few notes of optimism. He described Soviet leaders as opportunistic, ready to exploit weakness but not to overpower strong resistance. American strength and vigilance would prevent the expansion of Soviet power; this view provided the kernel for Kennan’s notion of containment of the Soviet Union. The flipside of containment was integration – bringing the Free World together – and here too Kennan called for American leadership.

The next month Winston Churchill coined a new term for the dividing line between the two worlds: the Iron Curtain. Churchill sounded an alarm for the 1940s based on Britain’s errors in the 1930s. Nazi Germany had grown larger and stronger while Western powers stood idly by; they must not make the same mistake with the USSR. In the past, statesmen could count on the balance of power to maintain world peace; that outmoded doctrine, he argued, could not counteract the Soviet threat to Anglo-Saxon civilization. The enthusiastic American response to this speech, in both the policy and public arenas, showed how it resonated with American ideology. Stalin rebutted the “Iron Curtain” speech the following week, opening with the statement that Churchill and his allies in the United States were little different from Hitler. Each side claimed to find the Nazi specter in the other.

Soviet assessments of the postwar world similarly emphasized conflict, especially within the capitalist world. In September 1946, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, N. V. Novikov, sent an alarmist telegram to Moscow; it attributed American foreign policy to “the imperialistic tendencies of American monopolistic capitalism.” The Americans would seek global domination through an expanding network of military bases and the spread of American capital in economies all over the world. Yet Novikov’s dispatch, representing the Foreign Ministry’s views, foresaw intercapitalist rivalry – USA vs. UK – as

¹⁸ Kenneth M. Jensen (ed.), *Origins of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 18–19.

the main threat. The postwar world would be divided, but the sides were not yet entirely clear.¹⁹

That same September, presidential advisers Clark Clifford and George Elsey took Kennan's alarums about the USSR and linked them more specifically to Soviet ideology. Soviet leaders keenly believed Marx's theory that capitalism would ultimately destroy itself. Given the Soviet propensity to expand its influence and control wherever and whenever possible, Clifford and Elsey argued, the United States should come to the aid of any nation threatened by Soviet expansion. The United States should orient its diplomacy and military toward the prevention of Soviet expansion, not toward the elimination of the Soviet Union itself. Even dissenting voices envisioned two worlds. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace, for instance, lost his job for condemning American bellicosity toward the Soviet Union – but he, too, imagined spheres of influence.

The year 1946 saw both the United States and the USSR move toward acceptance of a bifurcated world. Each side believed that it would ultimately prevail – the laws of history dictated its victory – but the time horizon for this victory receded into an ever-more-distant future. In the meantime, there would be little direct effort to create an American SSR, or to destroy the Soviet regime. The remaining task, in 1947, was to define the two worlds as ideological, not national, opponents, and to give the American–Soviet conflict its final shape as a conflict between different social systems each intent on expansion. The American case was made, most prominently, by President Harry Truman in March 1947. Responding to Britain's retreat from the eastern Mediterranean, Truman announced his doctrine that the United States would intervene in the name of freedom in Greece, and wherever else freedom was threatened. In defining the Cold War as a battle of freedom against totalitarianism, Truman invested the two worlds with ideological content while striking what would be a common refrain about the Cold War as a battle between different ways of life.²⁰ Like Churchill, he drew an explicit parallel between the rising conflict with the USSR and the conflicts that gave rise to World War II.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁰ *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1947* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1962), 176–77; Anders Stephanson, "Liberty or Death: The Cold War as US Ideology," in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 81–99.



2. A popular American cartoon published by the Catechetical Guild Educational Society of St. Paul, Minnesota, 1947, showing an imagined future of the United States.

Soviet authorities, after emphasizing national themes in World War II, quickly assimilated the Cold War as an ideological conflict. Because Marxist ideology privileged material conditions over ideological motives, Soviet ideologues tended to blame American expansion on its capitalist economy rather than its liberal ideology. Yet changed attitudes toward world capitalism in general and the United States in particular were visible in 1947. The economist Varga argued that World War II had changed capitalism; bourgeois governments, he theorized, might act in the interests of preserving the capitalist system as a whole (stabilizing consumption as they had during the Depression, for example) and thus slow the inexorable march of capitalism into crisis, revolution, and eventually

Communism. Though Varga faced stringent criticisms for these views, within a few years his vision of capitalist stabilization would take hold. And even as Varga wrote, Soviet economists placed less emphasis on intercapitalist rivalry and envisioned a capitalist world united against the USSR. Senior Communist Party official Andrei Zhdanov, in September 1947, offered a similar message to foreign Communists. He compared postwar American expansion to Germany in the 1930s; the rising tide of anti-Communism was only a cover for its expansionist designs. Soviet foreign policy, in contrast, accepted that capitalism and socialism would coexist for the foreseeable future. Zhdanov's speech neatly encapsulated the postwar Soviet posture: he compared American capitalism to German Fascism and expressed a Soviet acceptance of a world divided in two.

Back in Washington, Kennan authored the single most important article of the 1940s. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" (by a certain "X") revised his Long Telegram, placing ideology at the center of Soviet behavior. Soviet foreign policy, Kennan concluded, was shaped by two tenets of Marxism-Leninism: the "innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism" and "the infallibility of the Kremlin." His famous article described the American-Soviet conflict as an ideological one; the Soviet Union was not a nation in the traditional sense, but the terrestrial incarnation of an ideology. The task of the United States, then, was to limit the range of Soviet action: "no mystical, Messianic movement – and particularly not ... the Kremlin – can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself ... to the logic of that state of affairs."²¹ To change Soviet policy, the United States needed not to eliminate the Soviet Union – only, famously, to contain it. A contained Soviet Union, the logic went, would be less aggressive internationally and less stable domestically; it would ultimately collapse of its own internal contradictions.

Kennan offered an elegant exposition of the United States' task for the postwar world. It merited a fourteen-part response from the country's most influential commentator on foreign affairs, Walter Lippmann, who challenged Kennan's basic premise; the sources of Soviet conduct, the columnist wrote, were Russian, not Marxist. Lippmann argued that Stalin was the heir not of Marx but of Peter the Great, continuing the tsar's efforts to expand Russia's influence. Though the American chattering classes favored X's ideological explanation over Lippmann's national one, the columnist had at least one lasting impact. When his columns appeared in book form in early November 1947, they bore a title that outlasted its arguments: *The Cold War*. Three decades to the week after the Bolsheviks took power, American-Soviet conflict now had a new form and a new name.

21 X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, 25 (1947), 566–67.

The remainder of the late 1940s focused primarily on the division of Europe. The American Marshall Plan (announced in 1947) sought to reconstruct Europe and integrate Western Europe while containing Soviet influence to the eastern and southeastern portions of that continent. The establishment of the Cominform (1947) amounted to a belated and impoverished Soviet effort to integrate its own European sphere – by imposing tighter Soviet control backed up with military force. At the center of the early Cold War was Germany, under four-power military occupation (by Britain, France, the USSR, and the United States) in the late 1940s; the occupation of Berlin, deep in the Soviet zone, was similarly divided. The Soviet Union challenged this division, in 1948 blockading ground transportation between the western zones of Germany and Berlin. Rendering West Berlin a “Free World” island in the middle of a Red Sea, the blockade prompted a strong Western response – but not a military one. The airlift of supplies to West Berlin indicated Western resolve to contain the Soviet Union; the United States was not in a position to roll back Soviet power, but would act assertively to limit its expansion. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949) provided a military component to earlier forms of economic integration of Western Europe under American leadership and the American nuclear umbrella. When the Soviets ended the blockade a year later, the map of Cold War Europe had been drawn. Both sides repeated their ideological claims that the continent would eventually turn to their own way of life; in practice, though, the Iron Curtain separated the two realms.

The most influential American policy document of the early 1950s expressed the two-world concept in language bristling with ideological confidence. NSC 68, an official doctrine approved in April 1950, opened with the messianic claim that “the idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history.” The contrast with the Soviet system was total: “No other value system is so irreconcilable with ours.” The American response must be firm, though it would not entail, for the foreseeable future, direct military engagement. Instead, the United States must “place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power.” The immediate goal was not the elimination of the USSR but instead the “emergence of satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR.”²² Following NSC 68, American foreign policy directed significant resources to psychological warfare but avoided direct military confrontation.

Soviet pronouncements expressed similar confidence. In his last statements on foreign policy, Stalin insisted that intercapitalist rivalry was inevitable; it

22. Cited in Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War* (New York: NYU Press, 1999), 2, 79.

would eventually destroy capitalism from within and leave Communism victorious. “Eventually” was a key qualifier here; in other writings, Stalin counseled patience to those economists who wanted to move too quickly toward Communism. The transition to Communism, he scolded, was a “difficult trick.” Communism’s victory was inevitable, but not imminent.²³ When the architects of the Cold War, Truman and Stalin, both left the scene in 1953, the ideological orientations were firmly in place for their successors.

In its next phase, American–Soviet ideological conflict expanded into Asia. While neither Lenin nor Stalin had evinced serious hopes for a colonial revolution, the facts on the ground – most notably Mao Zedong’s establishment of the People’s Republic of China in late 1949 – showed the power of Communist appeals outside Europe. Asia became all the more important to the Cold War as decolonization, starting with British India in 1947, replaced European empires with a welter of new states. While the Clifford–Elsey and Novikov memoranda of 1946 worried about a third world war, the 1950s gave rise instead to a Third World war.

The rapidly expanding Third World would remain contested terrain for the remainder of the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union competed for influence in the newly independent nations, measuring their progress on a global scorecard. The Soviet Union had two distinct advantages in the so-called battle for the hearts and minds of this Third World. American support for its European allies – up to and including Marshall Plan aid – put that nation, in the eyes of most anticolonial leaders, on the side of empire. They had a point; American policymakers saw the transition from colonies to independent nations as a gradual process under the tutelage of Western powers. The USSR’s economic system gave it a second advantage. Having recently transformed itself from a backward nation into a modern industrial society, the Soviet Union was an inspiration for former colonies too impatient for the gradualist approach promoted by American development agencies.

The American effort to bring Third World nations into the Free World had its own advantages. First, the American economic record was far stronger than the Soviet Union’s. True, the Soviet economy grew much faster than the American one – but mainly because it was at such a low relative level to begin with. Even as the two superpowers squared off as supposed equals, the United States economy dwarfed the Soviet Union’s – two to three times the GNP in 1960, even more by other measures. The sheer size of the American economy,

23 Ethan Pollock, *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 205.

not to mention the rapid spread of American popular culture around the postwar world, advertised the country's cornucopia. The image of American democracy attracted the attention and sympathies of many Third World intellectuals and leaders – though this was often undercut, as recent scholars noted, by growing attention to racial inequality in the United States. The Third World became the site of numerous military battles but also the center of a hotly contested ideological struggle.

Instruments and ends of ideology

The ideological nature of the Cold War conflict played out not just in the shape of the Cold War but in the instruments used to fight it. Both sides undertook massive military buildups, with as much as one-third of the Soviet economy devoted to military production. But armaments were far from the only weapons used in the Cold War. Since both sides stressed the importance of economic production as proof of their own system's superiority, both used economic growth – the ability to “deliver the goods” – as a key indicator of their own success.²⁴ The focus on growth applied not only to the superpowers themselves but also to the other nations in each camp. Thus, Americans celebrated the German “economic miracle” and its Japanese counterpart, while Soviet officials did the same for its major development projects in the Third World – India's Bhilai steel plant, Egypt's Aswan dam, and other high-profile efforts. Finally, each side relied heavily on information/propaganda operations, further suggesting the ways in which the Cold War was a battle for influence. As such, it took place on an ideological plane, seeking persuasion over conquest – but when necessary using conquest as a tool for persuasion. As historian Frank Ninkovich noted wisely, international conflicts in the twentieth century were predicated on the idea of an international audience.²⁵ The notion of global public opinion showed the ways in which modern conflicts – and the Cold War in particular – were fundamentally ideological in their origins and operations.

Yet the ideological vigor of the early Cold War did not survive the first two decades of the conflict. Two existential crises in the early 1960s challenged some of the fundamental premises of the ideological Cold War. The first – the

24 Charles Maier and Charles Kindleberger, “Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe,” *American Historical Review*, 86 (April 1981), 360.

25 Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: US Foreign Policy Since 1900* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

erection of the Berlin Wall in the summer of 1961 – ratified the division of Europe dating back to 1949. The inability of the East German economy to match the economic miracle of its western neighbor grew increasingly problematic, as Berliners sought to flee the East for the West in steady (and steadily increasing) numbers. Khrushchev eventually acceded to the East German proposal to separate East and West Berlin, ostensibly to protect the East from Western infiltration but in fact to reduce the exodus of East Germans; the Wall became the final line drawn in Europe during the Cold War. Though it was the target of President Kennedy’s fierce rhetoric, he took few direct actions. Second, the Cuban Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962 revealed the dangers to both sides of escalating and militarizing the Cold War in the Third World, showing how proxy competition in a nuclear age could endanger the superpowers themselves. Changes in personnel and ideas also changed the nature of American–Soviet relations. The ouster of Khrushchev – in large part for his failings in Cuba – marked the changing of the guard in the USSR. His successor, L. I. Brezhnev, moved away from the ideological paradigm that had motivated his predecessors. At home, he favored actually existing socialism over the bright future. Historian Vladislav Zubok argues that Soviet elites, generally, had traded in some of their ideological fire for improvements in standards of living and employment opportunities, and for a more stable existence than was possible in the quarter-century of Stalin’s rule.²⁶ Internationally, the Soviet Union chose its allies on the basis of strategic alliances, focusing less on bringing about socialist revolutions. The death of Kennedy, who had viewed the Cold War as a battle between different ways of life, similarly left American leadership without an energetic proponent of ideological struggle. As President Lyndon B. Johnson dealt with one product of American ideology – the deepening US involvement in Vietnam – he wrestled with the notion that Americans should “pay any price” to spread liberalism around the world. But it would take Richard Nixon to bring American–Soviet relations to focus on interests rather than ideas, an underlying principle of détente.

American–Soviet relations had begun in 1917 with each nation’s efforts to transform the other. By 1964, though, each side had accepted the existence of the other and its sphere of influence. They would still compete, but in ever-more-marginal areas – and what, after all, could be more marginal to superpower

²⁶ Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

interests than Vietnam and Angola? At the same time, the superpowers sought more measures of coexistence and, to a surprising extent, normalized the Cold War. American–Soviet conflict would continue for another quarter-century, but it would never be the same.

The ideological battles that dominated the middle decades of the twentieth century left many important and disturbing legacies. The universalism of both the American and Soviet ideologies turned a bipolar conflict into a global conflagration, with devastating results. The Third World suffered from superpower embrace, which turned areas of domestic dispute into geopolitical hotspots. The brief but intense focus on Third World countries – Iran, Guatemala, Egypt, Taiwan, Indonesia, Lebanon, and Cuba in short succession – left nations with despotic rulers who served the needs of their superpower sponsors or themselves rather than their own nations' interests. Civil wars became superpower proxy wars, multiplying the length, complexity, and destructive fallout of heretofore-local conflicts. In the name of appealing to a prosperous future, the world of the present suffered mightily.

The ideological nature of American–Soviet conflict marked its protagonists as well. Citizens on both sides, whether voluntarily or otherwise, would (in Kennedy's famous words) "pay any price and bear any burden" in the name of victory. President Dwight D. Eisenhower enumerated some of the American costs as early as 1961. His farewell address bemoaned the rise of a "military-industrial complex" that had come into being under his watch and had distorted the politics, culture, and economy of the United States. The price borne in the USSR was much greater, but its public recognition much later; not until Mikhail Gorbachev took the reins in 1985 were there serious efforts to reduce the defense burden, restructure the economy, and open up a new public sphere. Gorbachev's reforms failed, leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; a country that for seventy-some years had declared itself a harbinger of the future was itself relegated to the dustbin of history. Within the United States came signs of triumphalism; it was not just neoconservative Francis Fukuyama who declared the "end of history," but a wide swath of the American policy elite that declared ideological victory.²⁷ That confidence, bolstered by the universalism at the root of American liberalism and the military might acquired during the conflict with the Soviet Union, might be the Cold War's most durable legacy.

27 Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 53–57.

The world economy and the Cold War in the middle of the twentieth century

CHARLES S. MAIER

Vice President Richard M. Nixon boasted about American color television to Nikita Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, during their famous “kitchen debate” of July 1959, but the early Cold War was fought in black and white. The issues were monochrome and so were the images: stacks of Marshall Plan flour on an Italian wharf, C-47s approaching Tempelhof airport over the ruins of Berlin during the blockade, films of blast furnaces with white sparks emitted against a night sky, and the photos of the American vice president and the Soviet first secretary debating the path to household affluence in a Moscow exposition hall. At stake in that model American kitchen was consumer affluence or collective prowess, suburban dreams of the Eisenhower years versus Khrushchev’s cocky promise from 1956, “We will bury you,” rendered plausible a year later by the trail of Sputnik in the night sky.¹

Still, when Nixon and Khrushchev debated their societies’ respective achievements, they agreed that peaceful competition was preferable to ruthless military or political confrontation. Peaceful competition meant primarily economic competition: the rivalry between capitalism and state socialism. Divergent economic systems should not be so menacing that they compelled a strategic arms race; the two sides had not organized extensive alliances just to defend private or state ownership of capital, the market or the plan. Nonetheless, distinctions between socialism and capitalism seemed fundamental to ideological identity and to bloc cohesion in the 1950s, as they would again in the 1980s when the state socialist economies showed evident signs of decomposition. Neither were the distinctions just a source of

¹ For a transcript of the kitchen debate, see www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/14/documents/debate/; “We will bury you” – perhaps too harsh in English translation – was uttered to Western ambassadors in November 1956, reported *Time*, November 26, 1956. In this chapter I do not cite from archival sources directly; references can be found in the essays and books listed.

ideological identity, no more than the stake of economic rivalry was just household appliances. The two economic systems had to provide the resources to sustain the military confrontation and subsidize allies. National power depended on economic achievement – a point the American vice president recognized when he conceded that the Soviets still led in getting payloads into orbit.

Economics, therefore, was crucial to the history of the Cold War. On the Soviet side, domination meant constructing an economic bloc of centrally planned economies that was designed to resist the seduction of the Marshall Plan and a reemerging West European capitalism. In the case of the United States, leadership meant helping to modernize its allies' economies and to integrate as much as practical the residues of older imperial economic zones – German and British above all – into a sphere of trade and exchange that posed no barrier to United States economic doctrines or ambition. National Socialist Germany's economic domain had been shattered with Hitler's defeat, but as much of it as feasible had to be reintegrated into the West. The Cold War's division of Europe would facilitate the transformation of West German industry from a threatening prewar and wartime rival system into a major asset of an integrated Atlantic economy. With respect to the British system of imperial trade preferences, Washington faced a different choice. United Kingdom finances were strained by the great debts London had accumulated to fight the war, including those owed to its Asian dependencies, its "white dominions," and to Washington. To what degree the United States should compel Britain to liquidate its remaining international assets or help keep them intact for the sake of postwar partnership was an open issue, to be repeatedly debated in the administration and Congress.

American readiness to replace German and British international economic domination raised implicitly the parallel question of future American leadership in Asia. Washington had been drawn into the Pacific war by its unwillingness to surrender China to Japanese imperial control. With the defeat of Tokyo, Washington was potentially in a position to assume regional economic leadership in East Asia. US policymakers were concerned (as were Japanese conservatives) about the possible rise of a Marxist Left in defeated Japan and would soon seek to limit economic restructuring, just as they wanted to buttress the Chinese Nationalist regime against Mao's movement in North China. But whereas a thorough integration of Japan and South Korea was to be achieved, any voice in postwar China was lost with the advent of the Communist regime.

Even if Washington policymakers did not envisage the expansion of American economic reach in imperial terms, the exhaustion of earlier economic hegemony – regional in the instance of Germany and Japan, trans-oceanic in Britain’s case – militated for a reorganization of global economic relations, which subordinated allies as well as opposing the emerging Soviet adversary. Believing the alternative to be the extension of Communist power, a bipartisan coalition in Washington repeatedly took on commitments from 1945 into the 1960s that consolidated a territorially extensive, though hardly universal, zone of trade, payments, and investments conducive to liberal capitalism. All these pressures – ideological, technological, and geopolitical – interacted to shape the economy of the Cold War, and this chapter will follow them in turn.

Ideas

As Nixon and Khrushchev agreed in the Moscow model kitchen, the Cold War invoked a competition over models of economic organization. The Soviets stressed the virtues of public ownership and central planning; Americans, the capacity of the market, private ownership, and entrepreneurial control. Still, the Communists’ economic program varied greatly over time. Ideology remained important, but its interpretation was malleable. Over the longer term, Communists professed belief that after successive crises of capitalism their vanguard party would seize authoritative power, allegedly on behalf of the industrial working class, and transfer economic assets from private to public control. Social democratic reformist or “revisionist” versions of Marxism in the Soviet Union and Western Europe might advocate incremental economic change, but earned only contempt from Lenin after 1914 and then from Stalin as he consolidated power in the late 1920s. By the end of that decade Stalin and his allies unleashed a campaign against peasant small-holding agriculture, embarked on collectivization, and introduced the first of many Five-Year Plans. The rise of Fascism and the threat of Nazi expansion led Stalin to shift course anew in the mid-1930s and seek broad alliances with the social democrats and even non-Marxian liberal democrats. From the Kremlin decisions of 1935 to encourage popular fronts until the formation of the Cominform in 1947, the Soviets soft-pedaled their earlier aspirations for single-party dictatorship and collectivization wherever it might be opportune. Instead, the Comintern, itself dissolved in 1943, called merely for “progressive” coalitions that would defeat Fascism and institute “people’s democracies” in the countries liberated from the Germans. The ultimate form of the economy

was adjourned as an issue for the future. Western socialists and British Labour Party leaders remained more insistent on old ideas of nationalization. They believed, along with a now-rather-forlorn New Deal Left marginalized during the war, that political power would be based on control of economic institutions. The Soviets understood that economic structures would depend, conversely, on political control. Hence they wished to maintain a substantial share of power in the West, and increasingly total domination in Eastern Europe.

Non-Communist political leaders possessed no unified anti-Bolshevik economic ideology between the wars. Catholics clung to a vision of diffused property. Fascists wanted a vigorous program that combined state-led modernization, rearmament, and coordination of interest-group bargaining. They were defeated, but economic mobilization during the Depression and then World War II brought far more state intervention even to liberal economies. Given the sacrifices demanded from civilian populations, expanding welfare-state policies and sometimes nationalization of basic industries seemed a foreordained imperative for postwar social policy in many European societies. The balance of political forces changed – the Labour Party unexpectedly won the 1945 election in Britain. Coalitions based on resistance forces defeated Fascists and collaborationists on the continent and were prepared to enact the enshrined goals of their socialist participants. Labor union and anti-Fascist political party leaders worked together on “charters” of the resistance or national solidarity pacts that provided for initial wage restraint but more social security, greater protection against unemployment, and further nationalizations of infrastructure. In Britain and the United States, “Keynesian” deficits were accepted as possible fiscal weapons to prevent a return to prewar unemployment. In occupied West Germany, both the Social Democrats and the labor-oriented wing of the Christian Democrats spoke out against any reinstitution of a powerful capitalist industry.²

Call all these latter concepts the ideas of 1945. They enjoyed significant but limited success until the end of the 1970s. The upshot was a social compromise in the West and in Japan. Welfare states were largely instituted, but they coexisted with a return of private enterprise and ownership. The American occupying authorities in Germany helped postpone irrevocable decisions for nationalization until left-wing energies dissipated after 1948–49. Nonetheless, trade unions and the Social Democratic Party sought and achieved a fundamental voice in corporate governance by winning the right of co-determination – that is, parity representation on boards of directors. In

2. See Hans-Peter Schwarz’s chapter in this volume.

Japan, following extensive debate, American occupation authorities supervised a “reverse course” that helped conservatives to rein in union activism and patiently reconstruct corporate control. Whereas German unions managed to institute co-determination, the Japanese unions worked to forge a system of lifetime job security for their workers. Fascism ended as a political discipline but left its habits and networks: entrepreneurs and political leaders wanted to recover a framework of social discipline and political conservatism. Whether in Italy, Germany, or Japan, labor and management fought to a draw, as American policies both restrained workers’ new strength and assured their new voice. In other countries, conservatives returned to the governing coalitions after 1948 and through the 1950s, which became in general a decade conducive to economic growth under capitalist auspices.

Indeed, as Cold War confrontation congealed at the end of the 1940s, the economic “ideology” that came to play the greatest role in the non-Communist world was the idea of sustained economic growth – both as high theory and in the applied form that I have earlier termed the “politics of productivity.”³ Ideas of progress and enrichment had marked earlier economic analysis from the eighteenth century. But the new formalized notions of sustained economic growth as measured by increasing national income could be traced to young Anglo-American economists on the eve of World War II, who assimilated John Maynard Keynes’s 1936 *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*. But they went beyond Keynes’s concern with using government spending to recover high employment and defined economic goals in terms of achieving a continuous expansion of output. Early growth literature stressed how difficult it was to achieve the delicate equilibrium between consumption and saving so as not to veer off into inflation or recession.⁴ By the late 1940s, however, New Deal economists and the Truman administration promised that technological innovation would assure continuing expansion year after year. Such steady enrichment would allow simultaneous gains for capital and labor. They were not locked into a class war – a

3 Charles S. Maier, “The Politics of Productivity,” originally in *International Organization*, 1977; reprinted in Charles S. Maier, *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 121–52.

4 For early discussions, see R. F. Harrod, “An Essay in Dynamic Theory,” *Economic Journal*, 49 (1939), 12–33, 377, who used the term “knife-edge view”; and Evsey Domar, “Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment,” *Econometrica*, 14 (1946), 137–47. See also Moses Abramovitz, “Economics of Growth,” in Moses Abramovitz, *Thinking about Growth and Other Essays on Economic Growth and Welfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 80–124.

message that American labor delegates as well as entrepreneurs and government officials delivered throughout the late 1940s and 1950s.

Applied to the less-developed countries – then called more frankly “backward” or “undeveloped” – the idea of sustained quantitative growth was reshaped as a template for qualitative and structural change, that is, for economic development, which would be enshrined as an official program in Point IV of Truman’s January 1949 inaugural address. The promise of the vast dam or steel complex attracted intellectuals and policymakers in Asia and Africa, who asked, however, whether their societies might industrialize without replicating the class divisions of the West. Each camp dangled development projects before the nonindustrialized world in an effort to marginalize the influence of the other. The Point IV aid requested, however, remained about 1 percent of Marshall Plan funding and tended to be extended as an adjunct of trade negotiations on behalf of American firms. Even had sums been larger, development would have remained elusive as even well-funded European areas such as the south of Italy persistently demonstrated.

Specific ideologies aside, the Cold War exerted a profound behavioral impact on economic habits in general. In effect, the protracted confrontation replaced the role of ascetic Protestantism to which Max Weber had ascribed so important a function in Western economic development. Envisaged as a long and enduring commitment, the unremitting vigilance that Cold War leaders invoked naturally reinforced the tradeoff between present and future that is always at the heart of economic progress. As George Kennan signaled in his famous long telegram and anonymous article (signed by “X”), Cold War victory, like economic reconstruction, would take a long time and demand continuing discipline. So, of course, did economic progress. Until the mid-1960s, socialism and capitalism both prioritized the future. Reconstruction required dreams deferred. Remarkably enough, each side did impose that discipline on itself – and this after the most costly war in history had already demanded so much sacrifice. Still, the overarching adversarial contest evoked a capacity for deferred gratification that economic aspirations alone might not motivate. The confrontation between “East” and “West” and the need to rebuild industries and urban centers led to a decade of extraordinary public cohesion. So, too, did the diffuse commitment to reconstituting traditional family and gender roles and the unavowed determination to repress the memory of wartime violence and occupation, complicity, and even betrayal. This extraordinary psychosocial discipline lasted until the mid-1960s. Then the claims of the present, of consumption and of social welfare, of youth culture and expressivity – of *détente* – reclaimed the present against the future; and

the great societal self-discipline – freely chosen or imposed – began to weaken and fray. Music and missiles, rockets and rock and roll began to pull in separate directions.

The Fordist zenith

Social theorists, such as Raymond Aron and Daniel Bell, argued that both Communist and capitalist economic systems constituted varieties of a common “industrial society.” Given the bureaucratic logic of industrial organization, liberal intellectuals explained as the Soviet regime began to “thaw” after Stalin’s death, the contending systems might “converge” on a mild sort of planned economy with a developed welfare state. Underpinning this prognosis was a form of industrial structure interwar European business leaders had termed “Fordism,” a concept that subsequently migrated into postwar social theory. Fordism envisaged that the mass-production factory was at the heart of the modern economy, an impression reinforced by national industrial mobilization during wartime. As of the 1950s, Fordism entailed deploying mass factory labor at highly mechanized factories that were involved above all with the transformation of steel. For both sides in the Cold War this process seemed crucial, and annual steel tonnage measured relative success. The continuous broad-band rolling mill, developed in the United States, became the iconic component of postwar modernization for German Ruhr firms, the Italian steel industry, and the French Commissariat du plan. Until the later 1960s, Cold War economic rivalry remained a Fordist competition that seemed to turn on winning the hearts and minds of the laboring masses who were yoked to the machines and assembly lines that worked the metal.

Nonetheless, industrial relations still remained adversarial into the 1950s. Employers felt they had to restore a discipline to the factory that had been undermined after 1945; unions believed that employers were trying to reimpose the harsh authority they had enjoyed before the war. Into the mid- to late 1950s employers benefited from a robust supply of factory labor as mechanization and fertilizers massively increased the productivity of the European countryside and workers moved into urban areas – from southern Italy to the country’s north, from French and Dutch farms into the greater urban areas, then from the southern peripheries of Europe into Germany. In France, Italy, and Belgium, employers recovered the power to lay off workers who had been hired during the triumphant days of the anti-Fascist Resistance. Under the impetus of American ideas, and by means of a series of monetary reforms that ended a decade of prevalent inflation and sometimes hyperinflation,

employers amended pay schemes by reducing the cost of living increases or indexation that over time leveled wage differentials. They reintroduced piece-work and bonuses for production. Trade unions affiliated with the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic Parties largely concurred in this effort because they tended to represent skilled or white-collar workers whose relative wage position had been eroded by inflation and fixed-increment indexation. Communist industrial federations, in contrast, sought to speak for the less-credentialed masses and resisted wage differentiation. But while they retained working-class loyalties, they did not win more general victories.

Elsewhere, there was less resentment. Britain and Scandinavia rewarded their working-class parties with political power or shares in power; in West Germany, employers and workers made common cause in the late 1940s against industrial dismantling for reparations. Moreover, one encompassing trade-union federation, the *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (DGB) spoke for almost all industrial workers. The Communist regimes allowed no scope for independent trade-union action, and relied on state planning mechanisms to impose more demanding “norms” or productivity demands from above. Calculating the norms branch by branch in terms of hourly effort, work time, and wage premiums became a continual activity under the socialist planned economies. But precisely because the norms might provoke resistance if screwed too tight (as they did in East Germany in June 1953 and as Moscow warned East Berlin they would), the Communist regimes often left a lot of room for waste and slack, relying instead on Stakhanovite campaigns of socialist “emulation.” Despite implicit negotiations, increasing subsidies, and assured employment, they still faced restive workforces: after East Germany in 1953, labor protests shook Poland in 1956 and again in 1970.

The balance of power in the Western workplaces began to erode in the 1960s as labor markets tightened, and there was upward pressure on wages and renewed working-class militancy. Two decades into the postwar era, the priority of reconstruction became less urgent, the demand for present rewards more compelling. Dutch workers in 1964 and German unions in 1966 went out on major strikes; French workers briefly joined student protestors in 1968; Italian labor boiled over in its “hot autumn” in 1969. African-American labor pressed for civil rights gains in the cotton South in the mid-1960s. By this time, another great transition in the organization of work was under way. Costly coal mines and steel smelters – initially the shared achievement of reemerging Europe, the vanguard of the Common Market – would enter a period of overproduction and decline; the miners would troop dispiritedly to employment centers and no longer to the pits.

The classic European proletariat was, in effect, dissolving as Europeans groped toward a post-Fordist economy. The peasant of the Third World or the North American Black Panther replaced the industrial worker as the heroic protagonist of revolutionary change. Even as industrial labor seemed to lose its salience for Western economic progress, the lingering disputes over Berlin and East Germany seemed to be settled by Social Democratic “Ostpolitik” and Soviet–American détente at the beginning of the 1970s. The dramatic sites of Cold War rivalry moved to Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. “North–South” struggles subsumed the formerly “East–West” division and helped to reignite radical aspirations in Europe and North America among those not yet safely integrated into the capitalist labor force. These included such diverse groups as the recent migrants from the Italian south to the factories of Turin, the vastly expanded cohort of university students in Europe and Latin America, and the antiwar protesters and the African-American populations of the United States. The result was a decade of destabilization between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, as the volatility in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, as well as the racial and student conflict in the Atlantic world, undermined the stalemate earlier achieved in East–West relations.

It was historically fitting that by the end of the 1960s the hearts and minds of peasants in the Third World seemed to emerge as the most dramatic ideological battleground of the Cold War. The years of Cold War antagonism coincided not just with the zenith of Fordism, but also with the final stage in the long agonizing global transformation of rural life. Just as Communism and capitalism represented different principles for ownership and control of the industrial economy, so they proposed rival policies for transforming the world’s farmers and peasants. This transition managed to frustrate each system but in different ways. Socialist prescriptions for collectivization tended to keep farmers inefficient and a source of chronic shortages more than plenty. Only opening new “virgin land” or importing grain from the West overcame their own deficiencies. Capitalist agriculture, on the other hand, with its mechanization and consolidation of holdings, made farmers so efficient that their family incomes had to be maintained by subsidy, while their surpluses were sold to the East or to less-developed countries whose subsistence agriculture was yielding to monoculture exports.⁵

5 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, *Histoire des agricultures du monde: de néolithique à la crise contemporaine* (Paris: Seuil, 1998), 457–73.

Looking ahead a decade and more, though, we can see that the intractable difficulties of global agricultural transition and even the dramatic resurgence of peasant revolution did not spell defeat for either side in the Cold War. Rather, the transition out of Fordism proved ultimately disabling for state socialism, even as a revived market capitalism rode out the difficulties. Stalin's successors had sought to loosen the yoke of a system that had become increasingly paranoid and repressive. They were prepared to envisage an effort to accommodate market forces in the 1960s – half-hearted compromises with planning known as Libermannism or *khozraschet* (autonomous firm accounting) in the Soviet Union, identified with Ota Sik in Czechoslovakia, and introduced by Walter Ulbricht's New Economic System in East Germany. East German and Soviet planners became interested in cybernetics – both as an area to which technology might be applied and as an approach to social planning in general. In practice, however, the reforms of the 1960s ran into difficulty as the freedom to set prices or retain profits created shortages in other sectors. Moreover, they were ultimately discredited in Leonid Brezhnev's eyes by the infectious political reforms that soon thereafter swept over Czechoslovakia.

Yet without market-based reforms – above all without the freedom to redeploy labor from older Fordist to post-Fordist employment – the state socialist economies were doomed to lag. Layoffs and, in effect, enterprise closures were excluded under socialism, which ultimately contributed to its undoing. What its major analyst has called the soft-budget constraint – never really facing a bottom line – always deferred facing up to inefficiency, redundancy, and waste and, ironically, produced constant scarcity.⁶ Until the mid-1970s, both social “partners” in Western Europe also tended to accept the policy imperative of assuring reasonably full employment. It was part of the postwar social contract that had secured a quarter-century of economic growth. Still, there were reality checks on economic behavior under capitalism that did not exist under socialism – preeminently a functioning price system and the presence of the market with its continuing transformative dynamic, its constant rewarding of innovation, and its unremitting constraint on a mass of employees who might otherwise believe they should continually seek a greater share of national income.

So the Cold War, which began in an age when coal and steel were the base of industrial power, continued into an era when these underlying elements – and

6 János Kornai, *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), esp. 129–59, 203–61.

the industrial structures based on them – no longer seemed crucial for progress. It began preoccupied by East–West issues, but concluded with problems we shorthand as North–South. (In fact, the North–South aspect was never absent from the Cold War, for stabilizing East–West tensions required reshuffling North–South exchanges and power as well.) These changes did not spell the end of American economic preponderance. The United States would extricate itself from Vietnam; accept counterrevolutionary regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean; reorganize its overextended financial leadership around a flexible dollar still necessary as an international means of exchange; and eventually by the 1980s roll back many of the remaining elements of nonmarket regulation that had emerged out of World War II. As in the 1950s, Washington would do so in a partnership with a weaker Britain, whose ideological and occasional military support still remained legitimating.


Even as these transformations took place, postindustrial society undermined the emphasis on labor and production that had characterized what the Italian sociologist Aris Accornero has written would be remembered as the century of work.⁷ New lifestyles, the expansion of consumption, new migrants: all dissolved this once heroic austerity. Even the shiny kitchen appliances Nixon had brandished a decade before were no longer enough – all the more since they came burdened by gender typologies that a new generation sought to transcend. The Cold War began in black and white, but ended in color. We cannot finally comprehend its totality unless we see it within the context of that half-century advent of mass prosperity based originally on a mass-production industry, but destined to fragment into a kaleidoscopic society shaped by migrations, job evolution, ideological reassessment, and insecurity.⁸

Restructuring global economic space

Cold War rivalry was territorial as well as ideological. Influence was sought in particular territories and regions – Europe at first, but then Asia and Africa. This was not really rivalry over resources or raw materials despite many statements to the contrary. Each side was plentifully endowed with strategically important commodities, including oil. What the Soviets and their dependants could tap within their vast land mass, the Western allies

7 Aris Accornero, *Era il secolo del lavoro: come era e come cambia il grande protagonista del '900* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997), esp. 62–73.

8 See Matthew Connelly's chapter in volume III.



r. The Cold War as a Fordist competition: crude steel output, 1945–1970 (in thousands of metric tons)

Note: Steel tonnage was widely considered as a proxy indicator of industrial prowess, as well as being a basic input into industrial products. Polish data suggests the partial industrial transformation of Eastern Europe. During successive decades, steel output moved to newly industrializing countries and stabilized in Europe and North America. Global steel output in 2006 was 1,250 million metric tons, over twice the world total of 595 million tons in 1970, of which China produced over a third (422.3 million tons), India 50 million tons, and South Korea 48.5. Sources: B. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics, 1750–1970*, abridged ed. (London: Macmillan, 1978), 223–28; American output from *Historical Statistics of the United States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), vol. IV, 636 (converted from short tons to metric tons); 2006 data from *Steel News* of the Iron and Steel Statistics Bureau (London), and special assistance from Arnulf Grubler of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.

effectively controlled in areas of former colonial dependency or longstanding special access. The confrontation between the Soviets' coalition and the Americans' developed rather as a struggle for territorial and political control in the wake of German and Japanese military collapse in Europe and Asia.

The urgent economic task facing both sides in the postwar era was recovery from the damage of World War II. But this was an asymmetric task. The Soviet Union had lost 20,000,000 or more of its 1939 population of about 170,000,000. While a great deal of economic plant had been moved to the Urals, western Russia was physically devastated. The estimate of real national output in 1945 was about 80 percent of the 1940 gross national product.⁹ In

⁹ B. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics, 1750–1970*, abridged ed. (London: Macmillan, 1978), 7 (population), 415 (GNP).

contrast, the United States economy had grown during the war; it had mopped up the 15 percent unemployment that still idled so many workers as late as 1940. Insofar as the Soviets wished to maintain any sort of legitimacy in the East European nations where their armies were to remain, the Kremlin had also to assure these countries some prospect of recovery.

In the European arena Germany appeared the key to the job for both sides. As a political conflict, the Cold War originated as a struggle against the postwar exclusion of non-Communist political leaderships in Poland and Eastern Europe. As an economic contest, the Cold War originated as a struggle for Germany. Under the inter-Allied reparations program discussed at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, German industry beyond the minimum needed for survival was set to be dismantled and its productive resources distributed to both East and West. This would allegedly avoid the protracted annuities that Versailles had stipulated and which had remained a source of continued friction throughout the 1920s. But reparations proved a wedge for conflict after World War II as well. At Yalta, the Allies named a reparations sum of \$20 billion, half of which could be claimed by the Soviet Union, but at Potsdam in July the new US president – less moved than his predecessor by the emotional tug of the joint war effort – claimed the old figure had never been binding and sought to fix a new total of \$10 billion. The compromises finally worked out stipulated that German productive capacity would be rolled back to the level of 1932 and that excess industrial plant would be dismantled for reparation. Each occupying power would draw 75 percent of its reparations from these surpluses in its own zone, which left the Soviets a free hand in the East. Additionally, the Western powers would provide 10 percent of their reparation assets to the Soviets free and clear, and a further 15 percent in return for agricultural commodities to be provided from the East. Critics of reparation and dismantling – in the United States increasingly business leaders and Republican senators – complained that the projected ceilings on German output would permanently hobble its economy. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes reassured a German audience at Stuttgart on September 2, 1946, that Washington had no intent to prevent their economic recovery – the first major public revision of strict occupation guidelines.

By this time, the reparation agreement was disintegrating in any case amidst recriminations on each side. In May 1946, General Lucius Clay ordered a stop to reparation deliveries to all recipient countries, and the Americans sought to gain a greater voice in policy in the industrial regions of western Germany administered by the British. The British likewise found paying for their zone a growing strain and agreed to the creation of a joint economic

administration – “Bizonia” or the Bizone – to come into effect at the beginning of 1947. Germans were put in charge of its rudimentary economic administration, and its Economic Council (Wirtschaftsrat) would become the predecessor of the West German parliament. The French opposed American efforts to relax the constraints on German production. At the Moscow and London meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers of April and December 1947, the Americans refused to make any further concessions on constructing the unified German institutions that the Soviets pressed for – fearing they were intended to serve only as a fulcrum for Communist influence in the West.

Thus the united economic area that Germany had once constituted disintegrated, and two economic realms would emerge. The UN’s Economic Commission for Europe to be headed by Gunnar Myrdal would seek to counter the trend and to preserve a united economic space, but Myrdal tended to be held in contempt by policymakers in Washington and London. The Allies had supposedly acted on behalf of a reunited Europe at Yalta, but the reparation agreement at Potsdam left each zone to be milked by its respective occupying power. Growing distrust about political intentions – Washington’s conviction that the Soviets wanted to dominate all of Germany; Moscow’s conviction that Washington preferred to partition Germany – turned out to be well founded.

The division of Germany meant the economic division of Europe more generally. A whole series of incremental decisions from 1945 through 1948 led to that result, but the most dramatic and far-reaching was American organization of the European Recovery Program (ERP), or the Marshall Plan, announced after the failure of the spring 1947 Moscow Conference. By that time, it had become evident that Europe’s dollar deficit, which meant its need for United States commodities, remained an urgent problem despite the effort to assure postwar liquidity by the Bretton Woods agreements negotiated in the summer of 1944 and significant relief payments through UNRRA (the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration). Britain could not sustain anti-Communist assistance in Greece; the French, Belgian, and Italian Communist Parties were making inroads among a working class whose standard of living seemed threatened; Germany’s currency was no longer serving to coax goods into the market.

What was the magnitude of American assistance? Over four years, the ERP authorized almost \$14 billion of assistance. When it began in 1948, the first authorization (comprising first so-called Interim Aid, then assistance under the European Recovery Program *per se*) amounted to about 2% of US gross domestic product; by 1951, it was closer to 1%. This was a significant transfer of

resources, but not at all disabling. (Americans had already been spending 40 to 45 percent of GDP on war-related expenses by 1944–45.) As for the recipient countries, the sums received had a qualitative more than a quantitative impact: they alleviated balance-of-payments or budgetary constraints. The national income of European countries tended to recover the levels of 1938 or 1939 by 1948. Getting back to prewar levels of national income, however, did not mean that national wealth destroyed, damaged, or depreciated in wartime was reconstituted in five years. Infrastructure had to be rebuilt and, after that, housing needed to be repaired; ruins, shabby transport, and makeshift accommodation persisted for years afterward. Long-accumulated private savings held as monetary assets often for the next generation (bank accounts, bonds) were diminished either deliberately in monetary reforms, as in Belgium, West Germany, and Eastern bloc countries, or by living with inflation. Perhaps most farsightedly, Washington agreed to help finance the dollar pool needed to let the Europeans return to partial currency convertibility through the European Payments Union (EPU) during the 1950s. By the time EPU was wound up in 1958, it was becoming clear that, against all expectations, the international dollar shortage was becoming a dollar glut. The era of a weakening but tethered dollar from 1958 to 1973 – at which latter date the Nixon administration accepted a regime of floating exchange rates – may have contributed to the unprecedented length of real economic expansion throughout the non-Communist world. At the same time, the outflow of dollars helped set the stage for the decade of inflation in the 1970s and ultimately discredited the neo-Keynesian assumptions that had justified the welfare-state policies and monetary expansion of the previous quarter-century.

All in all, the economic initiatives on both sides of the Iron Curtain profoundly changed Europe's economic geography and its economic institutions. The European Recovery Program helped confirm the division of Europe, but placed the major onus on Moscow for this result. In theory, Marshall Plan aid was offered to all European states that might join in a cooperative effort to increase international trade and output. Moscow planners felt this must undermine their own central planning and domination of East European economies and quickly withdrew cooperation. Only the Czech coalition government would stay until the fall of 1947 and pay for this autonomy with a Communist takeover in February 1948.

Within Western Europe, the Recovery Program – organized through the new autonomous European Cooperation Agency (ECA) – became an agency for transformative thinking, especially from the fall of 1949 on when Paul Hoffman – facing a congressional fight for renewed authorizations and

seeking a dramatic initiative – called for an admittedly ill-defined “integration” among the West European recipients. The ECA’s Washington economists, trained just before the war as interventionist ideas flourished, continually urged a more coordinated and even planning-type intervention on the Europeans. The ECA itself spurred recipient countries – organized initially as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), then as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – to develop common Western criteria for measuring economic performance, including better national income statistics. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Mutual Security Administration (MSA) that succeeded the Recovery Program pressed statistical coordination even further when the NATO Temporary Council Committee of the fall of 1951 began to measure members’ military expenses as a ratio of their gross national product in order to overcome lagging rearmament.

In a long-run perspective, the postwar transformation of European economic space served also to restructure two major prewar trade and investment relationships: the German–Russian and the British–American exchanges. East Germany ended up taking on most of the burden involved in reconstructing the first of these relations. It was a territory to be stripped for so-called war booty, then for reparations. As the East–West rift deepened, however, the Soviets decided to take East German industrial output as reparations, rather than its equipment, perhaps up to 40 percent during 1947–48. Throughout its existence, East Germany and later the German Democratic Republic (GDR) would remain the major supplier of machine tools to the Soviet Union. Moscow further sought to establish an integrated state socialist economic bloc that could dispense with imports from the West, and the countries they controlled zealously replicated Soviet-style central planning and collectivized industry and land, with Polish farms remaining the great exception.

The Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and East Germany and the multi-year American program for West European aid meant that there would be no socialism in just one country – and no capitalism either. Within the two blocs, participating states strove for greater amounts of trade and exchange. Just as the Marshall Plan would seek to reconstruct multilateral Western trade, the Soviets would establish the Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, CMEA) for the planned economies. In effect, the Comecon was designed to offer an alternative for the economies to which Moscow denied access to Marshall Plan aid; it thus had to establish its own intrabloc trade in lieu of dollar purchases, but it was to remain a region of second-class

manufactures, at times exploited by the Soviet Union and at times subsidized with inexpensive oil and raw materials.

British–American economic relations also changed profoundly. While the Soviets could treat Germany as a defeated power, Britain and the United States were victorious allies. London, moreover, retained a privileged relationship with its imperial dependencies and dominions. Nor was London alone in drawing on such vestiges of empire. British–American economic relations before the war had been troubled by the 1931 Ottawa Agreements that had put the Commonwealth countries, including Canada, behind new tariff walls. Lend-lease assistance had been granted under the condition that after the war such trade discrimination would be dismantled. But Britain faced acute balance-of-payments strains. The country had fought its East Asian war by levies on its Suez-to-Singapore dependencies (or the businesses and plantations within them). In return for materiel, the Exchequer had credited its suppliers with sterling accounts in London. After the Bretton Woods agreements and the negotiation of the American loan, these balances were supposed to be made convertible into dollars. United States officials tended to believe that British pretensions outweighed its real economic resources and that London should ultimately shed the imperial privileges or monetary immunity it sought to retain. Accepting convertibility of sterling (that is, ending what UK policymakers described as a two-world system) would compel the British, so the Americans were convinced, not without reason, to strengthen their own industrial resources. Still, pressure from Washington was only intermittent. Britain retained an important voice in the reorganization of Ruhr resources, was fighting putatively Communist guerrillas, briefly in Greece and then in Malaya, and might help stabilize Iran and Arab lands. The British had friends among the State Department and other elites, but Republican congressmen, who controlled the House after 1946, fretted about the supposed indulgence of a semi-socialist welfare state.

Were the powers partners or rivals? The answer, repeatedly vouchsafed but only after episodes of hard bargaining, was partners of a kind.¹⁰ Thus, the United States extended assistance first by a postwar credit of \$3.75 billion and then by granting Britain the largest single share of Marshall Plan

¹⁰ I borrow the title of Christopher Thorne's valuable book on British–American wartime relations, *Partners of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). Joyce and Gabriel Kolko captured the ambiguities of the economic relationship in *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945* (New York: Random House, 1968) and *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper, 1972).

authorizations. Simultaneously, however, American Treasury officials pressed Britain toward a quickly rescinded attempt in July 1947 to restore the convertibility of sterling, and two years later toward significant devaluation of the pound in September 1949. On the other hand, ERP and State Department officials put less pressure on London; they envisaged Britain as an important partner in containment; neither did they object so viscerally to expensive welfare-state commitments. The ECA agencies that administered the ERP authorized Britain to use its Marshall Plan allocations to reduce its overall debt burden. Similar considerations led Washington to tolerate the French use of Marshall Plan funds to help balance their budgets, lest fiscal austerity increase the domestic role of the Communists and undermine the French military effort in Indochina.

The upshot of all these arrangements between 1944 and 1973 was that Washington first funded, then replaced, British and French imperial commitments, often in the cause of containing Communist challenges in the Third World. Direct loans to London and Paris, then Marshall Plan aid and military assistance, helped Paris and London pay for their forlorn wars in Asia and Africa. Increasingly, Washington intervened directly without intermediaries. In effect, the United States became the *de facto* heir to the “Third World” empire, now exercised through economic influence and selective military or covert action. Some sites were new, such as Iran, some old, as in Central America.

From 1950 on, nationalists throughout the Middle East would be seeking to claw back the profits of Western oil companies. The US Arabian-American consortium, ARAMCO, its position reinforced by Franklin Roosevelt’s cultivation of Ibn Saud, conceded the Saudi claim to half their oil revenues, in part because the American firms were entitled to claim equivalent tax deductions at home. The British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, with its great offshore refinery at Abadan Island, enjoyed no equivalent tax exemption and resisted an equivalent bargain. When the leader of the nationalist party coalition, Muhammed Mossadeq, successfully urged Iranian nationalization of the industry as of May 1951, the Truman administration initially dissented from London’s ideas for a military response. But the Republicans who took power in 1953 had different sympathies, and sponsored a Central Intelligence Agency intervention that ousted Mossadeq and restored the young Reza Shah Pahlavi from his brief exile. Although the nationalization remained in effect, marketing of the oil was turned over to an international consortium in which American firms now participated. The new status quo lasted for another twenty years – providing cheap energy for the West, guaranteeing profits

for the oil firms, confirming Iran's pro-American orientation, and reining in any British dreams of reexerting imperial methods – at least until London faced the next nationalization crisis over Suez two and a half years later.

Rivalries over oil are often identified as a major stake in the Cold War. But the politics of oil perhaps exerted less impact as a stake in the Cold War than as a major resource that the two superpowers used to organize their respective blocs. In 1973–74, when the era of cheap energy threatened to end, and the control of prices was at stake, another Republican administration managed to reassert American interests through monetary hegemony which, though weakened after 1971, could not easily be replaced. Since payment to members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries was collected in dollars, Americans did not face the exchange constraints their allies did. American firms collected oil revenues for Middle Eastern producers who held them in dollarized assets. Similarly, as the global price of oil rose sharply in 1974, the Soviets used their vast reserves to subsidize their Comecon partners and assure their continued adherence to the Communist economic bloc. Control of oil and scarcity of oil thus served the primacy of each superpower.

Raw materials were hardly the only stake in the Third World. Certainly American and British oil firms had powerful interests in the Middle East, as did the United Fruit Company in Guatemala, where Americans worked to unseat the reformist Guatemalan premier, Jacobo Arbenz, in 1954. So, too, did the Belgian Union Minière, which supported the secessionist Moïse Tshombe in Katanga province of newly independent Zaire in 1960–61, while Washington helped to eliminate the radical premier Patrice Lumumba. But the stakes in the regions described successively as “backward,” then “underdeveloped,” then “less developed,” then just as “developing,” transcended their commodities. From Lenin on, Communist leaders envisaged that the colonial regions would be a decisive arena of ideological conflict. North–South contention would influence East–West outcomes. As the Cold War became global, each side sought to forestall the influence of its adversary from becoming decisive in the postcolonial world.

Hence, alongside the colonial wars that would ravage successive societies, a system of competitive aid structures would emerge by the 1950s. The Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, would turn to the Soviets to help build the Aswan dam (and nationalize the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company) when the West walked away from the project in 1955. After West Germany recovered formal foreign-policy autonomy in that year, the two Germanies would offer assistance to the Third World, the Federal

Republic in large part to keep quarantining the GDR as its “Hallstein Doctrine” stipulated. China entered the arena in the 1960s in large part to contest the Soviet Union. As for the African states, no matter how inclined toward socialism, they also sought to balance their suitors. The Western powers, moreover, had the capacity to vastly outweigh the credits and grants that their Eastern rivals offered. From 1954 through 1963, the Soviet Union opened credits of \$4.94 billion to the “developing world” and made payments of \$1.62 billion; OECD payments reached almost \$23 billion.¹¹

Looking back at the economic results achieved, it might be asked in what respects the recipient countries benefited from the aid received. Funds poured into mines and extractive industries did not advance manufacturing capacity; ambitious leaders could use the aid to reinforce systems of personal rule that reinforced tribal loyalties and clientelism; the big projects that donors assisted often misallocated resources; farming could be discouraged as agricultural prices were held down to subsidize the new industrial labor forces. Too often, despite the well-meaning effort of so many individuals who labored to improve the health and welfare and progress of Africans and others on the margins of subsistence, the stake of aid was not welfare but control.

Costs and benefits

Since this is an inquiry into the economic aspects of the Cold War, which so dominated global international relations for almost half a century, it is fitting at the end to inquire into its costs and benefits even if the gains and losses of any grand national project, such as a war or an arms race, can never be fully determined. If there are benefits – perhaps employment levels maintained at a higher level than might otherwise be the case, or stimuli for innovation – it is impossible to attribute them unambiguously to the conflict. Conversely, the levies imposed on a society represent not just what was actually spent, but the opportunity costs of postponed or discarded alternatives; and it is hard to price even plausible counterfactual paths of development. Perhaps we can compare the societies caught on different sides of the Iron Curtain – East and West Germany, North and South Korea, in which case the indices of economic welfare clearly favor the non-Communist side. Between 1936 and 1955, East German GNP rose 10.4% while West German GNP increased 80.3%. The East Germans did relatively better from 1950 to 1955, when their GNP rose 40.6%

¹¹ See Sara Lorenzini, *Due Germanie in Africa: la cooperazione allo sviluppo e la competizione per i mercati di materie prime e tecnologia* (Florence: Edizioni Polistampa, 2003), 148.

while the West German went up 63.5%.¹² To be sure, West Germany had received Marshall Plan aid while East Germany had paid heavy sums in reparation; nonetheless, even at the time of reunification almost four decades later, East German productivity and per capita national income were probably about half those of West Germany. The toll taken by a cumbersome state socialism is not the same as the costs imposed by the rivalry between the systems. Communism and the Cold War were not the same, but the Cold War helped to congeal the differences between systems as well as being in part their consequence.

We should question, I believe, one popularly held hypothesis, namely that in the West, at least, the military rivalry imposed a great burden on civilian investment and general progress. Western defense-related expenditures in the Cold War were highest for Britain and the United States; the UK was spending roughly 10% of GDP on defense in 1947, almost twice the US ratio of 5.25%, and, in 1948, 7.26% or 1.5 times the US share. The Korean War and the NATO rearmament effort brought US expenditure to almost 15%; Britain's peaked at about 10.5%; and France hit its maximum – even higher than before World War II – of about 12% in 1952. Other Western societies did not approach this level. The most careful study of the economic impact on Britain concludes correctly, I believe, that even allowing for indirect costs, such as the higher interest rates for civilian expansion, and for short-term strains, no major economic drag intervened. France's war in Indochina was largely funded indirectly by the Americans, according to the best study we have. The demands of defense probably stimulated research and development in what would prove to be the most advanced sectors of the civilian economy – namely computers and related electronic and software industries – beyond what civilian demand alone might have encouraged. NATO forces also continued to lower Europe's current account constraints. On the other hand, Soviet expenditures may have been 20 percent of GDP, and probably did contribute to the difficulties of its economy.¹³

12 Wolfgang F. Stolper, *The Structure of the East German Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 417.

13 Till Geiger, *Britain and the Economic Problem of the Cold War: The Political Economy and the Economic Impact of the British Defence Effort, 1945–1955* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 38–44, 121 n. 3. As Geiger argues, Britain may have made some unfavorable tradeoffs within the defense budget, but consistently from 1947 through 1957 spent between 54 and 66 percent of its public expenditure on defense and accepted a “warfare state” without really stinting. See also Hugues Tertrais, *La piastre et le fusil: le coût de la guerre d’Indochine 1945–1954* (Paris: Comité pour l’Histoire Économique et Financière de la France, 2002), 356–96.

What impact, one might finally ask, did the Cold War have on the global environment that was its arena? The emphasis on industrialization and economic growth, the privileged access to minerals, fossil fuels, and hydrocarbons, either by Western companies or state socialist governments, probably increased the rapid exploitation of these resources. Of course, this toll would have been even higher if, absent the Cold War, economic growth had been even more rapid. Still, it makes sense that insofar as each side felt it must press industrial and military output to a maximum, it would sacrifice ecological and even safety considerations. The East Germans, for example, expanded brown coal production, dirty chemical firms, and an exploitative use of their once-extensive forests. The emphasis on heavy industry, whether in the Soviet paradigm of socialist planning or the American encouragement of import substitution, spurred industrial construction that had grave impacts on the environment.

Without the competitive pressures of the Cold War, according to John McNeill, the “green revolution” might have been far slower to make its effects felt in Mexico or India. On the other hand, in Third World regions where the superpowers competed, their prescriptions for import substitution and industrialization encouraged the sacrifice of subsistence agriculture, and the abandonment of farms for shantytowns. The Chinese regime embarked on the reckless “Great Leap Forward” in the late 1950s and helped produce one of the most disastrous famines of its history. But a megalomaniacal leader, not Cold War competition per se, motivated this policy, and China drew appropriate lessons. Old-fashioned national economic competition would probably have been intense even without the Cold War. Brazil and Africa incurred deforestation without extensive Cold War motives; *barrios* and *favelas* have continued to spread after the Cold War ended. And even state socialism brought to its lands public goods – literacy and access to basic health care – that might otherwise have lagged. And of course the environmental costs were not produced by one side alone: the American consumerism that Nixon vaunted in that Moscow kitchen, with the personal auto as its centerpiece, has played its role in global warming and other externalities that have yet to be tallied.¹⁴

Should we not also assign some cost to the fact that at many moments hundreds of millions of men and women and children and the accumulated monuments of their many civilizations were hostage to atomic destruction? Would humankind not collectively and individually have paid a substantial

¹⁴ For the impact of the Cold War on the environment, see John McNeill’s chapter in volume III.

premium to have that very real danger removed? Or was the danger itself, as deterrence theory suggested, the premium we had to pay so that these weapons were never used? Alternatively, the danger could be construed as the premium that political leaders on both sides claimed was needed to avoid political subjugation. Could we have developed a less risky and more rational premium? Or was its rationality ultimately demonstrated by the fact that the wager was never called? With such inquiries, however, we reach the limits of history and of political economy.¹⁵

¹⁵ For additional assessments of the Cold War and the world economy, see the chapters by Wilfried Loth and Richard N. Cooper in volume II and Giovanni Arrighi in volume III.

The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952

MELVYN P. LEFFLER

On April 12, 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt died. His vice president, Harry S. Truman, assumed the leadership of the United States of America. He had been in office only a few months, and knew little about his predecessor's diplomacy and strategy. He felt "like the moon, the stars, and all the planets had fallen" on him. "Pray for me now," he whispered to friendly reporters the next day.¹

Challenges and aspirations

Truman presided over the greatest military and economic power the world had ever known. War production had lifted the United States out of the Great Depression and had inaugurated an era of unimagined prosperity. Gross national product increased by 60 percent during the war, total earnings by 50 percent. Despite social unrest, labor agitation, racial conflict, and teenage vandalism, Americans had more discretionary income than ever before. Simultaneously, the US government had built up the greatest war machine in human history. By the end of 1942, the United States was producing more arms than all the Axis states combined, and, in 1943, it made almost three times more armaments than did the Soviet Union. In 1945, the United States had two-thirds of the world's gold reserves, three-fourths of its invested capital, half of its shipping vessels, and half of its manufacturing capacity. Its GNP was three times that of the Soviet Union and more than five times that of Britain. It was also nearing completion of the atomic bomb, a technological and production feat of huge costs and proportions.

Yet Truman and his advisers did not feel secure. They feared that the United States would again sink into depression. They understood that

¹ Alonzo L. Hamby, *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 293.

wartime government demand had boosted production, and they wondered what would replace it at the war's end. They were convinced that they needed an open world trading environment to sustain demand. High tariffs, quotas, and exchange restrictions had sundered the global trading system during the 1930s as had the trading blocs established by the Nazis, the Japanese, and even the British. Now, as the war approached an end, the appeal of national planning and statist controls to many people in Europe and Asia, coupled with the popularity of social-welfare programs, posed new challenges to the world's foremost champion of free enterprise, private property, and individual rights.

The desire for an open world trading system merged economic, ideological, and geostrategic lessons of the interwar era. The greatest military lesson of the late 1930s and the early 1940s was that potential adversaries must never again be allowed to gain control of the resources of Europe and Asia through economic practices, political subversion, or military aggression. The acquisition of such resources allowed potential foes to augment their fighting capabilities, encouraged them to spread their influence to the Western hemisphere, tempted them to wage war against the United States, and enabled them to fight a protracted struggle. The United States, said Roosevelt in 1940, must not become "a lone island in a world dominated by the philosophy of force."²

Truman's task, therefore, and that of his advisers, as World War II came to a close, was to use American power to forge an international environment conducive to the American way of life. The new president believed that the United States was God's country, the city on a hill, the exemplar of a superior civilization based on personal freedoms, private property, entrepreneurial opportunity, and limited government. He grasped that this way of life had been endangered by the rise of German Nazism and Japanese militarism. The isolationist policies of the interwar years had been a grave error, allowing time for hostile adversaries to gain control of the preponderant resources of Europe and Asia. Hence, Truman wanted to follow Roosevelt's policies. He wanted to forge a new world order based on nonaggression, self-determination, equal access to raw materials, nondiscriminatory trade, and participation in an international organization.³

2 Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940* (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 261.

3 Truman's address to the UN Forum, January 17, 1944, in *Appendix to the Congressional Record*, vol. 90, pt. 8 (78th Cong., 2nd sess.), A265-66.

What this meant in terms of actual strategy, however, was a mystery to Truman and his advisers in the spring of 1945. What this meant in terms of the future of the great wartime coalition was no clearer to them. The new president wanted to get along with the leaders of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. But he had no great reverence for Winston Churchill, Britain's wartime leader, nor any special antipathy toward Iosif Stalin, the Soviet Union's Communist dictator. He expected them both to defer to American leadership. Compromises, Truman knew, he would have to make. But American power and American righteousness, in his view, placed the United States in a special position. When he talked about concessions, he meant that he expected to get his way 85 percent of the time.⁴

Once Germany surrendered in May 1945, Truman faced two overriding foreign-policy questions: how to bring about the end of the war with Japan and how to deal with Stalin and the Soviet Union. These questions themselves were interrelated. Stalin had promised Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan within three months of Germany's surrender. Should he do so, Soviet troops would engage large numbers of Japanese divisions on the Asian mainland, thereby reducing American casualties. In return, Roosevelt had promised Stalin that he could gain control of Manchurian ports and railroads and other Far East territories, such as Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands that Japan had seized after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. In his desire to nurture postwar collaboration with the Soviet Union, this deal made sense to Roosevelt, especially if Stalin recognized the Chinese Nationalists and withheld aid from the Chinese Communists, which the Soviet leader promised he would do.

But Truman's advisers and friends were deeply divided about how the United States should deal with Stalin, and their attitudes shaped the recommendations they gave to the new president. Some advisers, such as W. Averell Harriman, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, Admiral William Leahy, the president's chief military aide, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, and Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, wanted the president to take a hard line against the Soviet Union. They feared the growth of Soviet power as troops marched toward Berlin through Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the eastern parts of Germany. They were disgusted by Stalin's imprisonment and murder of selective non-Communist leaders, especially in Poland, and they objected to the provisional governments he was establishing throughout Eastern Europe. Other advisers and friends, such as Secretary of

4 Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, 1945: Year of Decisions* (New York: Signet, 1965), 87.

War Henry L. Stimson, Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's envoy to Stalin, Henry A. Wallace, the secretary of commerce and former vice president, and Joseph C. Davies, the former US ambassador to Moscow, encouraged Truman to tolerate Stalin's transgressions, understand his security imperatives, and craft acceptable compromises.

As he pondered what to do, Truman was greatly affected by the rapid development and successful secret testing of the atomic bomb in the New Mexico desert in mid-July 1945. Only a few of his closest advisers knew about this new technological wonder that promised to have such a huge impact on the configuration of power in the postwar world. But for some of those who did know about it, such as James F. Byrnes, Truman's newly selected secretary of state, the atomic weapon offered the leverage to shape the peace according to American desires. The atomic bomb, Byrnes said, "had given us great power, and ... in the last analysis, it would control."⁵ Truman was inclined initially to think along similar lines. When he elliptically told Stalin at the Potsdam Conference about the powerful new weapon that the United States had just tested, Truman was thinking that it would serve as his trump card to get Stalin to be more amenable about the composition of the provisional governments in Eastern Europe and the occupation of Germany. The president did not decide to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to shape the diplomacy of the postwar world, but he certainly believed that it would enhance US power and augment his ability to elicit concessions from the Soviets. He even dared to hope that the atomic bomb might force the Japanese to surrender before the Soviets declared war on Tokyo and seized the territories promised them at Yalta. "Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in," Truman jotted in his diary. "I am sure they will when Manhattan [the atomic bomb] appears over their homeland."⁶

Yet neither Truman nor Byrnes, the man Truman now relied on more than any other person, wanted a showdown or a cold war with Stalin. After meeting him at Potsdam, Truman wrote his wife, "I like Stalin. He is straightforward. Knows what he wants and will compromise when he can't get it."⁷ But dealing with Stalin, in Truman's view, meant that the Soviet dictator would need to comply with American thinking about the

5 Diary of Joseph Davies, July 28 and 29, 1945, box 19, Joseph Davies Papers (Library of Congress, Washington, DC).

6 Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 54.

7 Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *Dear Bess: Letters from Harry to Bess Truman* (New York: Norton, 1983), 522.



3. From left, Winston Churchill, Harry S. Truman, and Josif Stalin at Potsdam.

configuration of the postwar international order, however vague and inchoate that thinking was. In broad terms, Truman laid out his conception in his Navy Day speech of October 27, 1945. The president championed self-determination and national sovereignty. He ridiculed territorial changes that were forced upon peoples against their will. He championed open trade, freedom of the seas, unrestricted access to raw materials, and international economic cooperation. He embraced pan-Americanism and the United Nations. He said the United States would hold the atomic bomb as a “sacred trust” for all mankind. He made clear in a variety of speeches and statements that he was not averse to negotiating agreements governing the control of atomic energy, but he emphasized that he would not relinquish the United States’ superior power.⁸

But after Japan officially surrendered in September 1945, the United States quickly demobilized its armed forces. The air force struggled tenaciously to become an independent entity, and the army and the navy fought one another

8 Address, October 27, 1945, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945* (hereafter PPP: Truman, with year) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), 431–38.

bitterly over roles, missions, and a shrinking military budget. Secretary of State Byrnes did little to assuage the sensibilities of colleagues either in his own department or the military services as he moved quickly to gain control of the nation's foreign policy. Truman's initial instinct was to allow Byrnes to shape the nation's diplomacy, but the president realized very quickly that his secretary of state was offending powerful legislators without achieving any notable diplomatic successes. American foreign policy seemed to be floundering, engendering the contempt of potential adversaries in the Kremlin without garnering much sympathy from potential friends in London, Paris, and elsewhere.

At the end of 1945, Truman grew frustrated with the performance of his secretary of state and embittered by the actions of the Soviet Union. He wanted a tougher policy. He ridiculed the "police states" that the Kremlin was forming in Bulgaria and Romania and condemned the Soviets' refusal to withdraw their troops from Iran. "There isn't any doubt in my mind," Truman wrote, "that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean ... I do not think we should play compromise any longer ... I'm tired of babying the Soviets."⁹

What this meant in terms of policy and strategy was far from clear. The expansion of Soviet power needed to be contained, but neither George F. Kennan's "long telegram" from the US Embassy in Moscow in February 1946 nor Winston Churchill's "iron curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, in March provided the specificity that was needed to design a concrete strategy or a set of priorities. Kennan's message and Churchill's address simplified the myriad problems of the postwar world in terms of a threat from another totalitarian power intent on unlimited expansion. "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic," Churchill warned, "an iron curtain has descended across the continent." Not only were Soviet occupation authorities imprisoning potential foes and supporting their local minions in Eastern Europe, but Communist Parties beyond the reach of Soviet armies in Western and Southern Europe were angling to win power legally or to seize it illegally. With "Christian civilization" endangered, the former British prime minister recommended that Anglo-Saxons unite to withstand the new totalitarian specter.¹⁰

⁹ Ferrell, *Off the Record*, 79–80.

¹⁰ For a discussion of Churchill's speech, see Fraser Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 185–91.

Kennan's telegram was widely circulated throughout US policymaking circles because his analysis accorded with Truman's instincts and the thinking of many of his advisers. Stalin's view of the world, wrote Kennan, was "neurotic," based as it was on a "traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity." Kremlin leaders conjured up a hostile, evil world. They sought to foment disunity in Western Europe, promote dissension among capitalist nations, and erode links to the colonial dependencies of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal. "We have here," Kennan concluded, "a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with [the] United States there can be no permanent *modus vivendi*." Yet Kennan was not pessimistic about the future. Soviet expansion could be contained. Soviet leaders were "impervious to logic of reason," but "highly sensitive to logic of force ... If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns."¹¹

Embracing containment

Truman and his advisers embraced the idea of containment, but they had little idea of how to apply it. They did toughen their rhetoric. They told Stalin to pull his troops out of northern Iran, as he was obligated to do. Several months later, in July and August 1946, they rebuffed the Kremlin's overtures to renegotiate Soviet rights and expand Soviet privileges in the Turkish straits. Truman's military planners began to design war plans should US efforts to contain Soviet power peacefully falter and should war erupt as a result of miscalculation.

But Truman and his aides did not expect war. Their war plans were rudimentary and their military expenditures paltry. They were determined to contain the further expansion of Soviet power and Communist influence, but they still labored with Soviet diplomats to finish the peace treaties regarding Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, and Italy. Nor had they relinquished hope that they might agree with the Kremlin on a German settlement. In Japan, they had won Stalin's grudging acceptance of US control of the postwar occupation. In China, General George C. Marshall, the renowned wartime leader of the US Army, was seeking to mediate a resolution to the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists while Soviet troops were pulling out of Manchuria. The Kremlin looked like a formidable adversary and the specter of Communist power loomed large, but Truman

¹¹ George F. Kennan, *Memoirs (1925–1950)* (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), 594–95.

had not forsaken hope that Stalin would exercise self-discipline and accept the postwar status quo.

But the American perception of threat grew. This had less to do with fears of premeditated Soviet aggression than with worries about postwar social, economic, and political conditions in Western Europe and in the occupied parts of Germany and Japan. As the war came to an end in the spring of 1945, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy visited Europe and reported back to Truman and Stimson: "There is complete economic, social and political collapse going on in Central Europe, the extent of which is unparalleled in history." The situation in Germany, he stressed, "was worse than anything that ever happened in the world." Stimson had expected the chaos, he wrote in his diary, "but the details of it were appalling." There will be "pestilence and famine in Central Europe next winter," he wrote President Truman on May 16, 1945. "This is likely to be followed by political revolution and communist infiltration."¹²

Assistant Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, soon to become the president's most trusted adviser, spoke even more apocalyptically when he testified before a Senate committee in July 1945. "There is a situation in the world," Acheson emphasized, "very clearly illustrated in Europe, and also true in the Far East, which threatens the very foundations, the whole fabric of world organization which we have known in our lifetime and which our fathers and forefathers knew." In liberated Europe, Acheson explained, "you find that the railway systems have ceased to operate; that power systems have ceased to operate; the financial systems are destroyed. Ownership of property is in terrific confusion. Management of property is in confusion." Not since the eighth century, Acheson maintained, when the Muslims had split the world in two, had conditions been so frightening. The industrial and social life of Europe "had come to a complete and total standstill."¹³

A year later conditions seemed no more auspicious, and they worsened even more during the winter of 1946–47. Heavy snows and frigid temperatures exacerbated a terrible coal shortage, forcing factories to close and spreading unemployment, hunger, and despair. Famine stalked the zones of Germany

12 Memo for the President, by J. McCloy, April 26, 1945, box 178, President's Secretary's File (PSF), Harry S. Truman Papers (Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO); Stimson to Truman, May 16, 1945, box 157, *ibid.*; Stimson Diary, April 19, 1945, Henry L. Stimson Papers (Sterling Library, Yale University).

13 Acheson testimony, June 12, 1945, US Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, *Bretton Woods Agreements Act*, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), esp. 19–21, 48–49.

occupied by American and British troops. Germans were living on 1,200 calories a day. Without additional food, US Army officials warned, they would lose “the great struggle ... to prevent [Germany] going communistic.” Writing from Rome at about the same time US ambassador James C. Dunn warned: “All the indications we receive ... show that the Communists are consistently gaining ground and that our policy to assist the development of a free and democratic Italy is losing ground.” When Under Secretary of State William L. Clayton returned from his own trip to Europe in May 1947, he wrote that he had underestimated the problems besetting the economy of the Old World: “Europe is steadily deteriorating ... Millions of people in the cities are slowly starving ... Without further and substantial aid from the United States, economic, social, and political disintegration will overwhelm Europe.”¹⁴

Truman was alarmed. Financial stringencies forced British officials to curtail their presence in Greece, Turkey, and the eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, the shortage of dollars in European treasuries meant that European governments could no longer afford to purchase the coal and grain they desperately needed to keep their factories running and their peoples fed. These governments hoarded their gold and dollar reserves, imposed quotas on imports, and regulated the flow of trade. The international economy was becoming more and more constricted. Communists were finding more and more opportunities to capitalize on domestic turmoil and internal unrest. In countries such as France and Italy, they were capturing more than a third of the vote and competing actively for control of legislative assemblies.

Yet it was not easy for Truman to determine what should be done. In November 1946, the Republicans won a smashing victory in the congressional elections. They blamed the administration for high prices and high taxes. They promised the American people that they would cut deficits, end the work stoppages, bring down taxes, and curb inflation. They assailed Truman for his incompetence, and clamored for smaller and more effective government. Yet to deal with the worldwide crisis that loomed in front of him, Truman had to send more aid abroad, boost US military capabilities, and postpone tax reductions. Should he do so, he knew, he would ignite a political firestorm.

¹⁴ Howard C. Petersen to Robert P. Patterson, June 12, 1947, box 8, General Decimal File, Robert P. Patterson Papers, Record Group (RG) 107, National Archives (NA) (College Park, MD); James C. Dunn to George C. Marshall, May 3, 1947, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972), vol. III, 891 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number); Clayton to Acheson, May 27, 1947, *ibid.*, 230–32.

Should he not do so, and should Communism spread, he would also be vilified for his indifference to the red menace. Although Truman's conservative critics were not eager to bear the burden of containing Communism abroad, they were intent on exposing domestic subversives and destroying the New Deal at home.

Truman faced grave decisions. In March 1947, he decided to ask Congress for \$400 million for assistance to Greece and Turkey. In what became known as the Truman Doctrine, he told senators and congressmen that "At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternate ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one ... Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world ... Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching."¹⁵

The stark language was purposeful. "There must be no hedging in this speech," Truman insisted. "If we were to turn our back on the world, areas such as Greece, weakened and divided as a result of the war, would fall into the Soviet orbit without much effort on the part of the Russians. The success of Russia in such areas and our avowed lack of interest would lead to the growth of domestic communist parties in such European countries as France and Italy, where there were already significant threats. Inaction ... could only result in handing to the Russians vast areas of the globe now denied to them."¹⁶

Truman's anti-Communist rhetoric resonated deeply in the American polity. Religious fundamentalists, segregationists, anti-union businessmen, patriotic organizations, and conservative politicians had been red-baiting for years, shrilly warning the American people that their basic institutions and core values were endangered by Communists, atheists, racial integrationists, and New Dealers. How could these right-wing critics be concerned with Communists at home yet do nothing about the expansion of Soviet power around the globe? Truman's rhetoric locked many Republicans and Southern Democrats into supporting an internationalist foreign policy.

The Truman Doctrine identified Greece and Turkey for aid, and the president implied that he might ask Congress for additional funds for other areas of the globe threatened by internal subversion or external aggression. But it was not clear where the United States should focus its attention. Truman asked General Marshall, arguably the most revered man in the

¹⁵ Special Message to Congress, March 12, 1947, PPP: Truman, 1947, 176–80.

¹⁶ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Signet, 1965), 128, 123–25.

country, to become his secretary of state and to sort out priorities. Marshall established a Policy Planning Staff and placed it under the direction of the nation's foremost Kremlinologist, George F. Kennan. Kennan and his subordinates immediately began writing a series of brilliant policy papers that helped to define priorities. Gradually, a strategy emerged, not simply for containing Soviet power, but also, eventually, for winning the Cold War.

Setting priorities

The overriding priority was to keep the power centers of Europe and Asia outside the Soviet orbit and linked to the United States. Western Europe, the western zones in Germany, and Japan had to be revived economically. They had to become self-supporting, capable of earning dollars to pay for their required imports. Otherwise, they might be lured into the Soviet orbit, or Communist Parties and their supporters might win power legally or seize it illegally. For the moment, Japan was firmly in the grasp of US occupation authorities under General Douglas MacArthur. Attention, therefore, was focused on Western Europe. The greatest peril to the United States, said Kennan, was the prospect that the manpower and resources of the Soviet Union might be united with the technical skills and advanced industries of Western Europe.¹⁷

On June 5, 1947, in a commencement address at Harvard University, Secretary of State Marshall announced the administration's readiness to provide substantial assistance for a European Recovery Program (ERP). The purpose of the program was to revive the world economy and nurture "the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."¹⁸ The place to begin, almost everyone in the Truman administration agreed, was in the coal-producing areas of the Ruhr and the Rhine Valleys.¹⁹

Truman's advisers believed that they should focus on economic initiatives rather than military rearmament. The principal Soviet threat was not military; it was political and psychological. The Soviets would not risk war; they were too weak. "I was conscious," Kennan wrote, "of the weakness of the Russian

17 One of the clearest statements of Kennan's strategic thinking was his speech, "Contemporary Problems of Foreign Policy," September 17, 1948, box 17, George F. Kennan Papers, Seely G. Mudd Library (Princeton University, Princeton, NJ); see also Acheson's speech, May 8, 1947, *Department of State Bulletin (DSB)*, 16 (May 18, 1947), 991–94.

18 Remarks, by Marshall, June 5, 1947, *DSB*, 16 (June 5, 1947), 1159–60.

19 Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, July 3, 1947, box 3, Safe File, Patterson Papers, RG 107, NA.



4. George Marshall (left) and Dean Acheson.

position, of the slenderness of the means with which they operated, of the ease with which they could be held and pushed back.”²⁰ So long as the United States could “outproduce the world,” control the seas, “and strike inland with the atomic bomb,” Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal said, the United States could “assume certain risks otherwise unacceptable.”²¹

The initiative had to be seized because the nation’s vital interests seemed imperiled. If Communist Parties capitalized on the economic disarray or if economic autarchy grew, the Soviet Union would be able to advance its power and reach. The disappearance of the “free community of Europe,” Marshall warned Congress, “would be a tragedy for the world. It would impose incalculable burdens on this country and force serious readjustments in our traditional way of life. One of our greatest freedoms – freedom of choice in both domestic and foreign affairs – would be drastically curtailed.”²²

²⁰ Kennan, “Notes on the Marshall Plan,” December 15, 1947, box 23, Kennan Papers.

²¹ Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), 350–51.

²² Statement, by Marshall, US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Emergency Foreign Aid*, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 10.

The international environment was fraught with risk, and US officials knew they needed to act. No task was more important than reviving western Germany, establishing self-governing institutions there, and preserving its alignment with the United States. “Without a revival of German production,” Marshall emphasized, “there can be no revival of Europe’s economy.”²³ But reviving the power of Germany posed dangers of its own. Kennan succinctly stated the challenge: “We have to nurse our recent enemies, the Germans, back to economic strength without instigating them to renewed aggression or making them the masters of our recent allies.” This was a task of immense complexity. But it could not be evaded. With the help of old allies such as France and Britain and with the help of ex-enemies such as the west Germans, Kennan declared, “we have to maneuver this Russian bear back into his cage and keep him there where he belongs.”²⁴

US officials were not surprised when Stalin forbade the participation of Czechoslovakia and Poland in the ERP, formed the Cominform, tightened the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe, and orchestrated a campaign of riots and demonstrations against the Marshall Plan throughout Western Europe.²⁵ These were logical developments, Kennan explained. “Subject to a squeeze play,” the Communists were making a final effort to thwart the ERP before it became a reality.²⁶ But the United States could not be deflected from its purpose. Western Germany, Marshall insisted, must participate in the Recovery Program. Its potential power had to be coopted and integrated into a Western alliance system; that goal was now more important than reaching agreement with the Kremlin. No arrangements would be countenanced, he said, that “would leave [western Germany] defenseless against communist penetration.”²⁷

A great showdown was approaching as Truman and his advisers pressed Congress in early 1948 to appropriate the money to support the Marshall Plan. In February, Stalin orchestrated a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. American officials were stunned by Stalin’s audacity, but did not think that it altered the prevailing balance of power. What they did fear was its demonstration effect on the European neighborhood. The ease with which Czech

23 Marshall speech, November 18, 1947, *DSB*, 17 (November 30, 1947), 1028.

24 Kennan, “Contemporary Problems,” September 17, 1948.

25 For Soviet policies, see Vladimir O. Pechatnov’s and Norman Naimark’s chapters in this volume.

26 Kennan to Robert Lovett, October 6, 1947, box 33, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, RG 59, NA.

27 For the quotation, see Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 330–31.

Communists seized power in Prague might empower their counterparts in Rome and Paris and demoralize their adversaries. The Czech coup spurred a Republican Congress to pass the legislation to implement the Marshall Plan, notwithstanding its adverse impact on the budget, tax cuts, and the inflationary outlook. The Czech coup also catalyzed a full-scale covert effort by the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency to ensure the defeat of the Italian Communists in the April 1948 elections.

Germany, however, remained the focal point of the emerging Cold War. Truman, Marshall, and their subordinates were determined to reform the currency, merge the French zone of occupation with the British and American zones, and form a provisional German government that would be amenable to the wishes of Western occupational authorities yet command the support of the people in the western zones. Stalin warned that if the United States, Britain, and France proceeded with their plans, the Soviets would interdict traffic from the western zones of Germany to the western parts of Berlin. The French were terrified that British–American initiatives might trigger a war that nobody wanted. The French, moreover, were scared of revived German power. They demanded more extensive controls over the Ruhr and more constraints on German trade. Most of all, they wanted security guarantees against the immediate prospect of Soviet retaliation and the protracted specter of German aggression.²⁸

Washington would not back away from its commitment to rebuild and coopt West German power. When the Soviets blockaded Berlin at the end of June 1948, the United States responded with an airlift of supplies to Berlin. If the Soviets had interfered with the airlift, hostilities could have erupted. But US officials did not expect war. “It is our view,” wrote General Lucius Clay, the head of the US military government in Germany, “that [the Soviets] are bluffing and that their hand can and should be called now. They are definitely afraid of our air might.”²⁹ The Soviets might have overwhelming superiority in numbers of conventional troops and weapons, US analysts concluded, but their transport system was in disarray and their petroleum industry was underdeveloped. Their economy was still in shambles and their people were demoralized. Their satellites in Eastern Europe were unreliable. They had no real navy, no strategic air power, and no atomic bomb. Stalin might feel provoked by US initiatives in the western zones, but he would not go to

28 For policies in Germany, see Hans-Peter Schwarz’s chapter in this volume.

29 Jean Edward Smith (ed.), *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945–1949*, 2 vols. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1974), vol. II, 708.

war. “The present tension in Berlin,” Marshall told his Cabinet colleagues, “is brought about by loss of Russian face in Italy, France, Finland ... It is caused by Russian desperation in face of success of ERP.”³⁰

What the United States most needed to do was to reassure its allies that their security and interests would not be endangered by the ongoing initiatives in western Germany. The French desperately wanted guarantees of their own security.³¹ The Americans said their troops would remain in Germany for the indefinite future. Washington would also provide military assistance to the French, and US military planners were authorized to coordinate war plans. But this did not suffice to allay anxieties in Paris, and the French continued to find ways to obstruct the formation of a west German government and to interfere with US plans for handling reparations and rebuilding German industry.

British foreign minister Ernest Bevin kept pressing the Americans to sign an Atlantic pact that would guarantee the security of France. When Truman was reelected in November 1948 and asked Dean Acheson to become his secretary of state, Acheson embraced the security treaty as the best means of reconciling the legitimate fears of the French with west Germans’ aspirations to recover their sovereignty and solve their economic woes. A treaty, Acheson told wavering US senators, “would give France greater sense of security against Germany as well as the Soviet Union and would materially help in the realistic consideration of the problem of Germany.”³² He wanted to integrate western Germany into Western Europe, and bind a united Western Europe to the United States. He and President Truman were not eager to abandon 150 years of political isolation. But strategic obligations were the price Americans had to pay to consummate their economic and political goals. The North Atlantic Treaty was the capstone of a grand strategy that envisioned the cooption of the newly formed Federal Republic of Germany (or West Germany) into a healthy Atlantic community led by the United States and committed to the values of democratic capitalism.

Simultaneously, in 1948–49, US officials focused their attention on Japan. “Any world balance of power,” Kennan stressed, “means first and foremost a balance on the Eurasian land mass. This balance is unthinkable as long as Germany and Japan remain power vacuums.”³³ Conditions inside Japan had to

30 Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, July 23, 1948, box 1, Matthew J. Connelly Papers, Truman Library.

31 For developments in Western Europe, see William I. Hitchcock’s chapter in this volume.

32 Memorandum of conversation, by Acheson, February 14, 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, vol. IV, 109.

33 Kennan, “Where We Are Today,” December 21, 1948, box 17, Kennan Papers.

be ameliorated so that the Japanese would want to remain aligned with the United States over the long run. Once the occupation ended and Japan regained its autonomy, poor economic conditions might play into the hands of Japanese leftists or might impel a Japanese government to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union or with China, now rapidly falling under the control of the Communists. "Japs," wrote Secretary of State Acheson, "will either move toward sound friendly relations with non-commie countries or into association with commie system in Asia."³⁴

US officials throughout 1949 and early 1950 focused attention on resuscitating the Japanese economy. They became convinced that the Japanese could not recover economically and would not stay tied to the West unless they were assured of markets and raw materials in Southeast Asia. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US security in the Far East hinged "upon finding and securing an area to complement Japan as did Manchuria and Korea prior to World War II."³⁵

Forging a grand strategy

The grand strategy of the Truman administration focused on binding the industrial core areas of Western Europe and Northeast Asia to the United States. But officials increasingly realized that success in these core areas depended on containment in the underdeveloped periphery. Just as Western Europe depended on access to the petroleum of the Middle East and the natural resources of former and current colonial possessions in Asia and Africa, so, too, did Japan's rehabilitation depend on supplanting its former ties with Manchuria, North China, and Korea with new markets and raw materials in Southeast Asia.

When Mao Zedong consolidated Communist power on the Chinese mainland and when Congress allocated new funds to thwart the spread of Communist influence in the area around China, US Army and State Department officials agreed that they should use the money to fight Communists and revolutionary nationalists in Southeast Asia.³⁶ Stalin's pact with Mao in January 1950 and his recognition of Ho Chi Minh's government in Indochina appeared portentous. Acheson deemed Ho a mortal enemy of the

34 Acheson to certain diplomatic officers, May 8, 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, vol. VII, 737.

35 JCS 1721/43, "Assistance for the General Area of China," January 20, 1950, P & O, 091
China Top Secret, Records of the Army's Plans and Operations Division, RG 319, NA.

36 For the Chinese Civil War, see Niu Jun's chapter in this volume.

United States. Although the secretary of state knew that Ho had the support of the majority of the Vietnamese people, the United States established formal diplomatic ties with Bao Dai, the French-backed puppet emperor. Linking the United States to the remnants of French colonialism was not something that Truman and Acheson wanted to do, but they felt they had little choice given the trend of events. “From our viewpoint,” Acheson said in May 1950, “the Soviet Union possesses [a] position of domination in China which it is using to threaten Indochina, push in Malaya, stir up trouble in the Philippines, and now to start trouble in Indonesia.”³⁷

Acheson’s perception of threat in the periphery was greatly influenced by the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in August 1949. Heretofore, US officials had believed the Soviets would back down should a grave confrontation occur. The Berlin crisis appeared to confirm the veracity of this assumption. Now, with the atomic bomb, the Soviet penchant for risk-taking might increase. Stalin might even become bolder if the Soviets developed a hydrogen bomb, potentially many hundreds of times more powerful than the atomic weapons the United States possessed. The “blackmail” potential of the hydrogen bomb, US officials concluded, was “tremendous.” Should the Soviets develop it, the Americans might hesitate to take the steps necessary to rebuild and integrate West Germany, sign a peace treaty with Japan, or contain Mao’s attempts to support Ho’s Communists in Vietnam. In other words, atomic and hydrogen weapons were critical for the shadows they cast in peacetime. Truman resolved that the United States should develop its own hydrogen bomb, and requested a study of the nation’s goals and strategy in view of the Kremlin’s new capabilities.³⁸

George Kennan opposed the growing stress on strategic weaponry, but his influence waned as Acheson gathered stature and asked Paul Nitze to take charge of the Policy Planning Staff. Nitze conducted the comprehensive reexamination of US strategy that the president had requested. In the most renowned strategic paper of the Cold War, NSC 68, Nitze reiterated many of the axioms that had guided US policy in the first years of the Cold War. The Soviet Union, he wrote, was animated by a “new fanatical faith, antithetical to our own.” The Kremlin, he claimed, wanted to impose its “absolute authority over the rest of the world.” Nitze, like Kennan, did not anticipate that Stalin would engage in overt aggression. But he did think that the Kremlin would

37 US delegation to Webb, 11 May 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, vol. III, 1038.

38 Report of the Special Committee of the National Security Committee to Truman, 31 January 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, vol. I, 513–22 (quotation on 515).

use its growing military prowess and atomic arsenal to neutralize US diplomatic initiatives. This was portentous when Washington still faced formidable challenges. It had to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan, link West Germany to NATO, preserve stability in the Middle East, and thwart the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia. To move ahead on these matters, Nitze emphasized, the United States had to have “an adequate military shield.” “Without superior aggregate military strength,” he argued in NSC 68, “a policy of containment – which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion – is no more than a policy of bluff.”³⁹

The goals of US strategy, as outlined in NSC 68, were not different than those Kennan had stated in the document he penned eighteen months before, NSC 20/4. In both documents, the aim was not containment. US goals were far more ambitious: “to reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations” and “to bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN charter.” What distinguished NSC 68 was its stark delineation of threat and its pronounced stress on rearmament. “Only if we had overwhelming atomic superiority and obtained command of the air might the USSR be deterred from employing its atomic weapons as we progressed toward the fulfillment of our objectives,” Nitze wrote in NSC 68.⁴⁰

President Truman embraced the strategy of NSC 68 in May 1950, but hesitated to say how much it would cost. He knew it would stir a contentious debate at home when he was already being vilified for his failures in China and for his alleged indifference to internal espionage. Conservative critics, led by Republican senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, assailed the president for losing China and harboring Communists inside his administration. Actually, Truman, Marshall, Acheson, and Kennan had weighed intervention in China carefully and calculated that direct military intervention would be too costly and unlikely to succeed. They had no illusions about Mao, but in their view China was too poor, too fractious, and too unstable to add materially to Soviet strength. Hence, they had eschewed intervention, but had not abandoned their global struggle against Communism.

39 NSC 68, “US Objectives and Programs,” April 7, 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, vol. I, 235–92 (quotations on 237–38, 282, 253).

40 *Ibid.*, 287–89, 268.

Acheson's chief concern in Asia was not the loss of China. He was concerned that Mao would aid Ho in Indochina, thereby endangering Japan's access to the markets and resources of Southeast Asia. In a famous speech in January 1950 to the National Press Club, Acheson talked about the United States' strategic perimeter and stressed the importance of retaining Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. He did not include South Korea, Indochina, and Southeast Asia. But he was not indifferent to their fate. The strategic perimeter encompassed the areas that were deemed essential to wage war. Yet Acheson was far more interested with winning the peace and achieving preponderant power without war. As for the funds that Congress allocated in early 1950 for the containment of Communism in Asia, Acheson wanted to use them in Indochina, South Korea, and Southeast Asia rather than Formosa.

Waging limited war, gaining global predominance

When the North Koreans attacked South Korea at the end of June 1950, Truman and Acheson immediately deployed US troops to defeat the aggression and asked the United Nations for its support. US officials were surprised by the invasion, but had no doubt that it was orchestrated in the Kremlin. Truman and Acheson believed that it was a test case of their will. If the United States did not respond, American credibility would be shattered and more important friends and prospective allies, such as the Japanese and West Germans, would lose faith in US power. Certainly, if they did not respond, Republican critics at home would condemn them for their timidity in the face of aggression.

The North Korean attack confirmed the suspicions of Truman, Acheson, and Nitze that the Soviets were becoming bolder as they gained strategic might.⁴¹ The United States, therefore, not only had to thwart the attack, but also needed to reestablish the aura of military superiority that was deemed critical for the success of their diplomacy and their strategic vision. Truman asked Congress for funds not simply to wage the war in Korea but to support the concepts enumerated in NSC 68. The aim was to contain and roll back Soviet power without risking all-out war.

Truman, Acheson, and their advisers were convinced that the Kremlin, while bolder, still did not seek conflict with the United States. Hence when General Douglas MacArthur launched a successful invasion at Inchon and drove North Korean troops back to the thirty-eighth parallel that had divided

⁴¹ For the Korean War, see William Stueck's chapter in this volume.

North and South Korea, Truman decided that the United States and its allies should cross the prewar border, liberate North Korea, and unite the peninsula as part of the free world. Betting that the Chinese and the Soviets would not intervene because they would not risk hostilities with the United States, they allowed MacArthur to move to the Yalu River on the Chinese–Korean border. The impending defeat of their North Korean friends and the specter of a hostile United States on their very border triggered the intervention of the Chinese Communists in November 1950.

The escalatory spiral profoundly worried officials in Washington. They still did not think Stalin would intervene directly, but their confidence was shaken. They wanted to dissuade Stalin from even thinking about initiating hostilities in Europe. They were determined to build superior power and capitalize upon it. Truman deployed four US Army divisions to Western Europe and helped transform the North Atlantic Treaty into a viable defensive organization. The president also approved gigantic new defense expenditures. During fiscal years 1951 and 1952, Truman planned to spend the staggering sum of about \$140 billion to pay for national security programs. Compared to June 1950, by mid-1952, the US Army would have 1,353,000 troops rather than 655,000; the navy would have 397 major combatant vessels rather than 238; the air force would have 95 wings rather than 48. Since only \$3–\$5 billion per year was being spent in Korea, the vast majority of the money was allocated to cast the shadows necessary to support US diplomacy.

Now was the time, Acheson and Nitze were convinced, to take the initiatives that were fraught with risk, but that were essential to preserve long-term strategic predominance. They authorized plans to rearm and link West Germany to NATO. When the French reacted with consternation, US officials embraced a French plan to establish a European Defense Community that would include German troops, but no German general staff. The overarching design of the Truman administration was to lock West Germany and Japan into permanent association with a Western alliance system spearheaded by the United States. To do this, additional risks had to be taken to cede more sovereignty to the West Germans and the Japanese in return for their promises to stay aligned with the West and to allow the United States to use their territories to enhance its strategic reach. The Kremlin remonstrated against these actions, but Truman, Acheson, and Nitze gambled that Stalin would avert war. “It was felt,” said Nitze, “that the risk of provocation had to be taken, otherwise we were deterred before we started.”⁴²

42 Memorandum of conversation, by R. Gordon Ameson, June 14, 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, vol. 1, 847.

At the same time, Truman, Acheson, Nitze, and their associates did not forget the importance of the periphery in relation to the industrial core areas of Eurasia. The United States increased its strategic reach in the eastern Mediterranean and Southeast Asia. The United States championed the incorporation of Greece and Turkey into NATO. It established the ANZUS alliance with Australia and New Zealand. It worked with Britain, Turkey, Egypt, and others to design a Middle East Command. It provided vast sums of money to support French efforts to defeat Ho Chi Minh's Communist forces in Indochina. Acheson and Nitze did not want US policymakers to be self-deterred in the future as they felt themselves to have been in Korea when they hesitated to attack China directly lest they trigger the intervention of the Soviet Union. In the future, Nitze emphasized, the United States "must be willing to face the danger of war with the Soviet Union." In the future, Acheson emphasized, freedom of choice must remain "with us, not the Russians."⁴³

From an inchoate beginning, Harry Truman and his advisers had transformed the strategic posture of the United States in the postwar world. Their overriding priority was to prevent a totalitarian adversary from conquering or assimilating the resources of Europe and Asia and using them to wage war against the United States, as the Axis powers had done during World War II. Even if the United States were not attacked, as it had been at Pearl Harbor, the United States could not be indifferent to Soviet aggression or Communist subversion. "If communism is allowed to absorb the free nations," President Truman explained, "we would be isolated from our sources of supply and detached from our friends. Then we would have to take defense measures which might really bankrupt our economy, and change our way of life so that we wouldn't recognize it as American any longer. That's the very thing we're trying to keep from happening."⁴⁴

The strategy evolved from vague talk about an open world and an international organization to more concrete ideas about the need to rebuild western Germany, reconstruct Western Europe, and rejuvenate Japan. Reviving former enemies, however, posed dangers. Although the Truman administration accepted unprecedented strategic commitments, these military guarantees could not assure success. West Germany, Western Europe, and Japan could not prosper and could not be secure if the periphery gravitated into the hands

43 For Nitze's views, see Memorandum of discussions, January 16, 1952, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, vol. XII, 30–31; for Acheson's views, see US Minutes, August 4, 1952, *ibid.*, 182–83.

44 Radio and television address, March 6, 1952, *PPP: Truman, 1952–1953*, 194–95.

of revolutionary nationalists and Communists. Risk-taking in the Third World in places such as Indochina, Iran, and the Middle East was the price US officials felt they had to pay for the successful rehabilitation and integration of Northeast Asia, Northwest Europe, and North America into a thriving capitalist community based on democratic values.

The strategy of the Truman administration was never limited to deterrence and containment. The strategy was to wage a cold war and win it. "I suppose," said Truman in his "farewell address" on January 15, 1953, "that history will remember my term in office as the years when the 'cold war' began to overshadow our lives. I have had hardly a day in office that has not been dominated by this all-embracing struggle – this conflict between those who love freedom and those who would lead the world back into slavery and darkness. And always in the background there has been the atomic bomb. But when history says that my term of office saw the beginning of the cold war, it will also say that in those 8 years we have set the course that we can win it."⁴⁵

Victory was Kennan's goal from the outset. Both in the "Long Telegram" and in his even more famous X article in *Foreign Affairs*, he stressed that prudence, perseverance, and determination would allow the West to triumph, provided it successfully nurtured its own institutions and values. In the strategy papers that he authored and that his successors wrote, the overall objective of US policy was more than containment. The aim was to reduce the influence of the Soviet Union and induce a basic change in the Kremlin's approach to international affairs. Truman articulated this notion well in his last "state of the union" message. If "the communist rulers understand they cannot win by war, and if we frustrate their attempts to win by subversion, it is not too much to expect" that they might change their "character, moderate [their] aims, become more realistic and less implacable, and recede from the cold war they began."⁴⁶ The strategy, as it evolved over the decades, had its strengths and weaknesses, but it prevailed.

⁴⁵ Farewell address, January 15, 1953, *ibid.*, 1199.

⁴⁶ Annual message, January 7, 1953, *ibid.*, 1127.



1. Soviet territorial expansion at the end of World War II.

The Soviet Union and the world, 1944–1953

VLADIMIR O. PECHATNOV

By mid-1944, the end of the war was finally within sight. After the great battle of Kursk and the D-Day invasion of Normandy, the Axis powers were in retreat. Soviet leaders began to look ahead, sorting out their agenda and priorities for the postwar period.

The war losses of the USSR were staggering: the country lost at least 27 million people and about a quarter of its reproducible wealth; over 1,700 cities and towns were destroyed and more than 31,000 industrial enterprises demolished. With its human resources depleted and much of its productive capacity destroyed, the country faced a huge task of postwar reconstruction. Yet there was also a new sense of optimism and self-confidence among the populace justly proud of defeating the Nazi juggernaut which the rest of the world could not stop. The Stalinist system survived the test, having proved its ability to concentrate resources, maintain internal discipline, and act decisively under enormous pressure. The Great Patriotic War (as World War II came to be called in the USSR) endowed the Communist regime with broader legitimacy and brought Iosif Stalin to the peak of his popularity.

Externally, the Soviet position was also marked by contradictions. On the one hand, the coming victory was bound to bring the USSR to new heights of strategic and political influence. Its two mortal enemies – Germany and Japan – laid prostrate; its military predominance over the Eurasian landmass seemed assured along with a new status as a great power and a key member of the victorious Grand Alliance. The Soviet model gained new prestige, while the growth of Communist and Left parties in Europe and national liberation movements in Asia opened new avenues for expanding Soviet influence. On the other hand, the war graphically exposed the country's critical strategic liabilities: easily penetrable borders, lack of ready access to key seaways, and the absence of power-projection capabilities. The narrow escape from a shattering defeat at the hands of a much smaller but technologically more advanced Germany was the best proof of the regime's vulnerability and backwardness.



5. Ruins of the northern Soviet city of Murmansk, June 1942. The war devastated large areas of the Soviet Union; a herculean task of reconstruction lay ahead.

“Lenin left us a great estate and we made shit out of it,” was Stalin’s dictum to his lieutenants in the first weeks of the war.¹ No wonder security concerns remained paramount in the Kremlin’s thinking about the postwar world.

Postwar plans and intentions

In Bolshevik strategic culture, shaped by Stalin’s concept of “socialism in one country,” the Soviet state was surrounded by a hostile world and its survival and enhancement were overriding goals to which all other interests – those of temporary allies, foreign Communists, and its own people – were to be subordinated. This fusion of Soviet national interests with those of the world revolution freed the Kremlin’s hands for the most cynical Realpolitik, justified, ultimately, by allegedly *noble* utopian ends. Having identified himself with the system of his creation, Stalin was determined not “to make shit out of it” again; his aim was to turn the USSR into an invincible fortress against foreign enemies. Now was the time to restore Russia’s historical rights, lost in the previous ill-fated wars of the twentieth century, and to convert the gigantic losses and victories into lasting security for the Soviet Union and its ruling circle.

1 Anastas Mikoian, *Tak Bylo* [That Is How It Was] (Moscow: Vagrius, 1999), 390.

One key precondition for so doing was building up its national military-industrial base. The other had to do with space. Quite conventional in his geopolitical rationality, Stalin, as Maxim Litvinov observed, had “an outmoded concept of security in terms of territory – the more you have got, the safer you are.”² Inherited from the Russian tsars, this concept was given extra credence by the experience of the war, which had proved the importance of defense in depth. Bolshevik ideology reinforced this “defensive expansion.”

Haunted by the “Barbarossa syndrome,” Stalin and his circle were determined to keep Germany enfeebled and to extend the Soviet borders to the line of 1941 (i.e., to retain control over the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, and Belorussia, plus Bessarabia, all of which Russia had lost after World War I and repossessed in 1939–41, as well as Northern Bukovina). To further increase the depth of its defense, a glacis of “friendly states” was envisioned along the USSR’s western borders. In addition, postwar plans of Soviet diplomats and navy commanders mapped out a chain of strategic strongholds along the seaways adjacent to Soviet borders in the northwest: Bornholm and Spitzbergen, as well as Bear Island.

The same logic applied in the Far East where twice in the twentieth century Japan had gravely threatened Russia’s security. There, in addition to enfeeblement and demilitarization of the old enemy, Soviet planners wanted to regain territories and privileges lost to Japan in 1904–05: southern Sakhalin and control over strategic railroads and seaports in Manchuria, plus the militarily important Kurile Islands (see map 1, p. 89).

In the southwest, the Kremlin’s tentative agenda included building up a Soviet enclave in northern Iran, along with acquiring a controlling influence over the Turkish straits, and strongholds in the Mediterranean via trusteeship over former Italian colonies. This expanded version of the old tsarist aspirations was to protect Russia’s “soft underbelly,” a region that also contained most of the known Soviet oil deposits.

Although this very ambitious program was not conceived in absolutist terms of world revolution or global hegemony, it was in line with traditional Russian imperial policy. The leading Soviet diplomats involved in policy planning – Litvinov, Ivan Maisky, and Andrei Gromyko – believed that vital security interests of their country were largely compatible with those of the United States and Britain. This optimism was based in part on a revised image of Western democracies which during the war came to be seen as staunch opponents of German Fascism and Japanese militarism and respectful of the USSR’s newly gained status, interests, and rights.

2 *Washington Post*, January 23, 1952.

Another assumption behind this optimism was a traditional notion of the United States as a distant giant, posing no direct military threat, and likely to withdraw from Europe after the war. Thus, postwar Europe, in Maisky's words, would "have only one great land power – the USSR – and only one great sea power – England" which would help "to prevent the formation in Europe of any power or combination of power, with powerful armies."³ Besides, the Bolshevik theory of imperialism led the Soviets to expect a new round of "interimperialist contradictions" which would pose a rising United States against a declining Britain, and would incline both Anglo-Saxon powers to keep Germany and Japan weak. If discord existed between Britain and the United States, and if Japan and Germany were enfeebled, the likelihood of a hostile Western coalition – fear of which had haunted Soviet leaders since the October Revolution – would be minimized.

Thus Soviet planners could hope to reach some *modus vivendi* with the Western allies based on mutually demarcated spheres of influence. The United States would dominate the western hemisphere and the Pacific, while Britain and the Soviet Union would (in Litvinov's words) reach "an accord," based on an "amicable separation of security spheres in Europe according to the principle of geographic proximity."⁴

Stalin and Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov were hardly prone to the "revisionism" about the West that affected their more impressionable diplomats. The wartime experience of cooperation did not change their basic Bolshevik view of the bourgeois allies as selfish and cunning hypocrites, anti-Soviet at heart. Britain's and the United States' procrastination on the second front and secretly developing atomic weapons helped to sustain this view. The Kremlin's general ideological vision – of a hostile capitalist world, aggressive but inherently unstable, doomed to repeated cycles of depression, war, and revolution – also remained intact, along with a belief in the need for the Soviet Union to gather strength for an inevitable new showdown.

Yet a "survival strategy"⁵ also prompted Stalin to keep the option of postwar cooperation alive. Soviet diplomats were instructed to play an active role in founding the Bretton Woods system and creating the United Nations.

3 I. Maisky to V. Molotov, January 11, 1944, Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (hereafter AVP RF), fond 06, opis' 6, papka 14, delo 147, list 8.

4 M. Litvinov, "On the Prospects and Possible Basis of Soviet–British Cooperation," November 15, 1944, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 6, p. 14, d. 149, l. 54.

5 Silvio Pons, "Conceptualising Stalin's Foreign Policy: On the Legacy of the Ideology/Realism Duality," in Geoffrey Roberts (ed.), *Stalin: His Times and Ours* (Cork: IAREES, 2005), p. 18.

In 1942–43, Stalin was so impressed with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “four policemen” idea that he vainly tried to flesh it out at the Teheran Conference. During the war Stalin also refrained from direct interference in the western sphere. In 1943, he grudgingly accepted British–American dominance in the occupation of Italy, while in 1944–45, he restrained French and Italian Communists from attempting to seize power. He also refused to support actively Communist military campaigns against the British-backed government in Greece and the American-backed Nationalist government in China.

Even within his own sphere Stalin was in no rush to impose the Soviet system. His “popular front” strategy boiled down to an incremental buildup of Soviet influence behind a façade of multiparty parliamentary democracy and a mixed economy. Whether this strategy was from the outset a cynical cover-up for creeping Sovietization, or whether Stalin had real hopes for a “peaceful” and “national” road to socialism, is still a matter of historical debate. But, in any case, the strategy served both options by developing the sinews of Sovietization (especially inside the military and security apparatus) as insurance should the “peaceful” way falter. No less importantly, this strategy, as Eduard Mark argues, “was the vehicle for temporarily harmonizing” the conflicting goals of preservation of the Big Three alliance and consolidation of the Soviet sphere of influence.⁶

Stalin wanted to preserve stable relations with the West for a number of reasons, including preventing the resurgence of German and Japanese power as well as legitimizing the new borders of the Soviet Union and confirming its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. In Stalin’s view, an amicable division of war spoils was clearly preferable to a confrontation with his wartime allies. In addition, cooperation was necessary to secure economic assistance for reconstruction and allowed time for British–American differences to surface. Finally, because Stalin and his aides were fully aware of the military-industrial preponderance of the British–American world, they wanted to prevent a conflict they could not win at that point, or postpone it until shifts in overall correlation of forces were forthcoming. In short, the Kremlin hoped to combine its geopolitical agenda with cooperation from the West – at least for a transitional period during the settlement of postwar problems – but between these two tasks the former clearly assumed a priority.

6 Eduard Mark, *Revolution by Degrees: Stalin’s National Front Strategy for Europe, 1941–1947*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 31 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2001), 29–30.

This agenda, in Stalin's view, was a moderate interpretation of his country's security requirements. What was strategically justifiable also seemed morally right to Soviet leaders, who saw their demands as a just distribution of the spoils of war, a war won by great sacrifice from the Soviet people. This sense of entitlement was reinforced by a deeply felt need to be recognized as a legitimate great power.

Stalin realized that it would be difficult to achieve his goals. Well versed in Russian history and mythology, he expected sinister Western imperialists to follow their usual pattern of behavior: use Russians as cannon fodder, lure them with promises of major strategic gains, and then leave them empty-handed in the end. In his words, cited by Molotov at the war's end, tsarist Russia used "to win wars but was unable to enjoy the fruits of its victories ... Russians are remarkable warriors, but they do not know how to make peace: they are deceived, underpaid."⁷ Stalin knew that he had been deceived by Hitler, with whom he had tried to strike a similar deal in 1939–40. Determined not to be outsmarted again, Stalin and Molotov braced for tough bargaining with their allies. They were determined to seek their primary security agenda with their allies' consent, if possible, and without it, if necessary.

Toward the policy of "tenacity and steadfastness"

The sudden death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 – Stalin's favorite Western partner – dealt the first blow to Soviet calculations. The Kremlin's misgivings about Harry S. Truman were soon confirmed by his pointedly cool reception of Molotov during their April 23 meeting. This change of mood was also evident at the San Francisco Conference, where Molotov and his Western counterparts clashed over the admission of Poland and Argentina. With his armies conquering Berlin, Stalin fully approved Molotov's combative stand. "I must say that you [are handling] the conference very well," he cabled his foreign minister on May 2.⁸

A few days later, the White House abruptly terminated lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union. In Moscow this step was perceived as an act of political pressure. The Kremlin's real feelings were apparent when Molotov instructed the Soviet trade representative in New York "to stop ... begging American authorities for deliveries; if Americans want to end deliveries, so

7 *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: iz dnevnika F. Chueva* [140 Talks with Molotov: From F. Chuev's Diary] (Moscow: Terra, 1991), 78.

8 I. Stalin to V. Molotov, May 2, 1945, Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation (hereafter PA RF), f. 45, op. 1, d. 770, l. 3.

much the worse for them.”⁹ In his talks with Harry Hopkins, Truman’s personal envoy, in June 1945, Stalin condemned this “insulting and brutal” act.

From the Soviet perspective, the reasons for this American “toughening” were obvious. Once Germany was defeated, Stalin believed, the Americans would think that the Soviets were no longer necessary. The dictator had a point, but the tension was eased when Truman sent Hopkins to Moscow to resolve the contentious issues regarding the recognition of the provisional Polish government and the voting procedures in the UN Security Council. In June, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius agreed in principle to the Soviet request for a share in the trusteeship over the former Italian colonies. Kremlin leaders were also encouraged by the initial American response to Soviet requests for German reparations and for the internationalization of the Ruhr.

But, as the appetite of the Kremlin grew, the Americans and the British became more intransigent. At the Potsdam Conference, the Allies rebuffed Soviet reparation demands as well as Soviet requests for internationalization of the Ruhr, for a trusteeship in the Mediterranean, and for bases in the Turkish straits. Yet Soviet leaders were able to achieve much of what they wanted regarding the occupation regime in Germany, the new borders of Poland, and the preparations of the peace treaties for Germany’s European satellites. Stalin also succeeded in blocking Western attempts to monitor elections in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Talking to Georgi Dimitrov, Molotov said that this step “in effect recognized the Balkans as a [Soviet] sphere of influence.”¹⁰ So the overall balance of the Potsdam agreements looked quite satisfactory.

The Kremlin’s satisfaction did not last long, however. The US decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki constituted a dramatic new challenge to Soviet strategic assumptions. It shattered the previous image of the United States as a distant power unable to present a direct military threat to the USSR. It also foreshadowed a shift in the global balance of power in favor of the United States. Finally, it endangered Soviet hopes of acquiring a sizable role in the occupation of Japan and of retaining the strategic and territorial gains in the Far East that it thought it had secured at the Yalta Conference in February 1945.

The United States, in fact, began to squeeze the Soviets out of the area: Truman rebuffed Stalin’s request to accept Japan’s surrender on Hokkaido,

9 V. Molotov to the Soviet ambassador, May 16, 1945, PA RF, f. 3, op. 66, d. 296, l. 13.

10 Georgi Dimitrov, *Dnevnik (9 mart 1933–6 fevruari 1949)* [Diaries, 9 March 1933–6 February 1949] (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Ohridski,” 1997), 492.

demanding basing rights in the Soviet-occupied Kuriles, and secretly ordered his military to capture the port of Dalian where the Soviet side was to enjoy special rights according to the Yalta decisions. There is little doubt that Stalin saw these actions as an American effort both to lock the Soviet Union out of Japan and to penetrate the Soviet sphere in the Far East.

At about the same time, Washington and London vowed not to recognize Soviet-sponsored governments in Bulgaria and Romania until they included pro-Western candidates from the opposition parties. In the Kremlin's eyes, this challenge to Soviet control in the crucial security zone on their western frontier, coupled with the events in the Far East, constituted a new American offensive, supported by atomic leverage. Stalin's response was to accelerate his country's own atomic project and to demonstrate new toughness in negotiations.

The dictator's main priorities at the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers were to consolidate Soviet control over the Balkans and to acquire a foothold in Japan. Molotov was instructed "to stand firm and make no concessions to our allies on Romania." Supporting local anti-Soviet forces, added Stalin, was "incompatible with our allied relations." The categorical refusal of the United States to consider the Soviet proposal on a control mechanism for Japan, Stalin called "the height of impudence," which demonstrated that the Americans lacked even "a minimal sense of respect for their ally."¹¹ The same fate befell the Soviet request for Tripolitania, even though Molotov strictly followed Stalin's instructions "to remind Americans about their promise." This retraction could only confirm the Soviet impression of American drift away from Yalta–Potsdam. But the most revealing glimpse into Stalin's thinking was contained in his assessment of Secretary Byrnes's proposal on Germany's demilitarization, which in Stalin's view had the following hidden agenda: "First, to direct our attention from the Far East, where the United States assumes a role of tomorrow's friend of Japan ...; second, to receive from the USSR a formal acceptance of the United States' playing the same role in European affairs as the USSR, so that the United States may hereafter, in league with Britain, take the future of Europe into its own hands; third, to devalue the treaties of alliance that the USSR has already reached with European states; fourth, to pull the rug out from under any future treaties of alliance between the USSR and Romania, Finland, etc."¹²

Stalin was clearly beginning to see the United States as a potential rival for hegemony over the European continent. As a grand strategist, he realized that

11 I. Stalin to V. Molotov, September 26, 1945, PA RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 218, l. 84.

12 I. Stalin to V. Molotov, September 22, 1945, PA RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 247, ll. 57–58.

American dominance in both Europe and Japan would mean a drastic shift in the global balance of power. Also, Stalin did not intend to withdraw his troops from the lands they occupied in exchange for accepting a problematic US proposal to demilitarize Germany; if he did so, he would lose his main geo-strategic ace – the Red Army's presence in the heart of Europe. He was, moreover, concerned with the corrosive effect such a treaty might have on building a system of bilateral security guarantees with his clients in Eastern Europe, since the specter of German revanchism bound them together. Faced with firm Western resistance, Stalin preferred to disrupt the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945 rather than make concessions.

Internal developments also complicated Stalin's efforts to balance his desire to preserve East-West relations with his determination to fulfill his geopolitical agenda. The Red Army was in ferment; a crime wave was spreading through urban centers; workers and peasants, exhausted from the war, wanted the regime to soften its demands on them; even Stalin's own lieutenants, having tasted greater authority during the war, were displaying more autonomy. Yet in the dictator's view the country had to be mobilized for a gigantic new effort to reconstruct its economy and its military-industrial base. The external threat calling for discipline and sacrifice seemed to justify the goal and the specter of such a threat was credible enough, given growing Western obstructionism.

By the fall of 1945, Soviet propaganda began to remind people about "capitalist encirclement" and "reactionary tendencies" in the West. In November, Stalin sternly rebuked Molotov for relaxing censorship of foreign correspondents and summoned his Politburo colleagues for the "tooth and nail struggle against servility before foreign figures." To amplify his message, Stalin staged a humiliating indictment of Molotov before the Politburo for his alleged "liberalism" and for "placating the Anglo-Americans."¹³ The lesson for top Soviet officials could not be clearer: the time for pandering to the Allies was over and from now on the premium was on anti-Western toughness.

Yet Stalin still kept his options open. In China, he avoided any direct conflict with American forces; he subsequently withdrew Soviet troops from Manchuria. In December 1945, the Red Army left Czechoslovakia, much to Truman's surprise. Soviet propaganda described the outcome of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers as a temporary setback. Stalin clearly saw the London meeting as an exploratory operation and wanted to

13 Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Allies Are Pressing on You to Break Your Will ...": *Foreign Policy Correspondence between Stalin and Molotov and Other Politburo Members, September 1945–December 1946* (translated by V. Zubok), CWIHP Working Paper No. 26 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1999), 13–14.



6. Viacheslav Molotov (left) and Iosif Stalin at the Yalta conference.

continue bargaining from a position of strength in order to restrain the overconfident Western Allies.

The success of pro-Soviet forces in Bulgaria's and Yugoslavia's parliamentary elections and Byrnes's initiative to hold a meeting of the Big Three foreign ministers seemed to confirm the efficacy of Stalin's tactics. That, at least, is how he himself saw the situation in a message to his Politburo colleagues on the eve of the Moscow conference: "We won the struggle in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia ... It is obvious that in dealing with such partners as the United States and Britain we cannot achieve anything serious if we begin to give in to intimidation or to betray uncertainty. To get anything from such partners, we must arm ourselves with the policy of tenacity and steadfastness."¹⁴

¹⁴ I. Stalin to V. Molotov, G. Malenkov, L. Beria, and A. Mikoian, December 9, 1945, PA RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 771, l. 3.

The outcome of the Moscow conference was quite positive in the Kremlin's view. "At this meeting," concluded Molotov in a circular letter to his staff, "we managed to reach decisions on a number of important European and Far Eastern issues and to sustain development of cooperation among the three countries that emerged during the war."¹⁵ The Kremlin was still hopeful about future deals with the West.

The Soviet drift toward the Cold War

The spring of 1946 was an important turning point in the unraveling of the Grand Alliance. In his speech on February 9, Stalin presented his mobilization strategy: since capitalism remained a main source of wars, the Soviet people must steel themselves for a new and strenuous effort to insure their hard-won security "against any eventuality." That insurance was to be provided by accelerated economic development with the emphasis on heavy industry envisioned in the new Five-Year Plan. Targeted at a domestic audience, the speech was interpreted in the West as a call for a renewed ideological struggle and for revolutionary expansion. When Western policies hardened, for example, demanding that the Soviets leave Iran – as they were obligated to do – and when former British prime minister Winston Churchill delivered a stinging attack on Soviet policies in Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946, Stalin was further angered. Churchill's speech – given with Truman at his side – sent a powerful signal to the Kremlin conveying the impression that the United States was, at best, conniving and, at worst, plotting with Churchill in a new anti-Soviet ideological offensive. The Soviet people now needed to be more vigilant than ever, and, accordingly, Stalin launched his famous propaganda campaign to guard against Western encirclement.

Stalin's efforts to prevent further British–American collusion against the USSR were undermined by his own actions in Iran and Turkey. Determined to strengthen his vulnerable southern flank and get access to Iranian oil, he went to great lengths to create a pro-Soviet enclave in northern Iran, an area occupied by the Red Army and populated by ethnic Azeris and Kurds. By delaying the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran and by instigating a local Communist-led separatist movement, Stalin hoped at a minimum to wrest a favorable oil deal from Teheran. Faced with firm resolve on the part of the Iranian government, backed by the United States and Britain, he settled for a compromise (troop withdrawal followed by an oil deal), only to be outfoxed

¹⁵ V. Molotov to Soviet ambassadors, January 2, 1946, PA RF, f. 3, op. 63, d. 234, l. 229.

in the end by the Majlis's refusal to approve it. Moscow did nothing to defend its Azeri clients in northern Iran as Teheran forces brutally crushed their resistance. Giving up this very expensive and promising investment while running no risk of serious military resistance from Iran and the West could be explained only by the dictator's inner caution and reluctance to turn the British and the Americans against himself too soon.

The crisis regarding Turkey followed a similar pattern. Doubtful of Western support for Russia's historical claim to the straits, Stalin first demanded their "joint defense," coupled with a request to regain small chunks of territory in Kars and Ardahan that had belonged to Armenia and Georgia before 1921. In August 1946, this scheme was repackaged into a proposal to secure control over the straits for the Black Sea powers. The Soviet position in this war of nerves was backed up by troop concentrations along Turkey's northern borders. The Kremlin's calculation that Ankara would yield to Soviet pressure while the Allies would stand aside proved to be wrong. Both crises revealed a lack of long-term strategic planning on the part of Stalin, who essentially was "knocking at the doors" in search of weak points around the Soviet periphery. He provoked the consolidation of an British–American bloc against the USSR and pushed Iran and Turkey toward the West.

By the summer of 1946, Stalin and his aides had made the key decisions about Soviet national priorities that would shape Soviet foreign policy for years to come. Postwar reconstruction was to be combined with massive rearmament, which included the acceleration of the atomic project plus crash programs in rocketry and air defense. Their achievement had to be a bootstrapping operation since all potential sources of outside assistance (except for industrial dismantling in the occupied territories) had failed to materialize. Greater reparations from Germany were blocked by the Allies. The Soviet request for a reconstruction loan was at first "lost" in Washington and then became encumbered with unacceptable political conditions. Soviet membership in the Bretton Woods system was ultimately prevented by the Kremlin's own fears of opening up the Soviet economy. As a result, economic incentives to cooperate with the West were reduced to almost zero, making it much easier for latent ideological and political hostility to take hold. With its returns diminishing, the Big Three alliance was losing its former attraction to Stalin and his subordinates.

In Soviet internal assessments, the United States began to emerge as the main adversary, set on an aggressive course: resurrecting Russia's old enemies, surrounding the Soviet state with military bases, and threatening it with atomic bombs. A vivid example of this new thinking was apparent in a long

analytical report written by the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Nikolai Novikov, and supervised by Molotov himself. The essence was that the United States was pursuing “world supremacy.”¹⁶ High-ranking officials in Moscow who did not share this black-and-white picture of the world lost influence. Maisky’s departure in 1946 was soon followed by the expulsion of Litvinov, who had the nerve to criticize Soviet policy (in an interview with a US news correspondent) as being overly offensive and ideological.

Growing international tensions provided a fitting background for tightening screws at home. The official campaign against “fawning” on the West, launched in August 1946, was a crude but effective way to extinguish the residual respect for Western culture and ideas by appealing to Russian national pride and a traditional sense of moral superiority over the “rotten West.” The anti-Western ideological indoctrination was accompanied by a crackdown on British–American propaganda, curtailing subscriptions to foreign books and periodicals, and banning informal contacts with foreigners.

Busy with erecting the Iron Curtain at home, Stalin was still engaged in pragmatic bargaining with his former allies over a peace settlement in Europe. At the Council of Foreign Ministers sessions in Paris and New York, hard-nosed Soviet diplomacy was able to achieve most of its aims. The peace treaties with former German satellites confirmed the new Soviet borders with Finland and Romania, provided reparations to the USSR and its new allies (or eased their burden), and in general contributed to Soviet dominance over the Balkans and Eastern Europe. At the same time, Molotov failed to get a foothold in the Mediterranean; he also had to compromise on the status of Trieste and the Italy–Yugoslavia border – much to the frustration of Moscow’s new ally, the government of Josip Broz Tito. The latter concession was personally approved by Stalin who instructed Molotov “not to derail the conference because of the issue of Trieste.”¹⁷

There could be adjustments on secondary issues, but not on the main ones. Creating a glacis of pro-Soviet states along the western border remained at the top of the Kremlin’s agenda. Stalin’s overt strategy in Eastern Europe was to support “people’s democracies,” a framework that postulated peaceful ways to socialism pursued by coalition governments in the various countries of the region. In Poland, through 1946, Stalin instructed local Communists to tolerate a legal opposition and not to alienate the country’s Roman Catholic Church. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Moscow continued to deal with

¹⁶ “On the USA’s Foreign Policy,” AVP RF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 45, d. 759, ll. 21–39.

¹⁷ Druzhkov (Stalin’s alias) to V. Molotov, June 23, 1946, PA RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 219, l. 1.

non-Communist leaders. Communist control was more obvious in Romania and Bulgaria, but even there non-Communist political parties continued to function. Yet the “people’s democracy” formula faced mounting difficulties: harsh methods of “creeping Sovietization” were setting local populations against the USSR and its indigenous agents; Western-backed nationalist opponents would not give up; and local Communists were increasingly resentful of having to put up with their opponents, which Moscow instructed them to do. At the same time, diminishing returns of cooperation with the West were loosening external constraints on Soviet policy regarding compliance with democratic appearances. In early 1947, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began to prepare plans for a forcible imposition of the Soviet model.

Germany was another top priority for the Kremlin, and the situation there did not look promising either. Soviet diplomats perceived the consolidation of the American and British zones as a means to undermine the influence of the USSR in Germany and to resurrect its power on a reactionary basis. Denial of reparation transfers from the American zone in 1946 reinforced this impression.

Stalin’s plans for postwar Germany still arouse considerable historical debate, but he appears to have pursued several contradictory options at the same time. The most tempting one was a united pro-Soviet Germany. He told Georgi Dimitrov, “All of Germany must be ours, Soviet.”¹⁸ He also directed German Communists to merge with the Social Democrats to establish a nationwide Socialist Unity Party and to expand their influence westward, even with the help of former rank-and-file Nazis. But making the whole of Germany “ours” was too problematic, considering the Allies’ firm control over its larger and richer part. The middle option could be a demilitarized and neutral Germany serving as a buffer between Western and Soviet spheres of influence. Finally, there was always a minimum program designed to set up a client state in the Soviet zone of occupation which would at least preserve the Soviet presence in the heart of Europe. Stalin was establishing the material preconditions for this scenario by secretly Sovietizing the eastern zone, but he did not abandon his larger aims.

Growing international tensions notwithstanding, the USSR was not preparing for a major showdown with the West. By 1948, the Red Army was reduced to one-quarter of its 1945 strength, and the military budget of 1946–47 was only

¹⁸ Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (London: Hart-Davis, 1962), 139.

half of its wartime peak. The scarce documentation available on Soviet military planning reveals that, contrary to American assumptions, Soviet contingency plans did not envision any offensive operations in Western Europe, concentrating instead on holding the line of defense in Germany.¹⁹ Soviet naval commanders' requests for a major buildup of an ocean-going navy were rejected by Stalin as too expensive and unnecessary for coastal defense.

Rediscovering the enemy

While the Soviet reaction to the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine was rather muted, Moscow's response to the Marshall Plan proved to be much more consequential. Originally, the overture by the US secretary of state was met with a mixture of mistrust, interest, and uncertainty, but the main Soviet line was to gather more information from its former Western partners and to use the proposal to Soviet advantage. Soviet diplomats were instructed to clarify the scale and conditions of the proposed plan and to insist that it be organized on a national basis and not as an integrated program, which the Kremlin feared would come under US control. Neither did the Kremlin want German resources to be used in the program unless outstanding Soviet demands for reparations and for supervision of the industries of the Ruhr were met. What the Soviets feared most was that Eastern Europe would fall under the West's economic hegemony and that Germany would become integrated into a US-led orbit.

Those fears were quickly confirmed at the very beginning of the Paris Conference. The British and the French insisted on an all-European plan using German economic resources. They displayed little desire to modify the American proposal. Molotov wrote Stalin that it was clear that the Western partners "are eager to use this opportunity to break in to the internal economies of European countries and especially to redirect the flows of European trade in their own interests."²⁰ The Soviet leaders knew only too well that in an open competition they stood little chance against US economic power, and that Western economic penetration would soon be followed by political inroads. The Marshall Plan, in the Kremlin's view, would prove to be a Trojan horse, designed to undermine the centerpiece of its postwar strategic desiderata – the security zone in Eastern and Central Europe.

19 Vojtech Mastny, "Imagining War in Europe: Soviet Strategic Planning," in Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 16.

20 V. Molotov to I. Stalin, June 29, 1947, PA RF, f. 3, op. 63, d. 270, ll. 43–44.

After Molotov's unsuccessful attempts to hamstring the Marshall Plan, Stalin rejected it and forced his allies to do the same. These developments triggered a further revision of Soviet strategic guidelines. The Kremlin concluded that the United States had decided to rebuild Western Europe (including the western part of Germany) as a junior partner in a transatlantic bloc against the USSR. Instead of a multipolar system, in which the Kremlin could play off capitalist powers against each other, it now had to reckon with an American-led anti-Soviet global coalition. All the unsettling signs of American policy now merged into a single threat that seemed to endanger the very existence of the Soviet Union and its allies. Frustrating this design became the overriding Soviet goal.

On the operational level, the Kremlin tried to disrupt the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe and to consolidate its own control over Eastern Europe. The Cominform was created in September 1947 as the principal vehicle through which to achieve these goals. Its ideological underpinning – the concept of “two camps” – provided a rationale for strict discipline among Europe's Communist Parties and for their unconditional support of Soviet policy.

Moscow directed Western Communists to destabilize “the capitalist economy” and to abort implementation of the Marshall Plan by general strikes, militant demonstrations, and even underground preparations for armed resistance. This radical departure from the earlier “people's democracy” strategy contributed to the isolation of West European Communist Parties, but Stalin was not concerned about this consequence. Yet, even while seeking to thwart the Marshall Plan, the Kremlin calibrated its steps carefully to avoid American overreaction. Fearing US military intervention in Italy, Moscow cautioned Italian Communists against trying to take power through armed insurrection. The Italian Communists' subsequent electoral defeat in April 1948 ended the Kremlin's hopes for Communist takeovers in Western Europe.

In Eastern Europe, Stalin tightened the screws within his orbit. The intensification of the Cold War terminated any lingering restraints on the full-scale Sovietization of the region. The Kremlin gave the green light to its Communist clients in Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to crack down on their opponents. The new agenda was to intensify the class struggle, monopolize political power, establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, and launch a crash program of industrialization. The establishment of Soviet-type regimes in Eastern Europe was accompanied by the negotiation of new security arrangements between Moscow and its clients. Identical treaties of “friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance” were signed in early 1948 with Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, providing for mutual assistance in case of aggression from Germany and its associates.

The Soviet camp's weakest link remained Czechoslovakia, where Communists still shared power with other parties. In the post-Marshall Plan environment, this exception could not be tolerated, and in February 1948 Moscow exploited a political crisis to orchestrate a final showdown. As Czechoslovakia was being transformed, Stalin dissolved the Soviet–Yugoslav alliance. He was infuriated by Tito's unsanctioned preparations for military intervention in Albania and by the signing of a separate treaty with Bulgaria. When, in addition, Yugoslavia refused in March 1948 to share sensitive information about its economy with Moscow, the Soviet government recalled its military and civilian advisers, declined to grant Belgrade a loan, refused to sign a trade treaty, and launched a vitriolic campaign against Tito's leadership. Stalin wanted to remove or intimidate Tito, thereby teaching his other new allies an important lesson about deference to the Kremlin's leadership. Failing to achieve this, Stalin used the conflict to tighten his grip over other countries in Eastern Europe. Purges took place everywhere in the region, deepening the alienation between the Communist regimes and the peoples they governed.²¹

The political unification of the Soviet bloc called for similar steps in the economic sphere. The growing economic integration of Western Europe impelled the Kremlin to increase the coordination of trade and economic policies throughout Eastern Europe and to promote its dependence on the Soviet Union. Moscow also curtailed trade and economic ties between those countries and the West. In December 1948, the Politburo laid the basis for the establishment of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (formally established in January 1949).

But the most dangerous crisis of the early Cold War arose over the crucial issue of Germany. The Soviets were alarmed by the decisive turn of Western policy in late 1947–early 1948. Western decisions to unify the French and British–American zones, end de-Nazification, rebuild German industrial power, and establish a separate West German state were seen in Moscow as a threat to the very existence of the Soviet state – a resurrected lethal enemy, backed by the world's strongest economy. Analyzing developments, the Soviet Foreign Ministry concluded that “the Western powers are transforming Germany into their stronghold and including it in the newly formed military-political bloc, directed against the Soviet Union and the new democracies.”²²

21 See Svetozar Rajak's chapter in this volume.

22 A. Smirnov to V. Molotov, March 12, 1948, in G. Kynin and J. Laufer (eds.), *SSSR i germanskii vopros, 1941–1949* [The USSR and the German Question], vol. II (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2000), 601.

In a desperate attempt to stop what was happening, Stalin struck back at the Allies' weakest point – their positions in West Berlin, deep inside the Soviet occupation zone. When Stalin closed the communication routes between the western zones of Germany and the western zones of Berlin, his main aim was to force the allies to reverse their decisions regarding western Germany. Yet, even while undertaking such a dangerous gamble, Stalin was careful to avoid a direct military confrontation. There were no troop movements or other signs of military preparations, and when the allies introduced a massive airlift to West Berlin there was no attempt to disrupt it. Faced with the failure of his strategy, Stalin was ready to negotiate, but the Western powers took this as a sign of weakness and refused to bargain. Again, as with Turkey and Iran, Stalin's heavy-handedness proved to be counterproductive and he was forced to retreat. The Berlin blockade provided a stronger impetus than had ever existed for the Western powers to establish a separate West German state and to effect closer military cooperation.

Soviet diplomats and intelligence analysts closely followed the negotiations in Washington that led to the North Atlantic Treaty. Particularly troubling from the Soviet viewpoint were US plans to expand its strategic reach by including Italy and Portugal in the emerging alliance, along with at least one Scandinavian country. Still, there was little Moscow could do other than verbally protest and instigate Communist-led anti-NATO campaigns in countries such as Italy and France.

Inside the Soviet Union, there were also mounting tensions in 1948–49. The earlier postwar trends of demobilization and defense cuts were reversed. The anti-Western xenophobic campaign was intensified and turned into a witch-hunt against “rootless cosmopolitans” – mostly Jewish professionals and other allegedly disloyal individuals. In so doing, grassroots anti-Semitism was fomented to eliminate the remnants of Western influence and to rally the Soviet mob against foreign enemies as well as their “domestic agents.”

While being cynically manipulative, this mania also reflected the Kremlin's real anxieties. Stalin and his lieutenants were certain that the West would redouble its efforts to organize a “fifth column” inside the Soviet bloc, and there was enough evidence to feed those suspicions – covert operations by the newly established Central Intelligence Agency, the use of émigré groups to prepare anti-Soviet revolts in Eastern Europe should war erupt, growing contacts between anti-Soviet Russian immigrants and US government officials, and American usage of the former Nazi intelligence network specializing in Soviet affairs.

Among ordinary Soviet citizens, the official anti-Western propaganda found some resonance. For them, the “hostile encirclement” was recognizable in US military bases around the Soviet Union, its atomic monopoly, its publicized war plans, and the saber-rattling rhetoric of American officials. The aggressive US posture, designed to destabilize the Soviet system, produced, at least in the short run, the opposite effect. It made Stalin’s charges more credible, allowing him to blame the West for his country’s postwar economic troubles; it also brought the regime and its people closer together instead of setting them apart. No less importantly, the hostile challenge from abroad provided a powerful catalyst for the system to develop its awesome mobilization potential and to justify unending sacrifices from the Soviet people.

Cheerfully fighting imperialism

The creation of NATO and a formal division of Germany solidified the split in Europe, leaving little room for further diplomatic bargaining. Yet there were two events in the fall of 1949 potent enough to change Soviet strategic calculations and the general Cold War stalemate. The first one was the end of the US atomic monopoly, publicly acknowledged by President Truman on September 23. The Kremlin was greatly relieved by this breakthrough, which provided much-needed reassurance against the American atomic ace, but the bomb was neither integrated into Soviet military doctrine nor assigned to troops until after Stalin’s death.

The second critical development of 1949 that redounded to the strategic advantage of the Kremlin was that it secured a giant new ally in the East. In 1945–47, Stalin carefully kept his options open, maintaining close contacts with both sides in the Chinese Civil War. This caution was in line with his general skepticism about revolutionary prospects in Asia. For Stalin, local Communists were too nationalistic, too immature, and too independent to be trusted. He paid little attention to their liberation struggles. Stalin’s constant message to Communist leaders of Indochina and Indonesia was to go slow, avoid revolutionary goals, and concentrate instead on an agenda for national liberation. But, as the tide in China’s Civil War turned against the Nationalists and as Soviet–American relations deteriorated in Europe, Stalin moved to a closer partnership with Mao Zedong. The establishment of Communist control over mainland China laid the basis for institutionalizing a new relationship between the two most populous Communist regimes on earth. Stalin ultimately agreed to annul the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek,

admitting to Mao that “for us it entails certain inconveniences and we will have to struggle against Americans. But this we have already learned to live with.”²³

The new Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance, signed on February 14, 1950, after tense bargaining, provided for military assistance in case of aggression from Japan and its associates, along with a mutual pledge not to take part in coalitions hostile to either party. According to other agreements, the Soviet Union was to yield control over the Chinese Eastern railroad with its entire huge infrastructure, to transfer to China all its property in Dalian, and to evacuate its Port Arthur (Lüshun) naval base with no compensation for construction costs incurred prior to 1945. These big concessions were reciprocated by secret agreements providing for Soviet special rights in Xinjiang and Manchuria, which in effect preserved this area as a Soviet buffer zone. Overall, in Stalin’s eyes, the benefits of a Sino-Soviet alliance clearly outweighed any substantial concessions. China’s incorporation into the socialist camp promised not only to serve Soviet security interests in East Asia and the Far East, but also to change the overall correlation of forces in the Cold War.

The momentous events of late 1949 and early 1950 prompted Stalin to endorse North Korea’s attack on South Korea. The main Soviet interest in the area was to prevent Japan and the United States from using the Korean peninsula to attack Manchuria and the Soviet Far East as Japan had done in the 1930s. Until the end of 1949, Moscow restrained Kim Il Sung from attempting to unite the country by military force. Such an attempt, warned Soviet diplomats, was likely to result in US military intervention under UN auspices and a renewed American occupation of the South.

But on January 30 – a week after his decisive meeting with Mao – Stalin changed his mind. Most likely the dictator was tempted to make up for the Soviet retreat in Europe and enlarge a territorial springboard from which to threaten Japan. Second, the emergence of the new ally in Asia with its huge manpower resources made it possible, if necessary, to assist Kim Il Sung and in the process to lock China firmly into the Soviet orbit by setting it against the United States. Finally, a continued denial of Kim Il Sung’s request in the presence of comrades from the new Communist China might have endangered the Kremlin’s leadership in the Communist world and encouraged Mao’s pretensions to that role.

²³ PA RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 331, ll. 29–32.

During his talks with Kim Il Sung, Stalin gave a new estimate of the situation: the victorious Chinese Communists were now free to assist the North; furthermore, the Americans would have no stomach to fight China after it became a Soviet ally and would be reluctant to interfere in Korea now that the USSR had acquired the atomic bomb. Stalin's miscalculations became obvious early on: the Americans intervened under the UN flag, the Chinese equivocated, and the North Koreans were soon on the run. By early October, Stalin contemplated a total defeat of Kim Il Sung rather than a direct clash with the United States, but after intensive arm-twisting managed to encourage Mao to send his armies into battle. Pledging Soviet help in case of an American attack on China, Stalin hoped that the United States would not risk an all-out war against his main ally and did everything he could to avoid a direct superpower confrontation.

This hope proved to be justified once the war became stabilized. Stalin, then, was in no hurry to stop the bleeding of his "main enemy." "This war poisons Americans' blood," was his blunt remark to Zhou Enlai in August 1952. "Americans realize that the war is detrimental for them and will have to stop it."²⁴ Until he died in March 1953, Stalin encouraged Mao and Kim Il Sung to stall ceasefire talks. But while the outcome of the Korean War looked like a draw, its long-term consequences were very negative for the Soviet Union. The conflict led to a massive rearmament of the United States and NATO's transformation into a full-fledged military alliance; it also boosted the United States' long-term military presence in the region.

Faced with a militarization of NATO, Moscow began to flesh out its own military alliance in Europe. During a January 1951 meeting with party leaders and defense ministers from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, Stalin laid out a crash program for building up their national armies and defense industries. To increase defense cooperation within the Soviet bloc, a Military Coordination Committee was set up. Participants' accounts of that meeting point to a defensive rationale: Stalin wanted to repel any "aggression from the West," which now looked increasingly likely to Moscow.²⁵ By 1953, the Soviet military budget had doubled from its 1948 level.

Preparing for the worst, Stalin still tried to block the final moves toward West Germany's integration into a West European army. The famous Soviet notes of March–April 1952 were a desperate last-minute attempt to torpedo

²⁴ PA RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, l. 67.

²⁵ Leonid Gibiansky, "The Formation of Soviet Bloc Policy," in N. Egorova and A. Chubarian (eds.), *Kholodnaia voina 1945–1963: istoricheskaia retrospektiva* [Cold War 1945–1963: A Historical Retrospective] (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2003), 178.

Western agreements that envisioned the creation of a European Defense Community to include West Germany. Whether Stalin was truly ready to sacrifice his puppet state in East Germany for a neutral, united, and demilitarized Germany, or whether he pushed this scheme mostly for propaganda purposes, remains unclear. But the West did not test his intentions; their rejection of his *démarche* cleared the way for the final Soviet steps to set East Germany on a course of socialist construction, rearmament, and rapid integration into the Soviet bloc.

Stalin and the Cold War

Assessing the results of Soviet postwar strategy at the end of his life, Stalin must have had mixed feelings. On the one hand, he had managed to rebuild Soviet power and achieve his core security goals – expanded borders and control over Eastern Europe – without provoking a major war with the West. In 1953, the “socialist camp” encompassed one-third of the world’s population and territory. “Fighting imperialism has become more cheerful,” Stalin quipped at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952.²⁶ On the other hand, Moscow was now faced with what it had feared and had tried to avoid: a hostile Western coalition under US auspices that embraced both old and new enemies of the USSR. From now on, the likely results of this confrontation were either a direct military collision between the two power blocs or, at best, a Cold War of attrition. Stalin and his circle entangled their worn-out country in a long twilight struggle against the preponderant West that the Soviet Union could not win. But, given the nature of the Soviet regime and external threats to its existence, they could hardly have done otherwise.²⁷

²⁶ *Pravda*, October 15, 1952.

²⁷ For additional assessments of Stalin’s policies, see the chapters by Svetozar Rajak and Norman Naimark in this volume.

Britain and the Cold War, 1945–1955

ANNE DEIGHTON

In 1945, Britain was an activist world power. It possessed the world's second-largest national navy, and its Empire–Commonwealth was genuinely global. The Dominions stretched from Canada to Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa; it had colonial possessions from the north to the south of the African continent, to the east of Suez, in South and Southeast Asia, as well as many scattered, and often strategic, island outposts. The 'jewel in the crown' of the Empire was India.

On VE Day, 8 May 1945, Britain and its loyal Empire–Commonwealth had 4 million troops serving overseas for the Allied cause. Wartime summit meetings had reinforced both the reality and the image of a Britain as a world power as Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States parleyed with the Soviet leader, Iosif Stalin, while the tide of fighting brought them all towards victory. It was therefore inevitable that the British would have a large role in shaping the untidy transition that was to come, and that would transform the world from war to an uncertain peace.

Leading British decision-makers assessed early on that they would have to base postwar foreign policy both on the threat from Communist ideology and on the consequences of the arrival of the Soviet Union as the new great power on the world stage. Britain would have to take a leading role to ensure that at least the western part of Germany – the motor of the European economy – was secured against Communism. It could then be revived for the Western and capitalist part of Europe through the Marshall aid programme. The British were also to play a major role in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) which was to bind the other great global power, the United States, to the defence of the West against the Soviets and their allies. By 1955, the British had committed themselves to a military presence on the ground in West Germany.

Sustaining great power status in the face of these new ideological and power-political threats took other forms, too. First was the expensive but most secret decision to go nuclear. This was made less than two years after the end of the war, with a second generation of atomic weaponry then being developed by 1955. On the 'home front', a necessary part of the emerging Cold War strategy was to secure the hearts and minds of the population in Britain and the Empire against the baleful tenets of Communism. This strategy can be seen as an echo of the domestic politics of the Second World War that had successfully secured the British 'home front' against Nazism.

So for Labour (1945–51) and Conservative (1951–55) governments, the defining trait of foreign policy was to maintain Britain's place as a major global and imperial power in a rapidly changing period of fresh ideological and power-political challenges. It is fair to argue that this priority would still have existed in Britain even if the Soviet Union had withdrawn from active international politics immediately after the war. The quest to sustain the image and the reality of great powerdom through leadership, influence, and 'punching



7. Ernest Bevin (left) and Clement Attlee, Labour's foreign secretary and prime minister, at the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in London, 1946.

above our weight' was part of the *mentalité* of British planners, the military, and the politicians.

Yet this was not a straightforward policy, because Britain's own weak financial position would now force an extraordinarily rapid process of decolonisation. Over this period Britain retreated from India, Ceylon, Burma, Palestine, Ireland, and the Suez Canal zone in Egypt, while preparations for the end of imperial management were begun in Malaya and in West, Central, and East Africa. While the nature of imperial rule varied from country to country, and each country presented different challenges and possible solutions, the fear always remained that the Soviet Union might move in to fill a power vacuum or to disrupt a defensive base. So British imperial policies did not come to an end just because Britain had divested itself of some of its possessions.¹ The Middle East and Far East remained key bastions of empire, and Britain committed large numbers of troops to many areas, including Palestine, Malaya, and Kenya, over the decade. Indeed, the ending of empire was conceptualised and presented as a necessary modernisation. Adaptation to the new concept of commonwealth was conceived as nothing less than a 'world wide experiment in nation-building'. It was an attempt to create a set of global partnerships with new Commonwealth countries that would shore up the West, and that would be part of a 'global resistance to the "onrush" of communist influence', which was as much feared as was indigenous nationalism and communal violence.²

Britain's Cold War strategy emerges

Well before the war ended military planners were determining the elements of this reasonably clear Cold War strategy. The first priority was the extent to which British national interests could be protected and perhaps even advanced after the war. What was to be its global strategy?

Strategic thinking involves not only geography, but also ideas. The British had wrestled – literally as well as intellectually – with both German nationalism

1 Wm. Roger Louis, 'Introduction' and 'The Dissolution of the British Empire', in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 29, 329–42.

2 United Kingdom National Archives (UKNA), CO537/5698, May 1950; CAB 129/37/3, CP (49) 245, annex A, 'The requirements of national defence', October 1949. See also Ronald Hyam (ed.), *British Documents on the End of Empire*, Series A, Vol. II, *The Labour Government and the End of Empire, 1945–1951*, Part I, *High Policy and Administration* (London: HMSO, 1992), 334, doc. 72. There were also extensive development programmes for the colonies, a process much favoured by Bevin.

and Communism in the first half of the twentieth century: how to live with Bolshevism had concerned Whitehall even as the First World War was coming to a close (the choice between the 'Boche or the Bolshie'). The effort of trying to compare the threat of Communism from 1917 onwards with that of the rise of Nazism and fascism had played havoc with traditional 'balancing' notions that dominated British thinking about the European continent and had contributed to the scarring debate about appeasement in the 1930s. The period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact between 1939 and 1941 confirmed Whitehall's distrust of both Germany and the Soviet Union, a distrust that was in reality not much mitigated by the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Thus anti-Communism and anti-Soviet thinking were already firmly part of the British cultural landscape in the 1940s.

It was the military chiefs and intelligence officers who were the main driving force of Britain's future Cold War strategy. New evidence confirms the extent to which intelligence, and those with access to intelligence material, played a central role and generated a mindset about Soviet intentions that was to dominate thinking for the next fifty years.³ The Joint Intelligence Committee was at the apex of the intelligence-gathering system, and was chaired by a senior Foreign Office official with a membership drawn from the Chiefs of Staff. In 1943, a Post Hostilities Planning Committee was established; its work was overseen by a ministerial Armistice and Postwar Committee, chaired by the deputy prime minister of the coalition government, Labour's Clement Attlee. This committee was at the centre of intense arguments about the extent to which the Soviet Union should be considered a postwar threat.

These committees were examining Soviet capabilities as well as behaviour. Assessments were based upon a mixture of ideological predisposition to distrust Soviet intentions, as well as geostrategic analyses, although some thought that such radical debates should be off-limits while the war was still being fought, as any leaks to the Soviets might create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Yet planning had to be concerned with the balance of power rather than with nebulous indications of goodwill to the Soviet Union.⁴ An anti-Soviet mindset can be detected in the intelligence community from 1943 onwards, with racist

3 Peter Hennessy, *The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War* (London: Penguin, 2002), 8–19, xiv; Richard Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001), 43–63.

4 Julian Lewis, *Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942–1947*, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2003), xcvi, 338.

attitudes towards the 'semi-oriental' Soviet forces, and an appreciation on the ground of how the Soviets behaved which was confirmed from the very top of the military hierarchy, chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Alan Brooke himself.⁵ The Foreign Office was more ambivalent about seeing the Soviet Union as the next great challenge for British interests while the war was still on and while the Soviets remained an important military ally, although there was still considerable apprehension about Europe's postwar future. In a revealing exchange of minutes as early as mid-1942, it was observed that the current trend of Soviet policy would amount to the extension of exclusive Soviet influence over the whole of Eastern Europe. Britain could not stop 'the establishment of Russian predominance in Eastern Europe if Germany is crushed and disarmed and Russia participates in the final victory'. In this case, it would seem that the worst fears of 'the Poles, Yugoslavs, Greeks & Turks are justified, and their only hope for the future lies in a Germany strong enough to counteract Soviet predominance'.⁶

As the war drew to a close, strategic planning for the postwar world became more intense. Although Britain had gone to war in 1939 in defence of Poland, Poland's fate was not now the primary concern of British decision-makers. British national interests centred, first, on Germany, as it remained the fulcrum of the European continental balance of power; and, second, on the future of Britain's imperial holdings, particularly in the Mediterranean region. Ostensibly, the coalition government sought a four-power plan and a United Nations; however, the military were sceptical about both ideas. They did not see how Britain could work constructively with the Soviet Union, did not like the idea of a United Nations, and thought China was 'rather a joke'.⁷

Yet this change was an uneven process. Churchill's lack of serious consideration of postwar planning, and the uncomfortable coexistence of his own anti-Communism with his personal respect for Stalin, meant that wartime planning exercises within Whitehall were often incoherent. Opportunism rather than ideology framed Churchill's attitude towards the Communists, although he wrote to his foreign secretary Anthony Eden in April 1944 that, though 'I have tried in every way to put myself in sympathy with these Communist leaders, I cannot feel the slightest trust or confidence in them.

5 Aldrich, *Hidden Hand*, 43. Agencies also did not stop their work on Soviet code breaking after 1941.

6 UKNA, FO371/30834, R. Makins minute, 7 May 1942, W. Strang minutes, 12 and 14 May 1942, O. Sargent minutes, 13 and 14 May 1942. I am indebted to Vit Smetana for these references.

7 Lewis, *Changing Direction*, 69.

Force and facts are their only realities.⁸ So, as the Soviet armies began to move west, it was becoming clear that an expansionist Soviet Union possibly controlling a communised Germany would require a very different kind of peace settlement from anything envisaged during the early part of the war. The Soviet Union's own wartime experience would mean that it would never co-operate in any revival of Germany that it could not control. So the question became one of how Britain could build a coalition to contain the power of the Soviet Union, by working with France and maybe even Germany itself. As the Soviet Union could threaten British interests worldwide, American balancing support would also be required. Indeed, as the war ended, and knowing of the impending US test of the atomic bomb, Churchill even asked for plans – Operation Unthinkable – to be drawn up for an immediate non-nuclear-based invasion of the Soviet Union. These plans left officials – even Brooke – aghast.⁹

Finally, the strategists were all too well aware of the financial disaster that could descend upon the country as the war ended. Britain was bankrupt. The costs of war had emptied British coffers, and had also placed a huge strain on its imperial creditors. Yet even this was seen as only a temporary phenomenon: it was the price of victory, and a price that the Americans would surely help to pay. National retreat from global status after military victory was entirely counter-intuitive for both British bureaucrats and politicians.¹⁰

Yet, for the British electorate in 1945, it was the domestic agenda that was most important. The Labour Party had promised to implement the ambitious Beveridge Report of 1943 and to create a genuine welfare state. This would ensure that the postwar traumas of the 1920s and 1930s became nothing more than a distant memory. So, flushed with its success in the 1945 general election, Labour now had to balance Britain's overseas interests with the demand for domestic reconstruction. They had to manoeuvre through uncharted waters, between the commitment to reconstruction, the tough geostrategy required to sustain British global and imperial interests, and the containment of Communism and the Soviet Union. This had to be done in spite of the noisy opposition that came from the left wing of the Labour Party itself.

8 David Reynolds, *In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War* (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 407–20, quote on 416.

9 Aldrich, *Hidden Hand*, 58–59; Lewis, *Changing Direction*, xxxvi–xlvi.

10 David Reynolds, 'Great Britain', in David Reynolds (ed.), *Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 78–79; on the American loan negotiations, see Robert Skidelsky, *John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Britain*, vol. III (London: Macmillan, 2001).



8. Housewives queuing for potatoes in London, 1947. Domestic priorities competed with Cold War imperatives.

Britain's Cold War abroad: the 1940s

It is not surprising that the tough three-power Potsdam Conference was seen as a watershed in the politics of the wartime Grand Alliance.¹¹ The British negotiators were reminded that Britain had earlier failed to heed warnings about Hitler's intentions and should not now repeat the error of appeasement, but should instead confront Stalin's 'ideological Lebensraum'. If the German question – what Germany would do next – had dominated the interwar years, now it was the question of what to do with a defeated and occupied Germany.¹² For Germany was the geostrategic and economic powerhouse

¹¹ Gill Bennett, *The End of the War in Europe, 1945* (London: HMSO, 1996), 97–98.

¹² Rohan Butler and Margaret E. Pelly (eds.), *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, Vol. I (London: HMSO, 1984), No. 102, 11 July 1945; Noel Annan, *Changing Enemies: The Defeat and Regeneration of Germany* (London: Harper Collins, 1995), 146: 'Bevin hated the Germans ... [But he] had no illusions about the Soviet Union, or about communists'; Anne Deighton, "'Minds, Not Hearts": British Policy and West German Rearmament', in Christian Hasse (ed.), *Debating Foreign Affairs: The Public and British Foreign Policy since 1867* (Berlin: Philo, 2003), 78–96.

of Europe. If the Soviet Union was to be successfully contained, US support in securing the West German zones would be vital even if most of Eastern Europe was 'lost'. Worse, if proper attention was not given to western Germany, a new Rapallo mentality might emerge as Germans turned once again towards the Soviet Union.

Soon after the war, senior Foreign Office officials extrapolated from what they could see of Soviet behaviour in postwar Germany as well as in the Soviet Union itself, and they shifted closer to the Chiefs of Staff's wartime line of argument, accepting an anti-Communist Soviet agenda as the organising principle of British postwar foreign policy, arguing that 'in seeking a maximum degree of security Russian policy will be aggressive by all means short of war'.¹³ The diplomat Christopher Warner, who had been optimistic about the postwar world, now concluded that the UK had been chosen by the Soviets for a political and diplomatic onslaught. They 'have decided upon an aggressive policy, based upon militant communism and Russian chauvinism. They have launched an offensive against social democracy and against this country ... The Soviet Government makes coordinated use of military, economic, propaganda and political weapons and also of the Communist "religion". It is submitted, therefore, that we must at once organise and coordinate our defences against all these, and that we should not stop short of a defensive-offensive policy.'¹⁴

Labour's foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, was confronted with these perceived new realities in Soviet policy, and, in May 1946, Bevin himself warned the Labour Cabinet of the new dangers. A Russia Committee to lead policy was established in the Foreign Office.¹⁵ A rear-guard attempt by Prime Minister Clement Attlee at the end of the year to argue that the eastern Mediterranean was now essentially undefendable was overridden by Bevin, himself backed by the Chiefs who threatened to resign *en masse* if Attlee got his way.

This important row indicated that it was a Cold War mindset that now dominated Whitehall, even if some politicians were slower to grasp this: now 'Communism [was] the most important external political menace

13 UKNA, CAB 81/132: JIC (46) 1 (o) (Final) (Revise), 1 March 1946. Recent Russian research reveals the uncertainty of Soviet policy at this time, and that UK planners also thought that the Soviet Union might fear an 'impending penetration by the Western Allies', but nevertheless based their assessments on worst-case analysis.

14 UKNA, FO371/56832, C. Warner memo, 2 April 1946. Warner was now head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office.

15 UKNA, FO371/56885, 12 April 1946. The Archbishop of Canterbury was invited to join the committee.

confronting the British Commonwealth and Western democracies and [was] likely to remain so in the foreseeable future.’¹⁶ The new mindset was also shaped by the dispatches of the Foreign Office diplomat, Frank Roberts, who thought that Britain had to show it was the champion of a progressive faith and way of life ‘with an appeal to the world as least as great as those of the communist system’.¹⁷ The Communist menace was not yet simply or even primarily military, but was driven by a Marxist ideology that assumed expansion, caution, and the use of every political and economic trick. Communism was a form of religion that placed ideology even above national loyalty, so how the Soviets organised Communist Parties abroad – including that in Britain – was also of great importance. In short, as well as being a potential long-term challenge to territorial defence, the Cold War was conceived as a war of ideas, of loyalty to beliefs, and of all political mischief short of war.

The shift in Whitehall towards a Cold War mindset was momentous, if not unexpected. Now, suspicion of the Soviet Union, and of Communism in the UK, in Europe, and the Empire–Commonwealth would dominate policy planning and implementation for the next fifty years. But, over the next two years, while working out how to manage the new threat, the British government was also simultaneously involved in efforts to plan collectively for the postwar world through a United Nations organisation and the Bretton Woods institutions. This was the public, optimistic, and co-operative face of British diplomacy. The failure to establish effective institutions of collective security, and the retreat of the United States into isolationism during the interwar period were powerful reminders of the public responsibilities that the British had to bear to ensure that international institutions worked this time round. In the peace treaty talks, they also worked hard to retain their influence in the eastern Mediterranean in particular, where imperial and trusteeship interests were at stake, while access to oil and to strategic land and sea routes gave the area a special importance that continued to shape British policy. There was also some early optimism about the potential of France to act as a European and imperial partner in the creation of a third world force that would balance both US and Soviet power, but,

16 UKNA, CAB 130/17, JIC (46) 70 (C) (Final), 23 September 1946, ‘The spread of communism throughout the world and the extent of its direction from Moscow’. This was used as a reference text for the Cabinet working party on subversive activities (GEN 168) in early 1947.

17 UKNA, FO371/56763, F. Roberts to FO, 18 March 1946. He and his distinguished counterpart George Kennan were both reporting from Moscow in 1946.

although this notion was not formally abandoned until 1949, it seemed an increasingly weak strategic response to the new realities.¹⁸

However, the logic of bipolarity became increasingly potent. Negotiations in the torrid atmosphere of successive Council of Foreign Ministers meetings brought to fruition a Cold War policy that predicated the need for a viable West Germany with first US, and then later French, backing to balance Soviet power in Central Europe.¹⁹ Then, over the summer of 1947, the outline of the Marshall Plan was laid down.

In British eyes, the Marshall Plan was an indication that the United States had finally realised that incremental help through loans to Britain and France was not of itself going to bring the economic revival of the western zones of the defeated Germany, or the wider West European economy. While some may have hoped for an all-Europe recovery programme, most people in the UK and the United States were by now working on the principle that an East–West breakdown was inevitable, but wanted to put the blame fairly and squarely upon the heads of the Soviet leaders, even as aid was given to the capitalist countries of Europe. As Bevin whispered to his principal private secretary, Pierson Dixon, in the crucial Paris meeting of June–July 1947, ‘we are witnessing the birth of the Western bloc’.²⁰ Shortly after this the Soviets stormed out. Britain’s role was crucial in ensuring this breakdown, and then in persuading the United States that the organisation of the programme should meet UK expectations, and certainly not be the first step to a more politically integrated Western Europe. The Marshall aid programme did stimulate the wider West European economy and also served to assist domestic restructuring in Britain. Britain’s financial problems were vast, however, and the quest for resources and the constant sterling crises were an uncomfortable backdrop to activist policies at home and overseas. Most important aid eventually provided a psychologically comforting basis from which to build ‘the West’.

Within this seam of Cold War politics lay the issue of British–American relations. From 1945, it had been clear that the United States was essential to all Britain’s international diplomacy. Without US leadership nothing would happen. Relations were frequently very close in areas such as intelligence, and informal contacts based upon Joint Service operations during the war were sustained into the postwar era by British–American co-operation

18 Anne Deighton, ‘Entente Neo-Coloniale? Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo–French Third World Power, 1945–1949’, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 17, 4 (2006), 835–52.

19 Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1947* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990/1993).

20 Pierson Dixon diary, 2 July 1947, read with kind permission of Pierson Dixon.

over access to materials and the sharing of staff.²¹ However, tensions between the UK and the United States were considerable: they covered the management of Germany (the United States had even volunteered to swap German zones in 1946, if the British felt they could not do the job), bases, and nuclear politics, as well as aid and reconstruction funding. Indeed, the secret decision to build a British nuclear bomb had been in part the result of a breakdown between the British and the Americans over access to nuclear technology.

Part of the reason for the difficulties in the British–American partnership in the early postwar years resulted from suspicion about US intentions and its reliability that was widely held in the UK. While some Conservatives wanted to base British foreign policy upon old imperial precepts, others – particularly on the left of the Labour Party – feared that Bevin’s hard line against Communism revealed him to be some kind of American lackey. In November 1946, some members of the Labour Party even sought in the House of Commons to bring a vote of no confidence in Bevin.

Yet 1947 saw a sea-change in British politics, in which the voices of opposition to its Cold War strategy were drowned out by evidence of the threatening behaviour of the Soviets in Eastern Europe and over Germany, and the real prospect of American financial aid for Western Europe through Marshall aid. However, the path to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty was not easy, although after its signing Marshall aid and NATO were conceived of as the two halves of the same walnut, delivering economic and military security, as the response to the Berlin blockade was already showing. Yet, in 1948, Bevin had hoped instead for US backing for a security grouping that was West European, which would have given the British greater freedom of manoeuvre. The five-power Brussels Treaty of 1948 was, however, soon overtaken by the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed in April 1949 by twelve powers, including the United States itself and to which Greece and Turkey were admitted in 1952, and West Germany in 1955.²² It fulfilled Britain’s need for an American guarantee to Europe against an outside threat, and met the obvious new reality of the late 1940s – the new balance of power was global, not just European.

²¹ Aldrich, *Hidden Hand*, 207–11.

²² The original members of the Brussels Treaty were Belgium, Britain, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty were the five Brussels Treaty signatories plus Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. For the impact of the Marshall Plan, see also William I. Hitchcock’s chapter in this volume.

Britain's Cold War at home

Recently released archives now show that the Cold War 'home front' was also an integral part of Britain's Cold War history, and domestic institutions were, in some respects, put back on to a war footing, as Communism represented a critical and ongoing threat to British values in particular and to Western democracy in general. In other words, Britain was at war, domestically and overseas, in the same way that it had been between 1939 and 1945 – militarily, economically, and spiritually.²³ Cold War exigencies required efforts to monitor Communist activity and weed Communists out of public services and trades unions at home and abroad, given the perception of the menace to the interests and safety of the whole British Commonwealth.²⁴ Assessments suggested that there could be Communist manipulation of domestic affairs, espionage, and fifth-column activity. The government had therefore to counter infiltration in the trades unions, and the influence of the Communist Party in industry, the armed forces, the police, and the civil service. Although the party itself was not banned, by the early 1950s those applying for public service appointments were vetted for their political affiliations, while Cabinet committees on home and overseas Communism were established to monitor these ongoing efforts.²⁵

Yet, it was not until the end of 1947 that the Labour government was ready to go public with an assault upon Communism at home. After Cabinet meetings in early January 1948, Bevin launched his social democratic crusade in the House of Commons.²⁶ His career as a trades unionist in the 1920s and 1930s had left him with a deep-seated dislike of Communists in the unions; and in 1946 he had worked with trades union leaders to ensure that senior posts within the movement were denied to Communist Party members where possible. He would have agreed with the Joint Intelligence Committee analysis of 1947 that 'the Soviet leaders were especially hostile to "reformist socialism" which they regard as a competitor for working-class support in many countries'.²⁷

23 This was the view of the Colonial Office Information Committee, UKNA, CAB 130/37/ August 1949; GEN 231/4, 16 June 1949.

24 UKNA, CAB 130/17, JIC (46) 70 (C) (Final), 23 September 1946, 'The spread of communism throughout the world and the extent of its direction from Moscow'.

25 UKNA, CAB 130 series; Hennessy, *Secret State*, 77–119.

26 House of Commons, Hansard, 5th series, vol. 446, cols. 383–409, January 1948.

27 UKNA, CAB 158/1, JIC (47) 7/2.

A senior ministerial committee then was convened to oversee the implementation of anti-Communist measures at home.²⁸ While it was agreed that Britain in 1948 was not in a state of war, quite extraordinarily, the committee then debated on how to use the Labour Party as a means for countering Communist activity at home and abroad. The British Council, the Central Office of Information, and the Foreign Office's Information Research Department were to be important players, tasked to promote a British way of life through social propaganda, and thereby encourage their audience to infer that the democratic way of life was to be preferred to the Communist way of living.²⁹ Ministers wanted the full panoply of films, exhibitions, international conferences, and national and international youth groups to be used to promote social democracy, and this would be supported by 'white' and 'grey' propaganda initiatives and supported by the British film industry.³⁰ The BBC itself was the focus of much discussion, and although Bevin sought not to undermine its famed independence, he did also note that there were already very close informal contacts between the head of the BBC Overseas Service and the Foreign Office. Trades unions were seen as being in the front line in the struggle against Communist influence. The committee also assessed ways of drawing the churches into what was seen as a common action in defence of Western civilisation.³¹

The nature of the Cold War and the level of fear about Communism at home as well as abroad are historically highly significant. If Britain managed to avoid the extremes of US McCarthyism, it is nevertheless clear that the means used came close to undermining the very way of life that was being protected, although Bevin was at pains to rein in the more extravagant proposals of his advisers. Yet it has to be said that, by the mid-1950s, such activity no doubt contributed to the creation in Britain of a remarkable elite and working-class consensus about Britain's place and role in the world. It has been argued that

28 UKNA, CAB 130/37. It was called first the European Policy, and then the Anti-Communist Propaganda Committee, 1948. It was chaired by C. Atlee, and E. Bevin, H. Morrison, S. Cripps, A. V. Alexander, J. Chuter Ede, and G. Isaacs were members.

29 UKNA, CAB 130/17, GEN/168, 3 February 1947.

30 Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, *Britain's Secret Propaganda War* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998), 105–15; Tony Shaw, *British Cinema and the Cold War: The State, Propaganda, and Consensus* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 1–5, 193. Films were an enormously popular medium in the mid-1940s, and at least half of the adult population visited the cinema once a fortnight.

31 Federico Romero, *The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944–1951* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 105–07; Dianne Kirby, 'The Church of England and the Cold War Nuclear Debate', *Twentieth Century History*, 4, 3 (1993), 250–83.

this consensus was largely manufactured by the government to manage public opinion.³² This may overestimate both the competence and the cohesion of the covert agencies and of government departments. The notorious cases of the upper-middle-class ‘Cambridge Spies’, Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, and Donald Maclean, were deeply embarrassing for the government, although the Americans, too, had had their own spy scandals. There were deep disagreements between government departments, and even between ministers, on how to deal with the Cold War as a domestic as well as a foreign-policy issue. Foreign Office minister Kenneth Younger, for example, deeply disagreed with the ‘virulent anti-Soviet slanging match’ that typified the propaganda work under the management of his fellow Labour Party office holders Christopher Mayhew and the reactionary Hector McNeil.³³ It is also hard to measure the effectiveness of propaganda.³⁴ Yet, it remains the fact that a fairly sustained public consensus did emerge on the subject: domestic dissent about Soviet policy was muted throughout the 1950s, and, for example, there was virtually no criticism of NATO in Britain throughout the Cold War.

Into the 1950s

Although it is an oversimplification, British foreign policy over this whole period can be characterised by Churchill’s iconographic ‘Three Interlocking Circles’ concept of Britain as the only country that acted as a link between the Empire–Commonwealth, the United States, and Europe. Yet in the 1950s the formula was challenged, and found to be wanting, for the UK could not secure leadership of the kind of Europe it wanted while at the same time preserving its leading role in the Empire–Commonwealth and all the while persuading the United States of the accuracy of the British position.

By the early 1950s, Britain had effectively abandoned its role as the principal partner of the United States in Europe. Marshall aid had generated considerable disagreement between the United States and the UK over European integration, for the British were not prepared to pursue economic and political

32 Peter Weiler, *British Labour and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 189–229; Jonathan Schneer, *Labour’s Conscience: The Labour Left, 1945–1951* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988). For developments in the United States, see the chapter by Laura McEnaney in this volume.

33 Quoted in Geoffrey Warner (ed.), *In the Midst of Events: The Foreign Office Diaries and Papers of Kenneth Younger, February 1950–October 1951* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 41, 70.

34 Hugh Wilford, ‘Calling the Tune? The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War, 1945–1960’, in Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (eds.), *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–1960* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 49.

policies that extended beyond an intergovernmental, Commonwealth-type approach, although the United States had had early expectations that Britain would lead a West European grouping.³⁵ British governments had also been unimpressed by continental European efforts to create a quasi-federal Council of Europe between 1948 and 1949, and were likewise hostile to the Schuman Plan proposals of June 1950 for a Coal and Steel Community that would be managed by a supra-national High Authority. They were prepared to support the October 1950 Pleven Plan project for a European Defence Community, which would have brought West German troops (rather than the West German state) into the Western defence equation, but neither Labour nor Conservative governments considered that Britain should join these French-inspired projects. Meanwhile, after the signature of the important North Atlantic Treaty, American policy-makers now struggled with Britain's attitude to Europe and turned to France, which was willing and increasingly able to play a stronger 'Western' role, and to support the newly created West German government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.³⁶

Yet by 1955 the British still thought they had secured a good compromise between the United States and Western Europe, with the transformation of the Brussels Treaty Organisation into the Western European Union, with Italy and West Germany as new members, and with a token commitment of British forces to German soil, but with West Germany also in NATO. They thought that this settlement ensured that a 'Western Europe is now emerging, which, resting on the close association of the United Kingdom with the Continent ... will reinforce the Atlantic Community'. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was able to reassure his Conservative Party MPs that the United States now had new confidence in the 'stability of her European allies under British leadership', and was hopeful that the settlement had put an end to supra-national initiatives that would disrupt the agreement.³⁷

This was an aspiration about British identity and its role in the world, as well as about the Cold War balance of power, and the way in which European

35 William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 108.

36 Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), chs. 4, 5. An account of the UK response to the Schuman Plan is to be found in Alan S. Milward, *The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy, 1945-1963* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), ch. 3. This is the first volume of the British Official History on Britain and Europe since 1945.

37 Cmnd 928 (London: HMSO, 1954), 11; Conservative Party Archive, Bodleian Library, Oxford, CRD2/34/7, FACO (54)8, brief for debate on London and Paris Agreements, 15 November 1954.

supra-national integration was related to Cold War politics. The British thought that the military and psychological results of US membership in NATO were sufficient to ensure a favourable balance of power on the European continent. Institutions for continental West European integration could be useful, but they were not more than ‘nested’ institutions under the military security umbrella. It would not be necessary or even helpful for the UK to participate in them. The UK remained a global power with imperial responsibilities that extended well beyond the West European landmass.

Yet, ironically, by the 1950s Britain had also lost some of these imperial responsibilities, including India, Ceylon, and Burma. The link between the Cold War and decolonisation was not one of cause and effect; far from it, for by the turn of the decade both the British and the Americans had come to see Britain’s imperial possessions as having strategic utility for a global balance that was favourable to the West. Indeed, in strategically valuable areas the bogey of Communism could be invoked, even if it was not already present.³⁸ Thus, the developing Cold War environment actually pointed to the continued utility of imperial possessions and strategic bases for British and American foreign policy, although the economic burden of empire was becoming intolerable.

Bevin had also invested considerable energy in the Middle East with efforts to construct a new set of defence and associative relationships in the region because of its strategic and resource value and the fear of Soviet penetration. However, the infamous ‘scuttle’ from Palestine had sullied Britain’s reputation not only in the Arab world, but also with the United States, too. In East Africa, an attempt to establish a new base in Kenya failed, when Whitehall decided that the strategic threat from the Soviet Union was greater in the Middle East. The importance of this latter area also meant that the United States was playing an increasingly significant role.³⁹ Malaya, an early success story for the flexibility of British imperial policy, then witnessed an insurrection in 1948 which was seen in London as part of a larger Communist-inspired challenge in Asia. It required more than 40,000 troops to be deployed there to sustain a British presence in the region with the co-operation of like-minded Malays, and to convince the

38 John Kent, ‘The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–1949’, in Anne Deighton (ed.), *Britain and the First Cold War* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 165–83; P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914–1990* (London: Longman, 1993), 265; Susan Carruthers, *Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media, and Colonial Counter-Insurgency, 1944–1960* (London: Leicester University Press, 1995).

39 Roger Louis, ‘The Tragedy of the Anglo-Egyptian Settlement of 1954’, in Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds.), *Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 43–72.



9. British troops moving through Port Said, Egypt, during the 1956 Suez crisis.

Americans that Britain was still pulling its weight in the Cold War.⁴⁰ Likewise in the Gold Coast, the Accra riots of 1948 had been seen as evidence of the spreading influence of Communism to Africa, and were harshly suppressed. By 1955, pressures for decolonisation had nevertheless grown and this challenged Britain's position as an imperial power, although it was not until after the Suez fiasco that Britain's weakness became blatantly evident.⁴¹

The 1950s were also marked by increasing alarm in Britain about the United States, the third of Churchill's Three Interlocking Circles. US Cold War policy was becoming increasingly belligerent and provocative, and the British now

40 Aldrich, *Hidden Hand*, 499–500; L. J. Butler, *Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), 118–19.

41 David Goldsworthy, *Documents on the End of Empire*, Series A, Vol. III, *The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951–1957* (London: HMSO, 1994), xl.

struggled to contain the policy gap over how the Cold War should be fought. In 1950, war broke out over Korea, and it was here that cold war turned to an unwanted and unwelcome hot war. Although Korea was a UN operation, the war marked the clear arrival of the United States as a global Cold War actor and, with this, the relative diminution of the UK's role. Early on, the war had been presented as a chance to show the Americans the UK's 'capacity to act as a world power with the support of the Commonwealth', and thereby to convince them not to reduce Marshall aid grants to the UK as part of the Anglo-American spat about European integration.⁴² Yet British decision-makers soon found a number of worrying aspects to the United States' pursuit of the Korean War. There was concern that the Soviets might overreact to American pressure and destabilise Europe while all eyes were focused upon Asia. There was a panic that the Americans might use nuclear weapons: this impelled Attlee to visit Harry S. Truman in December 1950 to plead for a more temperate approach. Fears that the war might spill over into other parts of the region were increased when the United States insisted on branding China as an aggressor in early 1951, after UN troops had crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and headed towards the Chinese border. The war meant a huge rise in British defence expenditures (which rose to nearly £1,500 million), and this inevitably brought sections of the Labour Party into open revolt about the priorities of the government.

To make matters worse, joint planning and intelligence operations also indicated that the United States was taking a path that was alarming to senior decision-makers in Britain: some in the United States were increasingly contemplating 'winning' the Cold War, and doing this by force if necessary. 'Roll-back' and talk of a preventative war could spell disaster for the territorial status quo that the British thought they had secured with the NATO pact. A general world war was not one that could be won in any meaningful sense, and British decision-makers also knew that the country would be very exposed if there was ever to be a Soviet nuclear attack, both because of geography and because of the presence of US atomic weapons in the UK.⁴³

The response in Britain to the blatant arrival of American power and activism on the world stage was a cautious one. It was not considered appropriate to push the Soviets too roughly into a diplomatic corner; so, conforming to all aspects of US policy, in particular those relating to controls on exports from OEEC countries to the Eastern bloc, was resisted, even if this

42 UKNA, FO371/84081, P. Dixon memo, 28 June 1950; FO371/81655, FO to Washington, 30 June 1950; Kenneth Morgan, *Labour in Power, 1945–1951* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 422ff.

43 On US plans to launch an atomic attack from British bases in the event of war, see UKNA, DEFE32/1, CoS to A. W. Tedder, 28 July 1950.

seemed like a revival of an appeasement mentality.⁴⁴ How to manage the coming of age of an activist American Cold War policy also affected the politicians. Churchill returned to office in 1951, although he was by now ailing, and not really suited to the demands of high office. After the death of Stalin in 1953, Churchill made it his personal crusade to reinvent the summitry of the war years. If, by 1955, the Geneva Summit was projected as a serious step away from the first years of the 1950s, its achievements were actually limited.⁴⁵

Interpreting Britain's Cold War

Historians have moved on from the debate about who started the Cold War. Yet it is inadequate to talk of the Cold War simply as just one phase of foreign policy, or as a period of history from roughly 1945 to 1989. Since the end of the Cold War, more archival access and fresh, often interdisciplinary thinking that is taking place in a new political environment have transformed the ways in which we understand the Cold War. The Cold War emerged in different ways in each country and its characterisation is still essentially shaped by national political environments. For this reason, the rise of interest in the importance of Commonwealth and colonies, decolonisation, and the 'Third World' in the Cold War is especially relevant for the UK, whose own imperial footprint lay across the world, and whose Cold War arena was genuinely global.

The intelligence strand of the Cold War was also more important than was previously realised. Intelligence information was vital for both domestic and foreign policy, and it also became a very expensive subset of a Cold War game in itself.⁴⁶ Information was at a premium. Much work remains to be done on how intelligence was fed into specific Cold War decisions: some intelligence assessments were wrong; other assessments did not exist when they should have. Intelligence sources failed to anticipate the explosion of the first Soviet bomb in 1949; the Malaya crisis was not well served by intelligence information; neither the Berlin crisis of 1948–49 nor the invasion of South Korea were accurately

44 Ian Jackson, *The Economic Cold War: America, Britain, and East-West Trade, 1948–1963* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

45 Geoffrey Best, *Churchill: A Study in Greatness* (London: Penguin, 2002); John W. Young, *Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War, 1951–1956* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Saki Dockrill and Günter Bischof, 'Introduction', in Günter Bischof and Saki Dockrill (eds.), *Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).

46 In 1948, intelligence is estimated to have cost 7.1 per cent of GNP: Michael Dockrill, *British Defence since 1945* (London: Blackwell, 1988), 151–52. The huge popularity of the novels of John Le Carré is evidence of British fascination with this dimension of the Cold War.

anticipated; and British and American estimates on the size of the North Korean army were wildly inaccurate.⁴⁷ Yet the steady drip-feed of intelligence material formed an important environment in which spending, planning, and operational decisions were made in the UK. Peter Hennessy calls this the creation of a 'Secret State' within existing structures in Whitehall. Democratic control, such as there was, came only from ministerial decisions, not parliament.⁴⁸

Another interpretation of Britain's Cold War is more sociological, investing it with a domestic and social dimension that historians can unearth by reconstructing its 'lived experience'. In this interpretation, understanding the institutions of civil society, including trades unions, churches, and private networks, and their penetration by domestic and US intelligence becomes part of the fabric of a new history. This allows for a different kind of historical narrative that spills into hitherto-unexplored aspects of the Cold War, but which is also linked to the study of the rise of new forms of mass communications, and of national and transnational networks.⁴⁹

The prosecution of the Cold War was very effectively carried out in Britain. There are many reasons as to why a Cold War mentality became so successfully internalised: the validity of the cause perhaps; but also a deeply rooted reflex of activism and international leadership that still dominated Whitehall and Westminster during these years, despite the privations that this might mean for the general public.⁵⁰ These reasons were reinforced by the positive experiences of victory gleaned from the Second World War, for the wartime mentality that had delivered victory in 1945 did not then disappear completely. As they changed enemies, decision-makers saw that the intelligence and manipulative propaganda in domestic as well as overseas strategies were necessary to counter Communism, in the same way that they had been deployed against Nazism.

47 Aldrich, *Hidden Hand*, 500–03, 272.

48 Hennessy, *Secret State*. Recent scholarship has been possible only because of the changes in British legislation relating to hitherto-unreleased primary documents about intelligence and security: David Vincent, *The Culture of Secrecy: Britain, 1832–1998* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 195–201.

49 Christian G. Appy, *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945–1966* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 3; Patrick Major and Rana Mitter, 'East Is East and West Is West?: Towards a Comparative Socio-cultural History of the Cold War', in Patrick Major and Rana Mitter (eds.), *Across the Blocs: Cultural and Social History* (London, Frank Cass, 2004), 1–23. On American cultural influences, see Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); W. Scott Lucas, 'Mobilising Culture: The State–Private Network and the CIA in the Early Cold War', in Dale Carter and Robin Clifton (eds.), *War and Cold War in American Foreign Policy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 92–94.

50 Richard Thurlow, *The Secret State: British Internal Security and the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 285–86.

Party-political dissent was kept to a minimum, as there was also fairly robust political bipartisanship that dominated foreign policy making and minimised public disagreement if the national interest was said to be at stake. British elite groups were socially and ideologically coherent, not diverse, while intelligence monitoring and white propaganda encouraged the public notion of Britain as a responsible and moral great power. It remains the case that, as Britain settled down for the long haul of the Cold War, there was virtually no sustained questioning or opposition from the British masses or elites about British relations with the Soviet Union and Communism.

It is therefore impossible to disagree with the remark of the former permanent under secretary of state at the Foreign Office, Sir Michael Palliser, that 'the cold war is a thread that has run through everything'.⁵¹ The sense that there was an emerging Soviet and Communist threat obliged successive British governments to keep their people on an expensive semi-war footing at home and abroad.⁵² At home, vigilance and controls were nevertheless combined with welfare reforms and a greater state role in the management of the economy. Abroad, Britain had again to play a major part to create a favourable balance of power. As the Soviet Union was both a European and a global power, the support of the United States was also essential.⁵³ Going nuclear strengthened Britain's world power position and image, and it also helped the UK to deal with the United States as more of an equal partner, at least in the short term. By 1949, NATO was also in place to provide the security that would allow Communism to be contained at least behind the Iron Curtain. Soviet encroachment in the eastern Mediterranean and Iran, as well as in Asia, had to be stalled. A defence barrier across strategic parts of the Empire-Commonwealth was essential and, with American support, and despite early postwar decolonisation, this allowed 'the British Empire to revive before it collapsed'.⁵⁴ These were policy objectives that were perceived to be both necessary and of strategic benefit to Britain. They quickly became Cold War policy imperatives that were continually to trump the debilitating economic weakness of Britain itself.

⁵¹ Quoted in Hennessy, *Secret State*, 4.

⁵² In 1946, over 16% of GNP was being spent on defence; in 1956, it was near 10%, while over three-quarters of a million men were still under arms. See Frank Heinlein, *British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 73, n. 4; Butler, *Britain and Empire*, 100.

⁵³ Geoffrey Warner, 'Ernest Bevin', in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.), *The Diplomats, 1939-1979* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 103-35.

⁵⁴ Louis, 'Dissolution of the British Empire', 330.

The division of Germany, 1945–1949

HANS-PETER SCHWARZ

“The future of Germany was the question of questions and had to be looked at in its own terms. It was Germany that twice in a quarter-century had generated world war,” wrote Walt W. Rostow in 1972, when he analyzed the unfolding of the Cold War in Germany.¹ Rostow, national security adviser to President Lyndon B. Johnson in the 1960s, had been personally involved in the planning of American policies toward Germany in 1946. He was aware of the fear, the despair, and the hatred that German warfare, German occupation of Europe, and German atrocities had stirred up. But by 1947 most American decisionmakers had shifted their worries from Germany to the Soviet Union.

How did this change come about? Why did the insoluble questions of joint occupation lead directly into the Cold War in Germany? And how should we assess this historical event from the vantage point of the early twenty-first century? These are the leading questions of this chapter.

The German problem

“Germany is our problem,” wrote Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau in 1945. The measures to curb German power were many and they seemed justified: military government and an unlimited period of occupation; abolition of the German armed forces and elimination of the country’s industrial war potential; de-Nazification and punishment of all Germans involved in Nazi crimes; reparations to the Soviet Union on a gigantic scale as well as to the Western countries in order to restore – at least partly – the damages caused by Germany. In addition to occupation and security controls, radical structural changes seemed necessary. All sorts of recipes were on the table: “dismemberment” of the German Reich that, since its founding by Bismarck, in 1866 and 1871, had played a semi-hegemonic role in Europe and had ruled

1 Walt W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power: 1957–1972* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 9.

Europe from 1940 to 1944; the annexation of large portions of eastern and western Germany; a sharp reduction in the economic potential of this industrial giant; international control of the Ruhr; deep, perhaps revolutionary, reforms in many realms of economy, society, and administration; elimination of the economic, cultural, and administrative "old" elites that had joined up with Hitler's party; reeducation.

Yet, upon closer inspection, it was much easier to draw up a list of draconian policies than to agree upon them. The joint occupation of a defeated, still potentially powerful great nation by a coalition of victorious but heterogeneous great powers was a unique historical experiment. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see why the system of joint occupation was doomed to fail.

This failure of joint occupation had a multitude of causes. Five primary factors can be singled out: the breakup of Germany into zones of occupation; the power vacuum in Central Europe; the ideological incompatibility of the wartime Grand Alliance; the controversies over reparations; and the interdependence of the German economy with the economies of continental Western Europe.

For practical reasons, each of the four powers had to appoint a military governor to supervise its own zone of occupation and to act as the highest authority in his zone. Yet in order to ensure coordination "in matters affecting Germany as a whole," the commanders-in-chief were supposed to act "jointly" in the Allied Control Council (ACC), established in Berlin.² Decisions of the ACC would require unanimity. Thus the concept of the joint occupation of Germany that was agreed upon in the winter, spring, and summer of 1945 was based on a contradictory dualism. The ACC could evolve into the nucleus of a joint administration of Germany in order to ensure the necessary economic and political unity, or it could degenerate into a cumbersome multilateral body. In the latter case a bureaucratic nightmare as well as an inherent tendency to postpone common decisions was inevitable. By agreeing that each military governor should have a veto in the Allied Control Council, the occupying powers had made clear that in case of nonagreement their own national policies should prevail in their respective zone. More or less insoluble conflicts were unavoidable. In the case of the Allied Control Council, it took

2 Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, November 14, 1944, in: US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences of Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1955), 124.

only a year for the attempts at joint decisionmaking to come to an effective standstill.

The second factor was also more or less natural. The collapse of Germany had created a power vacuum in Central Europe. "Germany is no longer the dominating power of Europe, Russia is," wrote Britain's chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir Alan Brooke, on July 27, 1944, when the defeat of Germany was already a certainty. And he continued: "Therefore foster Germany, gradually build her up, and bring her into a federation of Western Europe. Unfortunately this must all be done under the cloak of a holy alliance between England, Russia and America."³ Such a hard-nosed analysis of the postwar world was not only confined to British decisionmakers. Everywhere, in London, Moscow, Washington, and Paris, it was no secret that the policies toward Germany would determine the structure of the new international system that would emerge from the rubble of devastated Europe.

In addition to the tensions engendered by the vacuum of power, these uncertainties led to the third factor. In Europe, a deep ideological schism had existed since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. It had been patched up by the Grand Alliance. During the war, in Western eyes, Germany was much more frightening than Iosif Stalin's Soviet Union; by the same token, in Soviet eyes, Fascist Germany was perceived as a much greater danger than the capitalist democracies. But how long could this strange alliance endure? When the hostilities ended on May 8, 1945, the joint occupation had to be made operative. In the beginning, there were compelling reasons for each of the Allied victors to make it a success. But the revival of ideological conflict between Western democracies and the Soviet Union made cooperation difficult. The Western democracies, sooner rather than later, had to decide whether they could attempt to build democratic structures and, if so, when and together with which German political parties. And the Soviet Union, for its part, had to work out policies to thwart the attractiveness of Western pluralism and freedom.

One of the most divisive factors relating to the treatment of Germany concerned reparations. For victorious powers, it is always tempting to compensate for wartime damage by imposing heavy reparations on the conquered adversary through dismantling existing industrial plants or taking the goods produced. The Soviet Union, in particular, whose industrial regions to the

3 Lord Alanbrooke, *War Diaries 1939–1945*, ed. by Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001), 575.

west of Moscow were destroyed by the German armies, was determined not only to bring about a massive dismantlement of German factories in the Soviet zone of occupation, but also to secure large quantities of reparations from the western zones. Yet American and British planners knew that the densely populated and highly industrialized zones of western Germany even before World War II had had to import roughly 20 percent of their food. This requirement significantly increased when large parts of agrarian eastern Germany were transferred to Poland. Western occupation authorities then faced a dilemma: allow millions of West Germans to starve or spend large sums for food imports; or, alternatively, permit the reconstruction of west German industry and the export of industrial commodities to pay for the food and other indispensable raw materials. In any case, London and Washington did not want indirectly to finance German reparations to the Soviet Union.

A final factor making cooperation difficult related to the restoration of the shattered economies of Europe. Among Western economists, businessmen, and diplomats, it was common knowledge that the economies of Western Europe were indissolubly linked not only to the coal and steel industries of the Ruhr, but also to the chemical, electrical, and machine-tool industries of Germany. Economic interdependence, in fact, had been reinforced during the war, when Germany ruled all of continental Western Europe. It seemed unlikely that the shattered economies of France and the Benelux countries could be rebuilt without resuscitating the industrial life of occupied Germany. To Soviet planners, the Western insistence on a certain amount of German industrial recovery for the sake of the economies of Western Europe smacked of a silent cooperation between the capitalists of the Western powers and those of western Germany. Thus, the contradiction between Soviet demands for reparations and US and UK desires for a reasonable level of industry in their zones was a great impediment to the joint administration of Germany.

To defeat Germany had been a difficult task. But to administer the destroyed country and to incorporate it into a viable peace structure seemed even more difficult. One may rightly speak of two quite different divisions of Germany. The first occurred in 1945, when the four occupying powers built up their respective zones of occupation as autonomous units with sharply divergent policies regarding politics, economics, education, and culture. In the spring of 1946, a second phase began. Two factors shaped events. The dramatic worsening of the economic situation called for a rapid economic merger of the zones. At the same time, the growing mistrust between the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union poisoned attempts to agree on a German peace treaty. Germany was regarded as a pawn in the evolving Cold

War, vividly illustrated by the failures to reach an agreement on a peace treaty at the Moscow and London conferences of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1947. Then, from the winter of 1947/48 until the fall of 1949, came the last phase. The three western zones were merged into a viable economic and political entity, a demarcation line arose between the western and eastern zones, two German states emerged, symbolizing a divided Europe, and Berlin became a powder keg in the center of Europe that might ignite a third world war. During subsequent decades, the failed attempts to achieve a cooperative joint occupation haunted East–West diplomacy until Germany was reunified in 1990.


Who was to blame for partition? While Germany was divided, this question engendered endless political and historical controversies. To address it in the aftermath of the Cold War, it is best to examine why and how the four powers pursued divergent policies, policies that had their roots in wartime planning.

The four powers and Germany: from joint occupation to partition

British policies had a considerable impact upon the division of Germany. From the Teheran Conference (November 28 to December 1, 1943) to the Yalta Conference (February 4 to 11, 1945) and the Potsdam Conference (July 17 to August 2, 1945), the British government greatly influenced the planning of the postwar occupation of Germany. Some of the most far-reaching decisions originated in a Cabinet committee presided over by Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee.

In the fall of 1943, when German armies were still fighting deep within the Soviet Union and six months before the successful invasion of France, the British government decided to assign to the Soviet Union an occupation zone comprising 40 percent of German territory within the Reich's borders of 1937 (including East Prussia, Mecklenburg, Pomerania, Saxony, and Thuringia). These proposals were submitted to the European Advisory Commission (EAC), composed of the British, American, and Soviet ambassadors in London. They were gladly accepted by the Soviet Union and, ultimately, in February 1945, adopted by Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Iosif Stalin.

Thus, the Soviet Union was offered strategic positions on the banks of the Elbe, putting its tank divisions just sixty miles from Frankfurt and the River Rhine, where they were to remain until the final Soviet withdrawal from Germany in 1994. Likewise, Attlee's Cabinet committee did not object to the joint administration of the Reich's capital, Berlin, although it lay deep inside



2. The division of Germany into occupation zones.

the Soviet zone of occupation. This would become one of the most crucial decisions, shaping more than forty years of the Cold War in Europe.

Britain also accepted the zone of occupation in the northwestern part of Germany (with roughly 22.3 million inhabitants), including the Ruhr area, the Cologne basin, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, and the important port of Hamburg. To London, control over the Ruhr seemed a priceless asset. During the first years of occupation, the British doggedly ward off all French and Soviet attempts to have a say in the control of the Ruhr. But the occupation of some of the most important industrial centers of Germany had its price: London had to foot the bill for food imports in order to feed many starving Germans and, therefore, felt obliged to ask for help from the United States, whose zone of occupation was in the south.

Another fateful British initiative took place at the Yalta Conference. Prime Minister Churchill spoke vehemently in favor of allowing France to become a fourth occupying power. Reluctantly, President Roosevelt handed over the southern and western part of the US zone to France. Thereafter, the United States had to govern 17.1 million Germans while the small and largely agrarian French zone had 5.7 million inhabitants. Decisions in Whitehall profoundly shaped the new map of Germany, which would endure for much of the Cold War.

The British did not wish to be left alone in Germany. At Yalta, the British delegates blanched when Roosevelt said the US occupation was likely to end just two years after the war. They, therefore, wanted France as a fourth occupying power in order to provide a West European counterweight to the Soviet Union. But the British failed to see the unwelcome consequences of this decision. In fact, the French looked to the USSR to control Germany. And London overlooked the fact that the French wanted to dismember Germany, a policy that Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union were tacitly abandoning in the spring of 1945. As soon as France was formally admitted to the ACC, it vetoed the installation of central German administrative agencies, thereby thwarting the economic unity of Germany. In the fluid period of 1945/46, when the British, Americans, and Soviets were still entertaining the idea of joint economic management of Germany, the inclusion of France had a most counterproductive effect.

In the first year after the war, Britain tried to make the best of the system of joint occupation. But already in the spring of 1946 skepticism prevailed at the headquarters of the British military government as well as in Whitehall. There were significant fears in London: apprehension about Soviet and French efforts to participate in the control of the Ruhr; concern about the failed

attempts to agree on common economic policies for Germany as a whole; alarm about the rapid deterioration of the economy; anxiety over the financial burden of feeding a starving population in their overpopulated zone; and a general fear of Soviet expansionism. In 1945, Churchill and Attlee had worried about a revengeful and resurgent Germany. By the spring of 1946, British apprehensions took a different turn: their worst fear was not a revived Germany. "The worst situation," wrote Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in May 1946, was "a revived Germany in league with or dominated by Russia."⁴

With increasing intensity, the British tried to bring about an economic, political, and military alliance with the United States and with the democracies of Western Europe.⁵ In Germany, one step followed the other. On August 23, 1946, the British military governor established the large, though initially highly artificial, state of North Rhine-Westphalia. It included the Ruhr, the British-occupied Rhineland, and large rural districts of eastern Westphalia. This decision was partly a reaction to French and Soviet attempts to put an isolated Ruhr under joint Allied control. At the same time, London gave the green light to the merger of the British and American zones. "Bizonia," initially an expedient initiative with an economic motive, subsequently became the nucleus of a new political entity, the Federal Republic of Germany.

In the spring of 1947, the United States assumed leadership in West Germany. But Britain was not yet merely a weak junior partner of Washington. From 1946 to 1950, London often initiated steps to integrate the western zones of Germany into the emerging bloc of Western democracies. But given the evolving Cold War, the British often had to wait for the United States to shoulder the costs and bear the risks.

Compared to the straightforward British approach to the occupation of Germany, American policies were far more complicated. During the war, Roosevelt had been the chief advocate for patient cooperation with Britain as well as with the Soviet Union. He wanted to keep the Grand Alliance together to conquer Germany and, subsequently, to secure Soviet help to defeat Japan. However, when Roosevelt died, on April 12, 1945, a few weeks before the surrender of Germany, it soon became clear that his unflinching commitment to the Grand Alliance with Stalin might be a passing phenomenon.

The new president, Harry S. Truman, did not share Roosevelt's strong commitment to perpetuating the Grand Alliance after the war. Nevertheless, for the next two years, Roosevelt's legacy still shaped US policy toward

4 Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945–1951* (London: Heinemann, 1983), 267.

5 See Anne Deighton's chapter in this volume.

Germany. When he died, Germany's defeat was so imminent that there was no alternative to joint occupation. And that meant trying to compromise with the Soviets. Thus, President Truman brushed off Churchill's last-minute attempts to rearrange the prior agreements regarding occupation zones. When the president and his secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, met Stalin at Potsdam, there was one overriding American motivation: to install, as quickly as possible, the control apparatus for Germany and to work out some essential compromises, particularly over reparations. The main motive of US decision-makers was to postpone the German question. Other issues seemed more urgent: to end the Pacific war, to demobilize the American armies in Europe, to "bring the boys back home," and to convert the war economy to peacetime purposes. The phrase "policy of postponement" aptly summarizes American policies in the early period of occupation.

Many American experts knew that the compromises of Potsdam were contradictory and full of loopholes. In the wings, there were already those who predicted that the joint occupation of Germany was doomed to fail. One of them was George F. Kennan at the American Embassy in Moscow. In the summer of 1945, he cabled: "The idea of Germany run jointly with the Russians is a chimera ... We have no choice but to lead our section of Germany ... to a form of independence so prosperous, so secure, so superior, that the East cannot threaten it ... Better a dismembered Germany in which the West, at least, can act as a buffer to the forces of totalitarianism than a united Germany which again brings these forces to the North Sea."⁶ That was a precise outline of American policies after mid-1947. Yet, in 1945, Kennan and those who shared his opinions were still marginalized.

The top ranks of the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) – namely, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, until December 1945 Supreme Commander in Europe and Military Governor of Germany, and his deputy, General Lucius D. Clay, who subsequently became the military governor in charge of OMGUS – were determined to make the joint occupation a success. Eisenhower had developed a liking for the Soviet military governor, General Georgi Zhukov. He was also favorably impressed by Stalin, whom he described to a *New York Times* correspondent as "benign and fatherly."⁷ Eisenhower cabled Clay in October 1945 to "move instantly to meet the Russians always at least half way." But that was not necessary: Clay, too, was favorably disposed toward his Soviet counterparts.

6 George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950* (London: Hutchinson, 1967), 258.

7 Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. I (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 430–31.

From the very beginning, Clay and his economic advisers believed that the strict curtailment of German industry was madness, because it would hamper the recovery of Western Europe. Nevertheless, he was determined to carry out the punitive policies of the basic directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of April 1945 while hoping to convince his superiors in Washington (as well as the Soviet and British representatives) that a more reasonable course of action was more likely to produce better results. Clay personified the “can-do” attitude of US occupation officials. Initially, he used all his administrative and political talents to overcome the problems besetting the joint occupation. Subsequently, when his attempts failed and when his superiors in Washington shifted policy, he worked arduously and successfully to bring the West Germans into the Western bloc.

In the early days of the occupation, when Eisenhower and Clay were on friendly terms with the Soviets, they made a major mistake by failing to conclude water-tight agreements on the access routes to the western sectors of Berlin. Another mistake was Clay’s acquiescence to the Soviet wish that the Western allies assume the obligations to provide food and fuel for the German population in their sectors. These decisions were made in a few hurried meetings in June and July 1945, and they were to have lasting consequences.

For many years, historians have debated various aspects of the American policy in the Allied Control Council just as vigorously as officials did at the time. But it is undisputable that until the spring of 1947 General Clay’s policy was characterized by a basic willingness to compromise with his Soviet counterparts. Yet the limits of American patience became increasingly clear: “no” to the Soviet and French wish to internationalize the Ruhr; “no” to the continuation of the economic and human misery in the American and British zones; and “no” to Soviet proposals to create a centralized Germany.

In addition to disputes over reparations and the level of industry, Western ideas of democracy engendered acrimony. Like all the other occupation powers, the Americans established political structures in their zone that they hoped would serve as models for the political and economic organization of Germany as a whole. Free elections were held locally in the American zone in early 1946. The Americans wanted federalism to prevail; the *Länder* (states) should be the starting point for the building of national institutions.

In 1946, at the highest level of decisionmaking in Washington, the question of the long-term treatment of Germany became more and more urgent. For more than a year and a half after the end of hostilities in Europe, the Truman administration had been reluctant to open the most difficult negotiations on a German peace treaty. Well into 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes pursued his

policy of postponement. But when the American delegation under the new secretary of state, General Marshall, went to the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow (March 10 to April 24, 1947) for the first serious negotiations, the international as well as the domestic scene in the United States had fundamentally changed. The mid-term elections in November 1946 had brought about the 80th Congress, dominated by a vocal anti-Communist Republican majority. Britain's admission that it could no longer stabilize the situation in the eastern Mediterranean had convinced the Americans that they had to fill the vacuum there. On March 12, 1947, President Truman asked Congress to give aid to Greece and Turkey, and declared his famous doctrine that the United States would not allow totalitarianism to spread. At the same time, there was a growing awareness that the reconstruction of Western Europe would be set back if recovery did not accelerate in the western zones of Germany.

After two years of economic stagnation under the joint occupation, many issues remained unresolved: where should the borders of Germany be? Should Germany be centralized or largely federal? How should it be organized politically and institutionally? Should it be neutral, linked to the Western democracies, or allowed to serve as a bridge between East and West? What sorts of controls should remain over Germany in the long term and how long should occupation troops stay in the country? How much should Germany pay in total reparations and to what extent should its industries be allowed to revive? Should the Ruhr be internationalized, or should its industries and resources be linked to the economies of Western Europe? And how should a provisional, representative, and democratically responsive government of Germany be established?

These and many other difficult questions could not be solved at a single conference. Stalin was right when he remarked to Marshall at the end of the Moscow Conference: "We may agree the next time, or if not then, the time after that."⁸ Yet protracted negotiations in Moscow convinced the American decisionmakers that time was running out. Thereafter, Kennan's earlier beliefs became US policy: the western zones of Germany were to be incorporated into plans for the reconstruction of Western Europe. This became the core concept of the Marshall Plan.⁹ Washington conceived the integration of the western zones into Western Europe as a central element of its Cold War policies, and General Clay ultimately became the founding father of the Federal Republic of Germany.

8 Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1969* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), 263.

9 See William I. Hitchcock's chapter in this volume.

And what was the French contribution to the division of Germany? To put it briefly: in 1945 and early 1946, it used its veto to thwart the attempts to establish joint economic administration under the Allied Control Council. When Britain and the United States sought to merge the western zones, Paris hesitated until the last moment. And when the founding of the Federal Republic was under way, the Quai d'Orsay did its best to hamper the establishment of a strong federal government.

French policies were understandable. In spite of the strict provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had emerged after 1933 as a formidable foe. The Germans had crushed the French armies in 1940, and followed their victory on the battlefield with a humiliating occupation. Because of these experiences, along with the obvious weakness of postwar France, its insecurity, and its desire for reparations, the harsh policies of French governments had strong support among the French people.

During the war, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill had talked about the complete dismemberment of Germany. But in the spring of 1945, Moscow, London, and Washington silently abandoned this idea in favor of a joint occupation of a unified Germany. France objected. From 1944 to 1947, Paris called for the dismemberment of Germany: transformation of the Saar and of the western Rhineland into autonomous political entities; the cession of part of East Germany to Poland; the internationalization of the Ruhr (with a decisive French influence); and the dismemberment of the remaining Reich through the creation of a large number of small, autonomous, loosely connected German states. French officials also wanted to steer a middle course between the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union in order to be in the best position to maximize their own goals.

Yet, of the four occupation powers, France held the weakest cards. Their obstructionist policies led nowhere, and they wrecked any slight possibility of working out common policies in the ACC. Reluctantly, in 1947 and 1948, when France had to take sides, the Quai d'Orsay decided to support Anglo-Saxon policies. The French extracted significant concessions from the United States and the UK: promises to receive cheap coal from the Ruhr, to incorporate the Saar area, with its rich mining and steel industry, into a French protectorate of sorts, and to allow France to participate in the international regime supervising the Ruhr and to have equal rights in the High Commission that would oversee the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time, in separate negotiations, the French received assurances that their security would be guaranteed by a new North Atlantic Treaty.

From the vantage point of Paris, the control of West Germany by a more integrated Western alliance entailed fewer uncertainties than the continuation of the failed joint occupation. Moreover, the French were witnessing a partial dismemberment of Germany between the three western zones on the one hand and the eastern zone on the other. A united Germany, composed of the four zones of occupation, would have had 68 million inhabitants with an enormous industrial potential, much larger than France's. Instead of that united Germany, two Germanies were emerging: the Federal Republic (FRG) had 49.8 million inhabitants (including the western sectors of Berlin) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) contained 18.7 million (including the eastern sector of Berlin).¹⁰ Two German states, integrated into the rival camps of the Cold War, were more acceptable to the French than a united Germany, whose future trajectory could not be assured.

And how shall we assess the Soviet Union's policies toward Germany? Contrary to a widely held belief, in the spring of 1945, Soviet actions were not particularly consistent. The Kremlin's policies, even more than those of the Western powers, were plagued by inherent contradictions. Stalin, who obviously kept policies in Germany under his personal control, made even more mistakes than his Western counterparts.

In spite of new archival sources on Soviet policies that have become available since 1990/91, historians still do not agree about Moscow's short-term and long-term goals. In Vladimir O. Pechatnov's view, for example, Stalin vacillated between three conflicting options: "a united pro-Soviet Germany" ("all of Germany must be ours," as he told Georgi Dimitrov); a "demilitarized and neutral Germany serving as a buffer between Western and Soviet spheres of influence"; and "a client state in the Soviet zone of occupation which would at least preserve the Soviet presence in the heart of Europe."¹¹ Not surprisingly, other historians argue that Stalin, openly or secretly, pursued one or another of these options, but not all three of them at the same time.

Instead of trying to speculate about the ulterior motives of the inscrutable Soviet dictator, it may be more rewarding to ask simply what he did in practical terms. In the heat of the war, Stalin, like Roosevelt and Churchill, wanted to break up the dangerous Reich once and for all. He was the first of the statesmen of the Grand Alliance to conceive, as early as November 1941, an

¹⁰ Figures are for 1950; see *Deutschland-Jahrbuch 1953*, ed. by Klaus Mehnert and Heinrich Schulte (Essen: Rheinisch-Westfälisches Verlagkontor, 1953), 67–68 and 370.

¹¹ See Vladimir O. Pechatnov's chapter in this volume, 103.



10. Soviet soldier directing traffic in bombed-out Berlin, 1945.

elaborate program of dismemberment.¹² Yet in the spring of 1945, when the Western allies had obviously moved away from dismemberment and when he had become aware that the great bulk of German industry and a large majority of the German population would be overseen by the Western powers, Stalin changed tack. With customary opportunism on May 9, 1945, when the German high command had capitulated, he declared that “The Soviet Union will celebrate victory, yet it is not prepared to dismember or annihilate Germany.”¹³ From the spring of 1945 until the end of his life in March 1953, he remained committed to preserving German unity – of course, on conditions favorable to the Soviet Union.

In the summer of 1945, the overall position of the Soviet Union in Germany weakened when the Kremlin transferred large regions of its original zone of

12 V. Molotov to I. Maisky, November 21, 1941, in Georgij P. Kynin and Jochen Laufer (eds.), *Die UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948: Dokumente aus dem Archiv für Außenpolitik der Russischen Föderation* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), I, 11–12. See also Eden to Churchill, January 5, 1942, in Winston S. Churchill, *The History of the Second World War*, vol. VI, *War Comes to America* (London: Cassel, 1964), 228.

13 “Ansprache des Genossen J. W. Stalin an das Volk, 9.5.1945,” in Josef Stalin, *Über den Großen Vaterländischen Krieg der Sowjetunion* (Berlin: n.p., 1946), 218–19.

occupation east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers to Poland. Stalin's decision, taken without consulting his British and American allies, had far-reaching consequences – the occupation zone of the Soviet Union shrank considerably (from 40% of the territory of the Reich in its 1937 borders to a meager 16%, with only 28% of the population). Thus, the United States, Britain, and France occupied the richest and most populous part of Germany (84% of the territory with 72% of the population). Although the Soviets boasted that they had made the major contribution to the victory over Germany, Stalin nevertheless remained the *demandeur* toward the Western powers. He wanted reparations from their zones and he called for Soviet participation in a four-power supervision of the Ruhr. He also wanted to influence political evolution in the western zones. Overall, he wanted to make sure that a final German peace treaty met Soviet strategic and economic requirements, but he had to pursue his objectives from a position of relative weakness.

Stalin tried to employ parallel strategies to overcome this weakness. But the strategies contradicted one another and backfired. First, there was the contradiction between the initial Soviet willingness to preserve the economic unity of Germany by cooperating in the ACC and the insatiable Soviet thirst for reparations. Most contemporary experts in the West, and many historians afterwards, were convinced that Stalin's entire German policy was largely dictated by reparation requirements. And in this respect Soviet and Anglo-Saxon short-term interests were incompatible, making it very difficult to implement joint economic policies. This was especially the case because at the Potsdam Conference Moscow had been given a free hand to take reparation deliveries from its own zone, thereby deepening the rift between the economy of the Anglo-Saxon zones and that of the Soviet zone.

There was a second contradiction in Stalin's policies. Very early, the Soviets discovered the utility of a centralized German party system. Even before the Western allies started to move into their sectors in Berlin, the Soviet military governor not only licensed, but also encouraged, the founding of four political parties in Berlin and in the Soviet zone: Communists (the KPD), Social Democrats (the SPD), Liberals (the LDPD), and Christian Democrats (the CDU). These parties had their headquarters in Berlin, inside the Soviet zone, yet all their leaders sought recognition in the western zones and wanted to speak for all of Germany. It quickly became apparent that the Soviet Military Administration of Germany (SMAD) had a hidden agenda: to bolster the leading role of the Communists. When the political weakness of the SPD and the KPD became obvious in the spring of 1946, Soviet authorities arranged a forced merger of the two parties (under the new name Sozialistische

Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) in the Soviet zone. But in the western zones, a strong SPD, under the determined anti-Communist leadership of Kurt Schumacher, reacted against the SED and its Soviet masters. The CDU and the Free Democratic Party were likewise motivated by deep-rooted anti-Communism. Jakob Kaiser, chairman of the popular CDU in the eastern zone, steered a compromise course. On the one hand, he tried his best to operate freely in the face of Soviet pressures; on the other hand, he said he wanted Germany to be "a bridge between East and West," hoping to avoid taking sides in the incipient Cold War. But when he hailed the Marshall Plan, he was forced to resign in December 1947. Neither the German Communists in Berlin nor their Soviet overlords were willing to accept Western pluralism. Thus, Soviet attempts to influence the German parties in the western zones by stressing the need for German unity were doomed to fail.

This leads to a third contradiction in Soviet policy. In the ACC, SMAD called for joint occupation policies in all four zones, but reserved for itself a free hand in the eastern zone. In addition to curtailing non-Communist parties, land reform was decreed, large-scale enterprises were nationalized, the traditional high school was marginalized, and children were required to take Russian-language classes after the fourth year of elementary school. By the spring of 1946, one year after the establishment of SMAD, society and the political system in the eastern zone of Germany increasingly conformed to the model of "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe. The Soviets achieved their goal of transforming the eastern zone into a relatively solid base for unchallenged Communist power. Yet to the Germans in the West, the Soviet zone was anything but a shining model of progressive policies; it was a nightmare of repression and brutality.

Then, in June 1948, the Soviet Union made its worst mistake. In reaction to the Western military governors' offering to convene a constitutional assembly for their zones and carrying out a separate currency reform (in June 1948), Stalin ordered the blockade of the roads and waterways to Berlin. The Western powers had to decide whether to abandon their plans to establish a Western government or pull out of their sectors in Berlin with a tremendous loss of prestige. The blockade risked war and was a desperate gamble. It convinced Western public opinion of the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. And the determination of the Germans in West Berlin to resist Soviet pressure had another significant impact in the West. For the first time since the war, West Germans appeared ready to opt voluntarily for the West and become reliable allies in the Cold War. When President Truman, supported by London and Paris, decided to break the blockade with a huge Allied airlift,

Stalin dared not to interfere, and his German policies were shattered. Nobody could have devised a better plan to convince the West Germans of the need to accept a provisional division of their country.

In the fall of 1949, after the establishment of the West German government, Stalin permitted the formation of the GDR, thereby sealing the division of Germany, although he had always been against it. In the great game for Germany, the Soviet Union was the loser. But, although the Soviet Union lost its chance to attract Germany into its orbit or, at least, to neutralize a united Germany, it won a crucial strategic position in the heart of Europe. The GDR served as a reliable “iron wall” that separated Poland from the West. Thereafter, the exposed western sectors of Berlin always reminded Western statesmen and FRG leaders that they were highly vulnerable to Soviet pressure.

The role of the Germans: coming to terms with partition

After the unconditional surrender, the Germans were merely the objects of Allied policy. From 1945 to 1948, they had only a minor role in a play that was staged by politicians, generals, diplomats, and economists from the occupying powers. When George Kennan, in March 1949, on the eve of the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany, took part in a meeting between the three Western military governors and the top German representatives, he commented: “To me, the spectacle of these ... meetings, the unlimited power of the one side and the abjectness of the other, was distasteful.”¹⁴ Even in the western zones, not to mention the Soviet zone, the Germans had no real choice of their own.

Nevertheless, as the rift between the West and the East deepened, it became a matter of primary importance which side in the Cold War the West Germans would choose or if they would want to stay “uncommitted” at all costs. In this respect, during the entire period of occupation the overwhelming majority of the population was strongly against the Soviet Union and its Communist German supporters. When an OMGUS poll asked in October 1947 about the German attitude toward the four Allies, 63% trusted the United States to treat Germany fairly, 45% placed their trust in the British,

¹⁴ Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950*, 433.

only 4% in the French, and none in the Soviets.¹⁵ During the years 1946–48, the German Communists proved to be unable to garner more than 5–12 percent of the vote in local or *Länder* elections in the western zones. And in one of the politically decisive local elections in all four sectors of Berlin a few months after the enforced merger of the KPD and SPD, on October 20, 1946, the SED won only 19.8 percent of the vote.

The anti-Communist feelings had many sources: traumatic experiences caused by the atrocities of the Red Army when it occupied East Germany and Berlin, the fresh memories of the refugees or of Germans expelled from East Germany, and the bad reputation of Soviet occupation policies. To a large extent, Soviet Communism was associated with rape and plunder.¹⁶ The anti-Communist fervor of the political leaders in the West also played an important role. Kurt Schumacher, the charismatic leader of the Social Democrats who had suffered nine years in Hitler's concentration camps, called the German Communists "red-painted nazis." At an executive meeting of his party on August 1, 1946, Konrad Adenauer, chairman of the CDU in the British zone, who would become the first chancellor of the Federal Republic three years later, had recognized that Stalin sought to exploit German nationalism and use it for Soviet purposes.¹⁷ Starting with this assumption, Adenauer did his best to turn his party toward the United States and the democracies of Western Europe. Although West Germans possessed grievances against the Western occupation powers, they were to a large extent united in their anti-Sovietism. Thus, Communist propaganda campaigns for national unity and against the founding of a German state in the western zones were an exercise in futility.

Yet, in the western zones, political leaders and voters were not willing to accept the permanent division of Germany. They regarded the founding of the FRG as an expedient. After all, the German Reich had existed for seventy-four years. In spite of all the catastrophes and crimes of the recent past, most Germans still regarded the Reich and German unity as supreme political values. Even in the East, neither Stalin and his followers in the ranks of the SED, nor the silent majority of suppressed Germans, ceased to call for the restoration of German unity. For the moment, Germany was divided. But

15 Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 180–81.

16 See Norman Naimark's chapter in this volume.

17 Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, vol. I, *From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952* (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995), 580–81.

how and when the division could be overcome became one of the main issues of the Cold War in Germany.

Perhaps now, from the vantage point of the twenty-first century, it is time to change our historical assessment. There were, of course, the obvious negative aspects to the division of Germany. From 1949 until the collapse of Communism in the GDR, both German states were exemplary protagonists in the Cold War. In spite of many attempts at *détente*, they could never overcome their fundamental ideological, political, economic, and cultural conflict. Twice, in 1948/49 and from 1958 to 1962, diplomatic crises over Berlin threatened to lead to an outright military confrontation. For the German people, the division was a national tragedy. After August 13, 1961, 17 million East Germans were locked behind the Wall. Most of them felt their lives were impoverished by a dysfunctional socialist economy forced upon them by the Soviet Union. And from the perspective of the captive Polish and Czechoslovak peoples, the Soviet-occupied GDR appeared as a barrier to their access to the Western democracies.

Small wonder that the negative consequences of the division of Germany have deeply influenced historical writing. For many historians the main question has been: who is to blame for the partition? The Soviets, the Americans, the British, the French? Or all four to a certain extent? When the partition was already under way, from 1945 to 1949, the controversy over responsibility for the division had been an issue of paramount importance. As is often the case, the subsequent controversies among historians have mostly recycled the political controversies of a previous era.

The antitotalitarian Cold War school in the West insisted that the division had been unavoidable since the Soviet Union was not prepared to concede human rights, true political pluralism, and a decent standard of living in the GDR. Soviet and East German historians, for their part, have criticized the integration of the western zones into the camp of aggressive Western capitalism and insisted that this was the main reason for the failure of joint occupation policies in Germany. Since the mid-1960s, in the ranks of the scholarly community of the West, a certain self-flagellation about Western policies has been conspicuous. Revisionists in the United States, Germany, and France have ridiculed the selfishness of the West: instead of giving the Soviets a fair share of reparations and of keeping the guilt-ridden Germans under strict joint control (maybe with a neutralized and demilitarized status), the United States, Britain, and, very reluctantly, France decided to give priority to West European recovery, to the return of West German capitalists, and to the establishment of a West German

state as bulwark of anti-Soviet containment. Thus, historical controversies on responsibility for the division of Germany have been as irreconcilable as the arguments that took place in the ACC or in the Council of Foreign Ministers between 1945 and 1948.

Today, two decades after the end of the Cold War, verdicts are blurred. There were four great powers – each with contrasting ideas about the shape of Europe and all with conflicting national interests – jostling over authority within a vanquished fifth great power; it is therefore not surprising that each bears some responsibility for the division of Germany. But one should not overlook the benefits, one might even say miracles. First, West Germany helped propel the economic reconstruction and political integration of Western Europe and laid a foundation for unprecedented peace and prosperity. As a result of the integration of West Germany into the framework of the Atlantic world, Franco-German rivalries were overcome, and a second miracle occurred: the conversion of most West Germans to democracy, to peacefulness, and to Western values. These outcomes, of course, had a price: the Cold



II. West German leader Konrad Adenauer.



12. East German leader Walter Ulbricht.

War and the division of Germany, with all their tensions and human tragedies. But nevertheless a third miracle also took place: in a long, tortuous, often dangerous process, the division became manageable: East and West worked out a peaceful *modus vivendi*. Eventually, in 1989/90, the four occupation powers, driven by events inside Germany, allowed for its reunification into a more integrated and peaceful Europe. From this vantage point, the initial failure of joint occupation appears in a more favorable light.¹⁸

¹⁸ For events at the end of the Cold War, see John Young's and Helga Haftendorn's chapters in volume III.

The Marshall Plan and the creation of the West

WILLIAM I. HITCHCOCK

Few US government programs have had so good a press as the Marshall Plan, which delivered some \$12.3 billion in aid to Europe between 1948 and the end of 1951. The fiftieth anniversary of the plan, in 1997, produced a flood of studies and conference reports that all shared the view, as one Marshall Plan official put it in his memoir, "that Marshall Plan dollars did save the world."¹ Calls for subsequent "Marshall Plans" for troubled regions such as the Balkans, post-1990s Russia, the Middle East, and Africa reveal the talismanic quality the very name has attained. For some decades now, scholars have been working to historicize the Marshall Plan and to take this legendary program out of the realm of myth and submit it to historical analysis. In doing so, they have significantly revised early accounts that saw the Marshall Plan as a beneficent rescue plan for war-torn Europe. For example, the economic impact of the plan has been significantly downgraded as scholars concluded that the crisis of 1947 in Europe was less grave than American policymakers had thought. Furthermore, the role of the Marshall Plan in exacerbating, perhaps precipitating, the division of Europe is now recognized, despite Marshall's initial claim that his offer of aid was not directed against any country or doctrine. The role of the Marshall Plan in promoting European economic integration has been questioned, and the demise of the plan in 1951, at a time when European economies were again facing economic crisis, inflation, and budget deficits, suggests a less-than-perfect performance. These critiques must be taken seriously. Yet in focusing narrowly on the short-term impact of the plan, they often fail to capture its historical significance. It was far more than a foreign aid program. It represented the first stage in the construction of that community of ideas, economic links, and security ties between Europe and the United States we know simply as "the West."

1 Charles Kindleberger, *Marshall Plan Days* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 247.

Origins

Though it grew into an ambitious project for European recovery, the Marshall Plan emerged primarily from the evident failures of American policy in occupied Germany. At the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union had agreed to govern defeated and occupied Germany as a single economic unit, even though they also agreed that Germany was to be divided into four zones (the fourth going to France). This contradiction, obvious even then, nonetheless was accepted as a workable program to guide a slow and carefully constrained German economic recovery while also ensuring that no central German administration would emerge to threaten the peace of Europe again. The problem with this plan was that German economic growth was vital to European economic recovery as a whole; without German coal, steel, manufacturing, and trade, the whole European network of industrial life did not have a remote chance of revival. How could the United States square the need for German economic growth with the geopolitical requirement that Germany be occupied, divided, and controlled? Until the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in March–April 1947, American administrators in Washington and Germany tried to find a middle ground between punishment and reconstruction. They failed, not least because two of their partners, the Soviet Union and France, insisted on a harsh occupation arrangement that was designed to hobble German industry permanently, while their British ally, with whom the United States fused its zone of occupation into a jointly run bizon, was calling for an easing of industrial restrictions so as to lower the costs that the overstretched British Exchequer was paying for the occupation. Between these two competing views, the Americans themselves were torn between a desire to impose a tough occupation regime and a growing anxiety that to do so might make Germany vulnerable to political instability, Communist subversion, and Soviet machinations.

By the beginning of 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, prodded by a number of his immediate advisers, notably Under Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, Policy Planning Staff director George F. Kennan, and Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William L. Clayton, began to see the need for a clear break with the ambivalent policies that the Potsdam agreement had generated. This was not only because Germany's own fate seemed to hang in the balance, but also because the overall European picture was threatening to American interests. The Truman Doctrine of March 1947 had announced an aid policy to Greece and Turkey in defiant tones: the

United States must be willing, President Harry S. Truman told the US Congress, “to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.”² This assertion echoed across the continent. In France and Italy, powerful Communist Parties organized strikes and protests against the reigning centrist governments, while the economic health of these European states had not apparently improved since the end of the war. Foodstuffs and coal were in short supply throughout Europe, and the piecemeal aid the Americans and British had offered through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and short-term grants had failed to generate self-sustaining recovery. It was time, Marshall believed, to use Germany as an engine to power a broader European recovery. “The recovery of Europe,” he told the American people in his radio address of April 28, 1947, upon returning from the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, “has been far slower than expected. Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. So I believe that action cannot await compromise through exhaustion. New issues arise daily. Whatever action is possible to meet these pressing problems must be taken without delay.”³

Bolstered by reports from his Policy Planning Staff and Under Secretary Clayton – whose May 27 memorandum to the secretary declared that “we grossly underestimated the destruction of the European economy by the war” – Marshall decided to go public.⁴ On June 5, 1947, Marshall delivered a brief speech at the commencement exercises at Harvard University. What is notable about this address is its emphasis on an integrated, coherent solution to Europe’s economic problems. “The remedy,” Marshall said, “lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole.” Carefully avoiding the specific issue of Germany, he said that the United

2 President Truman’s address to a Joint Session of Congress on March 12, 1947, can be viewed at www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/5-9.pdf#zoom=100.

3 Quoted in John Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976), 199.

4 US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972), vol. III, 230–32 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

States' purpose was "the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist." The Americans wanted to "find a cure rather than a palliative"; and to this end would help Europeans in drafting a Europe-wide plan for recovery.⁵

Marshall had already concluded that Germany would have to be mobilized in the effort of European recovery; and he anticipated that the only way to persuade France and other Europeans to accept this strategy was to create new institutions that would oversee and shape a balanced European recovery. An integrated approach, involving European cooperation, was also the best way to persuade Congress to increase funding for European recovery. Obviously, the Soviet Union would object; Marshall knew this because the Soviets had objected steadily to American proposals for an upward revision of German industrial activity and to the creation of any central German political institutions. Marshall could have had no illusions that the Soviet Union would perceive his European aid plan as an affront and an open break with four-power policies in Germany, which it was. Potsdam was dead; the Marshall Plan era had begun.

Of course, a number of crucial battles remained to be fought, both international and bureaucratic. Marshall's ideas had to be presented to the Europeans; they had to take up his invitation to act; and Congress had to create legislation giving life to Marshall's proposals. These multiple lines of action occupied the period from July 1947 to April 1948. In a hastily arranged conference in Paris in late June, British foreign minister Ernest Bevin, French foreign minister Georges Bidault, and Soviet foreign minister Viacheslav Molotov convened to discuss a European response to Marshall's June 5 speech. Bevin and Bidault were eager to make Marshall's plan work, even though they each had concerns about precisely what "integration" meant. But Molotov was wholly, indeed ideologically, opposed to the underlying premise of economic integration, common purpose, and transparency in his dealings with capitalist states. After a few days of trying to divide the French from the British, Molotov realized the Soviets were facing a common front: the Europeans wanted American help, and were willing to let Washington lead. Molotov and his legions of advisers withdrew from the Paris meetings and, in a massive strategic blunder, announced that the Soviet Union would not participate in the plan.

5 Quoted in Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York: Viking, 1955), 34–35.

Molotov's withdrawal opened the way for Bevin and Bidault to arrange a meeting of sixteen European nations that did wish to participate in a European recovery plan.⁶ Opening on 12 July, the meeting quickly created the Committee on European Economic Cooperation (CEEC). The CEEC was a cockpit of competing national economic interests, as the major states began to fight over precisely how much aid they needed, and how their own national recovery programs would deploy that aid in the common cause of European recovery. Nonetheless, throughout the summer of 1947, Europeans were talking openly and passionately about a plan for continental recovery in which CEEC states would work together: this marked a major turning point in the history of postwar Europe.

The CEEC final report requested \$19.3 billion in aid over four years; the Truman administration in turn sought \$17 billion; but Congress in the end appropriated \$5.3 billion for the first year and asked the administration to return for subsequent requests on an annual basis. This came only after a good deal of bargaining between the Truman administration and Congress, in which a small but vocal band of critics, on both Left and Right, assailed the plan. The Economic Cooperation Act of April 1948 authorized the European Recovery Program (ERP) and created the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to implement it. The European participants were grouped together in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), designed to coordinate progress toward the goals of the ERP. It is worth noting the language of the act that authorized the Marshall Plan, because it contains nomenclature that would become part of the fabric of postwar international relations, thanks to Marshall's initiative. The act stated that "the restoration or maintenance in European countries of principles of individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence rests largely upon the establishment of sound economic conditions, stable international economic relationships, and the achievement by the countries of Europe of a healthy economy independent of extraordinary outside assistance." European recovery required a "strong production effort, the expansion of foreign trade, the creation and maintenance of internal financial stability, and the development of economic cooperation, including all possible steps to establish and maintain equitable rates of

6 The countries were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, and the US-UK bizone of Germany.

exchange and to bring about the progressive elimination of trade barriers.”⁷ What had begun as a short speech at Harvard in June 1947, calling for a plan for European recovery, had emerged by April 1948 as a massive undertaking: in Michael Hogan’s words, the United States now undertook “nothing less than a major reorganization of the European state system into a more viable framework for controlling the Germans, containing the Soviets and putting the continental countries on the road to economic recovery and multilateral trade.”⁸

The economic impact of the Marshall Plan

If the narrative of events leading up to the announcement of the Marshall Plan is largely uncontested by historians, the plan’s impact remains a subject of serious debate. The question can be phrased simply: as Alan Milward put it, “was the Marshall Plan necessary?”⁹ Dean Acheson wrote in his memoirs that he and Will Clayton and Secretary Marshall had all concluded that Europe in 1947 was on the brink of “headlong destruction,” and that, unless something were done, “millions of people would soon die, creating a chaos of bloodshed and disorder.”¹⁰ This view of the European economic situation in 1947 was, we now know, overstated. In fact, thanks to the detailed research of Milward and numerous other scholars working in the archives of West European states, it is evident that the Marshall Plan was not, strictly speaking, necessary to restart the European economies. Despite the anguished prognostications of Clayton and Acheson, by the end of 1947, both Britain and France had reached or surpassed their prewar levels of industrial production. Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, among others, would do so by the end of 1948. Even when the slower performance of divided and occupied Germany is factored in, Europe had matched its prewar industrial production by mid-1948. Since the ERP did not become law until April 1948, and since Marshall Plan aid did not start arriving in Europe until May and June of that year, Marshall aid cannot be said to have restarted European economic growth.

7 *United States Statutes at Large, 1948* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1949), vol. 62, 137.

8 Michael J. Hogan, “European Integration and German Reintegration: Marshall Planners and the Search for Recovery and Security in Western Europe,” in Charles Maier and Günter Bischoff (eds.), *The Marshall Plan and Germany* (New York: Berg, 1991), 116.

9 Alan Milward, “Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?,” *Diplomatic History*, 13, 2 (1989), 231–53.


10 Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department*, (New York: Norton, 1969), 231–32.

Furthermore, once Marshall aid began, it remained a small fraction of the total gross national product of the recipient countries. In its first year of operation, from July 1948 to June 1949, Marshall aid represented 2.4% of Britain's GNP, 6.5% of France's, 5.3% of Italy's, and only 2.9% of West Germany's. The country with the highest figure was Austria, where Marshall aid amounted to 14% of GNP in that year. Marshall aid was essential, however, in addressing Europe's serious dollar shortfall in 1947, which was created, as Milward definitively showed, by Europe's sudden resurgence: in restarting production, Europeans began to draw in products and raw materials from overseas that they could not yet pay for, their dollar reserves having been long depleted. This shortfall of dollars threatened to halt Europe's recovery, and it was with this fairly narrow problem in mind that American planners in the State Department framed the idea of a large American aid program to Europe.

This argument, however, in no way demeans the impact of the Marshall Plan. It only obliges us to be more precise: Marshall aid did not restart European economic growth, but it allowed European states to continue along a path of industrial expansion and investment in heavy industry upon which they had already started, while at the same time putting into place a costly but politically essential welfare state to which all West European governments were committed.¹¹ Marshall aid allowed European governments to move with some confidence to effect a transformation in Europe's economic life, away from the cautious, deflationary 1930s to the Keynesian, high-investment strategies of the 1950s. In this sense, Marshall aid gave Europeans choices that they might not otherwise have had.

The economic impact of the Marshall Plan varied from country to country. France probably provides the best example of a country in which Marshall aid had an extremely advantageous "knock-on" effect. France used Marshall aid to support the Monnet Plan, an ambitious program of industrial investment and expansion that had been outlined by Jean Monnet in 1946. It was a state-designed scheme to channel investment into key sectors of the economy such as steel and coal production, railway and transport, cement, housing, and agriculture. Marshall aid allowed France to cover its yawning dollar deficit, which in turn allowed the French government to continue to invest in the Monnet Plan. Some 67 percent of Marshall aid in France was used to obtain raw materials vital for continued industrial production, such as coal, oil, and

11 Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 54.



2. Industrial production in countries receiving Marshall aid, 1947–1950 (1938 = 100).

Source: United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1950* (Geneva, 1951), 30–31.

cotton, as well as for purchasing machinery and vehicles. As a result of this strong commitment to heavy industry, French industrial output continued to climb throughout the Marshall Plan period: in 1951, it exceeded by 42 percent the level of 1938. Exports began to pick up, so that, by 1950, France was exporting almost as much as it was importing (though it continued to have a large deficit with the United States). Marshall aid was also used in France to help cover some of the national debt, which because of an inefficient tax system France could not do by internal revenues. This eased, though it did not cure, the constant inflationary problems that France faced in this period by limiting the amount that the Treasury had to borrow to cover the debt. On strictly economic grounds, then, the Marshall Plan experience in France proved a major success.

In Britain and Italy, the record was more modest. Britain received the largest amount of Marshall aid, at some \$2.8 billion. Yet the British economy was much larger than that of any other recipient, and Marshall aid amounted to no more than 2 percent of GNP overall. It was even smaller than the American loan of 1946. By 1948, the British economy was well on its way

toward viability, with exports having recovered well thanks to the heavy demand in Europe and the colonies for British manufactured goods. By 1948, Britain had reached a current account balance. Unlike France, Britain did not have an urgent political need for aid, as it was not facing a Communist challenge from within. Nonetheless, British officials still wanted Marshall aid, and felt it would provide the critical margin during a time of economic fragility. Because the government had pursued such a severe restriction of imports, the British people were constantly short of foodstuffs. British officials thus planned to spend much of the Marshall aid on staples such as wheat, tobacco, maize, barley and oats, meat and bacon, cotton, and edible oils and fats. Overall, 30% of Marshall aid in Britain was spent on foodstuffs, compared with only 10% in France. A large portion of the remaining sum was spent on paying down the national debt. Such was the basic health of the British economy that Marshall aid was stopped in December 1950.

Italy's experience in the Marshall aid period was altogether different from that of Britain and France. Italy, after all, was a former enemy and a defeated power. The effort to regain international standing and domestic legitimacy preoccupied the Christian Democratic governments that dominated Italian politics after the expulsion of the Communists in May 1947. The government of Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi therefore sought to distance itself from the statist, interventionist economic policies of the Fascist period, and from the sharp inflation that Italy had suffered in the last years of the war. De Gasperi outlined no urgent, state-financed program of national recovery, as Monnet had done in France. Instead, De Gasperi followed the lead of his ultra-orthodox budget minister Luigi Einaudi in attacking inflation first and restoring the stability of the currency. Einaudi wanted to balance the budget and trade deficit not through increased production but with sharp cuts in government expenditure – precisely the opposite approach taken in France. For De Gasperi, this was smart politics: it appealed to the middle and upper classes in Italy, who were gratified at the appearance of sound money policies and now rallied firmly to the Christian Democrats. The working class, which bore the brunt of these deflationary policies in the form of higher unemployment, were in any case already hostile to the De Gasperi regime.

The Italian government therefore looked upon American aid with some caution. Of course, the aid itself was welcome, especially the large quantities of bread grains, oil and coal, cotton, and machinery that the ERP provided from 1948 to 1951. At the same time, however, Einaudi steadfastly refused to accept American advice on using Marshall aid to “kick-start” the Italian economy. Fearful that a large state-financed investment program would

aggravate inflation, the Italian government during the Marshall Plan period undertook to finance only reconstruction efforts, and put little investment into new manufacturing capacity. This they left to the private capital markets, which were still moribund. Unlike the French government, which had pumped huge sums into heavy industry – and was suffering high inflation because of it – Italy restricted public investment, a policy that slowed expansion and contributed to unemployment. Large quantities of the “counterpart” funds – the lire that the Italian government earned from selling Marshall Plan goods in Italy – were merely put in the bank to bolster Italy’s reserves and strengthen the currency; too little of the aid made its way to industrial modernization. Only after two years of wrangling with the Americans did Italian officials agree to begin shifting counterpart funds into public-works projects, industry, and agriculture. Moreover, Italy did not lay out a long-term plan for recovery until 1955 – three years after the end of the Marshall Plan. Italy during the Marshall Plan period offers little support to the legend of an American rescue of postwar Europe. Italians took the aid but failed to use it well – and the Americans discovered to their surprise that they had little leverage to compel Italy to do so.

The dramatic postwar recovery of the Federal Republic of Germany seems at first sight to offer a clear case for the benefits of Marshall aid. In the ten years from 1948 to 1958, West Germany passed through a transformation so great, so swift, that it soon came to be called the *Wirtschaftswunder* – “economic miracle.” In the 1950s, industrial production tripled and unemployment sank from over 10% to less than 4%. Exports increased so much – sixfold – that, by 1960, the FRG was responsible for 10% of the world’s total exports, more than Britain and second only to the United States. From 1950 to 1960, the GNP increased at an average annual rate of 7.9%. Surely, this swift recovery owes something to Marshall aid?

The answer is not clear-cut, and there has been some considerable debate about the role of Marshall aid in German postwar recovery. Germany, it would seem, profited from a convergence of positive trends that opened the way for a swift economic expansion after 1948. The German economy was not entirely shattered by the war, and still had significant industrial stock intact at its end; Germany also profited from an immense pool of labor, the product of the postwar migration from the eastern zone at the end of the war. But the real trigger for German growth was the currency reform of June 1948. During the war, the Nazi leadership pumped Reichsmarks into the economy with heavily inflationary effects. By 1945, with German industry at a standstill, there were far too many old marks chasing very few goods. The currency’s value

collapsed and Germans fell back on bartering and the black market. In 1948, the Western powers – the Soviets would have none of it – agreed to withdraw all the old bills and replace them with a new Deutsche Mark at about a ten-to-one ratio. Thus, some 90 percent of the currency was withdrawn from circulation overnight. The new bills, printed in the United States and secretly shipped to Germany, were introduced on June 20, 1948. The effect was immediate. The new currency had genuine purchasing power. Workers returned to their jobs, absenteeism dropped, and productivity surged. The black market disappeared, as those who had goods to sell would now exchange them for the new currency. Shops filled up with goods that hitherto had been hoarded or stashed away. Factory managers could now look forward to earning hard currency for their goods instead of the worthless Reichsmarks. Economics minister Ludwig Erhard took the bold step of abolishing rations and price controls on most consumer goods, demonstrating his strong faith in the power of the free market to meet consumer demand.

If the currency reform was a sort of starting pistol for the takeoff of the German economy, Marshall aid played a crucial role in clearing a path down which the Germans could run. Just as in Britain in 1946 and France in 1947, Germany's sudden recovery in mid-1948 triggered a payments crisis, as Germans went on a buying spree and began drawing in large amounts of imports. Marshall aid, and earlier American grants, both covered a great deal of Germany's import needs: 70% in 1946–47, 65% in 1948, and 43% in 1949. In addition to helping Germans pay for their imports, the Marshall Plan gave a kick-start to industrial recovery through the use of counterpart funds. The German government sold US-financed goods to consumers, and then placed those marks in a separate account. These funds, still controlled by Washington officials, were then reinvested in industries that badly needed an influx of capital, such as electricity, coal-mining, agriculture, housing, railways, and shipping. Once new US-backed capital started to flow in to certain industries, the private capital markets in Germany soon followed suit. German money followed American money, and the result was a swift restoration of German industrial production – so swift in fact that the Germans were running a trade surplus by 1951. US aid, though modest in size – Germany received only half the aid given to Britain and France – kept German recovery moving. As historian Charles Maier put it, Marshall aid acted “like the lubricant in an engine – not the fuel – allowing a machine to run that would otherwise buckle and bind.”¹²

12 Charles S. Maier, “The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe,” *American Historical Review*, 86, 2 (April 1981), 342.



13. Marshall Plan freight cars arrive at the German town of Furth im Wald, near the Czech border.

In France, Britain, Italy, and Germany, Marshall aid was deployed by national governments in a context framed by national politics and priorities: Washington could cajole, and sometimes insist, but the real decisions on how to deploy the aid were left to European governments. With respect to economic policy, Marshall aid was, as one historian has written, Washington's "feeble weapon."¹³ But this was precisely part of the genius of the scheme. In restoring economic choices to Europeans, the Marshall Plan also restored political choices. American aid helped boost economic activity and gave the parties of the center-right that had won this generous support credibility and

13 Chiarella Esposito, *America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948-1950* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994).

legitimacy. Marshall aid gave the Christian Democrats (and their Socialist allies) in France, Italy, and later West Germany a chance to bring home the bacon. This they did, and a grateful electorate in turn rewarded these centrist parties with success at the ballot box, thereby ushering in an era of close ties between the United States and the reviving West European states.

Ripple effects: the Marshall Plan and the creation of the West

While the precise economic achievements of the Marshall Plan remain contested, historians nonetheless agree that the plan's political, strategic, and even cultural impact was enormous. Like a series of concentric circles rippling outward from a central node, the impact of the plan carried far beyond the narrow scope of the aid package so vaguely outlined in Harvard Yard in June 1947.

The most immediate political-strategic impact of the Marshall Plan was visible in the United States' German policy. The Harvard speech did not focus on Germany explicitly, but behind that message lay a sharp break with what had come before; the policy of Potsdam and the slow, heavily constrained German economic recovery it implied was now discarded. At the heart of the Marshall Plan lay an argument that European recovery as a whole could not proceed without a vibrant German economy as its engine. The corollary was true as well: the western part of Germany would not long remain quiescent and pliable unless it was given a role in the broader process of European revival. Marshall's proposal laid bare – and repudiated – the central contradiction of American policy up to June 1947, and acknowledged that there could not be a European recovery without Germany to underpin it. From a political point of view, then, Marshall's speech marked the birth announcement of a West German state, though in fact that achievement lay two years in the future.¹⁴

The implementation of this strategy had a number of overlapping stages: the upward revision of Germany's level of industrial production in the summer of 1947; the inclusion of the British–American bizone (the French, for the time being, kept separate control of their own zone) in the emerging Europe-wide agreements on trade and payments that were outlined at the CEEC; the expansion of powers given to German political authorities within the bizone in January 1948; and the inclusion of the bizone in the establishment

¹⁴ For further analysis of Germany's position, see Hans-Peter Schwarz's chapter in this volume.

of the newly formed OEEC itself in April 1948. Of the OEEC, General Lucius Clay, the military governor, noted that “for the first time since surrender, western Germany was a participant in an international undertaking.”¹⁵

The new American emphasis on placing Germany at the center of a Europe-wide recovery plan was most evident at the London Conference in 1948, where the United States, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg convened to discuss a long agenda of European issues. From February to March, and then again from May to June, the conferees negotiated precisely how the new Germany was to be *both* controlled and granted some political and economic autonomy. Secretary Marshall and his lieutenants pushed the argument that German recovery could bring security and prosperity to Western Europe; without it, Western Europe would continue to live in fear of an unstable, mercurial Germany, nursing grievances and playing a middle game between East and West. Using the Marshall Plan as a stick as well as a carrot – the Congress passed the ECA in April, right in the midst of the London Conference – the Americans demanded the fusion of the bizon with the French zone of occupation, and agreement on a plan to allow a Constituent Assembly in Germany draw up a federal constitution. As a concession, the Americans accepted the creation of an International Authority that would oversee and control coal and steel production in the industry-heavy Ruhr Valley – a vital French demand – though even this authority would be largely advisory, with no real power. By the end of the London meetings in June 1948, the United States had brought Britain, France, and the nascent German leadership toward a consensus on creating a West German state, partially sovereign, and linked to the West by economic integration.

Can it be said then that the Marshall Plan effectively started the Cold War? No; the chapter in this volume by Vladimir O. Pechatnov makes it clear that US-Soviet relations had already worsened severely during 1946.¹⁶ Yet the Marshall Plan surely marked a point of no return. It demonstrated that the Americans had made a clear choice to favor a strong German recovery as the engine of a West European recovery favorable to US interests. The Soviets, meanwhile, saw the plan as part of an American bid for economic and strategic hegemony that required a swift reaction. Moscow insisted that its own satellite states in Eastern Europe reject Marshall aid, and ordered West European Communist Parties to ratchet up their demonstrations, propaganda, and strikes. Within the Soviet sphere of influence in the East, Stalin

¹⁵ Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1950), 216.

¹⁶ See Vladimir O. Pechatnov's chapter in this volume.

became far less accommodating to any ideological deviation from the rigid line laid down by the Cominform, the Soviet-dominated association of Communist Parties, in September 1947. This played into the hands of the hardliners throughout Eastern Europe and culminated in the Prague coup of February 1948, when Stalin's Communist allies in Czechoslovakia engineered the overthrow of the last multiparty government in Eastern Europe. The Soviets radicalized their German policy as well. They denounced the London accord of June 1948 as a breach with wartime and postwar accords, which of course it was. Using the currency reform in the western zones as an excuse, the Soviets cut off land access into and out of the western sectors of Berlin. The Berlin blockade and subsequent airlift completed the transformation of the American role in Germany from occupier to protector. Progress toward fusion of all three zones, the creation of German government institutions, and the promulgation of the Federal Republic of Germany on May 23, 1949 was swift. It may be too much to state that the Marshall Plan started the Cold War, whose many roots reached back across a wide acreage of wartime and postwar distrust and rivalry. But from June 1947 on, the United States set a course for a western German state and a capitalist European economic revival that confirmed the division of Europe.

Just as the Marshall Plan led directly to the creation of a western German state and the division of Europe, so too did it spur new European security plans that would lead directly to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).¹⁷ The principal architect here was not, however, Secretary Marshall, but the able British foreign minister Ernest Bevin. Bevin, who described Marshall's plan as "a lifeline to sinking men," had played the key role in getting the CEEC up and running. Yet he also saw immediately the security implications of the plan. If Washington was now committed to a western German revival and perhaps an independent state, Bevin wanted to be sure that Washington would also deal with any adverse consequences, especially mounting Soviet threats to Western Europe. On December 15, 1947, Bevin told Marshall he wanted to see the formation of "a western democratic system comprising the Americans, ourselves, France, Italy, etc., and of course the Dominions. This would not be a formal alliance but an understanding backed by power, money, and resolute action. It would be a sort of spiritual federation of the West." In a formal paper, Bevin proposed the creation of a Western Union, including not just the core West European countries but old

17 For further analysis of the origins of NATO, see the chapters by Anne Deighton and Melvyn P. Leffler in this volume.

foes such as Germany, Spain, and Portugal, as well as all the Scandinavian countries. This, he believed, was the only way “to call a halt to the Soviet threat.”¹⁸ This proposal was well in advance of American ideas. The State Department, then seeking a Congressional commitment of many billions of dollars for Europe, did not want to begin lobbying for a military alliance as well. The Americans responded by giving Bevin their blessing, but refusing any outright support for his alliance scheme. This came as a blow to Bevin, who realized that, without American membership, any European security system would be a hollow shell.

Bevin’s vision for a Western alliance was given a huge and quite unintentional boost by the Prague coup, which galvanized West European leaders. On March 17, 1948, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Pact, a mutual defense agreement, and Bevin again urged the United States to join in a broader Atlantic security system to “inspire the necessary confidence to consolidate the West against Soviet infiltration.” The alternative, Bevin pointedly declared in a memo to the US State Department, “is to repeat our experiences with Hitler and to witness the slow deterioration of our position.”¹⁹ In what has become a case study of “empire by invitation,” Bevin and Bidault were positively begging for an assertion of US military power into Europe to defend them from what they perceived to be a determined Soviet campaign of expansion.²⁰ If there were any doubts about the Soviet menace, the Berlin blockade quickly dispelled them. The blockade was a massive miscalculation, for it gave Bevin yet another opportunity to plead for a formal military commitment from the United States. In mid-July 1948, the Western powers began exploratory talks on the creation of a Western alliance. The chief obstacle to the alliance was hesitation in the US Congress over weakening the constitutional authority of that body to engage the United States in a war on behalf of an ally. This issue was gradually resolved, and the result, in April 1949, was NATO, composed of twelve members.²¹ It would not have been created without Bevin’s determination and the bungling tactics of the Soviets; but NATO also sprang from a shared belief that the economic community being created by the Marshall Plan would be strengthened by a mutual defense pact alongside it. Like the ERP, NATO was an expression of

18 *FRUS*, 1948, vol. III, 1, 4–6.

19 *Ibid.*, 32–5, 46–8.

20 This term was coined by Geir Lundestad, in “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 23 (1986), 263–77.

21 The twelve original members were Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States.

transatlantic solidarity, a pact between the United States and Western Europe that underscored a common set of values and governing principles.

The Marshall Plan's long-term ripple effects reached out beyond Germany and US alliance policies. The plan also shaped the evolution of internal European politics, the process of European integration, and, by legitimizing a particular economic model of production and consumption, opened the way to the Americanization of Europe.

The Marshall Plan clearly impacted the internal political dynamics in a number of recipient states. In France and Italy, the powerful Communist Parties were obliged by Stalin's Cominform to align their policies with the Soviet bloc, which proved politically disastrous for them. By championing strikes and disruptions of American shipments of grain, tractors, and aid, the Communists put themselves at odds with a needy population; they also pushed away the moderate socialist parties which, in 1945, had been eager to carry a broad left-wing alliance, Popular Front-style, into the period of reconstruction. American tactics could sometimes be crude, as in the manipulation of the Italian elections of 1948, where covert funding of anti-Communist parties may have tipped the balance toward the Christian Democrats; but usually such measures were not necessary. The Marshall Plan forced European parties to choose between Moscow and Washington: all but the Communists chose Washington. By 1948, the Left was decisively split, with the Communists in opposition everywhere and the socialist parties firmly enlisted in the pro-Western camp. The beneficiaries of this leftist strife were the Christian Democrats and affiliated liberal parties, whose right-leaning, often Catholic leaders such as Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault in France, Alcide De Gasperi in Italy, Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard in West Germany, and Dirk Stikker of the Netherlands held power and key Cabinet posts well into the 1950s. Marshall aid helped create a cadre of Atlanticist leaders who shaped postwar Europe.

The Marshall Plan also had a catalytic effect on the process of European integration. The ERP, by placing Germany at the forefront of Europe's recovery, compelled France, Germany's perennial rival, to seek out new methods of international control that would block the emergence of a dominant Germany inside Europe. To France's dismay, the OEEC, on which the Americans had initially placed such high hopes, never evolved into a Europe-wide control authority. The British, eager to defend the integrity of the sterling bloc and their global network of financial and imperial controls, blocked any serious integration of Britain's economy with the European continent. The OEEC remained a talking shop, with no powers to compel

trade liberalization or currency stabilization. The French therefore felt somewhat bereft: Germany was recovering at a dramatic rate, but the hoped-for “web” of transnational controls was nowhere to be found. Still worse from the French point of view, the Americans and British were by the start of 1950 beginning to think about ways to enroll Germany into the Western alliance. The French greatly feared the rearmament of Germany and its entry into the alliance. Not only might such a policy provoke an armed response from the Soviets, but it would also tilt the balance of power in Europe in Germany’s favor; in addition to having a powerful economy, the Germans might soon possess a new, American-supplied army as well. What use would Germany have then for European cooperation? The Americans seemed determined to place West Germany at the center of its Cold War strategy, while Britain was unwilling to provide any counterweight to Germany inside a unified Europe.

Monnet, the creative, energetic director of the French economic recovery agency, suggested a solution to French foreign minister Schuman: France and Germany, and any other willing state in Western Europe, should pool their coal and steel industries, placing them under the international, binding control of a High Authority. In a stroke, Monnet believed, the long wrangle over Germany’s coal and steel production would be swept away. Germany would enter on equal terms into a novel arrangement with France, signifying a joint partnership in a program of industrial expansion. French anxieties would be eased because German industry, should it expand rapidly, would pull France and the rest of Europe along with it. The High Authority would contain Germany: by controlling coal and steel – the sinews of power in the 1950s European economy – it would in effect preside over a new balance of economic power in Europe. But it would do so in a constructive framework rather than through a humiliating military occupation. It would offer an olive branch to Germany while placating French anxieties over German recovery; and it would please the Americans, who had been urging Schuman to take just such a bold step.

On May 9, 1950, Schuman announced a proposal for the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community, which in due course became the cornerstone of the new Europe. The divergent reactions in Washington and London to Schuman’s plan reveal how far apart these two governments had drifted with respect to European integration. The US ambassador in Paris, David Bruce, hailed the plan as “the most constructive thing done by the French government since the Liberation.” The response in Britain, by contrast, was hostile and peevish. Bevin seethed with anger at having been ambushed in this way; the Foreign Office felt France had “behaved extremely

badly in springing this proposal on the world at this juncture without any attempt at consultation.” The British feared that France and Germany were reviving an old dream of a Franco-German cartel in Europe, one with profound implications for Britain’s own economy. Britain refused to join subsequent talks on the plan, in principle opposed to a scheme in which decisionmaking would be placed in the hands of a supranational body that was, as Prime Minister Clement Attlee put it, “utterly undemocratic and responsible to nobody.”²²

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had six founding members: France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries. The ECSC placed the coal and steel sectors of these states under a common, supranational authority whose purpose was to rationalize and modernize production, making the industry more efficient while removing decisionmaking from the hands of national governments. It started operations in August 1952, headquartered in Luxembourg, and with Monnet as its first chairman. The Marshall Plan did not author the Coal and Steel Community; rather, the ECSC was called into being precisely because the American plan for continental integration through the OEEC had stalled, while German economic recovery was surging ahead. But American officials took enormous satisfaction in the fact that France had become an advocate of the principles behind the ERP: that a Europe bound together by trade and coordinated economic policy would be prosperous and peaceful.²³

By promoting the rise of centrist political leaders and laying the groundwork for new international mechanisms of trade, modernization, and industrial growth, the Marshall Plan also contributed, perhaps decisively, to the Americanization of Europe. This term suggests more than simply the exchange of “productivity teams” of European and American industrialists, the screening of films about American factories, or sending traveling caravans into the French countryside to extol the virtues of American productivity – all of which were projects undertaken through the ERP. In the years during and after the Marshall Plan, on a broad front, European governments moved to change the way their peoples worked, produced, and consumed. They lowered tariff barriers to trade within Europe; they adopted American management style in

22 Bruce and Bevin cited in William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 129; Attlee cited in Derek Urwin, *The Community of Europe* (London: Longman, 1991), 46.

23 For further discussion of European integration, see N. Piers Ludlow’s chapter in volume II.

their businesses; they joined in the creation and expansion of multinational corporations, developed higher productivity standards, and eventually began to adopt American-inspired antitrust, deregulation, and privatization policies. The fact that Europeans also began to drink Coca-Cola, wear blue jeans, and watch American films were only symptoms of a deeper convergence among Western states of their habits of production and consumption. Europe and the United States, so different from one another before 1939, began to merge into a genuine transnational community that valued economic growth, security, high standards of living, and mass consumption. These had been the ideas promoted explicitly by the original missionaries of the Marshall Plan.

The Marshall Plan in history

In a narrow sense, the Marshall Plan was not long-lived. With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the American political establishment began a swift rearmament program and pushed the Europeans to do the same. Prices of commodities soared and the hard-pressed Europeans once again found themselves facing dollar shortfalls, budget deficits, and inflation – the very conditions the ECA had been designed to fix. The internal political environment in Washington also changed: Republicans gained seats in Congress and launched an attack on the multilateralist conceptions of Marshall aid. Congress created the Mutual Security Agency to replace the ECA, which it did at the end of 1951, and insisted that military rearmament be made the United States' chief foreign aid goal.

For the next three years, the diplomacy between Europe and the United States focused on securing a German contribution to European defense. Only after a bitter dispute was agreement reached and in 1955, ten years after the end of World War II, West Germany was brought into the NATO alliance. The officers who had served in the ECA and had promoted economic integration as a solution to European recovery were saddened and alarmed to see how the ERP had become militarized. But in the end, Germany's enrollment in NATO served the cause of European solidarity well: Germany turned out to be a vital partner in NATO, and the alliance knit European militaries closely together. Meanwhile, the Marshall Plan had helped generate momentum on a parallel track, toward genuine European economic integration, which took concrete form in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. It would take another thirty-five years before anything like a "united" Europe would be realized; and even today intense national rivalries over economic policy persist within Europe. Indeed, the construction of the West has not been easy or

swift. What can be said is that the vision of a Europe closely bound together in common purpose, premised on democratic governance, the free exchange of goods and services, and enduring transatlantic ties to the United States has been more fully realized than anyone could conceivably have imagined when George Marshall sketched out a plan to help Europe at the Harvard commencement on June 5, 1947.

The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, 1944–1953

NORMAN NAIMARK

The great Soviet victories at Stalingrad (January 1943) and Kursk (July 1943) reversed the tide of the war against the Nazis and made it likely that Soviet armies would occupy vast stretches of territory in Europe. Allied conferences at Teheran in November 1944 and Yalta in February 1945, and the notorious “percentages agreement” between Iosif Stalin and Winston Churchill in October 1944, confirmed that Eastern Europe, initially at least, would lie within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. Communists in the region also assumed that their countries would fall under Soviet sway in one form or another. Milovan Djilas famously recorded Stalin’s assertion during a wartime conversation: “This war is not as in the past: whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.”¹ Georgi Dimitrov, head of the Soviet Central Committee’s Department of International Information, noted in late January 1945 that Stalin expected a war with the capitalist world within two decades of the Nazi defeat, and therefore it would be necessary to maintain a strong alliance among the Slavic countries of Eastern Europe to counter that aggression.²

Yet there is very little evidence that Stalin had firm notions in 1944–45 about developing some sort of Communist bloc in Eastern Europe after the war. Instead, he probably shared many of the suppositions of two of the major policy-planning documents to emerge from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during World War II, Maxim Litvinov’s “Memorandum” of January 11, 1945, and Ivan Maisky’s “Note” of January 10, 1944. The Litvinov document was prepared in association with the Yalta Conference and explored the possibility of establishing an agreement about three spheres of influence on the continent. Linked to

1 Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962), 114.

2 Georgi Dimitrov, *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949*, ed. Ivo Banac (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 357–58.

the Soviet Union would be a zone in the east and north, including Finland, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. A second zone would be dominated by Britain and would include the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Most interesting was the “neutral” sphere, which included Germany as well as Denmark, Norway, Austria, and Italy. In this sphere the great powers would share responsibility for the security of the area, cooperating on issues of reparations and trade.³ According to the Maisky note, continental Europe would inevitably transform itself into a series of socialist states, but, barring armed conflict, it would take somewhere between thirty and fifty years for this evolution to take place. Meanwhile, cooperation with the United States and Britain was critical for setting up democratic regimes and functioning economies in formerly Fascist and Fascist-occupied countries.⁴

To those East European Communists who spent the war years in Moscow, the advance of Soviet armies into Eastern Europe meant that they would have the opportunity to vie for political leadership in their homelands. They did not take it for granted that they would instantly come to power as a result of Soviet victory and occupation. Instead, in Moscow, in the underground, and in prison camps, East European Communists developed strategies to cooperate with other anti-Fascist parties of the Left and center to form national fronts to liberate their countries and to build new and “truly democratic” political systems. They would cooperate with socialist, populist, and democratic parties to bring about an anti-Fascist democratic revolution.

This was also Moscow’s line at the end of the war, which was implemented by Dimitrov and his staff of mostly foreign-born Communists.⁵ Broadcast over radio and communicated by telegrams, brochures, and newspapers all over Eastern and East Central Europe, the policy was unambiguous. There would be no Communist revolution in Eastern Europe and no dictatorship of the proletariat; no workers’ councils (soviets) were to be formed. Instead, the East European revolution would see the completion of the 1848 bourgeois democratic revolution, bringing to an end the remnants of feudalism in the region. Free of the influence of the landholding class and big capital, the will of the people would be expressed through democratically elected parliaments. The rights of peasants and workers would be guaranteed by constitutional law.

3 G. P. Kynin and I. Laufer (eds.), *SSSR i germanskoi vopros 1941–1949* [The USSR and the German Question 1941–1949], vol. I, (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1996), 595–96.

4 T. V. Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor v vostochnoi evrope, 1944–1953* [The Soviet Factor in Eastern Europe 1944–1953], 2 vols. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999), vol. I, 23–48.

5 For Stalin’s foreign policies, see Vladimir O. Pechatnov’s chapter in this volume.

Communist Parties would operate in coalitions with agrarians, socialists, and true democrats to bring about a new stage in these countries' histories, that of "people's democracy."

The beginnings of "people's democracies"

The initial period of the foundation of the people's democracies, 1944–45, was one of the most important in the entire history of postwar Eastern Europe.⁶ But it is also one of the most difficult to categorize, since the Soviet Union followed flexible policies in establishing its influence. Given their geopolitical importance and the traditionally anti-Soviet and anti-Communist traditions of their political elites, Poland and Romania were fated to be controlled and manipulated by their Soviet occupiers. Here, Soviet involvement was absolutely central to the development of people's democracies. The same could be said of Hungary, though its geographical position was not as critical to Moscow as that of Poland and Romania and its political opportunities were more open-ended. Eastern Germany (the SBZ, or Soviet Zone of Occupation) was fully controlled by Soviet military and political authorities, but Soviet insistence on the unity of Germany prevented concrete moves toward building a people's democracy in this period.

Soviet involvement was also important in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, but this was coupled with the significant and sometimes equally important influence of purely internal social and political factors. Although to different degrees, the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak Communist Parties cooperated with other resistance forces during the collapse of Nazi rule, which portended decent relations with non-Communists in the postwar period. Still, it was the entry of Soviet troops into both of these countries and Moscow's support for their native Communist Parties that facilitated their eventual Sovietization. The success of the Communist-led September 9, 1944, coup in Bulgaria and the subsequent domination of the country by the Communist Party would not have occurred without Soviet help and encouragement. During the liberation of Czechoslovakia, the Communists, urged on by Moscow, promoted Edvard Beneš and the left-liberal forces he represented as partners in the formation of a new Czechoslovak government.

6 Some of the material in this and subsequent sections is taken from a draft report: Leonid Gibianskii and Norman M. Naimark, "The Soviet Union and the Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1956: A Documentary Collection," National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, contract number 817-16.

In Yugoslavia and Albania, the creation of people's democracies took place predominantly due to internal social and political causes rather than to Soviet influence. The local Yugoslav and Albanian Communist Parties had successfully resisted the Axis occupation of their countries, leading large, popular, and effective left-oriented national liberation movements and, eventually, armies, which freed their respective countries. To be sure, Soviet foreign policy aided their efforts. In Yugoslavia, the Red Army provided important, though not essential, military support. In Albania, Yugoslav advisers and military aid were significant in the outcome.⁷

The earliest and most blatant case of Soviet involvement in East European politics occurred in Poland, where the so-called Polish National Liberation Committee (PKWN) was secretly formed by Stalin from the ranks of former Polish Communists living in Moscow. According to plan, the PKWN accompanied Red Army troops as they poured into Poland in late July 1944. Then, the Soviets arranged for the PKWN to form a Polish national government in Lublin, which was formally recognized by Moscow. Polish Communists, organized in the Polish Workers' Party (the PPR), and other Polish leftists, including the socialists in the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), enjoyed the support of only a very small fraction of the Polish population. They were nevertheless called upon by the Soviets to serve as leading personnel in the PKWN, which increasingly asserted its power over those parts of Polish territory liberated from the Nazis by the Red Army. Already at the beginning of 1944, Stalin created a Central Bureau of Polish Communists from the ranks of the leading Polish émigré Communists residing in the USSR. This secret organization became a key instrument in guaranteeing that the Kremlin controlled the political platform of Polish Communism in these years.⁸ After the liberation of the country from Nazi occupation and the formation of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PPR in early September 1944, the Soviets made sure that the majority of its members previously belonged to the Central Bureau. This way, Stalin was able to ensure that the "Muscovite" segment of the Central Committee held the upper hand over those "native" PPR members, like Władysław Gomułka, who had participated in the resistance in Poland and tended to follow their own political inclinations.

Soviet military forces and special services protected the new postwar Polish government and administration from opponents in the Polish underground.

7 See Svetozar Rajak's chapter in this volume.

8 Gennadii Bordiugov, *et al.* (eds.), *SSSR-Pol'sha: mekhanizmy podchineniia 1944-1949 gg. Sbornik dokumentov* [The USSR and Poland: The Mechanisms of Subordination, 1944-1949. A Collection of Documents] (Moscow: AERO-XX, 1995), 13-15, 24-25.

Soviet forces eliminated groups attached to the London Polish government-in-exile, which had earlier fought against their Nazi occupiers.⁹ NKVD (secret police) units were extremely active in attacking, killing, and arresting underground activists. On August 23, 1944, Red Army troops were also ordered to take “urgent measures” against Home Army units in areas occupied by the Soviets. These units were to be immediately arrested and disarmed, thus preventing them from making their way to Warsaw to aid the ongoing uprising.¹⁰ This signifies, as does other evidence, that Stalin preferred that the uprising, which was organized by the émigré government, be put down by the Nazis, which indeed happened in September–October 1944, rather than achieve success and serve as an impediment to the imposition of Moscow’s authority in Warsaw and in Poland as a whole.

The Kremlin followed similarly forceful tactics in Romania. During the breakthrough of Soviet troops into Romania on August 20, 1944, the royal court and a number of Romanian generals staged a coup, removing General Ion Antonescu’s regime and joining the Allied cause. Even when the country was fully occupied by the Red Army, the king, his military allies, and his administration stayed in power. However, as early as the fall of 1944, the Communist Party, at the head of a Left coalition – the so-called National Democratic Front (FND) – unleashed a Soviet-approved campaign to move the government further to the Left. The FND leaders went so far as to demand that the government transfer power to themselves, even though they could muster very little support from the Romanian population as a whole. The Soviets also applied considerable pressure within the Allied Control Council in Romania, through their chief representative Andrei Vyshinskii, insisting on concessions to the “democratic forces” of the country, which meant the Communist-led FND. Continuing intimidation of the government culminated in a Communist-inspired coup in February–March 1945, which was backed by the Kremlin’s ultimatum to the king. King Michael had no choice in these circumstances but to appoint a new government on March 6, one that relied primarily on the FND and its Communist leaders.

9 John Micgiel, “‘Bandits and Reactionaries’: The Suppression of the Opposition in Poland, 1944–1946,” in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds.), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 93–111.

10 A. F. Noskova (ed.), *Iz Varshavy. Moskva. Tovarishtsu Beriia ... : dokumenty NKVD SSSR o pol'skom podpol'e 1944–1945 gg.* [From Warsaw. Moscow. Comrade Beriia ... : Documents of the USSR NKVD about the Polish Underground] (Moscow and Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 2001), 345–46.

During these dramatic events, Soviet military commanders and representatives of the Soviet administration in the Allied Control Council countered attempts by Romanian government troops and police to prevent FND-led demonstrations. In Bucharest, where skirmishes between FND protesters and Romanian government forces signaled the beginning of an acute political crisis, Soviet representatives intervened to support the FND. In collusion with the Romanian Communist Party, the Soviet special services made ready to create an FND government on their own should Vyshinskii fail to bully the king into proclaiming it himself. Additional Red Army units were moved toward Bucharest, including, on Stalin's orders, two divisions of NKVD troops.¹¹ In the end, there was no need for the direct application of force. Vyshinskii's relentless pressure on King Michael broke his resistance and the coup was accomplished under the veneer of royal legitimacy.¹²

The Soviets formed three German Communist "initiative groups" in Moscow to follow Red Army troops into occupied Germany in April and May of 1945: one led by Walter Ulbricht, the second by Anton Ackermann, and the third by Gustav Subbotka. Although some German Communists, most notably Ulbricht, played an important role in building a pro-Soviet political base in eastern Germany, this task fell primarily to the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, and in particular to the head of its Propaganda Section, Colonel Sergei Tiul'panov, and to its political adviser and representative of the Foreign Ministry, Vladimir Semenov. Tiul'panov was responsible for the political development of the SBZ and instituted a series of political initiatives favoring the Communists. But Soviet policy in Germany was characterized by a combination of restraint and control, which reflected the Kremlin's ambivalence toward the future of Germany. As long as there was the possibility of negotiating an agreement with the West over the future of Germany, Moscow held back efforts by Tiul'panov, Ulbricht, and others to go ahead with the Sovietization of the SBZ.¹³

In Hungary, the German overlords removed the wartime government of Admiral Miklós Horthy, who had tried to conclude a last-minute truce with the members of the anti-Hitler coalition, and replaced it on October 15, 1944, with the Arrow Cross leader, Ferenc Szalasi. Meanwhile, the Soviets created

11 T. A. Pokivailova, et al. (eds.), *Tri vizita A. Ia. Vyshinskogo v Bukharest, 1944–1946 gg.* [Three Visits by A. Ia. Vyshinskii to Bucharest, 1944–1946] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998), 86–87, 106–08, 123–24.

12 *Ibid.*, pp. 100–01, 105.

13 Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 298–301.

a provisional government that was to take power in the wake of the Red Army's advance into Hungary. Stalin was satisfied with placing Hungarian Communist Party members in prominent positions in the new government. The Communists were a minor political force in Hungary and the Soviets sought allies from anti-Nazi and anti-Szalasi Hungarian parties of the Left and center, and even some pro-Horthyite groups which offered to cooperate with the Soviet side.¹⁴ Stalin's policies toward Hungary seemed more pragmatic and flexible than those he promulgated in Poland and Romania.¹⁵

There is relatively little evidence that the Soviets directly interfered in the postwar political development of Czechoslovakia. In negotiations between Beneš and the Soviets in March 1945, there was general agreement that the Czechoslovak Communists would play an important, if not decisive, role in the new government after the liberation of the country from the Nazis.¹⁶ The Soviets neither pressured the new Prague government to engage in violence against its non-Communist opponents nor insisted on specific domestic policies. This did not mean, of course, that the Soviets were without influence. The very fact of the Red Army's entry into Czechoslovakia changed the situation on the ground. But the withdrawal of Soviet troops in late 1945 gave Beneš and his allies unusual latitude within Moscow's developing "sphere of influence."

The national road to Communism

The Soviets and their East European Communist allies understood that they could win over the local populations only by paying attention to their national goals and needs. Similarly, in their foreign policy, the Soviets tried to reinvigorate ideas of Slavic brotherhood by reviving nineteenth-century pan-Slavic ideas. The Poles were as suspicious of Stalin's pan-Slavism in the postwar period as they had been of the tsarist original in the late nineteenth century. But among the Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, and Yugoslavs, the ideas about a greater Slavic community of peoples, led by the great Slavic Russian brother

14 T. V. Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov 1944–1953* gg. [Eastern Europe in Documents from the Russian Archives 1944–1953], 2 vols. (Moscow and Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1997), vol. I, 86–87, 94–98, 102–04, 111–13; Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor*, vol. I, 109–16, 118–22, 167–72, 195–204.

15 Charles Gati, *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 4–6.

16 Jerzy Tomaszewski, *The Socialist Regimes of East Central Europe: Their Establishment and Consolidation*, trans. Jolanta Krauze (London: Routledge, 1989), 27–28.

to the east, found considerable resonance as the Red Army marched into Eastern Europe.

In the mix of slogans involving Slavic unity and anti-Fascist democratic revolutions, the Soviets encouraged Communists to pursue their own “national roads” to Communism, meaning they should adjust their demands to local conditions and share political power with other “patriotic” socialist and democratic parties. This program served Soviet aims in two ways: first, it contributed to good working relations with Western Allied governments, and, second, it helped build a popular following for what were – in the prewar period – very small and very insignificant Communist Parties. National roads meant that the individual Communist Parties could unambiguously bear the shields of patriotic causes, while vying with populist and social democratic parties in claiming to represent the best interests of the “nation.” In this spirit, Stalin supported the plans of the Czechoslovak and Polish governments to expel Germans from their countries.¹⁷ Communist Party promotion of ethno-nationalist causes, at least when they did not damage Soviet interests, were generally welcomed by the Kremlin.

Part of the rationale for supporting patriotic causes was to win the support of the mass of voters in electoral contests. The Soviets took these elections deadly seriously, in some cases more seriously than the East European Communists themselves. As a consequence, they were bitterly disappointed with the results. In Austria and in Hungary in November 1945, and in the eastern zone of Germany and Berlin in the fall of 1946, Soviet-sponsored Communist Parties suffered unexpected setbacks. Even with all the pressure applied by the Polish Communist forces against Stanisław Mikołajczyk and the PSL (Polish Peasant Party) in the crucial nationwide referendum of June 1946, including outright falsification of the returns, the Poles managed to register their displeasure with the Communists by voting “no” on the symbolically crucial first question. The Czechoslovak party did well in the elections of May 1946, garnering 38 percent of the vote. But its popularity noticeably receded thereafter, which no doubt played a role in the planning of the February 1948 coup. It is unlikely that the Soviets would have allowed Communists to be voted out of positions of power in Eastern Europe. In that sense, the anti-Fascist democratic revolution, as understood by many non-Communists, would have been hard-pressed to succeed.

¹⁷ Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 109–11.

The electoral defeats of the Communists were in part the result of the Soviets' own actions. There was considerable receptivity to socialism and even to Soviet liberation and occupation at the end of the war. But the combination of the miscreant behavior of the Red Army soldiers in foreign lands and the rapaciousness of Soviet reparations officials responsible for dismantling factories and seizing agricultural products for the army and home front led to anger and resentment on the part of local populations. In Hungary and Germany, the liberators were seen as thieves and rapists. In Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Germany, the Soviets dismantled factories as reparations and seized grain from farmers. Even in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the behavior of Soviet troops created "great disillusionment" among the common folk, who earlier had genuinely admired, even idolized, Soviet Red Army soldiers.¹⁸

Electoral "campaigns" aside, everywhere in Eastern Europe Communists seized control of the interior ministries and their police functions, especially those having to do with secret police and armed internal police units. Working in tandem and sometimes at the behest of the Soviet NKVD (after 1946 MVD) and NKGB (after 1946 MGB and later still KGB), domestic secret police pursued alleged counterrevolutionaries and Fascists, and arrested, tortured, exiled, and sometimes executed democrats and socialists who opposed growing Soviet influence.¹⁹ If in 1945 and 1946 one could not talk about a Communist seizure of power in what were formally parliamentary democracies, Communists used their control over the secret police apparatus to make sure that there would be no serious internal opposition to their policies. In this sense, the timing of the Great October Revolution was reversed; in postwar Eastern Europe, the civil war, where it existed, was fought and won by the secret police and its Soviet backers before – rather than after – the Communists actually seized power.

The Sovietization of Eastern Europe

After the initial formation of the people's democracies in Eastern Europe in 1944–45, the next stage of Sovietization involved the establishment of Communists' predominance. This process varied from country to country and differed significantly in its pace. It is also important to note that there was

18 Irwin Sanders, *Balkan Village* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1949), 196, 207. See also Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, 68–140.

19 Andrzej Albert [Roszkowski], *Najnowsza historia Polski*, [The Recent History of Poland], vol. II (London: Puls, 1994), 33–50.

considerable fluidity between these periods within individual countries. Still, the task of Sovietization was essentially completed in all of them by the end of 1947 and 1948.

The regimes in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and the SBZ developed mixed political systems in which the Communists accepted non-Communist parties as junior partners in multiparty coalitions. Controllable opposition parties were also sometimes acceptable in this schema. In Bulgaria, non-Communist parties that participated in the government were allies of the Communists within the Left bloc. In Poland and Romania, the allied parties in the Left bloc supplied the overwhelming majority of the government ministers. Some centrist forces also took part in the political life of these countries, but they were insignificant minorities in their respective governments. In Poland, this was the case of the Polish Peasant Party under Mikołajczyk. In Romania, the centrist forces were represented by the National Liberals, headed up by Gheorghe Tatarescu; but they soon abandoned their oppositional stance and joined with the FND.

In the SBZ, as well as in Poland and Romania, there can be little question that the leftist governments and the leading position of the Communists in them resulted primarily from Soviet military and political domination rather than from internal developments. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, the leadership of the Left bloc with the Communist Party at its head enjoyed substantial popular support. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, coalitions were formed between the Communist Parties and their leftist allies on the one hand and the democratic and even some conservative parties on the other. The coalitions were more genuine than the ones in Romania, Poland, and eastern Germany, and were based on a rough parity between leftist and center/rightist parties. Despite the growing pretensions of Josip Broz Tito, Moscow tended to be quite satisfied with the evolution of the Yugoslav regime and its Albanian client.²⁰

In most of Eastern Europe, Moscow opted for a strategy that emphasized the gradual evolution toward a socialist order. This meant gradually increasing the role played by the Communist Parties in the national governments and eliminating or marginalizing opposition forces in or outside the ruling coalitions. The Communists complemented these policies with the subordination of their partners on the Left. Meanwhile, the Communists strengthened their control over the economic and social spheres, expanding the realm

20 Volokitina, *et al.* (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa*, vol. I, 705–06.

of government-owned industry, taking over transportation, finance, and trade, and implementing radical land reform. Still, on Soviet instructions, they stopped short of fully nationalizing industry and collectivizing agriculture. The façade of democracy was to remain in the form of political coalitions, multiparty systems, and parliaments. The idea, which Stalin articulated in discussions with a number of leaders of East European people's democracies, was for these countries to move toward socialism without going through the stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat.²¹

Stalin was far less specific about the length of time it would take for the East European states to reach the stage of a socialist order by this non-Soviet route. Nor did he indicate how long a multiparty and parliamentary system should be preserved, including a legitimate opposition and elements of genuine coalition politics. Some historians maintain that the Soviets intended to drop the democratic façade as soon as possible and replace it with a transition to socialism on the Soviet model. Others contend that Stalin seriously considered the possibility that the countries of the region could develop democratic paths to socialism, distinct from the Soviet example.²²

The argument about the Kremlin's long-term intentions aside, the documents made available in Russia and Eastern Europe over the previous decade make it apparent that the means by which socialism would be built had little to do with democratic politics and parliamentary procedures. On the contrary, the implementation of socialist policies by the Communist Parties and their Soviet mentors relied from the beginning on administrative pressure, subversion, and direct repression, including attacks on the opposition and leftist allies if they proved too independent. At the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945, the Bulgarian government persecuted the leader of the Agrarian Union, Georgi Dimitrov (Gemeto), who was not only removed from his post as a result of behind-the-scenes Communist pressure but was subsequently arrested and brought to trial. Also in Bulgaria, Stalin ordered that the defense minister and a leader of the Zveno (Link) Party, Damian Velchev, be removed from power.²³ In Poland and Romania, the security organs arrested and interrogated opposition leaders and subjected others to restrictions and intimidation. To these actions in Poland and Romania should be added the black-mail, threats, and falsified results that accompanied the Polish referendum of

21 Dimitrov, *Diary*, 358, 413–15; Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa*, vol. I, 457, 511, 579.

22 Norman M. Naimark, "Post-Soviet Russian Historiography on the Emergence of the Soviet Bloc," *Kritika*, 5, 2 (Summer 2004), 561–80.

23 Dimitrov, *Diary*, 405, 406–07.

June 1946 and the parliamentary elections in Poland in January 1947 and in Romania in November 1946.

Having falsified the Polish parliamentary elections of January 1947, Communist authorities set out to destroy Mikołajczyk's PSL through force and repression. This produced a crisis within his party, which ended when Mikołajczyk and other PSL leaders fled for their lives to the West in October 1947, leaving control of the party to those members who opted to side with the Communist authorities.²⁴ In Bulgaria and Romania in June 1947, based on fabricated accusations of plotting against the government, the chief leaders of the opposition were arrested, accused of a variety of crimes in a series of show trials, and sentenced to long prison terms.²⁵

At the turn of 1946/47, the Hungarian Communist-controlled secret services initiated a campaign against the leaders of the Smallholder Party, which held significant positions in the government and in the parliament. (In the 1945 elections the party had received 57 percent of the vote.) The Smallholders were accused of fomenting an antigovernment conspiracy. As a result, the Soviet military authorities arrested the party's general secretary, Béla Kovács, in February 1947 and, in the course of the investigation, produced materials regarding the alleged participation in the plot of several party leaders, including the prime minister, Ferenc Nagy. The Hungarian Communist leader Mátyás Rákosi used these allegations to force the Smallholders to transfer the party's leadership and the post of prime minister to Left-leaning members connected with the Communists. As a consequence of splits within the opposition engineered by Rákosi (his so-called salami tactics), in August 1947 new parliamentary elections were held in which the leftist bloc collected 60 percent of the vote. Communist Party members officially held a third of the positions in the new government but, counting secret members and sympathizers who nominally represented other parties, they controlled more than half of the government posts. Relying on their strengthened position in the government, the Communists used well-tested police methods of accusing opposition politicians of engaging in antistate activities to eliminate political dissidence altogether.²⁶

Similar methods were used in Czechoslovakia. During the second half of 1947, the Communist-controlled secret police leveled accusations of

24 Albert, *Najnowsza historia Polski*, vol. II, 108–09, 118–23.

25 Mito Isusov, *Stalin i Bulgariia* [Stalin and Bulgaria] (Sofia: Izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Okhridski, 1991), 184–92.

26 Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa*, vol. I, 561–62, 606, 613–14, 619, 641–46, 691–93, 713; Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor*, vol. I, 425.



14. Hungarian election posters, 1947.

antigovernment conspiracy against several non-Communist parties in the ruling coalition. This offensive concluded with the February 1948 coup, which was orchestrated by the Czechoslovak Communists themselves and led to the destruction of all of the other parties.²⁷ In Bulgaria and Romania, the legal opposition was entirely eliminated in 1948; in Hungary, this process extended until the beginning of 1949.

In most of the East European countries, the domination of the Communist Parties over their social democratic “allies” was an important part of achieving

²⁷ Karel Kaplan, *The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 19–24.

total control over the domestic political situation. In the SBZ, this process began already in the spring of 1946, when the forced “unification” of the KPD and SPD produced the new, Communist-dominated SED (Socialist Unity Party). By 1948, the elimination of social democratic parties by merging them forcibly with the Communist Parties, often heralded by noisy “unity” campaigns, was completed in all of the countries of the region. The Communists reorganized and eliminated the other parties of the Left bloc during 1947–48, merging some into new formations, splitting others, and leaving some to survive as “stage props,” which unreservedly supported the preeminent role of the Communist Party in the building of socialism. Now all of the countries of Eastern Europe essentially had Communist one-party systems like Yugoslavia and Albania. The monopoly on political power was combined in all of the East European countries, including the SBZ, with corresponding measures in the social, economic, and cultural spheres.

Soviet representatives were involved in virtually all of the political machinations described above. Soviet advisers shaped electoral campaigns, selected government ministers, and approved secret police actions. Stalin sent a team of Soviet Interior Ministry experts to Poland to provide “technical advice” about the legal and extralegal methods to achieve the appropriate results in the elections of January 1947.²⁸ Stalin also personally approved political trials, unification campaigns with the social democrats, and important government appointments. East European Communists fully expected to work with the Soviets on political matters.

The East European comrades were also closely watched and sometimes carefully micromanaged by Moscow. Communist functionaries expected to be instructed, and they learned to ask their Soviet patrons for permission to undertake initiatives or for directives regarding even trivial internal or external policy questions, including appointments to positions in the party and government. Competing factions within the East European Communist Parties played out their rivalries in Moscow, providing alternative policy or appointment suggestions to their Kremlin patrons. One can see this in particularly sharp relief in the competition between Gheorghiu-Dej and his group in the Romanian party and their rivals Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Teohari

28 Volokitina, *et al.* (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor*, vol. I, 365–70; N.V. Petrov, ‘Rol’ MGB SSSR v sovetizatsii Pol’shi’ [Role of the USSR MGB in the Sovietization of Poland], in A. O. Chubar’ian, *et al.* (eds.), *Stalin i kholodnaia voina* [Stalin and the Cold War], (Moscow: IVI RAN, 1998), 114–18.

Georgescu.²⁹ The conflicts between Enver Hoxha and Koçi Xoxe in the Albanian Communist Party were similarly articulated in their alternative presentations to Moscow.³⁰ In these cases and others, internal party rivalries on the one hand, and Stalin's unwillingness to make an unambiguous choice on the other, often left the East Europeans with a measure of autonomy. Differences between Soviet advisers in the region also left room for maneuver.³¹

Where Stalin allowed the East Europeans very little autonomy was in the realm of foreign policy. Instructive in this connection were the measures taken by Moscow at the end of June and beginning of July 1947 to ensure the desired response of the people's democracies to the Marshall Plan. In a little over two weeks, the Soviet leadership changed its directives three times in encrypted telegrams sent to the leaders of the East European Communist Parties.³² Initially, the instructions stipulated that all the people's democracies should express interest in the plan. Later, the Soviets suggested that their representatives should participate in the conference of European states convened to discuss the plan, but should disagree with its substance and withdraw, trying to persuade the other small European states to leave with them. Finally, Moscow directed the people's democracies not to participate at all in the conference or in the implementation of the plan. The East European Communist leaders accepted seriatim all of these directives without question. The only serious complications emerged with the Czechoslovak government, which had a non-Communist majority. Beneš and his associates were completely committed to the Marshall Plan process. But at a meeting in Moscow on July 9, 1947, Stalin ruthlessly pressured the Czechoslovak government delegation, forcing them to reject outright the Marshall Plan and refuse participation in the upcoming conference.³³ Jan Masaryk wrote: "I went to Moscow as a Foreign Minister of an independent sovereign state; I returned as a lackey of the Soviet Government."³⁴

29 Robert Levi, *Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 194–219; Volokitina, et al. (eds.) *Vostochnaia evropa*, vol. I, 760–63.

30 Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa*, vol. I, 267–70; Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor*, vol. I, 340–45.

31 Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, 349–52.

32 Scott Parish, "The Marshall Plan, Soviet-American Relations, and the Division of Europe," in Naimark and Gibianskii (eds.), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes*, 274–2.

33 Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa*, vol. I, 672–75.

34 Bruce Lockhardt, *My Europe* (London: Putnam, 1952), 125.



3. Europe divided, 1949.

The Stalinization of Eastern Europe

The Soviets countered the perceived threat of the Marshall Plan by calling a meeting of European Communist Parties in Poland at Szklarska Poręba in September 1947. A new organization was set up, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), ostensibly to share information among Communist Parties, but in fact to monitor compliance with Soviet directives. Stalin's deputy for ideological questions, Andrei Zhdanov, delivered his famous "two camps" speech, in which he insisted that Communist Parties line up with and, by implication, mimic the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.³⁵ This brought to an end the period of "the anti-Fascist, democratic revolution" and the idea of national roads to Communism. Soon after the Cominform meeting, Soviet officers took a more active part in the development of East European armies. Economic relationships between the East European countries and Moscow were tightened, symbolized by the formation of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA; also known as the Comecon) in January 1949. The Communist Parties were also instructed to intensify the struggle against so-called kulaks in their countries and to emulate the Bolshevik model of rooting out the bourgeoisie. Those Communist politicians who thought otherwise and were wedded by conviction to ideas of national Communism were soon removed from their posts and purged from their parties.

After Szklarska Poręba, the policies of the Soviet Union were to serve as the policies of the Communist Parties of all of Europe. The Italian and French Communist Parties, severely criticized at the Cominform meeting for meekly succumbing to their respective partners in democratic coalitions, were enjoined to radicalize their programs and destabilize the bourgeois governments of the West. The Yugoslav Communists were pleased by the call for the sharpening of the "class struggle" in Western Europe and for vigilance against alleged counterrevolutionary forces within Eastern Europe indicated by the discussions of Szklarska Poręba.³⁶ By the spring of 1948, however, the Yugoslavs learned that Moscow's demands for conformity in the bloc included Stalin's insistence that they rein in their own aspirations, which they were

35 Anna Di Biagio, "The Establishment of the Cominform," in G. Procacci *et al.* (eds.), *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Milan: Feltrinelli Foundation, 1994), 32–34.

36 See the attack by Milovan Djilas on the French Communist Party in Procacci *et al.* (eds.), *The Cominform: Minutes*, pp. 253–63.

unwilling to do.³⁷ The subsequent Soviet–Yugoslav split in the summer of 1948 heightened tensions within the East European parties, as Soviet fears of the spread of “Titoism” led to denunciations and arrests throughout the region.

If the Cold War was born in the tensions surrounding the development of the Marshall Plan, its angry rejection by the Soviets, and the establishment of the Cominform, it was accelerated by the February 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, the beginning of the Berlin blockade in June 1948, and the eruption of the Soviet–Yugoslav split in the summer of 1948.³⁸ Stalin’s worries about enemies within the East European Communist Parties grew exponentially as it also became clear in late 1948 that the Yugoslav deviation was turning into heresy and defiance. Discipline in the newly emerging Soviet bloc would have to be ensured by the traditional Stalinist means of purges and show trials. Communist Parties “of the new type,” meaning Bolshevik and Stalinist, would be forged in the fires of denunciation, interrogation, self-criticism, and purges. Stalin and Beria dispatched NKVD “advisers” to the capitals of all the people’s democracies in order to quicken the hunt for “enemies of the people.”³⁹

The conflict with the Yugoslavs also intensified Stalin’s determination to maximize Soviet control over the other East European countries. With a new level of ruthlessness, the Soviets urged their East European satraps to crush non-Communist opponents and purge the Communist Parties of dissidents. The “case against Gomulka” constitutes one of the emblematic moments in this struggle. Gomulka had already been identified in the spring of 1948 as belonging to a faction of the Polish Politburo that was chauvinistic and prone to anti-Soviet statements and attacks. He was accused of holding an indifferent attitude toward the Soviet experience and of being a nationalist. Although Gomulka was unable to protect his position in the party and government, he cleverly used the politics of anti-Semitism with Stalin to bolster his case against the Polish party leadership.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the Polish secret services continued to build a case against Gomulka and others in his so-called clique. In 1951, Gomulka was arrested and was fortunate to escape with his life. Stalin died

37 L. Ia. Gibianskii, “Forsirovanie sovetskoi blokovoi politiki” [The Imposition of Soviet Bloc Politics], in N. I. Egorova and A. O. Chubar’ian (eds.), *Kholodnaia voina, 1945–1963* [The Cold War, 1945–1963] (Moscow: OLMA Press, 2003), 137–41; Ivo Banac, *With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 125, 145.

38 See William I. Hitchcock’s and Vladimir O. Pechatnov’s chapters in this volume.

39 See the documents on Soviet interference in: “Delo Slanskogo” [The Slansky Case], *Voprosy istorii*, nos. 3 and 4 (1997), 3–20 and 3–18.

40 Bordiugov, *et al.* (eds.) *SSSR–Pol’sha*, 271–77; Volokitina, *et al.* (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor*, vol. I, 549–60.

before there was enough evidence (and/or desire) to bring him and his associates to trial.

Communist leaders in other parts of Eastern Europe who fell from favor with Moscow did not fare so well, especially those of Jewish origin. Everywhere else in the region except for Poland there were show trials, which were meant not only to punish alleged offenders but to bolster the legitimacy of the Communist authorities. (In the German Democratic Republic [GDR], analogous trials of Paul Merker and others were held in secret.) Much as Lev Trotskii was the main defendant in absentia of the Moscow show trials, so was Tito the phantom defendant of the East European trials. This was particularly apparent in the May 1949 trial of former Albanian Politburo member and minister of interior, Koçi Xoxe. Xoxe was convicted as a Titoist and executed. László Rajk, the important Hungarian Communist and former minister of the interior, was similarly condemned as a Titoist and a Western spy and executed. Leading Hungarian Communists, many of Jewish origin, were tried and hanged. In December 1949, Traicho Kostov, an important Bulgarian Communist figure and economic specialist, was accused together with a number of his comrades of participating in a Titoist plot against the government and was executed. Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, former Politburo member and minister of justice in Romania, was the central figure in a plot concocted by Gheorgiu-Dej against alleged Titoists and spies. Because he refused to confess, he could not serve as the center of a show trial. He was later condemned to death and shot.⁴¹

The increasingly open manifestations of Soviet anti-Semitism in the early 1950s lent the October 1952 show trial of Rudolf Slánský, former general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, an ugly anti-Jewish aspect. Many of his alleged Zionist co-conspirators were also of Jewish background. They were accused of having dealings with the American Central Intelligence Agency agent Noel Field, who figured in many of the East European trials.⁴² For this and other alleged crimes, the accused Czechoslovak Communists were sentenced to death and hanged.

The show trials victimized not only Communist Party leaders who had fallen from favor, but also non-party government specialists and military leaders. In every case, Soviet “advisers” helped prepare and mastermind the purge trials, a job at which they were ostensibly expert. They sometimes

41 Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel* (New York: Free Press, 1992), 43.

42 Igor Lukes, “The Rudolf Slansky Affair: New Evidence,” *Slavic Review*, 58, 1 (Spring 1999), 160–88; Hermann Field and Kate Field, *Trapped in the Cold War: The Ordeal of an American Family* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

directly participated in the interrogations and drew up lists of those to be arrested. The East European parties, as well as security and judicial administrations, asked for advice from the Soviets and expected directions. Because historians still do not have access to the archives of the Soviet secret police, there is a lot that remains unknown about direct ties between the Soviet and East European security organs. Certainly, Soviet preferences during the trials, sentencing, and execution of alleged traitors made a difference. But domestic Communist politics, in which one rival group or leader attempted to remove opponents, dominated the calculus of political repression.⁴³ The result of the purges was that “Little Stalins” emerged throughout the region, Communist Party chiefs such as Bolesław Bierut (Poland), Rákosi (Hungary), Gheorgiu-Dej (Romania), Ulbricht (GDR), Klement Gottwald (Czechoslovakia), Hoxha (Albania), and Vulko Chervenkov (Bulgaria). Although their powers and domestic images resembled that of Stalin, their persons and policies were strictly subordinated to the Kremlin.

The Soviets used a host of other means short of repression and political manipulation to impose their will on the East European parties and states. Soviet participation in the organization of the power structures of these countries, in cadre politics, and in implementing economic, cultural, and social policies all served the cause of the successful Sovietization of Eastern Europe. Soviet advisers in the region – ranging from guest professors of philosophy in the universities to artillery specialists in the militaries – also played a crucial role in developing institutions that would mirror the supposedly superior Soviet counterparts. Soviet advisers were also important when the East Europeans undertook special projects, whether currency reform, the revocation of the rationing system, the launching of important economic projects, or the building of cultural institutions. Since in Stalinist Eastern Europe the “Soviet way” was the only right way to do things, the East Europeans often found it easiest to import Soviet specialists to show them how to accomplish concrete tasks. All the countries of Eastern Europe, from the most highly industrialized, such as Czechoslovakia and the GDR, to the least developed, such as Albania, imported Soviet advisers for an astonishing variety of purposes. Moscow often provided them with instructions on how to transform parts of the government apparatus, judicial and police systems, and educational and economic institutions, according to the Soviet model.⁴⁴

43 George H. Hodos, *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1987).

44 Volokitina, *et al.* (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa*, vol. II, 688–89.

Equally important to the penetration of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe was the explicit transfer of Marxist-Leninist(-Stalinist) ideology. In the era of “high Stalinism” at the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s, the Soviets demanded thoroughgoing ideological imitation, to ensure conformity in Eastern Europe as well as to confirm their superiority over and the subordination of the East Europeans.⁴⁵ They closely monitored East European ideological developments, whether in local party journals or in the arts, education, and the mass media. Local Soviet representatives sent “report cards” back home on how well the East Europeans matched up in their understanding of Marxism-Leninism. They discussed ideological questions with members of the local intelligentsia and nomenklatura, constantly harping on the need for the complete adoption of Soviet cultural norms and political ideas. Reporters from various agencies in Moscow emphasized not only the need for locals to learn better from their Soviet teachers but also the critical importance of countering the ideological influence of the West.

Sovietization or self-Sovietization?

Some scholars criticize the concepts of Sovietization or Stalinization because they overly simplify the complex processes of give-and-take between the Soviet Union and its East European subordinates.⁴⁶ They prefer the idea of “self-Sovietization” or “self-Stalinization,” terms that capture the fact that the East Europeans adapted and used Soviet models themselves without direct instructions or coercion. John Connelly is right to note that both processes were at work. The Soviets, given their exaggerated security concerns, “kept channels of information to Eastern Europe narrow, and left communists there no choice but to discover and implement the Soviet system themselves.”⁴⁷ Thus there was plenty of room for East European leaders to set their own

45 Andrew Janos, *East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 237.

46 See T. V. Volokitina, et al., *Narodnaia demokratiia: mif ili realnost'?* [People's Democracy: Myth or Reality?] (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 4–6, and T. V. Volokitina, et al., *Moskva i vostochnaia Evropa: stanovlenie politicheskikh rezhimov sovetskogo tipa, 1949–1953. Ocherki istorii* [Moscow and Eastern Europe: The Creation of Political Regimes of the Soviet Type, 1949–1953. Historical Essays] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), 17–18.

47 John Connelly, *Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945–1956* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 55.

priorities and initiate their own policies, but only within the contours dictated by Stalin and the Soviets.

A related question that suffuses the historiography, both traditionally and more recently, has to do with Stalin's original objectives in Eastern Europe. Was he, from the very beginning, interested in the development of Soviet-style regimes throughout the region, or did other factors, such as the interests of East European Communists themselves or threats from the West in the increasingly menacing atmosphere of the Cold War, prompt Stalin to clamp down on his East European allies? Most examples of recent Russian historiography tend to take the latter view.⁴⁸ But many historians in the West and a few in Russia think that Stalin developed his programs for anti-Fascist fronts and people's democratic governments as so much eyewash for the British and Americans and as a sop to the electoral sensitivities of the East Europeans.⁴⁹ The next stage, a fully Stalinist Eastern Europe, was the inevitable result of his political planning, with or without the Cold War.

The arguments by Soviet foreign-policy specialists Vojtech Mastny and Vladislav Zubok tend to support this latter view, though they attribute Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe to his pragmatic understanding of the spread of Communism within the traditional framework of spheres of influence. As acceded to by the Allies during the war, Stalin sought to nail down a belt of dependent countries on the Soviet European borders, while essentially turning over Western Europe and Greece to the British and Americans. Mastny emphasizes Stalin's fears and exaggerated needs for security as the motivating factors in constructing what came to be known as the "Soviet bloc."⁵⁰ Zubok places the primary weight on what he and Constantine

48 See, for example, Volokitina, *et al.*, *Moskva i vostochnaia Evropa*, 35–36. See also Norman M. Naimark, "Stalin and Europe in the Postwar Period, 1945–1953: Issues and Problems," *Journal of Modern European History*, 1, 2 (2004), 31–45. Geoffrey Roberts states that he supports the general view of Volokitina and her coauthors in his recent *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 411, n. 54.

49 Eduard Mark, *Revolution by Degrees: Stalin's National-Front Strategy for Europe, 1941–1947*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 3 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2001); Donal O'Sullivan, *Stalins "Cordon Sanitaire": die sowjetische Osteuropapolitik und die Reaktionen des Westens 1939–1949* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003); L. Ia. Gibianskii, "Problemy vostochnoi Evropy i nachalo formirovaniia sovetskogo bloka," [The Problem of Eastern Europe and the Beginning of the Formation of the Soviet Bloc], in Egorova and Chubar'ian (eds.), *Kholodnaia voina*, 105–37.

50 Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 93.

Pleshakov call the “revolutionary-imperial paradigm,” which conforms to traditional Russian proclivities to control Eastern Europe.⁵¹

The argument about Stalin’s intentions and motivations will not be easily resolved. There can be little question that the Soviets imposed their will on Eastern Europe in a gradual and carefully calibrated fashion. But the evidence is not conclusive that Stalin planned this process, rather than reacted to a variety of domestic and international stimuli along the way. As Vladimir Pechatnov has shown in his contribution to this volume,⁵² Stalin was constantly adjusting and resetting his plans and priorities, as prompted by shifts in American foreign policy and the international situation. From the perspective of more than a half-century later, the Sovietization of Eastern Europe can easily seem to have been designed from the very beginning of the Soviet occupation and even earlier. Appearances can be deceptive, especially when scholarly hindsight is at work, a consistent story needs to be told, and archival evidence can be mustered for opposing arguments.

In the immediate postwar period, both Communists and non-Communists in Eastern Europe assumed that the struggle for political mastery of their countries was open-ended and could lead to a variety of results. They thought that their policies – sometimes more and sometimes less “radical” than those generally proffered by the Kremlin – fulfilled the needs of their parties and of Stalin. It is unlikely that they missed something that we can clearly see today. That they were wrong about their ability to determine the ultimate fate of their countries was less a product of their political blindness to Stalin’s real intentions than of their inability to predict a future in which the growing intensity of the Cold War increasingly dominated Moscow’s view of the world.

51 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 4. See also Zubok’s *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 19.

52 See Vladimir O. Pechatnov’s chapter in this volume.

The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945–1956

SVETOZAR RAJAK

During the first ten years after the Second World War, events in the Balkans contributed significantly to the shaping of the Cold War world. The outbreak of fratricidal bloodshed in Greece in December 1944, which later escalated into a full-scale civil war, became the first major conflict of the Cold War. In May 1945, even before the German capitulation, an ideologically induced confrontation over control of Trieste threatened to draw the Communist Yugoslav People's Army and the British and American forces into an armed conflict. As the Second World War ended, a fault line between ideologically opposed groupings was emerging in the Balkans.

Three years later, as a result of the conflict between Moscow and Belgrade, and Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Soviet 'camp', the region witnessed the first strategic re-alignment between the two blocs. The ensuing five-year confrontation between Yugoslavia and the USSR and its allies created a schism that destroyed forever any view of the Communist movement as a monolith. Furthermore, the split encouraged Yugoslavia's leader, Josip Broz Tito, together with India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, to search for a multilateral Third World alternative to the bipolar Cold War world and, eventually, help create the Non-Aligned Movement of states. Finally, as recently opened East European archives have confirmed, the tentative Soviet–Yugoslav normalisation that followed the death of Iosif Stalin in 1953 had a significant impact on the process of de-Stalinisation in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

The establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence

The Normandy invasion in 1944 ended the prospect that the Western Allies might land in the Balkans and fight the German-led Axis there. The absence of Western forces decisively shaped the postwar settlement and the political composition of the region. By the end of the summer of 1944, the Romanian



4. The Balkan states after World War II.

and Bulgarian governments, members of the Axis coalition, collapsed in the face of the advancing Soviet Red Army.¹

There is no evidence suggesting that Iosif Stalin possessed a blueprint for the establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence in the Balkans. Its origins lay in the distribution of the 'spoils of war' among the ideologically opposed victorious superpowers. Moscow used 'people's' or 'popular front' governments as tools to establish its political influence, while slowly securing the

¹ For more on Romania and Bulgaria, see Norman Naimark's chapter in this volume.

deferential obeisance of the new regimes through ideological affinity. Local political circumstances shaped the pace and manner of growth of Soviet hegemony. In Romania and Bulgaria, countries under Soviet military occupation, Moscow simply installed 'popular front' governments. Yugoslavia and Albania, however, already under local Communist control, had to be pushed by Stalin to accept the same model. The 'popular front' governments consisted of representatives of both pre-war parliamentary parties and Communists; the latter held key posts, such as the Interior and Justice Ministries.

On the one hand, given the initial popularity and war record of the Communist parties, the Kremlin believed that its 'popular front' strategy would generate enough support to enable local Communists to launch socialism with the assistance of their non-Communist coalition partners. On the other hand, Moscow also hoped that this framework would allow the continuation of its wartime alliance with the United States and Britain, while securing friendly regimes in its periphery. During the first year and a half after the war, Stalin was generally careful not to undermine relations with the Western Allies. In the autumn of 1945, following British-American criticism during the first Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London, Stalin, for example, did curb the revolutionary terror of the Bulgarian Communists against their political opponents.

Led by local Communists, the partisan armies that liberated Yugoslavia and Albania swept pro-Soviet regimes into power, enabling Moscow to shape developments in those countries, with the result resembling something of an 'empire by invitation'. Unlike Romanian and Bulgarian Communist leaders who arrived with the Red Army, the new leaders of Yugoslavia and Albania were heroes of national liberation struggles. Tito's partisans were by far the strongest home-grown anti-Nazi resistance movement in occupied Europe. As a result of their considerable contribution in the fight against Hitler's armies, they received formal recognition and material support from Britain from the summer of 1943. The Red Army was involved in operations around Belgrade in September and October 1944, after which it left the country to fight in Hungary. German and Italian occupiers and the puppet regimes they set up, in particular the genocidal Ustashe regime in Croatia, had fostered the form of fratricidal carnage that would recur during Yugoslavia's breakup in the 1990s. At the same time, the war of liberation in Yugoslavia was a social revolution that set Communist-led partisans against more conservative forces, such as the Chetniks, Serbian guerrillas backed by the royal Yugoslav government in exile. The Chetniks' focus on destroying the partisans had led to periods

of collaboration with the Germans and Italians. Armed with a popular mandate and much left-revolutionary zeal, the Yugoslav Communists were sometimes oblivious to wider European realities and to Stalin's geopolitical considerations.

When he entered Belgrade, on 20 October 1944, Tito, the undisputed leader of the country, commanded the fourth-largest army in Europe, consisting of partisans fiercely loyal to him. Responding to British and American pressure, Stalin soon forced Tito to accept a coalition with the exiled royal government in London. With Communists firmly in control, however, Yugoslavia's industry was quickly nationalised. In August 1945, a major land reform was enacted but without immediate collectivisation, presumably in recognition of the peasants' crucial support for the resistance movement during the war. On 11 November 1945, the Communists won an overwhelming victory in a general election. Two months later, a new Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was created and Tito became its first prime minister.

In Albania, Enver Hoxha, the Communist Party and Albanian National Liberation Front leader, became the head of the new government. During the war, Tito's envoys had acted as advisers to the Albanian Communist Party and had assisted with the command co-ordination of partisan military operations. Within months after the November 1944 liberation of Tirana, Hoxha managed to eliminate most of the opposition, often through summary executions. The general election in December 1945 legalised Communist control. Three months later, the new constitution, emulating the Soviet Constitution of 1936, declared Albania a people's republic. With almost all of its industry and resources nationalised by the end of that year, Albania became fully incorporated into the Soviet sphere.

The manner in which the Soviets were marginalised in the Allied Control Commission in Italy in 1943 and the December 1944 British military intervention in Greece undoubtedly shaped Stalin's approach to the creation of a Soviet sphere of influence in the Balkans. To the Soviet leader, it seemed as if Britain and the United States justified their behaviour by assuming that they had a right to impose solutions within their zone of occupation. Stalin did not seriously challenge them; moreover, he instructed local Communists not to engage in insurrectionary action. In Stalin's mind, the behaviour of Washington and London affirmed the precept that imposition of control over their respective spheres of influence was a natural right of the victors. The often-quoted observation he made over dinner with Tito and Milovan Djilas in April 1945 that 'this war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system' can be understood only

within this context.² Made only weeks after the meeting in Yalta – at which Stalin believed the Big Three had defined spheres of influence – the remark was not Stalin's admission of a blueprint for a Communist take-over of Eastern Europe; it acknowledged the post-Second World War settlement between ideologically opposed victors. Stalin saw Britain, at least, as having been ready to acknowledge most of the Balkans as part of a Soviet sphere of influence since the talks during Winston Churchill's visit to Moscow in October 1944.

The emergence of an ideological fault line in the Balkans provoked the first major confrontation of the Cold War. On 30 April 1945, Tito's army liberated and occupied the strategically important Italian port city of Trieste. Afterwards, the Yugoslav leader flatly rejected British–American demands for a withdrawal, provoking a dangerous stand-off between the Allied armies that threatened a full-blown military confrontation. A month later, Stalin forced Tito to withdraw and sign a provisional agreement with the Western Allies, leaving the final settlement to the Paris Peace Conference. At the conference, however, the Trieste question became one of the most contested issues. It also provoked possibly the first act of dissent within the Communist bloc. In September 1946, unhappy with the Soviet concessions over Trieste, the Yugoslav delegation threatened to walk out of the Paris conference.³ Tito, nevertheless, bowed to Stalin's authority. The conference, in the end, extended the earlier provisional agreement, leaving the Trieste issue a dangerous flash-point. In October 1953, a unilateral British–American decision to hand the administration of Trieste to Italy, contrary to the provisions of the existing agreement, brought Yugoslavia and Italy within hours of a military confrontation.⁴ A year later, a Washington-brokered agreement settled the Trieste question, with the city itself being awarded to Italy, while Yugoslavia retained the southern areas.

With the end of the Second World War in sight, the Soviet Union had set out to establish its sphere of interest in the Balkans. Romania and Bulgaria were incorporated into this sphere as a result of Red Army advances and consequent Soviet military occupation. In Yugoslavia and Albania, indigenous resistance movements established Communist regimes that were Moscow's natural allies. Turkey, as a neutral during the war, remained outside the Soviet sphere. Only in Greece did the form of the postwar settlement appear

2 Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), 90.

3 Vladimir Dedijer, *Dokumenti 1948* [Documents on 1948] vol. I (Belgrade: Rad, 1979), 134.

4 V. Dedijer, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* [New Supplements to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito], vol. III (Belgrade: Izdavačka radna organizacija Rad, 1984), 629.

open-ended, as the Communists and the pro-Western government in Athens prepared for a showdown.

The Greek Civil War and the Turkish crisis

The origins of the Greek Civil War lay in the character of the anti-Nazi resistance in the country during the Second World War. In the autumn of 1944, when the German army retreated from Greece, most of the country was controlled by partisans of the National People's Liberation Army (Ellinikos Laïkos Apeleftherotikos Stratos, ELAS), the military wing of the National Liberation Front (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo, EAM), established in September 1941 by the Greek Communist Party (Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas, KKE). Some areas, however, were controlled by smaller resistance movements of pro-Western and anti-Communist orientation. From the outset of the anti-Nazi struggle, fratricidal in-fighting had been taking place between the left- and right-wing resistance movements.

During the summer of 1944, alarmed by the prospect of a Communist take-over after the war, Churchill successfully lobbied Franklin D. Roosevelt and Stalin and obtained support to sideline the EAM.⁵ In September, the EAM was forced to accept an agreement recognising the authority of Georgios Papandreou's royal government in exile. Furthermore, ELAS units were placed under the command of the British general Ronald Scobie. Developments in Greece certainly played a role in prompting Churchill to initiate the 'percentage agreement' on spheres of influence in the Balkans when he met Stalin in October 1944. During the same month, a British contingent landed in Athens, followed a few days later by the royal Greek government. An uneasy stand-off ensued between the Communist-led forces controlling the countryside and the government, backed by British troops in and around Athens. Shots fired by police during an EAM rally in Athens on 3 December triggered an open civil war. The British government urgently deployed reinforcements from bases in Italy. Within a month, a combination of British military muscle and Churchill's political cunning had forced ELAS out of Athens and its immediate surroundings.

The EAM's failure to take control of the country in late 1944 can be attributed to Stalin's refusal to authorise it to do so. When the British contingent landed in Athens, Stalin ordered the withdrawal of Bulgarian

⁵ Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 17.

troops from northern Greece, thus honouring, as he saw it, the inter-alliance agreement on Balkan spheres of influence.⁶ At the climax of the fighting in Athens, in mid-December 1944, Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Communist leader and head of the recently disbanded Comintern, communicated a stark message to the KKE leadership that the 'current international situation' did not permit other Communist states to support any offensive by the Greek Communists.⁷ On 10 January 1945, in front of Dimitrov, Stalin accused the KKE leadership of acting against his advice 'not to start this struggle', cynically adding that they probably 'expected the Red Army to descend to the Aegean'.⁸

Deprived of Moscow's support, the EAM ceased fighting over Athens and signed an agreement with the Greek government on 12 February 1945. This agreement effectively signalled the EAM's military defeat in the first round of the Greek Civil War. Under the terms of the agreement, ELAS and other paramilitary forces were disarmed and disbanded in return for a promise of a referendum on the fate of the monarchy and general elections. ELAS's demobilization allowed the Right, now in full control of the Greek army and the police, to unleash a 'white terror' campaign of persecution and murder against the Communists and their sympathisers. Many on the Right saw this as a retribution for Communist excesses perpetrated during the December fighting in Athens.

The KKE's decision to boycott the 31 March 1946 general elections, because of the widespread intimidation of its sympathisers, led to an overwhelming victory by the anti-Communist parties. The momentum created by this victory would, six months later, help the government and anti-Communist parties secure majority backing for King Georgios's return to Greece in a national referendum on the future of the Greek monarchy. The outcome of the elections and continued persecution of the Left provoked a series of spontaneous actions of ELAS veterans against government forces. Without Moscow's clear authorisation, the KKE leadership, in particular its general secretary, Nikos Zachariadis, escalated sporadic clashes into another round of civil war by the end of 1946.⁹ In December, the left-wing forces were unified into the Greek Democratic Army (Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas, DSE).

6 J. Iatrides, 'Revolution or Self-Defence?: Communist Goals, Strategy, and Tactics in the Greek Civil War', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7, 3 (Summer 2005), 3–33.

7 Peter J. Stavrakis, *Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944–1949* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 52.

8 Thanasis D. Sfikas, 'Toward a Regional Study of the Origins of the Cold War in Southeastern Europe: British and Soviet Policies in the Balkans, 1945–1949', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 17 (1999), 209–27.

9 Iatrides, 'Revolution or Self-Defence?.'

Organised into small guerrilla units, the DSE attacked government forces and outposts and then retreated into mountains or bases in Yugoslavia and Albania.

By the autumn of 1946, a consensus had been reached in Washington that the escalation of the Communist insurrection in Greece, coupled with Soviet pressure on Turkey, was proof of Moscow's expansionism and a threat to vital Western interests in the eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, the British government, preoccupied with problems in Palestine and India and its dire economic situation at home, was increasingly unable to fulfil its role as regional *gendarme*. Washington thus began preparations to step in and provide necessary military and economic assistance to the Greek and Turkish governments.¹⁰ This explains how on 12 March 1947, barely three weeks after the British had informed him of their inability to continue supplying arms to Greece, President Harry S. Truman was able not only to request from the US Congress a substantial military and economic assistance package to Greece and Turkey but also, more importantly, to promulgate a comprehensive doctrine of containment of the Soviet and Communist global threat – the Truman Doctrine.

By mid-1948, decisive US military and economic assistance to the Athens government, in the absence of Moscow's commitment to the DSE, tipped the scales of war against the Communists. Besides arms, Washington provided crucial assistance in military training, air support, and command co-ordination. In addition, substantial US economic aid helped turn the peasant population, exhausted after seven years of war, away from the Communists. The change in the DSE's military tactics to large-scale operations from the autumn of 1947, in particular the DSE's disastrous attack on Thessaloniki on 10 February 1948, haemorrhaged its human and material resources without any military gains in return. In addition, divisions and purges within the KKE caused by the Tito–Stalin split further diminished its effectiveness and its ability to wage war. In the summer of 1949, the Greek government army, under the newly appointed commander-in-chief, General Alexander Papagos, launched a series of successful offensives. The retreat of the last DSE units into Albania in October 1949 signalled the end of the civil war in Greece.

10 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh), Washington, October 15, 1946, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1946*, vol. VII (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969), 235–37; Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs – Memorandum Regarding Greece, Washington, October 21, 1946, *ibid.*, 240–45.



15. Communists shot by the government during the Greek Civil War, 1949.

Some historians have mistakenly attributed the end of the Communist insurgency in Greece to Yugoslavia's decision to close its border in July 1949. Between 1945 and July 1948, the Yugoslavs had supported the Greek Communists and often acted to promote their cause with Stalin. The closing of the border with Greece was a desperate concession to the West, at a time when Belgrade had become convinced of an imminent Soviet attack on Yugoslavia. By the summer of 1949, however, the outcome of the Greek Civil War had already been decided. The final offensive of the government's army had inflicted a fatal blow on the remaining Communist units, by then at a fraction of their strength in 1947.

Arguably, it was Stalin himself who decisively contributed to the Communists' defeat in the Greek Civil War. The Soviet leader repeatedly denied assistance to the Greek Communists and often deliberately undermined their policies. Available evidence suggests that Stalin never seriously contemplated a pro-Soviet regime in Greece because he was fearful that it would encroach on what he understood to be an area of vital British and American interests.¹¹ At the Yalta Conference, he never raised the question of Greece. The only time Stalin offered military assistance to the Greek Communists was during his May 1947 meeting with Zachariadis in Moscow. But even then he recommended that Zachariadis seek arms from Tito,

¹¹ Dedijer, *Dokumenti* 1948, 168–85.

knowing full well that Yugoslavia's stockpiles were at the time depleted and that it would not be able to deliver anything like the requested quantities. A few months later, Stalin excluded the KKE from the formative meeting of the Cominform, citing as justification the danger of provoking the Americans.¹² On 10 February 1948, Stalin angrily reprimanded Dimitrov and Tito's deputy, Edvard Kardelj, for aiding the Greek Communists, insisting that he had never believed in their victory.¹³

Turkey, although it was the only Balkan state that had remained neutral during the Second World War, emerged as an overwhelmingly underdeveloped country, with deep social divisions, and governed by an authoritarian regime based on a monopoly of power held by the Republican People's Party (RPP), which saw itself as custodian of Atatürk's political legacy. Building on what he thought was the Turkish state's internal weakness, Stalin in the summer of 1946 demanded shared control of the Bosphorus straits. Encouraged by the United States, Turkey resisted Moscow's demands and, together with Greece, provoked the Truman Doctrine and the West's emerging containment strategy.

Improved relations with the United States prompted a slow democratisation of Turkey's political life. The first postwar elections in July 1946 instigated a process of transition from twenty years of dictatorship to multi-party democracy. Elections in 1950 and 1954 and the victories of the former opposition Democratic Party under Adnan Menderes represented the culmination of this process. As a beneficiary of Marshall Plan aid, between 1949 and 1954 the Turkish economy also underwent substantial modernisation, which strengthened the central state further.

During the 1950s, Ankara received more than \$2 billion of Western, mostly US, military assistance that helped transform Turkey into a major regional military power. In February 1952, after participating in the Korean War on the side of the United Nations with a 25,000-strong contingent, Turkey was rewarded with full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).¹⁴ By the mid-1950s, Turkey had become the linchpin of US-backed regional military alliances. A treaty of military co-operation with Pakistan was concluded in August 1954. A similar treaty with Iraq, signed in February 1955, was a precursor to the Baghdad Pact, a regional alliance also joined by Iran and the United Kingdom, with the United States as an 'observer'. In the years that

¹² Iatrides, 'Revolution or Self-Defence?'.
¹³ Dedijer, *Dokumenti 1948*, 168–85.

¹⁴ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 235–39.

followed, Arab states in the Middle East increasingly perceived Turkey as an American Trojan horse and a regional policeman. After a radical coup in Baghdad in 1958 led to Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, a new Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) was formed, with the United States as a full member. In August 1954, Turkey, encouraged by Washington, created a military alliance with Greece and Yugoslavia – the Balkan Pact – the only formal Cold War military alliance with ideologically antagonistic members. Ankara thus played a very important role in the US strategy of encircling the USSR with pro-Western regional military alliances. In turn, it was rewarded with continuous access to Western economic aid and financial assistance.

With the Communists defeated in the Greek Civil War and Greece and Turkey firmly ensconced in NATO, the Americans and the British preserved a foothold in the Balkans, securing the vitally important rim of the eastern Mediterranean from Soviet penetration. As Europe began to split into antagonistic blocs, Stalin recognised the need for deeper cohesion inside the Soviet 'camp'.

The Tito–Stalin split

Until 1946, Stalin believed that the cautious building of his sphere of influence in the Balkans and Eastern Europe would avoid an all-out confrontation with Britain and the United States. But, after Churchill's Fulton speech in March 1946 and after Molotov wrangled with the British and Americans during the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers and at the Paris Peace Conference in the months that followed, the Soviet leader began to recognise the making of his worst geostrategic nightmare – an anti-Soviet alignment of the two strongest capitalist states and global powers.¹⁵ On 1 January 1947, the US and British occupation officials in Germany unified their zones into a single economic unit – Bizonia. In March, President Truman delivered his famous address calling for the containment of Soviet 'expansionism'. In June, US secretary of state George Marshall announced an unprecedented American economic aid package to Europe. By the time European foreign ministers assembled at a conference in Paris in late June 1947 to discuss the European response to the American initiative, Stalin had become convinced that the Marshall Plan was aimed at consolidating the British–American sphere of influence in Western Europe against the Soviets.¹⁶

¹⁵ See Vladimir O. Pechatnov's chapter in this volume.

¹⁶ For more on the Marshall Plan, see William I. Hitchcock's chapter in this volume.

Many historians have pointed out that the Marshall Plan changed Stalin's strategies, moving him towards 'confrontational unilateral action to secure Soviet interests'.¹⁷ As explained in Norman Naimark's chapter in this volume,¹⁸ consolidation of a Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe became Stalin's priority; the first major step was the creation of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) in September 1947 at Szklarska Poręba in Poland. The new organisation included all East European and major West European Communist parties. Moulded on the Comintern, its task was to achieve 'unity of action and co-ordination' under Moscow's control and guidance. Chairing the Cominform's formative meeting, Stalin's ideologue, Andrei Zhdanov, announced for the first time the existence of the 'two camps'.

By the autumn of 1947, the Kremlin exerted full control over its area of influence in the Balkans as well as throughout Eastern Europe. The Romanian opposition was politically eliminated after a series of staged trials. Left-wing parties were merged with the Romanian Communist Party into the Romanian Workers' Party. On 30 December 1947, King Michael was forced to abdicate. The Communist-dominated People's Democratic Front won almost 100 per cent of the vote in the fraudulent elections of March 1948. In Bulgaria, the purges and harassment of political opponents were renewed during the summer of 1946. After general elections in October, Dimitrov formed a government with Communists firmly in charge. In a staged trial in September 1947, Nikola Petkov, the leader of the opposition, was pronounced guilty of treason and executed, signalling the end of political opposition in Bulgaria.

In the first postwar years, Belgrade was considered Moscow's most trusted ally. Tito, the most popular European resistance leader and a veteran of the pre-war Comintern, enjoyed a certain freedom of action from Stalin, unlike any other East European leader. The Yugoslav Communist Party, which unaided by Moscow had carried out a victorious war of liberation and a successful socialist revolution, commanded special respect among European Communist parties. The Kremlin chose Yugoslav party representatives to spearhead the attack on the Italian and French Communist parties at the meeting that established the Cominform, and Belgrade was given the honour of hosting the new organisation. Thus, Tito and his comrades were shocked when they first began to observe a change in the mood of the Kremlin in January 1948. A Yugoslav delegation seeking Soviet military and economic assistance was badly treated.

17 Scott D. Parish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, *New Evidence of the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports*, Working Paper No. 9 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1994).

18 See Norman Naimark's chapter in this volume.



16. Josip Broz Tito (third from right), the leader of Yugoslavia, dancing with people in Dalmatia, 1950. His popular support empowered him to resist Stalin.

At the same time, *Pravda* dismissed Dimitrov's statement on the prospects of an East European and Balkan federation as a 'concoction'.¹⁹ Ominously, Stalin summoned both Tito and Dimitrov. Instinctively cautious, Tito instead dispatched his second-in-command, Kardelj.

During the meeting that took place on 10 February, Stalin viciously attacked the Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs for failing to consult Moscow on foreign-policy issues. As evidence of their sins, he singled out the idea of a Balkan federation, the deployment of two Yugoslav army divisions in Albania, and continuing assistance to Greek Communists. The following night, Kardelj was unceremoniously summoned to the office of Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov and required to sign a formal agreement compelling the Yugoslavs to consult Moscow on all foreign-policy issues. Soviet actions gravely worried Tito and his associates, witnesses to the 1930s purges in Moscow.²⁰ On 18 and 19 March, true to their foreboding and only weeks after Kardelj's return, Moscow ratcheted up the pressure, advising Belgrade of the withdrawal of all Soviet military and civil advisers from Yugoslavia.²¹

19 Dedijer, *Dokumenti* 1948, 167–68.

20 *Ibid.*, 168–87.

21 *Ibid.*, 196–97.

A letter dispatched to Belgrade on 27 March, signed by Stalin and Molotov, accused the Yugoslav leadership of the gravest 'sins' in the Communist vocabulary. They were assailed for slandering the USSR, repudiating Marxism-Leninism, and abandoning the principles of class struggle and the leading role of the party. After receiving a resolution of the Hungarian Communist Party of 8 April supporting Moscow's accusations, the Yugoslav leadership understood that Stalin was orchestrating a campaign against them.²² On 12 and 13 April, Tito convened a closed session of the Yugoslav Central Committee. All but two of its members approved a response to the accusations drafted by Tito himself; it repudiated 'the false accusations and a veiled hegemonic assault of one state against the sovereignty of the other, hidden behind an ideological veneer', and invited Stalin to send a Soviet party delegation to Yugoslavia to convince itself of the absurdity of accusations.²³

During the next two months, still in absolute secrecy, Moscow and Belgrade continued to exchange accusations and denials. The Kremlin suggested that the case be handed over to the next Cominform meeting to be held in Bucharest in June. Tito refused to attend, convinced that he and his party would be subjected to a staged trial with a predetermined verdict. Indeed, the Cominform resolution, publicised at the end of the Bucharest meeting on 28 June 1948, decreed the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist Party and exhorted 'true Marxist elements' within the party to remove Tito.²⁴ It came as a bolt from the blue to the Communist world and to the West. The resolution was never officially presented to Belgrade; in fact, the Yugoslav leadership learned of its contents from press reports.

Within weeks of the Cominform meeting, the USSR and its satellites initiated a total economic blockade, bringing Yugoslavia to the verge of collapse and causing outbreaks of famine in parts of the country for several years afterwards. The impact of the blockade was exacerbated by the fact that Yugoslavia had emerged from the Second World War in economic ruin and with a death toll of 2 million. Furthermore, from 1945 to 1948, the Yugoslav economy, subordinated to the 'division of labour' within the socialist 'camp', had become dependent on assistance and trade with the USSR and East European people's democracies.

However, the biggest danger to Tito's regime was the possibility of a Soviet military invasion. Immediately following the Cominform resolution,

²² *Ibid.*, 252.

²³ *Ibid.*, 225–49.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 299–306.

Yugoslavia faced armed hostilities on its borders on a daily basis as the Kremlin's satellites infiltrated armed saboteurs. According to Yugoslav figures, from 1948 to 1953 there were 7,877 border 'incidents', of which 142 were substantive clashes. These 'incidents' continued even after Stalin's death, until full Soviet–Yugoslav normalisation in 1955. Moscow and its allies also unleashed a fierce propaganda war against the regime in Belgrade, disseminating disinformation and encouraging Yugoslavs to liquidate Tito and his 'clique'. The near life-and-death struggle against Stalin was responsible for a trauma that weighed on Yugoslav society for decades afterwards. During this period, Tito created a concentration camp, located on the Adriatic island of Goli Otok. Almost 32,000 political prisoners passed through the camp, most of them accused of supporting the Cominform and Stalin; about 3,200 died there.²⁵

During the Cold War, historians mistakenly attributed the Soviet–Yugoslav split to Tito's 'national Communism' or to his foreign-policy aspirations. They cited his decision to deploy Yugoslav troops to Albania or his plans to create a Balkan federation with Dimitrov. The archives tell a different story. At the July 1955 plenum of the Soviet Party Central Committee, the president of the Soviet Council of Ministers, Nikolai Bulganin, echoed by Nikita Khrushchev, confirmed that the 'sins' purportedly perpetrated by Tito had been Stalin's fabrications.²⁶ Prior to 1948, Tito had always bowed to Stalin's authority, even over the final settlement of Yugoslavia's borders around Trieste and with Austria. Moreover, in 1946 and 1947, when the Greek Communist leader Zachariadis came to Belgrade to solicit support for the escalation of operations in Greece, Tito dutifully sent him to Moscow. And, furthermore, Tito's alleged unauthorised deployment of two Yugoslav divisions to Albania was nothing more than Belgrade's willingness to consider Albania's request for military assistance. After being expelled from the Cominform, Yugoslav leaders became convinced that Hoxha's request was a conspiracy, hatched in Moscow, to substantiate subsequent accusations against Tito.²⁷ Contrary to prevailing interpretations, the Balkan federation never even came close to implementation. At the end of their meetings in Yugoslavia in August 1947, and a few months later in Bulgaria, Tito and Dimitrov officially dismissed the issue as premature. Stalin's harassment of Dimitrov and Kardelj during the

25 Dedijer, *Novi prilozi*, vol. III, 461 and 478.

26 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955; Bulganin's address, transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session; RGANI (Russian Government Archive of Contemporary History, Moscow), fond 2, opis' 1, rolík 6228, delo 158, listy 90–100.

27 Dedijer, *Dokumenti 1948*, 177.

February meeting can be understood only as part of the lead-up to an orchestrated campaign against Tito.²⁸ The Yugoslav leader embarked on his 'own road to socialism' and independent foreign policy only *after* the break with Stalin.

Historical evidence suggests that the Yugoslav–Soviet rupture was the result of Stalin's belated and flawed efforts to create a monolithic Communist 'camp'. Not by accident, the attacks on Tito coincided with the February 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia. As detailed earlier, Stalin embarked upon creating a Soviet bloc after the autumn of 1947. The expeditious way to accomplish it, in his view, was through the process of Sovietisation. Stalin did not enjoy the good fortune of the British and Americans, who shared common cultural, religious, and ideological values with West European elites. Some of the countries inside his sphere of influence, such as Hungary and Poland, were deeply Catholic and Russophobe.

By Sovietising within his sphere of influence, Stalin sought to achieve several goals. On the one hand, he wanted to subordinate these countries by imposing a socio-economic and political system that was a replica of the one he had created in the USSR. On the other hand, he aimed to secure cohesion of the Soviet bloc by restraining these countries into a uniform ideological framework. To ensure this uniformity, he authorised the purging of 'internal ideological enemies', as he had done in his own country in the 1930s. The more prominent the personality, the better; if the most trusted comrades could be hidden enemies, anyone could. The presence of an 'enemy within' demanded permanent vigilance, which justified the temporary suspension of state and party institutions and the delegation of their functions to the security apparatus – the essence of Stalin's repressive state. The removal of Tito – the enemy within – initiated and justified the witch-hunts throughout Eastern Europe that followed the split with Yugoslavia; in Stalin's view, it mobilised popular support behind satellite regimes. This explains why Moscow portrayed the attempt to subjugate the regime in Belgrade as an ideological confrontation with Tito. Unfortunately for Stalin, the plot to remove the Yugoslav leader did not go according to script; thereafter, the complete rupture of Yugoslav–Soviet relations had a long-term corrosive impact on the Soviet bloc.

Following Yugoslavia's banishment from the Cominform, the Soviet satellite regimes staged show trials against 'Titoists'. During 1949, prominent political figures, such as Albania's Defence and Interior Minister Koçi Xoxe, Hungary's Foreign Minister László Rajk, and Bulgaria's Deputy Prime

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 179–82.

Minister Traicho Kostov were tried, sentenced to death, and executed. From 1948 to 1955, forty high-profile anti-Yugoslav trials were organised in the people's democracies. Thousands of party members and ordinary citizens were tried on fabricated charges and interned or executed. Many others were liquidated outside the judicial process. In Albania, for example, 142 people were executed without a trial.²⁹

As part of the Sovietisation process, USSR intelligence agents penetrated the political, economic, and security institutions of the satellite countries. Army officers attending military schools in the USSR were recruited by Soviet intelligence agencies. Members of the local police and security apparatuses were supervised by Moscow's intelligence officers, erasing distinctions between Soviet and local security services. Soviet technical advisers, attached to government ministries and commercial enterprises, acted as recruiters for the KGB. Most of those targeted did not dare protest, fearing loss of employment or arrest. Others, especially old Communists who were previously affiliated with the Comintern and who were now in prominent positions, believed working for Soviet intelligence was their 'internationalist duty to the first country of socialism'. Without such widespread infiltration, the Sovietisation of the Balkans would have been much harder, if not impossible.

The Yugoslav–Soviet rupture had important geostrategic implications. It created a new flashpoint along the still-unstable demarcation line in Europe; a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia might have escalated into a global confrontation of the blocs. Tito, however, rightly calculated that Stalin would not contemplate an invasion of Yugoslavia if convinced that it would trigger a war with the Western bloc. He sought and received Western security guarantees. From 1950 to 1955, Yugoslavia, previously a member of the Soviet bloc, became effectively incorporated into NATO through defence co-ordination, arms deliveries, and other military assistance. Thousands of US military advisers were attached to Yugoslav army units. This improved NATO's strategic position – the defence line against a possible Soviet attack in Southeastern Europe was moved a couple of thousand miles further to the north, from the southern tip of Italy to the Ljubljana pass in northwestern Yugoslavia.

Tito, however, consistently resisted Western pressure to join NATO formally. He feared, on the one hand, that it would destroy chances of reconciliation with the international Communist movement and, on the other hand, he worried that it would help the United States topple his regime. To avoid the risk of losing the vital protection offered by the Western defensive umbrella,

29 AJB Tita [Archives of J. B. Tito, Belgrade], KPR, I-3-a, SSSR.

Tito initiated a military alliance with two Balkan NATO members, Greece and Turkey. In Ankara in February 1953, the three countries agreed to co-ordinate their defensive capabilities, paving the way for the signing of the Balkan Pact on 9 August 1954. Although the pact was short-lived, due to Yugoslav–Soviet normalisation in 1955 and the deterioration of Greek–Turkish relations over Cyprus, it remained a unique feature of the Cold War – the only formal military alliance between ideological foes.

The West, especially the Americans, continued to provide Tito with vital economic and military assistance. Without this support, the regime in Belgrade would have found it much more difficult, even impossible, to resist Stalin's pressure. The West's eagerness to 'keep Tito afloat' was far from altruistic. Yugoslavia, the most loyal of Stalin's disciples until 1948, quickly became one of most valuable assets in the global propaganda war against the Soviet Union. Tito's defiance undermined the cohesion of the Soviet bloc, and the Communist movement. By becoming part of NATO's defence planning, Yugoslavia also closed the last European loophole in the military encirclement of the Soviet bloc. From 1949 to 1955, Tito's regime received approximately \$1.5 billion worth of Western economic and military aid.³⁰

The Tito–Stalin confrontation destroyed the ideological uniformity of Stalinism. Yugoslavs, eager to prove their Communist credentials, felt compelled to conceptualise and publicise their interpretation of 'authentic' Marxism. They revived Marx's early theses, which Stalin had buried in order to create a monstrous hybrid of a system. The Yugoslavs offered their 'road to socialism' as an alternative to Stalin's dogma. They introduced 'self-management' in the economy and in state organisations as a precursor to the waning of the state under socialism, and to the transformation of the party's role, from its commanding position to one of 'leading by example'. In promulgating these 'true socialist postulates', as they saw them, the Yugoslavs introduced 'workers' councils' in factories and enterprises as early as 1950. Within several years, the market assumed an enhanced role in the economy, effectively dismantling the administrative-command system. Workers' councils became the most potent symbol of Tito's anti-Stalinist socialism and Belgrade's chief ideological export to Eastern Europe; they mushroomed throughout Poland and Hungary during the short-lived liberalisation of 1956. As early as 1952, the Yugoslav party changed its name to the League of Communists to stress its changed role. In January 1953, it abolished collective farms; in fact, collectivisation had been introduced only

30 AJ, ACK SKJ [Archive of Yugoslavia, Archives of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Belgrade], 507/IX, 119/1–56.

after the Tito–Stalin split in 1949 as part of Belgrade’s effort to prove the falsehood of Moscow’s accusations that the Yugoslavs had abandoned the ‘construction of socialism’.

The Yugoslav–Soviet rupture also inspired Tito to seek a ‘third way’ and to play a crucial role in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Having resisted hegemony within the Communist camp, Tito would not allow Yugoslavia to be ensnared by the capitalist West. As early as 1951, he began searching for allies for an alternative foreign-policy strategy. His attention focused on newly decolonised countries, particularly those in Asia. On the eve of the Bandung Conference in November 1954, Tito went on a three-month trip to India and Burma, with a stop-over in Suez, during which he established an exceptional rapport with Nehru and Nasser. Their tripartite meeting in Brioni, in July 1956, heralded the ‘Third Way’. In September 1961, twenty-five heads of state met in Belgrade and institutionalised the Non-Aligned Movement. During the 1960s and 1970s, it became the largest gathering of nations outside the UN – the conscience of the developing world and the only challenge to the bipolarity of the Cold War.

Soviet–Yugoslav normalisation

The ‘New Course’ of Soviet leaders after Stalin’s death in March 1953 at first hardly reverberated among the Kremlin’s Balkan satellites. Local leaders, nicknamed ‘little Stalins’, in particular Hoxha of Albania and Vulko Chervenkov of Bulgaria, paid only lip-service to the role of collective leadership and to the separation of state and party organs. Although the brutal repression was somewhat relaxed, the Stalinist system remained largely intact in these countries long after a wave of liberalisation swept Eastern Europe in 1956. Even the removal of Chervenkov by Todor Zhivkov in April 1956 changed little in Bulgaria. In Romania and Albania, Gheorghiu Gheorghiu-Dej and Hoxha, both confirmed Stalinists, remained in power until their natural deaths in 1965 and 1985, respectively.

But Tito had a significant impact on the process of de-Stalinisation in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. Following Soviet intelligence chief Lavrentii Beria’s removal in June 1953, Khrushchev and his colleagues came to believe that bolder policy changes were necessary to extricate the Soviet Union from Stalin’s legacy. In this respect, a change of policy towards Belgrade became a measure of the new leadership’s readiness to step out of Stalin’s shadow. Still, it took Khrushchev more than a year to overcome the opposition of Molotov and other Kremlin hard-liners.

On 22 June 1954, Khrushchev dispatched a secret letter to Yugoslav leaders. It proposed normalisation of relations between the two countries and the two Communist parties.³¹ The Soviet initiative came as a shock. For two weeks, Tito chose not to show the letter to members of his Central Committee, fearing yet another Soviet ploy to discredit him. In a cautious response, sent almost two months later, Tito agreed only to re-establish state relations; the renewal of party relations was to follow once normalisation had become irreversible and only after the Kremlin acknowledged Stalin's responsibility for the 1948 split. The exchange of letters continued in utmost secrecy for almost a year. Despite strong disagreements, both sides were careful not to jeopardise the opportunity that had been created. A significant change of pace happened after Khrushchev demoted his rival, Georgii Malenkov, in January 1955. The Soviet leader then boldly proposed to Tito that they meet face to face in Belgrade.

The Soviet delegation landed in Belgrade on 26 May 1955, causing a sensation around the world. Upon arrival, Khrushchev delivered a speech expressing regret for what had happened between the two countries. After several days of intense talks and open exchanges, Khrushchev and Tito signed the 'Belgrade Declaration' on 2 June. For the first time, the USSR officially and publicly accepted that relations with Yugoslavia – and with other socialist countries – should be guided by the principle of equality.³² But the visit failed to bridge the ideological chasm created after 1948. Yugoslav leaders rejected Soviet invitations to rejoin the socialist 'camp' and to re-establish party relations. Still, the implications of the Belgrade meeting went beyond bilateral relations between the two countries. The visit ended a seven-year confrontation that had threatened the peace and stability of Europe. Yugoslavia was also allowed to re-establish its presence in other satellite countries. Awareness of Yugoslavia's independent socialism subsequently encouraged the liberalisation tide in Poland and Hungary in 1956.

Khrushchev's Belgrade visit also forwarded the process of de-Stalinisation in the Soviet Union. For the first time in their lives, Soviet leaders who met Tito heard criticism of Stalin from a fellow Communist. As Khrushchev would admit later, 'I realized the falsehood of [the Soviet leadership's] position [regarding Stalin] for the first time and in earnest when I arrived in Yugoslavia and spoke with Tito and other comrades there.'³³ During the

³¹ AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-48.

³² AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-56.

³³ N. S. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniia: vremia, liudi, vlast'* [Reminiscences: Times, People, Power], vol. IV (Moscow: Moskovskie novosti, 1999), 189.

concluding session of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), held in Moscow from 4 to 12 July 1955, Khrushchev reported on the visit to Belgrade. The discussion that followed represented a true landmark in the post-Stalin transition in the USSR. Using Yugoslavia as a pretext, Khrushchev managed to isolate Molotov and to re-assert his leadership credentials. By reviewing the causes of the rupture with Yugoslavia in 1948, Khrushchev and his supporters for the first time presented Central Committee members with evidence of Stalin's despotism, thus initiating the destruction of the *vozhd's* myth. The plenum resolution also called for equality in relations between the socialist countries and between Communist Parties. It is doubtful whether Khrushchev's 'secret speech' would ever have happened had he and his supporters not passed the first hurdle at the July plenum. The dismantling of Stalin's legacy thus began a full eight months before the Twentieth Congress.³⁴

In his report on Stalin's personality cult, the 'secret speech', delivered at the end of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, Khrushchev acknowledged Stalin's responsibility for the 1948 rupture with Yugoslavia. Following this admission, Tito agreed that party relations be officially normalised during his visit to the USSR in June 1956. To appease the Yugoslav leader, Moscow timed the announcement of the dissolution of the Cominform and Molotov's replacement as foreign minister to coincide with Tito's visit. Khrushchev exerted enormous pressure during these talks in the Kremlin to persuade Tito to rejoin the socialist 'camp'. The situation in Poland and Hungary was increasingly worrying the Soviet leadership, and Khrushchev, as the main architect of de-Stalinisation, was under growing pressure from Kremlin hard-liners. Given his enormous prestige among East European reformists, Moscow hoped that Tito's return to the 'fold' would defuse tensions in Poland and Hungary. The Yugoslav leader, however, managed to resist the pressure. The 'Moscow Declaration', a document signed at the end of Tito's visit, represented his victory. It reaffirmed the principle of equality between Communist parties. The Soviets agreed to the declaration barely an hour before the scheduled formal signing ceremony. They understood that a collapse of the talks would further underline their impotence at a time when Moscow's authority was being challenged in Poland and Hungary.³⁵

34 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955; transcripts, accompanying documents, and resolutions; RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, r. 6225, 6227, and 6228 (microfilms).

35 AJB Tita, KPR, I-2/7-1, 732–801.

Soviet pressure on Tito continued after the Moscow meetings. Khrushchev launched a last-ditch effort to bring Tito into the ‘camp’ in the second half of September and, once again, failed. In 1956, Tito actively supported reformers in Poland and Hungary in their efforts to topple Stalinist regimes, and he played an important role during the Soviet intervention in Hungary in November of that year.³⁶ After suppressing the Hungarian uprising, Soviet leaders abandoned attempts to win Tito over and focused instead on undermining his influence in Eastern Europe.

The Balkans and the origins of the Cold War

The Balkan peninsula became a contested area among the emerging Cold War superpowers even before the Second World War officially ended. The Red Army’s advance into Bulgaria and Romania brought these countries into the Soviet sphere of influence. In Yugoslavia and Albania, indigenous Communist regimes, which enjoyed popular support, indirectly yet effectively served Moscow’s interests.

Stalin’s understanding of his deal with the West placed Greece within the Western sphere of influence. Nonetheless, in 1946, in an attempt to change the status quo, the Greek Communists instigated a civil war against the Western-backed government in Athens – the first armed conflict of the still-undeclared Cold War. However, deprived of Moscow’s decisive support, their futile effort ended in total defeat in the autumn of 1949. The Truman Doctrine, prompted by the Greek Civil War and Soviet pressure on Turkey, catalysed the American and Western strategy of containment and defined the basic precepts of the Cold War that would be in place until its very end.³⁷

Faced with an effort by the British and Americans to consolidate their own sphere of interest in Western Europe, Stalin embarked upon creating a monolithic Soviet bloc of Balkan and East European countries through their Sovietisation. As part of this process, the attempt to remove Tito backfired and prompted a monumental Soviet–Yugoslav rupture in 1948, thereby creating the first schism within the international Communist movement.

Within a year after Stalin’s death, Khrushchev and the new Soviet leadership tried to normalise relations with Yugoslavia. These efforts added momentum to the process of de-Stalinisation in the USSR and allowed Yugoslavia to play an important role in the process of liberalisation that swept Poland and

36 For more information on the 1956 revolution, see Csaba Békés’s chapter in this volume.

37 See Melvyn P. Leffler’s chapter in this volume.

Hungary in 1956. In November of that year, following the Soviet military intervention in Hungary, relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR and its Balkan satellites deteriorated once again. However, by the end of the 1950s, Yugoslavia was firmly pursuing a new role as a leader of the non-aligned countries.

During the 1960s, Albania closely allied itself with Mao Zedong's China. The country would remain isolated as the lone unreformed Stalinist regime until Hoxha's death in 1985. Hailed as the only country within the Soviet bloc with an independent foreign policy, Romania would suffer under Nicolae Ceaușescu's dictatorship until his bloody overthrow in December 1989. Bulgaria followed a less eventful existence as a faithful Soviet satellite until 1989.

Although the Balkan peninsula was an amalgamation of small nations with diverse cultures and religions, with only a modest proportion of the world's population, its geostrategic position and its complex politics led it to play a large part in the formative years of the Cold War. As often before in its history, such as in 1914 and 1939, the region found itself in the mainstream of global historical developments from 1945 to 1955. The role the Balkan states played in the early Cold War helps us fully appreciate the ways in which the dynamics of the superpower competition were distorted and were critically influenced by regional political forces and distinct historical legacies.

II

The birth of the People's Republic of China and the road to the Korean War

NIU JUN

The international order in East Asia changed dramatically following the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945; the two most consequential events of this period were the birth of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, and, one year later, the PRC's entry into a three-year military contest against the United States in the Korean War, 1950–53. These developments confirmed the spread of the Cold War to East Asia and determined the long-term pattern of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the region. For China, the decision to ally with the USSR and enter the Korean War meant that there was no alternative but to man Asia's Cold War frontier against US encroachment. All developments accompanying the birth of the PRC and its choice of foreign policies – especially the decision to enter the Korean War – were deeply rooted in China's domestic politics, and it can be safely concluded that the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made coherent choices when confronted with international crises. Yet the contest between the United States and the Soviet Union rapidly grew into the most significant characteristic of the postwar international system, and greatly influenced the future of China. From 1945, it was the interaction between four actors – the United States, the USSR, the Guomindang (GMD), and the CCP – that constituted the fundamental interface between Chinese domestic politics and the international system. It was also this dynamic that pushed China into deeper and deeper involvement in the Cold War.

A fragile peace

Toward the end of the Sino-Japanese War, the political situation in China was chaotic. GMD–CCP relations were enmeshed with Sino-American and Sino-Soviet relations and with the conflicts between the United States and the USSR over their China policies. Two important international agreements influenced

China's internal political situation. One was the secret Yalta agreement of February 1945 reached by the American and Soviet leaderships; the other was the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship signed by the Soviet Union and the GMD-controlled Republic of China in August 1945. A history of diplomatic maneuverings among the United States, the USSR, and the GMD government lay behind these two agreements, and through them the United States and the USSR attempted to coordinate their China policies. Meanwhile, both superpowers attempted to make acceptable to each other their arrangements for China's political development after World War II.

In 1941, once war had broken out in the Pacific, US leaders had been temporarily convinced that, were China to emerge as a pro-American power in East Asia, this would not only help to defeat Japan, but also serve as a shield to contain the USSR and limit the revolutionary trend in the region.¹ The problem was that the United States conflated the success of its China policies with the maintenance of Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek's) leadership, and Jiang was facing a series of grave domestic crises by the end of the war. The press in the Allied countries also frequently criticized the Nationalist government's financial corruption and military shortcomings. Further complicating the matter for the United States, since the summer of 1943, were the struggles between the GMD and the CCP, wherein new military conflicts loomed.

The United States did not want a large-scale Chinese civil war for a number of reasons. Washington believed that Chinese military forces should concentrate on fighting the war against Japan, not least since the Soviets had yet to be persuaded to commit troops in that war. Facing a worsening of the political and military situation in China, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration searched for ways to maintain Jiang Jieshi's position and, by doing so, to avoid a civil war. This objective later led to direct and active American intervention in the GMD-CCP conflicts through the missions of Generals Patrick Hurley and George C. Marshall to broker peace in China.

Iosif Stalin seems to have anticipated several potential problems once the USSR entered the war against Japan. In his estimation, what mattered most for Soviet policy in postwar East Asia was balancing Sino-Soviet and Soviet-US

1 "Outline of Long-Range Objectives and Policies of the United States with Respect to China," January 14, 1945, "Unity of Anglo-American-Soviet Policy toward China," January 14, 1945, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1955), 352-54, 356-58 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number); Summer Welles, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History* (New York: Harper, 1951), 186.

relations with a mind to achieving and protecting Soviet strategic interests in the Middle Kingdom, and he was much less interested than Washington in resolving China's internal problems. Stalin thought that the United States and Britain would not allow the CCP to gain absolute political power, and thus felt that the USSR could not support any radical ambitions held by the Chinese Communists. Moreover, in Stalin's mind, it was uncertain whether the CCP conformed to Soviet ideological standards, and the GMD seemed plainly to be in a more powerful position than the Communists. By all accounts, for Stalin, relations with the CCP were a lower priority than those with the United States and with Jiang Jieshi's regime. From the summer of 1944 to some time after the war's conclusion, Soviet leaders told almost every American representative visiting Moscow that they would support US policies in China and US efforts to mediate the GMD-CCP conflict. They also told the Nationalist government that "there could only be one government in China, led by the GMD."²

Up to the summer of 1945, the United States and the USSR attempted to coordinate their China policies based on the assumption of "peace under Jiang Jieshi," which they both believed to be a reasonable outcome. This premise set two objectives. The first was to support Jiang's political standing in postwar China, and specifically the Nationalist government's legitimacy and Jiang's leadership position within that government. The second was to avoid a civil war between the GMD and the CCP.

Both the United States and the USSR enjoyed considerable influence in China, but the GMD and the CCP still played the key roles in the country's political development. After Japan announced its surrender on August 14, 1945, the Nationalist government immediately faced the major problems of restoring its rule in China, recovering control of most of east and north China – including those areas occupied by the CCP forces – and taking back Manchuria, which Soviet forces had occupied after Stalin declared war on Japan in the last days of the Japanese empire. The main difficulty for Jiang was the speed with which he had to carry out these operations: the GMD could not amass enough forces in the time available for all these tasks.

2 Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), 140–41; "The Meeting between General Hurley and Molotov," "Meeting between Hurley and Marshall Stalin," April 15, 1945, Shijie zhishi chubanshe (ed. and comp.), *Zhongmei guanxi ziliao huibian* [Collection of Documents on Sino-American Relations], 3 vols. (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1957), vol. I, 139–41, 159–61.

Jiang Jieshi needed – and received – American support. Yet he must also have known that the United States did not want him to use force against the CCP, and that the USSR would never accept the extermination of the Communists by the GMD. Jiang had at least to demonstrate his willingness to attempt a political settlement. On the day of the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty in August 1945, Jiang Jieshi telegraphed the CCP chairman Mao Zedong and invited him to “please come to the war-time capital” for a GMD–CCP summit.

After the US diplomatic mission under George C. Marshall arrived in China in late December, Jiang agreed to accept US mediation and to resolve GMD–CCP conflicts through renewed political talks. His reasons for these decisions were essentially no different from those behind his earlier invitation extended to Mao to come to Chongqing. After the military confrontations in north and northeast China in mid-October, Jiang again determined that the GMD forces lacked the resources necessary to eliminate the CCP militarily. The next steps that Jiang took showed that he was temporarily retreating from using force. He limited military activities, resumed GMD–CCP negotiations, and reduced Sino-Soviet tension.

Since the outbreak of war against Japan in the summer of 1937, the CCP’s approach to relations with the GMD had been characterized by efforts to avoid a large-scale civil war and to use political means to push the GMD toward a settlement. So long as the USSR remained allied with the United States and Britain, CCP leaders believed that they could not carry out a radical revolution, but Mao also felt reassured that the GMD would not try to eradicate the CCP by force.³ This situation benefited the CCP, as it occupied a weaker position at the time.

In light of the Nationalist government’s military defeats against Japan and the failed negotiations mediated by Patrick Hurley in late 1944 and early 1945, CCP leaders had for a while contemplated adopting more radical policies. However, Mao’s speech at an internal meeting of the Seventh CCP Congress in the spring of 1945 revealed that CCP leaders had many alternative visions regarding the specific form of a so-called coalition government. One of them was very close to the basic US plan: that is, establishing a government headed by Jiang with the participation of other parties, including the CCP.⁴

3 Mao Zedong’s telegram to Liu Shaoqi, July 9, 1942, in Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi (comp.), *Mao Zedong wenji* [Collected Works of Mao Zedong], 8 vols. (Beijing: Renmin, 1993), vol. II, 434.

4 Mao Zedong, “Explanations of the Coalition Government,” March 31, 1945, *Mao Zedong zai qida de baogao he jianghua ji* [Collection of Mao Zedong’s Reports and Speeches at the Seventh CCP Congress] (hereafter *Mao Zedong zai qida*), (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1995), 102–03.

CCP leaders had been convinced before the end of the war that the USSR would not assist them as it had the East European countries.⁵ They paid more attention to the possibility of armed US intervention than to Soviet policies. Mao certainly felt disgruntled by the Soviet leaders' demand that he go to Chongqing for negotiations, but what caused his gravest concerns was more likely Stalin's pessimistic prediction of China's impending civil war, that "the Chinese nation faced the risk of destruction."⁶ Not only was Stalin warning the CCP Central Committee, but the Soviet embassy in China and the Soviet army in Manchuria all believed that it was very likely the United States would intervene militarily in China in case of a civil war.

Influenced by Soviet thinking, Mao believed at the time that "the United States would necessarily intervene" if the CCP were to occupy big cities such as Nanjing and Shanghai. Clearly, this belief was one of the main reasons why the CCP Central Committee decided to resume negotiations with the GMD; this view also determined the party's basic position that it should participate in a government headed by Jiang Jieshi. Mao described the arrangement as "dictatorship plus some democracy."⁷

Soon after the Chongqing negotiations began and even after the signing of an agreement on October 10, the GMD and the CCP began major military operations in north and northeast China. Yet, the CCP Central Committee still maintained that the fighting was temporary, and that the following six months would be a transitional period from civil war to peace.⁸ After President Harry S. Truman summed up his policy toward China on December 15, and after the Council of Foreign Ministers Moscow Conference and the start of the Marshall mission, the CCP decided to resume negotiations with the GMD. The Communist leadership thought that the political agreement brokered by Marshall was acceptable, and even that the plan to integrate the two armies

5 Mao Zedong, "Conclusions at the Seventh CCP Congress," May 31, 1945, *Mao Zedong zai qida*, 197; Wang Ruofei, "Records of Comrade Wang Ruofei's Reports," August 3, 1945, 6442/1.4, Archive of the Department of CCP History, People's University, Beijing.

6 *Mao Zedong xuanji* [Selected Works of Mao Zedong], 5 vols. (Beijing: Renmin, 1997), vol. V, 286.

7 Hu Qiaomu huiyilu bianxie zu (ed. and comp.), *Hu Qiaomu huiyi Mao Zedong* [Hu Qiaomu's Recollections of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Renmin, 1994), 396–98.

8 "The CCP Central Committee's Instructions regarding the Situation and Tasks of the Transitional Period," October 20, 1945, in *Zhongyang dang'an* (ed. and comp.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* [Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee] (hereafter ZZWXJ), 18 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao, 1989–92), vol. XV, 371–72.

was quite commendable. They believed that “a new period of peace and democracy [had] begun.”⁹

Judging from the outcome of its participation in the negotiations, the CCP’s political plan reflected the prognostications of the Seventh Congress. The CCP leaders were notably consistent in their thinking regarding the issues at hand. For some time after the Sino-Japanese War, they were still convinced that “the central problem in the world now was the struggle between the United States and the USSR, which, reflected in China, was the struggle between Jiang Jieshi and the CCP.”¹⁰ Since both the United States and the USSR deemed the Nationalist government to be legitimate, and since they demanded the peaceful resolution of GMD–CCP conflicts, as the weaker side, the CCP had to compromise.

The GMD and the CCP conducted a series of negotiations from the end of the Sino-Japanese War to June 1946. Regardless of their reasoning, they at least tried to look for political solutions and to achieve their goals through discussion rather than civil war. This peace held as long as both Chinese parties believed that some form of US–Soviet cooperation would survive. In these circumstances, neither the GMD nor the CCP had the capability to eliminate the other by force, each therefore had to accept a political solution mandated by the two superpowers.

The Cold War and the Civil War

After ten months of off-and-on negotiations between the GMD and the CCP, a full-scale civil war finally broke out in June 1946. The timing of the conflict was very much determined by the Cold War. In fact, the tenor of GMD–CCP negotiations had been fluctuating directly in tune with that of US–USSR relations. As the Cold War set in – in part because of the suspicions the two sides had about each other’s East Asian policies – both the GMD and the CCP saw opportunities to take advantage of the contradictions and tensions that became increasingly evident as the superpowers pursued their overall goals.

After the Sino-Japanese War, the United States began sending troops to China – 110,000 at their peak. Most of these troops were stationed in the north

9 Liu Shaoqi, “Report on the Current Situation,” January 31, 1946, in Department of CCP History, People’s University of China (ed. and comp.), *Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao: jiefang zhanzheng shiqi I* [Reference Materials of CCP History: Liberation War Period I], 8 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue, 1981), vol. VII, 120.

10 “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions,” November 28, 1945, in *ZZWXXJ*, vol. XV, 455–56.

of the country. Even if unintended, the presence of the American forces, who assisted the Nationalist government with logistics and airlifting GMD troops to Manchuria, resulted in an intensified atmosphere of confrontation. In addition, American units had frequent skirmishes with CCP forces in northern China. It seemed clear to the CCP leadership that the US forces would risk getting involved in a Chinese civil war in order to help Jiang Jieshi recover his control. General Marshall typified Washington's concerns. He was convinced that if China were to be riven by civil war, and if the Soviets profited by controlling Manchuria, then the United States would have failed to achieve its "major goal of entering the Pacific war." If the United States wanted to save Jiang Jieshi, on the other hand, it would have to take over China's government and "shoulder endless duties."¹¹ Ultimately, the Truman administration chose to mediate GMD–CCP conflicts as Roosevelt's administration had before it.

Large numbers of Soviet troops had entered Manchuria once the USSR declared war against Japan in August, creating tension with US troops that had come into northern China. The USSR began withdrawing its forces from Manchuria that October, but the following month, when Jiang Jieshi shut down his northeast headquarters in Manchuria and ordered attacks on CCP forces in and around Shanhaiguan, Soviet troops quickly returned south and seized the major cities and traffic routes. The Red Army occupied the main ports in Manchuria and forbade US ships transporting GMD forces from docking there, but the Soviets also moved quickly to ease tensions with the GMD government in other areas and asked that economic issues in Manchuria be resolved through negotiation. The Soviets also limited their aid to CCP forces (while denying in public that any aid was given at all) and reiterated their position that GMD–CCP conflicts should be solved through negotiations.¹² At the Moscow Conference, Soviet foreign minister Viacheslav Molotov again supported democratic unification "under the Nationalist government," and promised that the Soviet army would withdraw as planned.¹³

11 "Memorandum of Conversation, by General Marshall," December 11, 1945, *FRUS, 1945: China*, vol. VII, 767–69.

12 "Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Stalin and Jiang Jieshi's Personal Representative Jiang Jingguo," December 30, 1945, in A. M. Ledovskii, trans. Chen Chunhua and Liu Cunkuan, *Si Dalin yu zhongguo* [Stalin and China] (Beijing: Xinhua, 2001), 24–25.

13 History Department of Fudan University (ed. and comp.), *Zhongguo jindai duiwai guanxi shi ziliao xuanji* [A Selection of Documents on Modern China's Foreign Relations] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1977), 322–23.

The United States and the Soviet Union seemed to move toward a new compromise at the end of 1945. However, US strategic worries about Soviet troops in Manchuria remained, as did Stalin's anger over having been shut out of any role in Japan. The Truman administration had followed Soviet moves in Manchuria very closely, and Marshall considered forcing the Soviets out of Manchuria to be his primary task. But the Truman administration was not ready to pull the chestnuts from the fire for Jiang in Chinese domestic politics. Marshall asked Jiang to make political concessions, and urged the Nationalist government to accept the CCP's request for a total ceasefire in northern China. The main objective of Marshall's efforts was to permit Jiang to dispatch more troops to take over Manchuria.

Jiang Jieshi adopted the tactic of using political concessions to obtain Marshall's support for the destruction of the CCP's military potential. He also wanted to exploit the Americans' suspicion of the Soviets to change US policy in the longer term. Jiang did not yet intend to commit his best troops to Manchuria. By improving relations with the Soviets, he hoped for their assistance in taking over the region. During the Sino-Soviet negotiations over Manchurian economic questions, the Nationalist government tried to win from the Soviets the promise of a trouble-free occupation of Manchuria in exchange for certain concessions. During his visit to Moscow in December 1945, Jiang Jingguo, Jiang Jieshi's Soviet-educated son, further promised the Soviets that Manchuria would never become an anti-Soviet base and that no Chinese troops would be stationed on the Sino-Soviet border.¹⁴ With such efforts from both sides, Sino-Soviet relations showed signs of improvement. The Soviets concentrated on these negotiations. They did not intervene in Marshall's mediation mission, but they did try to persuade the CCP to propose a ceasefire.

Sino-Soviet relations experienced a reversal after February 1946. With the GMD-CCP negotiations making some progress, the situation in north China stabilized. Marshall then wanted to apply more pressure on the USSR over Manchuria. He encouraged the Nationalist government not to make further concessions to the Soviets, and also recommended in a report to President Truman that more measures should be taken to force the Soviet troops out of Manchuria.¹⁵ On February 9, the United States told the USSR and China that it opposed handling Japanese property in Manchuria exclusively

¹⁴ "Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Stalin and Jiang Jieshi's Personal Representative Jiang Jingguo," 15-23.

¹⁵ "General Marshall to President Truman," February 9, 1946, *FRUS, 1946: China*, vol. IX, 426-29.

through negotiations between China and the USSR. Soon afterward the terms of the Yalta agreement were made public and the American and British press began to criticize Soviet behavior in Manchuria.

There is no doubt that American support encouraged Jiang Jieshi to change his policy of cooperation with the USSR. In February, anti-Soviet demonstrations broke out in Chongqing and other cities, instigated and assisted by the GMD, but reflecting anti-Soviet sentiment among parts of the public. These demonstrations added to the pressure on the government. Since he now believed he had US backing for sending GMD forces into Manchuria after the ceasefire, Jiang no longer wanted to yield to the Soviets. On March 5, the Nationalist government rejected Soviet demands on Manchurian economic issues.

The deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations coincided with increasing tension between the GMD and the CCP in Manchuria. Not only did Jiang notice the changes in US–Soviet relations, he also believed that Marshall was increasingly leaning toward the GMD in intra-Chinese mediation efforts. He thus took an increasingly hardline stance on all matters relating to Manchuria. At the critical moment of the battle of Siping in April 1946, Jiang rejected Marshall's suggestion for a ceasefire. Even so, Marshall agreed to transport more troops to Manchuria for the GMD. Having made up his mind to completely destroy the CCP in Manchuria, Jiang took advantage of US efforts to constrain the USSR. Marshall at first acquiesced and then gave reluctant support to Jiang's strategy. Gradually, the strategic visions of the United States and the GMD converged in Manchuria.

At the same time, the CCP's policies in Manchuria were also changing. CCP leaders believed that a favorable strategic position in Manchuria was vitally important. Mao in particular wanted a secure position there in order to break fundamentally with the CCP's perennial state of being under siege.¹⁶ Soon after the Chongqing negotiations in the fall of 1945, the CCP Central Committee mapped out a plan to seize all of Manchuria with Soviet support.¹⁷ But with the improvement of GMD–Soviet relations and the obstruction of the Soviet troops, the CCP had to abandon this plan. During the first two months of 1946, CCP leaders still adhered to the agreements reached at the GMD–CCP negotiations, and they told party members that “the tendency

16 Mao Zedong's telegram to Liu Shaoqi, July 9, 1942, 434–45; Mao Zedong, “Conclusions at the Seventh CCP Congress,” 218–19.

17 “The CCP Central Committee's Telegram,” October 28, 1945, in ZZWXJ, vol. XV, 388–89.

towards peace was now firm.”¹⁸ In this context, they reluctantly decided in late January to “strive for a peaceful resolution” of the Manchuria issue.¹⁹ The Soviets’ warning that a civil war in Manchuria would “provoke American involvement” deepened the worries of CCP leaders who thought that, even if their army defeated the GMD, the United States would still send its troops into Manchuria.²⁰

However, the CCP had its own precondition for any peaceful resolution of the Manchuria issue – that the Nationalist government should recognize the legitimacy of the CCP’s presence in Manchuria. If that were not accepted, the CCP would have lost all of its hard-won gains from the war against Japan. In reality, Jiang Jieshi did not accept the CCP’s position and, after taking Jinzhou in western Liaoning in January, GMD forces constantly attacked and occupied areas controlled by the CCP. The CCP already had a substantial strategic interest in the protection of Manchuria, which the Central Committee insisted would be threatened by repeated concessions, leading to “discord within the party.”²¹ Indeed, there had always existed hardline voices in the CCP army that could not be silenced.

The Soviet army began its quick withdrawal in early March, but no agreement could be reached between the GMD and the CCP over Manchuria. The CCP Central Committee decided to begin implementing a strategy of controlling northern Manchuria in late March, that is, seizing major cities such as Changchun and Harbin as well as the Eastern China Railway.²² Certainly, the CCP’s policy had the support of the Soviet army in the northeast; its rapid withdrawal provided the opportunity for the CCP to implement this strategy in the north of Manchuria. In early April, GMD forces launched large-scale attacks on CCP troops in Siping. On April 18, CCP troops seized Changchun as

18 “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions,” December 19, 1945, “The Central Military Commission’s Deployment for Guarding Zhangjiakou and Chengde,” December 29, 1945, *ibid.*, 494–95, 526.

19 “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions to the Northeast Bureau,” January 26, 1946, *ibid.*, vol. XVI, 57–58.

20 “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions to the Northeast Bureau,” December 7, 1945, *ibid.*, vol. XV, 465–66; “Peng Zhen guanyu youren jinggao dongbei jue buneng da” [Peng Zhen’s Remarks on Our Friend’s Warning against Fighting in the Northeast], January 26, 1946, Central Archive, Beijing.

21 “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions to the Northeast Bureau and CCP’s Delegation in Chongqing regarding the Principle of the Negotiations,” March 13, 1946, in ZZWXJ, vol. XVI, 89–91.

22 “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions to the Northeast Bureau,” March 24, 1946, “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions to Lin Biao and Peng Zhen,” March 25, 1946, *ibid.*, vol. XVI, 100–03.

planned, and later took Harbin and Qiqihaer. Akin to lighting a powderkeg, the CCP–GMD military conflicts in Manchuria quickly set off a nationwide civil war.

The outbreak of the Chinese Civil War marked the end of a distinct period of international politics concerning China. On one hand, both the United States and the USSR subordinated China with respect to their broader agendas, and both powers withdrew their troops from the country. On the other hand, in the northeast, strategic cooperation between the CCP and the Soviet Union had begun. Soviet troops not only provided the opportunity for the CCP to take over the north of Manchuria, but also furnished weapons and equipment to CCP forces. At the same time, the CCP had concluded that the United States was their primary external enemy. In this manner, the future patterns of the Cold War in East Asia had already begun to appear.

Alliance and confrontation

The event that truly determined China's foreign relations in 1947 and 1948 was the CCP's decisive victory in the civil war. In the face of this radical change, the responses of both the United States and the Soviet Union were gradual and passive. As the revolutionary movement developed, US influence in China steadily declined, until it finally disappeared completely. In contrast, Soviet political influence grew to the point that the USSR and the new Communist-dominated state, the PRC, came together in a formal alliance. After the CCP-led People's Liberation Army (PLA) seized Shenyang in November 1948, CCP leaders started to formulate the foreign policy of their new government. The CCP's cognitive framework, based on revolutionary theory, and the leadership's fundamental attitude to the growth in international tensions at that time largely influenced this change in CCP policy. Mao and his colleagues were Communist revolutionaries; they were deeply convinced that the Chinese revolutionary movement was a part of a worldwide Communist revolutionary movement. Regardless of the Cold War, this approach roughly determined the CCP leaders' attitude toward the United States and the USSR. Mao's concept of "leaning to one side" vividly revealed the basic tendency and choice of the CCP's leaders.

Nevertheless, one must note that the lean-to-one-side policy was really more like a broad statement of principle. Since it expressed only the CCP's general principle of managing foreign relations within the framework of US–Soviet confrontation, it obviously gave rise to few specific policies for managing foreign relations. In reality, the choices – of what kind of alliance with the



17. The Chinese Civil War left behind a devastated economy. Here people in Shanghai line up to exchange depreciated paper money for gold in 1948 – ten people were crushed to death in the melee that followed.

Soviet Union or which confrontations with the United States there were to be – were both the results of more complex decisionmaking processes.

At the end of 1947, when CCP leaders formed their strategy of overthrowing the GMD regime by force as soon as possible, Mao thought that relations with the Soviet Union would be the key to the new Chinese state's foreign policy and would serve as a model for its domestic development. He wanted to visit Stalin in Moscow to discuss these matters. Even if this proposition was never realized during the civil war, it did underscore the Chinese leadership's urgent wish to bolster relations with the USSR.

The CCP's gestures were not unrequited. In fact, beginning in the spring of 1948, Soviet aid to the CCP notably increased. After the PLA took over Manchuria in early November, Stalin deemed it necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of the CCP's internal situation and its policies in various areas. He again assumed personal responsibility for the USSR's China policies. However, some of Stalin's policies met with staunch resistance from the CCP leadership. On January 10, 1949, Stalin telegraphed to the CCP Central Committee his suggestions for peace talks between the CCP and the GMD. Even if that was not his intention, Stalin's suggestions could have led to a division of China and, consequently, Mao categorically refused to follow his advice. Stalin had to backtrack.²³ This incident demonstrated to Soviet leaders

23 See Niu Jun, "The Origin of the Sino-Soviet Alliance," in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance 1945–1963* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998), 64–65.

that they needed to study more intently the implications of the CCP's victory, as well as its domestic and foreign policies.

From early 1949 to the summer of that year, a number of top-level secret exchange visits occurred between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CCP. On January 31, 1949, Anastas Mikoian visited the CCP Central Committee's headquarters at Xibaipo, and for three days held extensive talks with Mao and other CCP leaders. As a result of these talks, the two sides reached broad agreement on the CCP's domestic and foreign policies. Disagreements regarding future bilateral relations were left for later discussion. Mikoian's visit had a very positive impact on CCP-USSR relations. Mao praised Soviet aid to the CCP at its Central Committee meeting in March 1949, where he also essentially dictated the lean-to-one-side policy for the new regime.²⁴ This event marked the establishment of the CCP's policy of a formal alliance with the Soviet Union for the new Chinese state.

In late June, Liu Shaoqi led a senior delegation to visit Moscow, where it concluded agreements with Stalin on the substance of the CCP's domestic and foreign policies following the founding of its regime. This visit completed the CCP's preparations for an alliance with the Soviet Union; the only outstanding issues were how to deal with the Sino-Soviet treaty of August 1945, and whether a new treaty ought to take its place.

CCP leaders saw the 1945 treaty as problematic. When they were young, they had all gone through a process of committing themselves first to the patriotic cause *before* becoming self-avowed revolutionaries and being drawn to Communism. In their mind, "following the path of the Russians" signified not only the elimination of an exploitative social structure, but also the creation of a new international order wherein the first item on the agenda was to abolish all of the unequal treaties China had previously signed. In this light, the CCP leaders were dissatisfied with the August 1945 treaty and, during Mikoian's visit to Xibaipo, they explicitly questioned some of its basic features. Subsequently, when Liu Shaoqi visited Moscow, he proposed to Stalin three alternative solutions: first, that they preserve the treaty, which would be recognized by the new China; second, that they abolish the treaty and create a new one; or, third, through an exchange of notes, that the two countries agree to keep the status quo temporarily while preparing themselves for a new treaty. Stalin prevaricated on the issue, and this meant that the

²⁴ Mao Zedong, "Report Delivered at the Second Plenary Meeting of the Seventh CCP Congress," March 5, 1949, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. IV, 1434-35.

question of the treaty was left to become the focus of the Stalin–Mao conversations after the founding of the PRC.

On December 16, 1949, having just arrived in Moscow, Mao held talks with Stalin on the treaty question. Stalin at first claimed that the time was not right for changing the old treaty. He suggested instead that a statement on the issue of Port Arthur would suffice. Only after Mao insisted on the complete termination of the old treaty did Stalin agree to make major revisions to it, though only after two years.²⁵ Clearly, Stalin was not ready to renounce the benefits that the Soviet Union itself had reaped from the old international order.

After Mao stood fast for another couple of weeks, and after several meetings between Stalin and his closest advisers, the Soviet leader's view began to change. During his talk with Molotov and Mikoian on January 2, 1950, Mao proposed three options: to sign a new Sino-Soviet treaty; alternatively, to have the official news agencies of the two countries issue a succinct communiqué announcing that agreements had been reached on the important questions; or, lastly, to issue a joint statement on the major points of bilateral relations. Molotov thought that the first option was the best. Mao immediately telegraphed Zhou to ask him to get ready for negotiations and to visit Moscow.²⁶

Zhou Enlai arrived in Moscow on January 20. On January 22, Mao and Zhou talked with Stalin and determined the basic contents of the new treaty. After that, negotiations passed to the specifics, where the two sides took up key issues such as the use of the ports of Port Arthur and Dalian. In the end, the Soviets mostly agreed with the suggestions from the Chinese side but, citing the issue of military aid, Stalin insisted on a “supplementary agreement” that prohibited other countries from entering Manchuria and Xinjiang. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was signed on February 14, 1950, and marked the formal birth of the Sino-Soviet alliance. From that point on, the Soviet Union began to supply economic, financial, and military assistance to the PRC on a grand scale.

The story of CCP–US relations mirrors that of its relations with the USSR. As was the case with the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations, the fundamental ideological attitudes of CCP leaders prompted them to opt for confrontation

25 Pei Jianzhang (ed.), *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi, 1949–1956* [History of the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China, 1949–1956] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1994), 17–18. See also Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War 1946–1950* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 310–15.

26 “Mao Zedong's telegram to the CCP Central Committee,” January 2 and 3, 1950, in *Zhonggong zhongyang yanjiushi* (ed. and comp.), *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian* [A Selection of Important Documents since the Founding of the People's Republic of China], 17 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1992), 95–96, 97.

with the United States. The Communist leadership also believed that the United States had become the major external threat to their final victory. During the last stage of the civil war and the founding of the PRC, the CCP lived in constant dread of various forms of US intervention, including a direct military intervention, schemes to sow division in the Chinese revolutionary camp, an embargo against the new China, or the obstruction of the final reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.²⁷

Concerning the domestic environment, after more than two years of political mobilization, the CCP had cleansed both party and army of “US-fearing” or “US-admiring” thinking. Two events – the takeover of the US consulate after the seizure of Shenyang in November 1948 and the searching of US ambassador John Leighton Stuart’s residence after seizing Nanjing in April 1949 – highlighted the prevailing anti-American sentiment among lower-rank PLA cadres and soldiers. The Central Committee had to take forceful measures to prevent overly zealous actions that might have triggered major international conflicts.

On the other hand, the CCP was also under considerable pressure from the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders distrusted the CCP’s relations with the United States. Because the CCP leaders treated their relationship with the USSR as their top priority from the very beginning, it followed naturally that they would do everything required to dispel the doubts of their Soviet counterparts, even at the cost of any chance of developing relations with the United States. Although Stalin had said, before the PLA crossed the Yangtze River, that the CCP could establish relations with the United States and other Western countries, particularly trade relations, the Chinese Communist leadership doubted that such relations would do them any good.²⁸ It is likely that the CCP leaders did not want to take any chances when they were at a sensitive stage in the formation of their alliance with the Soviet Union.

The CCP’s interactions with the United States during the period from late 1948 to the summer of 1949 came to have a significant influence on its US policy. These events included the arrest of US consulate staff in Shenyang in the winter of 1948 and the CCP representatives’ covert contacts with US ambassador Stuart after the PLA took over Nanjing in April 1949. While the CCP arrest of US consul Angus Ward and his staff produced intense

27 “The Military Commission’s Plan for Taking Over the Whole Country,” May 23, 1949, “The Military Commission’s Countermeasures for the Prevention of Imperialist Intervention in the Chinese Revolution,” May 28, 1949, in ZZWXJ, vol. XVIII, 292–93, 308–09.

28 “Stalin’s Cable to Kovalev,” March 15, 1949, “Stalin’s Cable to Mao,” April 1949, as cited in Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 230–31.

resentment in Washington, the talks between Ambassador Stuart and Huang Hua, the CCP representative in Nanjing who was Stuart's former student, had no positive results. It could even be said that the interactions with Stuart disabused the top CCP leaders of any notion of developing normal relations with the United States, if they indeed had one at that time. On June 30, Mao Zedong published "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in which he publicly announced that the new government would "lean to one side" in favor of the Soviet camp. Significantly, on the same day, the Central Committee telegraphed the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee to say that "we entertain no illusions that the US imperialists will change their policies [toward the Chinese revolution]." ²⁹ When, during the summer of 1949, the United States withdrew all of its diplomats from China, Mao wrote in response:

The war to turn China into a US colony, a war in which the United States of America supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people, has been an important component of the US imperialist policy of world-wide aggression since World War II. The US policy of aggression has several targets. The three main targets are Europe, Asia, and the Americas. China, the centre of gravity in Asia, is a large country with a population of 475 million; by seizing China, the United States would possess all of Asia. With its Asian front consolidated, US imperialism could concentrate its forces on attacking Europe. US imperialism considers its front in the Americas relatively secure. These are the smug overall calculations of the US aggressors. ³⁰

The CCP's victory overturned the existing postwar international order in East Asia, which was based on the Yalta agreement and the ensuing 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty. The new state of affairs was based on the *new* Sino-Soviet treaty signed in February 1950. Through its alliance with the USSR, the PRC now staked its initial position in the Cold War on standing alongside Moscow in confrontation with the United States.

Crossing the Yalu River

The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950. Previously, Chinese leaders had concentrated their attention on domestic matters, and the major tasks of the PLA had been to accelerate its entry into Tibet and to prepare for the takeover of Taiwan. Chinese leaders already regarded the United States as a major menace, but they did not believe that any American military threat was

29 "The CCP Central Committee's Telegram to the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee," June 30, 1949, Central Archive, Beijing.

30 *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), 434-35.



18. The chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong.

impending. At this time, both the Korean peninsula and Indochina were regions of tension. Of the two, China clearly saw the latter as more important. On the Korean peninsula, China hoped it would not have to intervene. From July 1949 to March–April 1950, three divisions of the Korean army (or more than 30,000 soldiers) that had fought in the Chinese Civil War were allowed to return, armed, to North Korea. Chinese leaders made this decision in part because they were concerned that North Korea might be attacked by South Korea, with possible Japanese assistance. On the other hand, these troops no longer had important duties in China. Allowing them to return to Korea was a logical component of disarmament at a time when the Chinese army was already being demobilized on a large scale.

In May 1949 – even as China made the decision to provide aid to North Korea – Mao explicitly told North Korean leaders that he did not approve of an attack on South Korea, and he continued to hold this position for some time.³¹

31 “Kovalev’s Telegram to Stalin,” May 18, 1949, in Academia Sinica (comp.), *Chaoxian zhanzheng: Eguo dang’anguan jiemi wenjian* [The Korean War: Declassified Documents from Russian Archives] (here after *Chaoxian zhanzheng*), 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2003), vol. I, 189–90.

Probably because he knew Mao's attitude, Stalin did not ask Kim Il Sung to consult Mao on North Korea's military plans until shortly before Stalin finally approved North Korea's attack in April 1950. On May 13, when Mao learned from Kim of the joint proposal by the USSR and North Korea, he first verified it with the Soviets, and then decided not to oppose Kim's planned offensive in South Korea, as he knew that China was in no position to challenge Stalin's decision.³² Nevertheless, Chinese leaders did not really focus on the situation on the Korean peninsula during the early stages of the war, immediately after June 25, 1950, because they saw it as a Soviet responsibility.

In addition to the basic solidarity that existed between Chinese and Korean Communists, the main reason behind the Chinese leaders' decision to enter the Korean War in the fall of 1950 was their reevaluation of the overall situation in East Asia after the success of the American military intervention. The military deployments undertaken by the Truman administration were extensive; the United States not only used force on the Korean peninsula, but also strengthened its military presence in the Taiwan Strait and in Southeast Asia. These actions led Chinese leaders to think that the United States was about to engage in a strategic expansion against China. At a Politburo meeting on August 4, Mao said that "if the US imperialists were to succeed, they would be complacent, and would threaten us."³³ Zhou's talk in the August 26 meeting on national defense highlighted the Chinese leadership's concern with a possible "domino effect" caused by US intervention.³⁴

In terms of the specific decisionmaking process, two events made a Chinese entry into the Korean War highly likely. First, when the United States dispatched troops to Korea, it also imposed a blockade of the Taiwan Strait. Essentially, the civil war in China had been a war for the reunification of the country, and the US presence in the Taiwan Strait therefore directly contradicted the final goals of the CCP. To Chinese leaders, the blockade constituted intolerable aggression. In fact, the American blockade of the strait forced the PRC to abandon a campaign to take over Taiwan and, in doing so, facilitated the redeployment of several PLA army corps to the Korean border where they would confront the United States. On July 7, the Central Military Commission

32 "Stalin's Telegram to Mao Zedong," May 14, 1950, in *Chaoxian zhanzheng*, vol. I, 384.

33 Bo Yibo, *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu* [Reflections on Several Important Decisions and Events], 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao, 1991), vol. I, 43.

34 Zhou Enlai, "Prepare Adequately for Immediate Victory," August 26, 1950, in the Central Documents Research Institute and the Military Science Academy (ed. and comp.), *Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan* [Selected Military Papers of Zhou Enlai], 4 vols. (Beijing: Renmin, 1997), vol. IV, 43–45.

decided to form an army for border defense in the northeast. Marshal Su Yu, who had been the intended commander for the invasion of Taiwan, was now appointed commander-in-chief and political commissar of the border defense army. The Ninth Corps, previously assigned to the attack on Taiwan, and the Nineteenth Corps, previously scheduled for demobilization, were instead concentrated along the Long Hai and Jin Pu railways in order to be transferred quickly to the northeast.

Second, the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel by US troops finally prompted Chinese leaders to enter the Korean War. When the war took a dramatic turn after the Inchon landing on September 15, Chinese leaders began sending warning signals to Washington that US troops should not cross the thirty-eighth parallel. On October 3, Zhou Enlai sent an ultimatum via the Indian ambassador to China, saying that if the American troops crossed the parallel "we would not just be by-standers; we would intervene."³⁵ The US leadership never took Zhou's warning seriously, and on October 7 their troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel. From that point on, in fact, it was inevitable that Chinese troops would, in some form, cross the Yalu River.

Although hostility to the United States played the key role in China's decision to enter the Korean War, the decisionmaking process was complicated by considerations of how to handle Sino-Soviet relations. After the North Korean reverses, Stalin asked for China's assistance in Korea, and leaders in Beijing found it difficult to say no because of China's subordinate role in the alliance. Proponents of a massive Chinese intervention – first and foremost Mao Zedong himself – could not have persuaded their comrades to intervene if it had not been for Stalin's willingness to meet Mao's minimum preconditions in terms of Soviet aid, including a guarantee that the Soviets would prevent the war from being expanded into China.

On October 1, after being asked to do so both by the Soviets and the North Koreans, Mao made the decision to enter the war. Yet because he did not have majority support, he did not send the telegram that he had drafted to that effect. He explained to the Soviet ambassador on October 3 that some policy-makers did not support China's entry into the Korean War out of concern that direct Sino-American confrontation would set back China's plans for peaceful reconstruction. They were also worried, he said, that disaffection might arise within China.³⁶

³⁵ "Zhou Enlai's talk," October 3, 1950, *ibid.*, vol. IV, 67–68.

³⁶ "Rochshin's Telegram to Stalin," October 8, 1950, in *Chaoxian zhanzheng*, vol. 2, 380–81.

At the beginning of the war, Stalin had kept China in the position of a limited participant. But at the decisive juncture of North Korea's failure to repulse US troops, he urged China to send troops, and tried to sway the Chinese leaders as best he could. In an October 5 telegram to Mao, Stalin cited the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty. He said that the United States had not made adequate preparations for a large-scale war and that, if the Americans were to carry the war into China itself, the USSR would assist in repelling them. He also noted that China's entry into the war would force the United States to make concessions, and that Washington would "have to abandon Taiwan." If China did not send troops, in contrast, then it would not "even get Taiwan back."³⁷ At about the same time that Stalin sent this telegram, the CCP Central Committee took the final decision to send troops to Korea. It is unclear whether Mao had yet received Stalin's telegram at that point, but Stalin's reaffirmation of the promises in the Sino-Soviet treaty certainly played a role by encouraging Chinese leaders to overcome their fears that war might spread into their own country.

Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao left Beijing for Moscow on October 8. In discussions on October 11, Stalin agreed to provide any military aid necessary to China. Yet, on the issue of Soviet air cover for China's troops as they entered the Korean peninsula, he stated explicitly that it would be impossible for the Soviet air force to enter the war immediately. What it could do, Stalin said, was to help bolster air cover for China itself.³⁸ Stalin's promise was very significant because it convinced the Chinese leaders that the PRC would not have to worry about US air assaults in China proper while its troops fought on the Korean peninsula.

However, Stalin's reluctance to provide air cover for Chinese troops in Korea undoubtedly made some of the preparations extremely difficult for China. Mao telegraphed Zhou many times, instructing him to urge the USSR to make a resolute and explicit promise to provide military equipment and to enter the war itself within two months. At this time, some Chinese leaders also envisaged that their troops would be engaged primarily in a defensive strategy, and would not launch attacks on US forces.³⁹

37 "Stalin's Letter to Kim Il Sung," October 8, 1950, in *ibid.*, vol. II, 386–88.

38 See Shen Zhihua, *Mao Zedong, Si Dalin yu chaoxian zhanzheng* [Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin, 2003), 239–40.

39 "Mao Zedong's Telegram to Zhou Enlai," October 13, 1950, "Mao Zedong's Telegram to Zhou Enlai," October 14, 1950, "Mao Zedong's Telegram to Zhou Enlai," October 15, 1950, in *Dang de wenxian* [CCP Documents], 5 (2000) 7–8, 10.

Around October 14, Chinese leaders essentially finalized their strategic plan and war objectives. They wanted to prevent the Korean War from expanding into China proper, to stop the United States from occupying the northern regions of Korea close to the Chinese border, and to help the North Korean regime survive. According to Mao's instructions, once Chinese troops entered the Korean peninsula, they were to be deployed in suitable positions so they could set up defensive lines. They were not to undertake offensive operations for six months. As Mao said on October 14, he meant "to push the national defense line toward Deokcheon, Yeogwon as well as south of them – assuring this will be of great benefit [to us]."⁴⁰ On October 18, based on Zhou Enlai's reports from the negotiations with the USSR, Chinese leaders again reviewed their decision to send troops to Korea, and gave the go-ahead for troops to enter. The following day Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River.

After finding conditions on the ground in North Korea to be to their advantage, China's army launched its first offensive campaign on October 25, 1950. From that time until July 27, 1953, China fought a large-scale regional war against the United States. This war – the PRC's first – had major consequences for the new state's international orientation.

The Korean conflict immediately brought the newly founded PRC to the forefront of the Cold War in East Asia. China's alliance with the USSR was strengthened and broadened, creating a much closer relationship between the two parties than had ever existed in the past. Equally important, China's antagonism toward the United States was deepened and made more permanent. The realities of war created perceptions among CCP leaders of a much more ominous world outside their region. The parameters of the Cold War in Asia, thus established, would remain unchanged for a long time to come.⁴¹

⁴⁰ "Mao Zedong's Telegram to Zhou Enlai," October 14, 1950.

⁴¹ For additional information on the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet alliance, see the chapters by William Stueck and Shu Guang Zhang in this volume.



5. Cold War East Asia and the Korean War (inset).



Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945–1960

SAYURI GUTHRIE-SHIMIZU

On August 14, 1945, still reeling from the aftershock of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese government accepted the Allied powers' Potsdam Declaration, and World War II came to an end in the Asia-Pacific. Stripped of all of its colonial possessions acquired since 1895, Japan faced, for the first time in its history, occupation by foreign troops and reconstitution of its government at the behest of external authorities. As the nominally Allied occupation of the vanquished empire began, US general Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), stood atop the Allied military command and administrative structure in Japan. At this moment, the post-World War II histories of the United States and Japan became inexorably entwined. The atomic blasts, which killed 40,000 of Hiroshima's 350,000 inhabitants and 70,000 of the 270,000 people in Nagasaki, ushered in the nuclear age and Japan's quest for redemption in the postwar world where visions of the "American century" now reigned supreme. This symbiotic genesis foreshadowed the knotting of Japan's antinuclear pacifism and the United States' investment, both material and metaphorical, in a nuclear arsenal as the bedrock of international peace and security during the Cold War.

In this braided history, it was the United States' self-assigned mission to remold Japan into a stable democracy conforming to the Western and capitalist rules of the game. But within months of the war's end, the confrontation with the Soviet Union began to color American strategic thinking and foreign policymaking, and the task of refashioning Japan came under the added and accumulating weight of the developing Cold War between the two superpowers. Officials in Washington and the American proconsul in Japan became determined to minimize Soviet influence in occupied Japan. By early 1946, the effective exclusion from the Allied Council and the Far East Commission – the inter-Allied institutions overseeing the occupation – of Soviet, and to a lesser extent British, voices infused another source of rancor into the former

Grand Alliance. The implementation of occupation policies became in all vital respects an American enterprise, with a small contingent of British Commonwealth forces, mostly Australian, sharing peripheral military tasks.

In the early postwar years, American policies for Japan were contingent on other strategic imperatives the United States found in the smoldering debris of the now-defunct Empire of the Sun. The Chinese Civil War, which resumed in the immediate wake of Japan's surrender, unfolded alongside early signs of American–Soviet geopolitical irreconcilability regarding Europe and the Middle East. Despite a yearlong mediation effort by the United States, the Communist–Nationalist split became irreversible by early 1947, and the Communist forces gradually emerged triumphant in the internecine military conflict. The flight of the Nationalist forces of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) to Taiwan and proclamation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 introduced an additional layer of complication in American plans for postwar East Asia.¹ The hot war in which the United States became mired on the Korean peninsula, another zone of contention recently liberated from Japanese colonial rule, compounded the task of reordering its strategic priorities in East Asia and destabilized its agenda for occupied Japan.²

The dissolution of Japan's colonial empire and its democratic makeover proceeded alongside parallel historical developments in Asia. In the 1950s, the United States as a global hegemon found itself amidst the gathering torrents of nationalism and the retreat of European colonialism in Asia. On this shifting political terrain, the United States began searching for a way to harness decolonization to American advantage and, perhaps, to that of its newly christened ally, Japan. But the challenge was not Americans' alone. As the ranks of newly independent nations grew and anticolonialism became a rallying banner among them in the 1950s, Japan faced anew its historical challenge of defining its place in Asia and somehow reconciling it with the niche in the Western world it so coveted. This conundrum in the face of decolonizing Asia appeared all the more daunting in the early Cold War years because Moscow and Beijing, armed with revolutionary ideology and propagating alternative visions of social organization, appeared to hold an advantage in the competition for the hearts and minds of recently decolonized nations in Asia and elsewhere. From 1945 to 1960, it was under this composite overhang of the global superpower rivalry and the process of decolonization

¹ See Niu Jun's chapter in this volume.

² See William Stueck's chapter in this volume.



19. General Douglas MacArthur of the United States and Emperor Hirohito of Japan meet in the US embassy in Tokyo, September 1945. Until the previous month, the Japanese regime had promoted the worship of the emperor as a god, and he had rarely been seen in public.

that the United States and Japan had to readjust their relationship and maximize their respective interests.

Allied occupation: phase I (1945–1947)

In contrast to the aftermath of World War I, the United States launched into post-World War II occupation of enemy territories equipped with fairly well-crafted blueprints. In the case of Japan, committees of experts set up within the State and War Departments began discussing postwar plans within six months of the Pearl Harbor attack. By early 1945, the coordinating committee of the State, War, and Navy Departments formulated SWNCC 150/2 as the basic policy toward postsurrender Japan. The occupation's objective, as stated in

the document, was to ensure “that Japan [would] not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world”; a reformed Japan was to be readmitted “as a responsible and peaceful member of the family of nations.” Voicing these lofty goals, the United States set out to cleanse Japan of militarism and strengthen what “Japan hands” in the State Department, such as former ambassador Joseph Grew, believed to be that nation’s innate democratic tendencies that had been temporarily suppressed by the hex of militarism in the 1930s.³

SCAP’s most immediate task was to dismantle Japan’s war machine. This was to be done not only by disarming troops and impounding munitions factories, but also, starting in January 1946, through “purges” of officials, journalists, educators, and businessmen who had collaborated with the prewar militarist state. Before the program’s end in May 1948, over 200,000 individuals were affected. Next, those identified as war criminals were brought before an international military tribunal convened in Tokyo. Between May 1946 and November 1948, twenty-eight Japanese leaders were put on trial for planning and initiating an unjust war of aggression, but the emperor’s name was conspicuously absent from the indictment. MacArthur opposed any attempt to bring the emperor to trial on the grounds that it would turn the local populace against the United States and eliminate all chances of peaceful administration of the occupied land. Seven defendants, including former prime ministers Hideki Tojo and Koki Hirota, were condemned to death by hanging.⁴

SCAP governed Japan through the nation’s existing political institutions, including the emperor. The burden of direct military rule that was being felt in Germany led American generals and civilian officials to decide not to duplicate the experience in Japan. Nor did Japan’s sooner-than-expected surrender allow training of the manpower needed for direct military rule. Many of the members of the complex occupation bureaucracy had little knowledge or experience of the country they had to govern and reform. The lack of knowledgeable personnel at times resulted in improvisation and uncritically transplanting American institutions to Japan. Some programs aimed at converting

3 For a biographical sketch of “Japan hands” involved in the occupation of Japan, see Howard Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1985). For the full text of this directive, see Edward M. Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1948), 122–50.

4 Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (eds.), *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 15–16.

Japan to “American democratic ideals,” such as land and electoral reforms, were successfully implemented through Japanese initiatives and by relying on indigenous expertise. Yet defeat acted as a catalyst for radical changes in Japan’s social and political institutions. Mandated by a victor who professed democratic principles and visions of an open world order, reforms materialized that perhaps would have been impossible with indigenous forces alone. Changes ran a wide gamut, from female suffrage and the revision of the gender-repressive Civil Code, to the abolition of licensed prostitution, the adoption of a pacifist constitution renouncing in Article IX the use of military force as an instrument of national policy, the abolition of the peerage, the encouragement of labor unionism, the liberalization of education, and economic deconcentration.

But the transformative nature of occupation-era reforms should not be overstated. Once the initial shock of defeat wore off, Japanese officials began to take charge of their own affairs and devised ways to subvert the intent of policies mandated by the occupier. The reorientation of US occupation policy after 1947 put a tailwind behind those Japanese officials who sought to reinstate elements of the old governing regime. Once the nation regained independence in April 1952, some of the reforms instituted over the previous seven years, like antimonopoly enactments, were reversed or eviscerated. A result of this binational collaboration in political backsliding was that, as historian W. G. Beasley once observed, “one can trace today [1995] a far greater continuity with the recent past than would at one time have seemed possible.”⁵

The occupation period was a bridge linking the old and the new in another way. It refueled the Americanization of Japanese mass culture, a permutation of the phenomenon commonly seen during the Cold War wherever American forces were stationed.⁶ In the interwar period, American-style consumerism had made major inroads into Japan, particularly among the urban middle class. Jazz, cafés, dance halls, movie theaters, and American youth apparel and accompanying free-spirited and individualistic social mores became familiar fixtures of urban life. American household amenities and lifestyles were envied and coveted as emblems of “modern life.” The Japanese fascination with things American had been temporarily buried during the national

5 William G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan* (London and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 214.

6 Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War*, trans. Diana M. Wolf (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

mobilization and forced austerity that began in the late 1930s, but the arrival of occupation forces and their dependents ignited its postwar revival. Consumer goods and electrical appliances displayed in PXes (post exchanges, stores operated by the US Army on its bases) fed the acquisitive fantasy of the battered and impoverished local population and established the attainment of material comfort as the legitimate goal of a peace-loving and “democratic” citizenry. Food, music, sports, and other forms of popular entertainment came under heavy American influences, due in no small part to the presence of US troops.⁷ This resumed cultural adaptation would become a fortifying ingredient of the social and cultural underpinning of the Cold War partnership and helped the bilateral relationship withstand the wear and tear of divergent national priorities in high politics.

Allied occupation: phase II (1947–1951)

By early 1947, the Cold War in Europe and the Near East induced a major reorientation in American occupation policy. The first harbinger of what became known as the “reverse course,” in which the emphasis shifted from punishment and reform to political stability via economic reconstruction, came with a reappraisal of reparations policy. In 1946, the survey team headed by Democratic oilman Edwin Pauley proposed a punitive program built around the massive removal of Japan’s heavy and chemical industry facilities and their transfer to countries victimized by Japan’s wartime aggression. This draconian scheme was replaced in January 1947 by the Strike Commission Report, which recommended more lenient terms and highlighted the need for assisting Japan’s economic rehabilitation and self-support.

By this time, key policymakers, chief among them the American proconsul ensconced in Tokyo, began to emphasize the importance of Japan’s industrial recovery and resulting political stability. In a press conference on March 17, 1947, MacArthur declared that the occupation’s central objectives, demilitarization and democratization, had been largely achieved, and that SCAP’s next task was economic rehabilitation. In order to facilitate this transition, the general suggested, it was time to consider a peace treaty and the withdrawal of Allied troops from Japan. For its economy to grow,

7 Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, “Baseball as a Vehicle of Soft Power in US–Japanese Relations: A Historical Perspective,” in David McConnell and Yasuyuki Watanabe (eds.), *Softpower Superpowers* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2008), 133–36.

Japan needed to engage in normal market-based trade free from SCAP's regulations.⁸

MacArthur's remarks, made without prior consultation with Washington, were largely motivated by his ambition for the 1948 presidential election. Coming five days after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, they nevertheless stirred strong reactions in Washington and in other Western capitals. Within the US government, vocal opposition came from George Kennan, the newly appointed first director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Viewing Japan along with Western Europe as a key laboratory of his containment policy, Kennan argued that granting Japan independence before the nation had achieved political and economic stability would compromise the United States' global strategic position. Shortly thereafter, once the Marshall Plan had been launched, Kennan became actively involved in Japanese affairs and lobbied vigorously to block what he believed to be a premature peace with Japan.⁹

As the Cold War took shape in Europe, officials in Washington came to agree on the importance of Japan's industrial recovery. In a revised policy statement (NSC 13/2) in October 1948, the Truman administration articulated its new vision. Democratization and demilitarization now took a backseat to economic growth and political stability. Labor strife had to be restrained, the economy had to be stabilized and reintegrated firmly into the Western capitalist world, and purges of undemocratic persons had to end, especially if they possessed proven administrative and technocratic credentials. Thereafter, occupation authorities began to crack down on Communists and their suspected sympathizers (the "red purge") and released nineteen suspected Class A war criminals, including Nobusuke Kishi, a prewar munitions minister and the future prime minister. That the three prime ministers who served in the latter half of the 1950s were all former purgees speaks volumes about the effects of the Cold War-induced "reverse course" on postoccupation Japanese politics. The return and entrenchment of conservative political forces, albeit in reconfigured postwar permutations, was a not-so-unwitting byproduct of American Cold War policy.¹⁰

8 Takeshi Igarashi, "Tainichi kowa no teisho to tainichi senryoseisaku no tenkan" [A Call for a Peace with Japan and a Turning Point in US Occupation Policy], *Shiso*, 12, 3 (October 1976), 1481–1503.

9 For Kennan's view on Japan, see his memorandum dated October 14, 1947, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, vol. VI (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972), 537–43 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

10 For a portrait of Nobusuke Kishi as a politician, see Yoshihisa Hara, *Kishi Nobusuke: kensei no seijika* [Kishi Nobusuke: Politician of Power] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shisho, 1995).

The new US orientation was mirrored in the economic realm as well. In December 1948, Washington sent SCAP a nine-point directive for Japanese economic stabilization featuring a balanced budget, stricter lending criteria, more efficient taxation, wage and price controls, and increased regulation of trade and foreign exchange. The man charged with implementing this austerity program was Joseph Dodge. The former Detroit banker, experienced in handling a currency crisis in occupied Germany, arrived in Tokyo in early 1949 as economic adviser to SCAP. He instituted sweeping changes that shaped Japan's economic development. Working closely with finance minister (and future prime minister) Hayato Ikeda, Dodge formulated what was dubbed "a super balanced budget" featuring a surplus of 156.9 million yen. A local-currency counterpart fund for American aid materials was established to be used for internal economic infrastructure development; credits were tightened and wages frozen; and, perhaps most importantly in the long term, Japan's currency exchange rate was set at 360 yen to the dollar – the rate that would remain until the "Nixon shock" in 1971. The undervalued yen was expected to facilitate Japan's export trade while helping to embed the Japanese economy in the Bretton Woods system through the now-almighty US dollar.¹¹

The San Francisco Peace Treaty

When, in March 1947, MacArthur called for an early peace with Japan and the withdrawal of US and Allied troops, he assumed there was no immediate danger of a Soviet attack on the island nation and that Japan's security could be adequately guaranteed by the United Nations' collective defense mechanism. But army strategic planners and some civilian policy planners valued bases in Japan and Okinawa, and killed the drive to end the occupation. Unsure about the Chinese Communist regime's future orientation, US officials initially hoped that Mao Zedong, driven by a hybrid of Marxist ideology and Chinese nationalism, would become a Tito-like renegade force within international Communism. However, when Mao signed a military alliance with Moscow in February 1950 and when he intervened in the Korean War in the fall of that year, he removed uncertainties lingering in Washington about Beijing's intentions and thereby rearranged the geopolitical and ideological configuration of East Asia. In this radically altered picture, Japan's importance in American strategic thinking skyrocketed almost overnight. Upgraded from the status of a former enemy in need of reform, Japan was now a crucial

¹¹ Shonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 198–235.

rearguard base for US forces fighting in Korea under the UN banner. Given its industrial capacity, population, and geographical location, Japan's credentials as the United States' new partner in the containment of Communism in the Far East now appeared self-evident.

Among the benefits of this enhanced status was a renewed, and this time irresistible, call for a peace treaty, a lenient one at that. To ensure bipartisan congressional support, President Harry S. Truman – then being hounded by the nagging question, “Who lost China?” – appointed John Foster Dulles, a prominent Republican with proven expertise on foreign policy, to head the negotiations with Japan. Entering into negotiations in Tokyo, Dulles insisted on the retention of American bases in Japan, with no time limits or restrictions on their use, for the duration of the Korean War. By early 1951, the Japanese government, particularly Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, had already decided to entrust Japan's postindependence security to the Americans and accepted the continued presence of US forces within its sovereign territory. Pro-American and wily, Yoshida knew the provision of bases to the United States was a price Japan had to pay for the restoration of sovereignty. He did not object to the idea that Japan's future security and interests would be most efficiently safeguarded through cooperative relations with the Americans. And yet he still maneuvered to extract as lenient a peace as possible from the Allies by playing the “base” card with Washington.¹²

On September 8, 1951, Japan signed a peace treaty in San Francisco with forty-eight nations. No severe restrictions were placed on Japan's economy or future political orientation. While Article 11 stated that the Japanese government accepted the Military Tribunal for the Far East, there was no direct reference to Japan's war responsibility. While Asian signatories worried about Japan's resurgence as a military power, the treaty contained no provisions restricting Japan's rearmament. Under American pressure, key belligerents renounced their claims to reparations. Southeast Asians, who refused to do so, were left to negotiate bilaterally with Japan at a separate venue.¹³

Besides its leniency, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was also notable for its truncated nature. In Japanese parlance of the day, it gave Japan only a “partial peace” (*katamen kowa*). Among those invited to the conference, Yugoslavia, India, and Burma refused to attend. The Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia participated but refused to sign the treaty. Representatives

12 Kazuya Sakamoto, *Nichibei domei no kizuna* [The Bonds of the US-Japanese Alliance] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2000), 26–38.

13 Sayuri Shimizu, *Creating People of Plenty: The United States and Japan's Economic Alternatives, 1950–1960* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001), 179–83.

of China, the nation on which Japan inflicted the most extensive destruction and human suffering from the time of the Manchurian incident in 1931 until the end of World War II, were not at the peace conference. This abnormality reflected a laboriously crafted compromise between Britain, which recognized the PRC in January 1951, and the United States, determined to ostracize Beijing. Dulles flew to London in June to iron out British–American differences over China, and the result was an agreement with British foreign secretary Herbert Morrison that neither of the claimants to the governance of China would be invited to San Francisco.¹⁴

The San Francisco Peace Treaty was not without heavy cost for Japan, however. One price paid was a bilateral security agreement it had to sign with the United States concurrent with the peace treaty. Going into force with the ratification of the peace treaty in April 1952, the security accord gave the United States the continued and fundamentally unrestricted use of bases in Japan proper and total administrative control over Okinawa until “peace and security” were achieved in the Far East. Okinawa, the keystone of US military operations in Asia, thus remained detached from Japanese sovereignty. The security treaty also relegated postindependence Japan to the status of military dependant by giving the United States the right to intervene militarily in the event of internal disorder in Japan, and by depriving Japan of the right to provide bases to a third country without US consent. In negotiating the peace treaty, the Japanese government sought to avoid being locked into this kind of bilateral military bondage to the United States. Reflecting their belief in postwar multilateralism, Japanese officials initially preferred to place the nation’s security arrangements with the United States explicitly under the umbrella of the collective self-defense mechanism sanctioned by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. But Dulles rejected this option.¹⁵

From Tokyo’s standpoint, another problem of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was that the Soviet Union and the PRC remained outside its framework. The incomplete nature of the peace caused a deep division within Japan, a schism reflecting dueling visions of Japan’s place in the postwar world. Those Japanese who desired “a whole peace” (*zenmen kowa*), including the country’s two Communist neighbors, envisaged a Japan that was not a mere appendage to American Cold War policy. Spearheaded by leftist intellectuals, oppositional journalists, and the Socialist and Communist Parties, this political

14 Chihiro Hosoya, *San Francisco kowa heno michi* [The Road to the San Francisco Peace] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1984), 232–45.

15 Sakamoto, *Nichibei domei*, 76–79.

coalition argued that Japan could safeguard its security through diplomatic neutrality and the unarmed pacifism that, they believed, was required by Article IX of the postwar constitution. Their ideological rivals – those who accepted a partial peace with the United States and its allies – either resigned themselves to, or actively sought, a Cold War alliance with Washington. For them, the best guarantee of Japan's security was a continued US military presence in Japan and Okinawa, perhaps coupled with Japan's own incremental rearmament, with or without a constitutional revision in the future.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1951 US–Japan Security Treaty thus catalyzed an ideological debate inside Japan and shaped party alignments for most of the Cold War. The peace achieved only with the non-Communist world and the quasi-military dependency Japan accepted vis-à-vis the United States placed foreign-policy questions front and center of postoccupation Japan's political debate. In this ideologically charged political environment, the United States and its Cold War dictates came to play an inordinately far-reaching and symbolic part.¹⁶

The ideological nature of the national debate over the peace treaty was most salient with regard to China. The Dulles–Morrison agreement left unresolved the question of an independent Japan's diplomatic relations with China, the problem over which Yoshida and Dulles had fiercely dueled. Desiring to restore Japanese trade with the vast Chinese mainland market, Yoshida sought to leave open the possibility of establishing governmental ties with the Communist regime. Yoshida's ideological pragmatism regarding China reflected his belief in the likelihood of a future PRC–Soviet estrangement. Until his semi-forced political retirement at the end of 1954, Yoshida preached indefatigably to American officials that Japan's capitalist penetration of the China market would help reorient the PRC and hasten a split between Moscow and Beijing. But Yoshida's nascent two-Chinas policy did not persuade Dulles. To keep the China lobby in the United States from derailing Senate ratification of the peace treaty, Dulles pressed Yoshida to sign a separate peace accord with Jiang's Republic of China in Taiwan. The choice Japan was forced to make regarding China in exchange for regaining its national sovereignty illustrated the narrow parameters within which Japan was able to conduct its relations with the rest of Asia during this phase of the Cold War.

16 Akio Watanabe, "Kowa mondai to nippon no sentaku" [World War II Peacemaking and Japan's Choice], in Akio Watanabe and Seigen Miyasato (eds.), *San Francisco kowa* [San Francisco Peacemaking] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986), 20.

Rearmament versus economic growth

The Korean War not only prompted an Allied (half-) peace with Japan, it also primed Japanese rearmament. Given the shortage of US manpower in the region, MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to create a paramilitary 75,000-strong National Police Reserve (NPR) and to augment the Maritime Safety Agency by 8,000 men. A US military advisory group trained the NPR; it, in turn, provided support for US forces in Japan. Initially, Yoshida did not intend to transform the NPR into a bona fide military force. Yet, during the peace negotiations, he grudgingly agreed to create a 50,000-man National Safety Force. In August 1952, the Japanese government established the National Safety Agency (NSA), comprising 110,000 ground troops and a 7,590-man maritime force. Its mandate implied more than domestic police duties.¹⁷

The Truman administration's desire to prompt Japanese rearmament shaped its first policy statement toward postindependence Japan, NSC 125/2. It called for a ground troop buildup to ten divisions and "appropriate levels of air and sea power," and claimed that these measures were necessary for Japan's self-defense and for its contribution to the common security of the free nations in the Far East and Pacific. In November 1952, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined a plan to establish an air force, a move that made it extremely difficult to argue that Japan's postwar military would be charged with self-defense only. These initiatives, moreover, necessitated major US assistance in terms of financial resources and equipment.¹⁸

The push for Japanese rearmament had thus begun before Dwight Eisenhower entered the White House. Dulles, now secretary of state for the Republican administration, did not get directly involved in this question. In testimony before Congress on behalf of the Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) program, however, he envisioned a ten-division ground force for Japan, amounting to 325,000–350,000 men. Yoshida's intent was to extract maximum financial aid from the United States under MSA while agreeing only to token rearmament. The United States, however, made its potential aid strictly proportionate to Japan's defense buildup.¹⁹ Hence the two sides were worlds apart when negotiations began in 1953.

17 Hideo Otake, "Yoshida naikakunoyoru saigunbi" [Rearmament by the Yoshida Cabinet], *Hogaku* [Legal Studies], 50, 4 (October 1986), 37–50.

18 Joint Chiefs of Staff to Clark, March 10, 1953, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. XIV, 1390.

19 J. Allison to Department of State, July 6, 1953, *ibid.*, 1445–47; Fred Dickinson, "Nichhibei anpo taisen no henyō" [The Transformation of the US–Japan Security System], *Hogaku Ronso* [Legal Treatise], 121, 4 (December 1987), 76–77.

Yoshida sent his protégé Ikeda to Washington in October to negotiate with Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson. During the month-long diplomacy, Ikeda tried to counter the US desire for a large ground force with a more modest proposal to build a force of 180,000 men over three years. In March 1954, the United States and Japan reached an agreement that provided Japan with military equipment amounting to \$140 million, another \$100 million in offshore military purchases, and US agricultural surpluses for sale within Japan. In exchange, Japan agreed to increase its ground troops to 110,000–140,000 during the initial aid period. Soon thereafter, the Japanese Diet adopted two defense bills. In July 1954, the National Safety Force was renamed the Self-Defense Force, to be administered by a Defense Agency under a director holding Cabinet rank.²⁰

Many historians have portrayed these developments in a Manichean way. Supposedly, Dulles demanded Japanese rearmament, but Yoshida, concerned with economic recovery and cognizant of the depth of pacifism in postwar Japan, resisted the American pressure. But recent studies based on Japanese sources reveal a more complex picture. They suggest that Yoshida essentially accepted moderate rearmament as a necessary price for membership in the non-Communist world. His challenge was to decide how resources should be allocated between the military and the economy. Similarly, Dulles conceded, privately at least, that there was only so much Americans could do to push Japan into rearming under its pacifist constitution – the one they had imposed on it.

By early 1954, the pressure from Washington for Japanese rearmament abated, and this question began to recede in US–Japan diplomacy, not so much because of Japan’s resistance as because of a change in American policy. The armistices in Korea in July 1953 and in Indochina in July 1954 drastically reduced military tensions in Asia and produced a new emphasis in US Cold War policies. The Eisenhower administration now concluded that rearmament should be pursued in a way that neither harmed Japan’s economy nor impaired its internal political stability and diplomatic allegiance to the United States. The new US ambassador to Tokyo, John Allison, was at the forefront of this strategic reassessment, which was approved as NSC 5516 in April 1955.²¹

²⁰ Sakamoto, *Nichibei domei*, 80–105.

²¹ NSC 5516/1 “US Policy toward Japan,” April 9, 1955, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, vol. XXIII (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 57. For an example of such recent Japanese scholarship, see Shintaro Suzuki, *Nichibei domei no sijiishi: Arison chunichi taishi to “1955 nen taisei” no Seiritsu* [The Political History of the Japan–US Alliance: Ambassador Allison and the Making of the “Year 1955 System”] (Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 2004).

Economic growth and trade with Asia

The Korean War also reshaped Japan's postwar trajectory by igniting its economy. In early 1950, Dodge's austerity program had caused a sharp economic downturn. Many small businesses went bankrupt, unemployment soared, and economic difficulties threatened to radicalize labor unions now under socialist and Communist stewardship. But massive US military procurements generated by the Korean War resuscitated the anemic Japanese economy. Not only producers of consumables but also mining and heavy industrial companies reported major gains in profits. The war boom enabled Japanese manufacturers to invest in research and development and to benefit from the transfer of industrial technology from the West. Equally important, US military procurements were paid in dollars, building Japan's foreign exchange reserves. By the time the US occupation ended in April 1952, Japan was well on its way to economic recovery, readying itself for high-speed growth in the 1960s. Its economic rebirth during the Cold War was thus partially fueled by a hot war in Asia.

From the beginning of the occupation, American policymakers understood the importance of foreign trade to the resource-poor island nation. That was why they tolerated Japanese trade with the Chinese mainland even after the proclamation of the PRC, as long as it did not threaten the multilateral strategic embargo system then being put in place. After November 1950, however, Beijing became the main target of American economic warfare against the Communist bloc. Capitalizing on Japan's desperate desire to be accepted into the Western world's institutional network, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the UN, the United States forced Japan to join the multilateral mechanism that was charged with enforcing embargoes against the PRC, trade sanctions that were even harsher than those imposed against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

For officials in Tokyo, this economic straitjacket became another example of the unjust restrictions the United States placed on Japan's relationship with China. Resenting US interference, Japanese business groups and their patrons in politics resorted to various subterfuges to contact the PRC and to promote trade. Between 1952 and 1958, four "private-sector" trade agreements were signed between a coalition of Japanese businessmen and the Chinese Communist Party's foreign-trade agency. Yoshida's successors, Ichiro Hatoyama and Tanzan Ishibashi, tacitly approved these maneuvers, which also received popular support. Believing that the Japanese were using these commercial contacts to move closer to formal diplomatic relations with Beijing, US officials fretted over the perceived disloyalty.

An alternative for the China market now controlled by the Communist regime might be Southeast Asia. By 1950, the idea of linking Japan's industrial economy with resources and markets of Asia's southeastern tier was nothing new in American policy circles. Eisenhower's own words lent credence to the putative Japan–Southeast Asia economic nexus. While pondering a possible military intervention in the Indochinese conflict in April 1954, the president, in his famous speech on the domino theory, warned that Indochina's fall to Communism might spill over to all of Southeast Asia and ultimately force Japan to seek accommodation with the Communists. This alarmist hyperbole was partially directed at protectionists in Congress who were threatening to block Japan's accession to GATT. But this compelling metaphor, as well as the notion of the economic symbiosis between Japan and Southeast Asia, took on a life of its own.²²

The president's reference to falling dominoes particularly stoked Japanese expectations. From Yoshida on, a succession of Japanese governments urged Washington to translate this intense strategic concern into a large-scale regional aid program. When Yoshida traveled to Washington in late 1954 – as the first Japanese prime minister to visit the United States – he called for a \$4 billion “Marshall Plan for Asia,” and was openly rebuffed. In 1957, Prime Minister Kishi presented to the Eisenhower administration a blueprint for a Southeast Asia development fund, including a regional finance corporation with \$3 billion in reserves to facilitate intraregional trade. But Washington again flatly rejected the Japanese proposal. Ironically, Japan's need for trade, unrealized in Southeast Asia, was met by a phenomenal increase in sales to the Western industrial world, especially the United States, after Japan's accession to GATT in September 1955.

Specters of neutralism

Following Yoshida's exit from power, American officials became alarmed by signs of Japan's drift toward neutralism. Part of the problem came from the difficulty in drawing lines between diplomatic impartiality, an amorphous anti-Americanism fermenting in Japan at the time, and popular discontent with the government closely associated with the overpowering presence of the United States in Japan's postwar life. But it was hard for Washington to deny the link between anti-Americanism and Japan's resilient pacifism, rooted in the nation's firsthand experience with nuclear weaponry. The *Lucky Dragon*

22. Shimizu, *Creating People of Plenty*, 23–28.

incident in March 1954 dramatically illustrated this connection. While operating in the high seas off the Bikini atoll, the Japanese tuna trawler was exposed to a US hydrogen bomb test, and a member of its irradiated crew later died.

Japan's second direct encounter with a nuclear blast exposed a deep chasm between American and Japanese perceptions of thermonuclear warfare and the meaning of the US–Japan alliance. For American officials and strategists, the hydrogen bomb was an integral part of the strategy of nuclear deterrence and, as such, contributed vitally to the defense of the free world. Barely a decade after the nightmare of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese did not see such redemptive qualities in the bomb. The incident inaugurated the organized antinuclear movement in Japan, culminating in the formation of the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo) and the Japan Confederation of A-bomb and H-bomb Sufferers' Organizations (Hidankyo). In this nationwide grassroots mobilization, revulsion toward nuclear weaponry also fused with disparate agendas of nonpartisan oppositional politics, such as the quality of life around American military bases, feminist opposition to prostitution in base towns, and the sincerity of the Sino-Soviet peace offensive. US policymakers realized that the spike in anti-Americanism, often couched in the language of universal humanitarianism, could not be simply attributed to socialist and Communist agitation. Washington also worried about the symbolic weight of its key ally hoisting the banner of international antinuclear citizen activism and drawing on its credentials as the sole victim of the nuclear destruction and suffering.²³

In the mid-1950s, Japan's grassroots anti-Americanism was paralleled by government policy. Yoshida's successors, drawn from within conservative ranks, wanted to reverse his legacy of perceived obsequiousness to American wishes. Hatoyama, who replaced Yoshida in December 1954, trumpeted "autonomous diplomacy" as the hallmark of his Cabinet. In the context of Japanese politics, this meant reaching out to the "other side," particularly China. Hatoyama appeared to condone the Japanese business community's flirtation with PRC trade officials, which resulted in the third Sino-Japanese private-sector trade agreement in May 1955. The trade accord included

23 Allison to Department of State, May 20, 1954, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. XIV, 598; Memorandum for J. F. Dulles, May 26, 1954, *ibid.*, 1948–50. For a good survey of the *Lucky Dragon* incident, see Roger Dingman, "Alliance in Crisis: The Lucky Dragon Incident and Japanese–American Relations," in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (eds.), *The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 187–214.

provisions for transactions between national banks and the establishment of a trade representative's office from each country in the other's capital. From the perspective of Washington, these proposals came close to quasi-diplomatic relations. Ishibashi, whose illness ended his premiership after only two months in early 1957, vocally supported trade with the PRC. In fact, when he was the minister of international trade and industry in the Hatoyama Cabinet, he appeared willing to undermine the Western embargo system by permitting Japanese shipments of strategic materials to mainland China in exchange for commodity imports.²⁴

These independent-minded leaders also sought closer relations with the rest of Asia. In the early postwar years, a sense of alienation from the Western industrial world still created a psychological need to find a comfortable niche in the nonwhite world. Japan's claims of brotherhood with Asians sometimes dangerously resembled the prewar "Asia for Asia" rhetoric. Hatoyama's "independent diplomacy" identified with the anticolonial fervor in Asia and the Non-Aligned Movement emerging in many parts of Asia and Africa. Since Japan, a military ally of the United States, was obviously a misfit in this movement, Japanese officials were both mystified and delighted to receive an invitation from the conveners of the Bandung Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement's inaugural meeting. The occasion was all the sweeter because Taiwan and South Korea were not invited. It was not that Japan was suddenly trusted by the Asians: the invitation came only because Pakistan, wanting to neutralize India's influence in the movement, decided to use Japan as a counterweight.²⁵

Japan sent a massive 31-member delegation to Bandung, but the delegates' experience in the Indonesian city revealed that Japan, despite its aspirations for autonomous diplomacy and partnership with Asia, could go only so far as long as it remained a US ally. Initially, the United States was ambivalent about the Bandung Conference and its principal organizer, Jawaharlal Nehru. Dulles, in particular, suspected that the Indian prime minister was attempting to erode US influence in Asia. The US secretary of state also feared that the participation of the PRC in the conference would enhance its international prestige. Once Japan received an invitation, Washington encouraged Tokyo to attend and act as spokesperson for the industrial West. The Japanese Foreign Ministry promised to restrain extremist elements at the conference, counter

24 Shimizu, *Creating People of Plenty*, 123–29.

25 Taizo Miyagi, *Bandon kaigi to Nippon no ajia fukki* [The Bandung Conference and Japan's Return to Asia] (Tokyo: Soshisha, 2001), 43–46.

anti-American diatribes, and frustrate any Communist peace offensive that might unfold in this international forum.²⁶

The Foreign Ministry's promise notwithstanding, chief Japanese delegate Tatsunosuke Takasaki, director of the Economic Deliberation Agency and a known advocate of Sino-Japanese trade, tried to use the Bandung Conference as a venue to contact Zhou Enlai, the Chinese foreign minister. At a prearranged meeting, Zhou offered to arrange future talks on economic matters and on the repatriation of Japanese nationals from the Chinese mainland. When the sensitive issue of Taiwan came up, however, worried Foreign Ministry officials in Takasaki's entourage tipped Washington off. Dulles promptly issued a stern warning to Tokyo, and the Japanese delegation in Bandung quickly fell back into the American fold. In the end, Japan even refrained from speaking up for a ban on nuclear weapons out of deference to Washington.²⁷

Dulles's warning also proved decisive at a critical juncture in Japan's efforts to resolve postwar problems with the Soviet Union. As part of his "autonomous diplomacy," Hatoyama placed normalization of relations with Moscow at the forefront of his diplomatic agenda. Rapprochement with the Soviets also held the key to Japan's membership in the UN. In December 1955, the Soviet Union vetoed Japan's accession to the world forum, in retaliation for the Republic of China's veto of the admission of Mongolia.²⁸ Japanese sensibilities were badly bruised by Japan's placement in the same category as Mongolia, and Dulles exhorted Tokyo not to accept this slight and to stand up to the Soviets in the ongoing negotiations for a peace treaty.²⁹ By then, US officials had begun to regret having made Japan renounce, in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, its claims to the Kurile Islands. A recent US military survey mission to Hokkaido had revealed that the Soviets had built substantial military installations in the Kuriles, deploying fifty MiGs to the islands closest to Hokkaido.³⁰

26 "Ajia Afurika kaigini Nippon sanku kata shinsei ni kansuru ken" [On the Invitation to the Asia-Africa Conference], from Wajima to M. Shigemitsu, December 31, 1955, Japanese Foreign Ministry Records, B'0049, Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, Tokyo; "Memorandum of a Conversation: Various Japanese Problems," January 28, 1955, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, vol. XXIII, 14; Miyagi, *Bandon kaigi*, 76–77.

27 Takasaki-Chou Memorandum of Conversation, April 22, 1955, Foreign Ministry Records A'0133, Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives; Miyagi, *Bandon kaigi*, 136–38, 156.

28 Rekishigaku kenkyukai (ed.), *Nippon dojidaiishi* [The Contemporary History of Japan], vol. III (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1990), 173–74.

29 "Memorandum of a Conversation," March 18, 1956, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, vol. XXIII, 156–59.

30 Wada Haruki, *Hoppon ryodo mondai wo kangaeru* [Considering Japan's Territorial Questions] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990), 139.

In the final stage of the Soviet–Japanese talks in the summer of 1956, Japanese foreign minister Mamoru Shigemitsu initially demanded the return of all four northern islands off Hokkaido seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The Soviets offered to return only two islands, Habomai and Shikotan. When Shigemitsu appeared ready to accept this deal, shock waves pulsed through Japanese governing circles. Meeting with Dulles in London, Shigemitsu explained that the Soviets would never relinquish the southern Kuriles (the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu) and that Japan had to settle for what it could get. Dulles warned that, should Japan recognize Soviet sovereignty over the southern Kuriles, the United States would claim full sovereignty over Okinawa on the basis of Article 26 of the peace treaty.³¹

Historians have puzzled over why Dulles suddenly intervened in the Japanese–Soviet negotiations and linked the Kuriles and Okinawa. Some have argued that he was not trying to sabotage the negotiations but wanted only to dissuade Japan from unnecessary concessions over the northern territory. Others have claimed that Dulles’s outburst reflected his frustration with the increasingly recalcitrant Japanese.³² Whatever the reason, after Dulles’s warning, the Japanese–Soviet negotiations over the islands stalled. Hatoyama decided to shelve the territorial issue and signed a joint declaration with Moscow on October 19, 1956, ending the state of war between the two nations. The signatories also agreed to exchange ambassadors, repatriate Japanese detainees from the Soviet Union, and complete a long-overdue fisheries treaty. Japan’s admission to the UN became a reality two months later.

The revision of the security treaty

Japan’s neutralist tendency seemed to abate after Hatoyama’s retirement and Ishibashi’s sudden illness and resignation. In February 1957, the United States gained a reliable junior partner in the person of Kishi. After years of fractious politics and party realignment in Japan, Kishi had helped engineer the merger of conservative parties into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in October

31 Suzuki, *Nichibei domei*, 189, 198–99; “Memorandum of a Conversation between Dulles and Shigemitsu,” August 19, 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, vol. XXIII, 202–04.

32 Kazuya Sakamoto, “Nisso kokko kaifukukosho to Amerika: Daresu ha naze kainyu shitaka” [Japanese–Soviet Rapprochement and America: Why Did Dulles Intervene?], *Kokusai Seiji* [International Relations], 105 (January 1994), 155; Marc Gallicchio, “The Kuriles Controversy: US Diplomacy in the Soviet–Japan Border Dispute, 1941–1956,” *Pacific Historical Review*, 50, 1 (February 1991), 100.

1955. In American eyes, the new prime minister appeared capable of achieving a long-awaited stability in Japan's electoral politics. Better yet, this conservative leader did not challenge United States Asian policy. After being "de-purged" and returning to politics, Kishi consciously used Soviet–American enmity as a way to advance his career and cultivated Washington's good graces.³³ The appointment in the same month of Douglas MacArthur II (the general's nephew) as the new US ambassador to Japan created a binational team that for the next three years worked closely together on a number of issues, not least of which was the revision of the US–Japan Security Treaty.

One of Kishi's prime attractions for the United States was his staunchly pro-Taiwan position. After the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with the PRC emerged as the next piece of unfinished business in Japan's public-policy discourse. Although public sentiment favored opening diplomatic relations with Beijing, Kishi visited Taiwan in June – the first Japanese prime minister to do so – and applauded Jiang's unconcealed intent to reconquer the mainland. This diplomatic grandstanding earned him a severe rebuke from Beijing, but Jiang reciprocated Kishi's support by endorsing the Japanese prime minister's Southeast Asian economic development scheme, even when the Southeast Asians themselves were skeptical about the Japanese initiative. By the time Kishi visited the United States in July, top administration officials considered him not simply the "best bet, but the only bet," in Japan for the foreseeable future.³⁴

This American trust carried a big payoff for Kishi. Washington heeded his call for renegotiating the 1951 US–Japan Security Treaty, which had been condemned by the Japanese as one-sided. The treaty's unilateral features – the US right to intervene inside Japan to suppress internal disorder, the US freedom to deploy American forces inside and outside Japan without consulting Tokyo, and the absence of a specified end date to the treaty – showcased the inequality of the alliance and undercut Japan's sovereignty. But perhaps the most unpopular feature of the treaty was that obligations were not mutual: while Japan was required to provide bases to the United States, there was no explicit guarantee by the United States to defend Japan. Leftist critics of the treaty argued that the arrangement only turned Japan into

33 Yoshihisa Hara, *Kishi Nobusuke*, 122–30.

34 Record of a Meeting between Dulles and Nash, June 5, 1957, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, vol. XXIII, 339; Ota to Ishii, May 23, 25, 1957, Marota to Osjoo, May 26, 1957, Yuki to Ishii, June 1, 1957, Kishi Sori Daiichiji Tonan Ajia Homon Kankei [First Kishi Tour of Southeast Asia], A'1.5.1.3-1, Japanese Foreign Ministry Records.

a launching pad for American military operations, including nuclear attacks, against its Cold War enemies and made the nation vulnerable to reprisals.

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu first broached the modification of the treaty into a more mutual arrangement when he visited the United States in 1955. He was rebuffed by Dulles, who asked sarcastically whether Japan, shackled by Article IX of its constitution, could send troops overseas to defend the United States. But several years later, when Kishi asked for an adjustment of the treaty, the US government was much more receptive. Washington valued his staunch allegiance to US Cold War policies in Asia. Moreover, Japan's diplomatic leverage was mounting now that relations with the Soviet Union had been reopened and Japan was a full-fledged member of the UN and GATT. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feared that the antibase sentiment cresting in Japan and leftist Diet members' move to sponsor restrictive legislation would endanger the use of bases in the Japanese main islands and Okinawa.

The impediment to making the treaty more mutual was the Vandenberg Resolution, which authorized the United States to enter into mutual defense agreements only with countries capable of providing self-defense and contributing to the security of the United States. But Eisenhower decided to accept Ambassador MacArthur's recommendation that the United States not wait for Japan to revise its pacifist constitution, and he concurred that Japan's provision of bases to the United States to maintain peace and security in the Far East should be considered an acceptable equivalent. In order to retain the guaranteed use of bases in Japan, the United States made a calculated choice: not to demand the elimination of the war-renouncing provision of the Japanese constitution as a precondition of treaty revision.³⁵

Signed in January 1960, the new security treaty included many of the changes desired by Japan as a sign of more equal partnership. It barred US military intervention inside Japan and eliminated prohibitions against providing bases to third countries without US approval. It also mandated consultation before American forces were deployed into or out of Japan. Additionally, the treaty contained provisions for economic cooperation similar to those in the North Atlantic Treaty. It had a time limit of ten years and explicitly stated that the United States had an obligation to defend Japan. In a supplementary *aide-mémoire*, specific restrictions were placed on how the bases could be used, and it was agreed that nuclear deployments to Japan also came under

35 For the ways in which Kishi and MacArthur worked closely together on treaty revision, see Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 127–42.

the requirement for prior consultation. Okinawa, however, remained outside these updated security arrangements, allowing the garrisoned island to be fully mobilized in the service of the new American Cold War agenda in the vaguely defined “Far East” – Vietnam.

Japan and the Cold War

Signed in the midst of the Korean War, the San Francisco Peace Treaty gave Japan a truncated peace and limited latitude to deal with the Communist world. Despite their professed commitment to an open international order, US officials restricted Japan’s engagement with its Communist neighbors and channeled its relations to that part of the world where Americans exercised decisive military, political, economic, and ideological influence. With varying degrees of enthusiasm, Japan’s postwar conservative leaders maneuvered within these structural constraints. There were occasional challenges and minor revolts, but in this period Japan did not break free of the dual “protective” umbrella of US nuclear superiority and dollar hegemony. The Bretton Woods system delivered to Japan capitalist plenty and consumer affluence, as Washington promised it would, and Japan quickly evolved from a militaristic empire to a modulated democracy with increasing political pluralism. But, because Japan failed to hold itself accountable to the victims of its wartime aggression in Asia and because the United States placed an overriding priority on Japan’s economic recovery and the entrenchment of conservative rulers, Japan’s full reconciliation with Asia remained a distant dream. In reaching out to the newly independent and non-aligned nations of Asia in the mid-1950s, Japan had an opportunity, however tenuous, to bring together the two parts of the continent rent asunder by the 1950 Sino-Soviet Alliance and the 1951 US–Japan Security Treaty. In the end, however, Tokyo elected to stay in its alliance of convenience with a powerful United States and chose the path to economic prosperity.

The Korean War

WILLIAM STUECK

The Korean War was a seminal event of the early Cold War, both regionally and globally, and of Korean history. The conflict militarized international politics far beyond previous levels, but, in part due to the better-defined superpower commitments that emerged in Europe and Northeast Asia, it also produced a relatively stable military balance, making less likely a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the war solidified China's division, escalated American involvement in Indochina, and ensured the prolonged estrangement of the United States and the People's Republic of China. Those developments, in turn, increased the likelihood of future conflict in Southeast Asia. For the short term, the war tightened the Sino-Soviet alliance, but it also sowed the seeds of future animosity between the Communist giants. Finally, while the fighting during the war did not extend beyond Korea's boundaries, it led to massive destruction on the peninsula and deepened the country's division.

Origins

The war emerged from an array of Korean and international factors. During the century prior to the outbreak of war on 25 June 1950, Korea was rent by division and foreign encroachment. Contending indigenous groups usually derived their identity from a combination of internal forces and ties to foreign powers. When in the 1880s Korea opened its gates to the Western world, pro-Chinese, pro-Japanese, pro-Russian, and pro-American factions all emerged, each drawing on the ideas and/or maneuvers of the great powers. Internal turmoil joined with the ambitions of more powerful neighbors to produce two major regional conflicts between 1894 and 1905. Japan emerged victorious in both, annexing the peninsula in 1910. Korean activists seeking to end foreign rule looked to other nations for inspiration and support. With the rise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia in 1917 and the emergence of the struggle

between Nationalists and Communists in China in the 1920s, Korean exiles inevitably took sides, with traditionalists of a Confucian stripe looking to the Nationalist Chinese, liberals of a capitalist, democratic bent appealing to the United States, and radicals casting their eyes toward the Soviet Union and/or the Communist Chinese. Affiliations were also influenced by regional or family origin in Korea and a foreign power's or party's geographic proximity to the peninsula, or hopes of their assistance against the Japanese. Group commitments were not always rigid, and because before World War II no major power had openly challenged Japan in Korea, independence forces operated in a frustrating, disconnected world that encouraged factions. Adding to the mix were the vast majority of Koreans who remained in their own country during Japanese rule. A few actively sought to undermine Japan and were killed, jailed, driven underground, or exiled. The others, to degrees ranging from sullen acquiescence to active endorsement, participated in the prevailing power structure. The struggle in Korea that emerged after liberation from Japan in 1945 grew out of divisions among Koreans that had developed over the previous two generations and were often partly defined by the relationships of individuals to a foreign power or powers. If Korean nationalists often used past affiliations of some of their countrymen with the Japanese colonial regime as weapons in the internal struggle for power, they themselves usually depended to some degree on foreign support based on contacts made during previous periods of exile.

Despite a major uprising in 1919 and sporadic guerrilla activity in extreme northern Korea after that, Koreans proved unable to undermine Japanese rule. A Korean provisional government emerged in China in 1919, but it never bridged the gap between Right and Left, nor did it consistently pull together all groups even on the Right. During World War II, some Korean exiles served in Chinese Nationalist armies, some with the Chinese Communists, some with the Soviets, and a few with the United States; but more fought on the Japanese side. At the Cairo Conference in the fall of 1943, Allied leaders of the United States, China, and Britain agreed that, after the war, Korea should "in due course ... become free and independent."¹ Yet US president Franklin D. Roosevelt believed Korea incapable of governing itself without a period of tutelage. Divisions among Korean independence forces plus their inability to provide significant aid in the struggle against Japan left Roosevelt and his advisers concerned primarily about preventing Korea from again becoming

1 US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), 449.

a source of great power struggle. To Roosevelt this meant creating a multi-power trusteeship including the United States, the Soviet Union, China; and perhaps Britain.

At the end of the Pacific war in mid-August 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union alone sent troops to Korea, leaving the two great powers to determine events. The Grand Alliance against Germany and Japan was already showing cracks, as the victorious powers turned attention from their common enemies to their otherwise-divergent views and interests. Over Korea, Soviet and American aims were bound to clash, as Moscow sought traditional goals of defense in-depth of its Northeast Asian frontier and warm-water ports, while Washington feared uncontested Soviet expansion in the vacuum created by Japan's defeat and China's weakness. Soviet intervention in the war against Japan on August 8, 1945, which the United States had solicited, magnified such fears, as Soviet armed forces now thrust into Manchuria and Korea in the extreme northeast. American forces remained south of the Japanese main islands, several hundred miles from Korea, and immediate plans focused on occupying Japan. Soviet occupation of the entire peninsula seemed a prospect. Under the circumstances, US president Harry S. Truman proposed to his Soviet counterpart, Premier Iosif Stalin, that the thirty-eighth parallel, which split Korea roughly in half, be designated the demarcation line between Soviet and American occupation forces. Stalin agreed.

The Americans and the Soviets bypassed the Koreans in deciding to occupy their country and in choosing a boundary between their occupation forces, but they could not ignore them once on the peninsula. While Koreans celebrated Japan's demise and interpreted "in due course" as meaning early independence, they were far from united on the future of their country. In the days before Japan's surrender on August 15, Japanese authorities in Seoul, fearful of mass uprisings against their countrymen, sought out, as historian Allan R. Millett puts it, "a native elite with sufficient nationalist credentials to command popular obedience" until the new occupiers assumed control.² Yo Un-hyong, a leftist with contacts among Korean independence forces both at home and abroad, emerged to form the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence. This group established affiliates in cities and towns throughout Korea, but its demand for confiscation of Japanese property left

2 Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning* (Lawrence, KS: Regents of Kansas Press, 2005), 43.

colonial officials and moderate Koreans worried that a social and economic revolution was on the horizon.

Such fears worsened on September 6, 1945 when some members declared establishment of the Korean People's Republic. Two days later, as American soldiers began to disembark at Inchon, the port for Seoul, conservative Koreans countered by forming the Korean Democratic Party. By this time hundreds of local people's committees had been established nationwide, sometimes in conjunction with the national preparatory committee, sometimes not. US occupation forces under Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, already wary of leftist groups and under orders not to recognize an indigenous regime, refused to work with the People's Republic, discouraged the people's committees, and favored contacts with members of the colonial apparatus or Korean conservatives. Led by Colonel Ivan M. Chistiakov, Soviet authorities north of the thirty-eighth parallel worked with the people's committees but did not recognize the People's Republic, despite the prominent role in its formation of Pak Hon-yong, the leading domestic Communist.

The Soviets treated their zone as a sphere of influence. With the national capital of Seoul and two-thirds of the population in the American zone, the Soviets set about consolidating their position in the north, which included maneuvering reliable native Koreans into positions of authority. Initially, the Soviets tried to include non-Communists, most notably Christian leader Cho Man-sik. But Cho proved too independent and in early 1946 was arrested and jailed. Meanwhile, a former guerrilla fighter in Manchuria, Kim Il Sung, had emerged as the Soviets' favorite. Born in 1912 near Pyongyang, Kim spent most of his early years in Manchuria, where in the 1930s he joined anti-Japanese partisans affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party. In 1941, he fled to the Soviet Union, enlisting in a brigade that included members of the Chinese, the Soviet, and the Kapsan factions of Korean Communists. Kim returned to Korea in a Soviet army uniform in September 1945 and early on sought establishment of a separate North Korean branch of the Communist Party. In December, he became the secretary-in-chief of that party; in February 1946, he became chairman of the new Korean Provisional People's Committee (NKPPC), in effect a provisional government under the Soviet occupation.

The occasion for creation of the NKPPC was a controversy over trusteeship. In December 1945, the United States and the Soviets agreed to create a joint commission between the occupation commands that would submit proposals to the governments at home for establishment of a provisional Korean government and later "a four-power trusteeship for a period of up to



20. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung.

five years.”³ Announcement of the agreement produced outrage among conservatives in the American zone, led by Kim Ku, formerly head of the provisional government in China, and Syngman Rhee, who prior to liberation had lived for decades in the United States. In response, the US occupation command suggested that trusteeship might be avoided, while the Soviets persuaded Communists to support the agreement. In February, virtually simultaneously with creation of the NKPPC, the Americans created the Representative Democratic Council dominated by the outspokenly anti-Soviet Rhee. Thus, in March 1946, the Joint Commission convened in Seoul in an acrimonious atmosphere. It adjourned in May without agreement.

³ US Department of State, *The Record of Korean Unification, 1943–1960: Narrative Summary with Principal Documents* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1960), 47–48.

By summer, politics in Korea had become polarized. The Soviets had turned toward consolidating Communist factions under Kim Il Sung's leadership rather than establishing a coalition that included non-Communist groups. The Americans strove for a coalition of Korean rightist and centrist forces while adopting repressive measures against the Communists. Whether from the perspective of relations between the occupying powers or those between indigenous political groups, the prospects for national cohesion were at best unpromising, at worst hopeless.

Meanwhile, economic conditions deteriorated in the US zone. From the start, the American occupation mishandled rice distribution and, unlike the Soviets in the North, it held back on implementing a broad land reform program. The influx since liberation of over a million Koreans into South Korea from the North, Manchuria, and Japan created shortages of food and housing just as the South's dependence on the North for electric power and coal produced shortfalls in heating, lighting, and transportation. Brutal acts of the national police, manned primarily by Koreans who had served under the Japanese, magnified resentments among the civilian population as did the insensitive behavior of American soldiers.

In the fall of 1946, strikes among railroad workers in Seoul, Pusan, and Taegu proved the beginning of what would become known as the Autumn Harvest Uprising. Mobs of industrial workers, farmers, students, and the unemployed appeared in cities throughout the zone. Disturbances lasted into November and were suppressed by the national police only with the assistance of US troops and a new South Korean constabulary. Deaths and casualties on both sides numbered well into the hundreds. Although the role of Communists from within or outside the American zone remains uncertain, the makeup, timing, and location of the riots suggest coordination rather than spontaneity.

American troops hoped that improvement of economic conditions and the building of a coalition of rightist and centrist forces in their zone would persuade the Soviets to return to the Joint Commission and accept unification on US terms. The fall disturbances indicated that the economy was a long way from becoming a source of strength, and simultaneous efforts at coalition-building showed limited success. In October, the occupation conducted elections for an Interim Legislative Assembly, and the Right emerged victorious in a process compromised by violence and other irregularities. In pursuing acceptance by centrists and moderates on the Left, General Hodge appointed many of them to the new body. Rhee, the most influential rightist, was furious and Yo, the leading figure on the moderate Left, still refused to serve in a body in which his allies remained a minority.

In early 1947, the Truman administration moved to reconvene the Joint Commission and develop a plan for economic assistance. The Joint Commission resumed meetings in May, but congressional opposition stymied expanded economic aid. In March, President Truman asked Congress for \$400 million in economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey. In June, Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed massive aid for the economic recovery of Europe. These initiatives reflected the emerging Cold War with the Soviet Union. Though sympathetic, Congress had limited tolerance for expensive foreign-aid programs. The legislature even cut military spending, making the Korean occupation more difficult to sustain. So the United States hobbled along in Korea with economic conditions worsening and agitation rising against the American occupation among Korean politicians, who continued to squabble bitterly among themselves.

The Soviet Union showed no interest in easing US discomfort. Unwilling to permit a unified government unless under Communist control, the Soviets were unaccommodating in the Joint Commission and finally proposed that the occupying powers withdraw to permit Koreans to resolve conflicts on their own. That was a recipe for civil war and eventual Communist control, as the North was more stable than the South and possessed a more substantial indigenous armed force. The United States was unwilling to depart without a final effort to establish a viable independent government, if not for the entire peninsula at least south of the thirty-eighth parallel. The chosen instrument for this effort was the US-dominated General Assembly of the United Nations.

The United States placed the Korean issue before that body in September 1947 and, two months later, pushed through a resolution calling for national elections on the peninsula, supervised by a United Nations commission and aimed at creating an independent government. The Soviets opposed the measure and threatened to block its implementation in the North. In 1948, they carried out this threat, but the United States persuaded the Interim Committee of the General Assembly to endorse supervision by the UN commission of elections in the south alone. Amidst considerable turmoil, including a widespread boycott, elections occurred on May 10, 1948. Right-wing forces led by Rhee, long a proponent of an independent government in the South, emerged victorious. A divided UN commission endorsed the outcome as "a valid expression of the free will of the electorate."⁴ The new legislative assembly drafted a constitution for the "Republic of Korea" (ROK)

4 US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1974), vol. VI, 1229–30.

and elected the 73-year-old Rhee its first president. Inauguration ceremonies took place in Seoul on August 15. The Soviets followed in their zone with creation of the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (DPRK), with Kim Il Sung at its head. Korea was finally independent, but its division into hostile regimes augured ill for its peaceful development.

From the beginning, the ROK was unstable. To some historians the Korean War had already begun, with the April 1948 revolt of Communist-led partisans on Cheju-do, an island off the south coast of Korea.⁵ Sporadic partisan action on the mainland accompanied the uprising. Then, in October, a revolt occurred in a regiment of the ROK constabulary stationed at Yosu on the south coast. Action spread to the populace and soon rebels had seized both Yosu and Suncheon forty miles to the north. Loyal elements of the ROK police and constabulary took nine days to restore control and hundreds of the rebels fled to nearby mountains, where they organized guerrilla operations against authorities. From April 1948 through the spring of 1950, unconventional warfare waxed and waned throughout much of South Korea, with fatalities estimated at between 30,000 and 100,000. Reinforced by infiltrators from North Korea, the guerrillas garnered support from thousands of South Koreans discontented with the ROK government. ROK army and police campaigns of the winter of 1949/50 removed prospects for its early overthrow, setting the stage for the largely conventional and much more destructive conflict.

In March 1949, with Soviet troops having departed the previous December, Kim Il Sung proposed to Stalin a large-scale North Korean attack on the South to unite the country. Stalin demurred, as 7,500 American troops remained south of the thirty-eighth parallel and the North Korean army lacked a decisive advantage over that of South Korea. The Soviet dictator told Kim to increase his effort to undermine the ROK through infiltration of guerrillas and materiel to reinforce southern partisans. In September, with the American military presence reduced to 500 advisers to the ROK armed forces and after continued indecisive guerrilla operations in the South and conventional skirmishes along the thirty-eighth parallel, Kim again proposed an attack. Again, Stalin said no. He did not change his mind until late January 1950. Early the next month he approved a request to give North Korea the heavy arms necessary to equip three new army divisions.

By this time, the Communists in China had driven the Nationalists off the mainland to Taiwan and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

⁵ See, most recently, Millett, *War for Korea*, 2.

Communist leader Mao Zedong was in Moscow negotiating a treaty of alliance.⁶ US secretary of state Dean Acheson had recently defined the American defense perimeter in the Pacific as extending from the Aleutians to Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines, thus omitting South Korea and Taiwan. With the guerrilla war stalled in South Korea, Kim was impatient. Although much in debt to the Soviets, he suggested that, if Moscow refused to give the green light, he would turn to Beijing, which was in the process of returning to North Korea tens of thousands of Korean soldiers seasoned by years of combat on the Communist side in the Chinese Civil War.

Kim visited Moscow in late March, staying for nearly a month. Stalin explained to him that, for the reasons above plus the Soviet explosion of an atomic device, the international situation had improved. The time was ripe to initiate a military offensive to unite the peninsula, but with three qualifications: first, Mao must approve the venture; second, it must appear as a counter to a South Korean move north; third, Kim must recognize that, in case of trouble with the Americans, he would depend on China, not the Soviet Union, to send troops to save him.

Kim went to Beijing in mid-May and received Mao's reluctant approval. Although the Chinese leader would have preferred that his plans to attack Taiwan be given priority, he was in a weak position to resist given Stalin's approval of the venture, however conditional, and North Korea's past support for him in his own civil war. The Soviets went on to provide heavy artillery and T-34 tanks and assisted in drawing up an operational plan. At the last minute, Kim claimed that the ROK might have discovered the plan, so he requested permission from Moscow to speed up the main attack, which Stalin gave, thereby reducing the plausibility of the claim that it was a counter to ROK action. When North Korea moved across the thirty-eighth parallel before daylight on June 25, it achieved virtually total surprise.

North Korean forces advanced rapidly, capturing Seoul in three days. On June 29, General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of US forces in the Far East, visited the battlefield south of Seoul. The next day he proposed to Washington dispatch of a US army regimental combat team to Korea. The United States was already providing air support for ROK troops and bombing and strafing north of the thirty-eighth parallel. At American behest, and with the Soviet delegate absent, the UN Security Council had passed two resolutions, the second calling on members "to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to

6 See Niu Jun's chapter in this volume.



21. President Syngman Rhee of South Korea and US general Douglas MacArthur.

restore international peace and security in the area.”⁷ President Truman had announced that the US Seventh Fleet would prevent attacks from mainland China on Taiwan and vice versa, plus an increase in US aid to the Philippines and the French in Indochina. Now, he approved MacArthur’s recommendation to send American ground forces into combat in Korea. The United States was committed to the defense of the ROK.

Why did the United States fail to take greater action prior to June 25, 1950, to deter a North Korean attack? In the face of such an attack, why did the United States commit its armed forces to repulse it? The answer to the first question rests, on the one hand, in the interaction of public opinion, executive-legislative relations, and maneuvering between the State Department and the Pentagon in Washington and, on the other, in the ambivalent feelings of American officials toward the Rhee regime in Korea. Korea lacked a powerful constituency in the United States and, among the four American occupations,

7 United Nations Document S/1508, Rev. 1, June 27, 1950.

was the least desirable place for US soldiers to be stationed. With military spending in decline, the service chiefs sought to reduce the US presence abroad. In September 1947, they determined that the United States had “no strategic interest” in maintaining troops in Korea and pressed for an early withdrawal from the peninsula. The State Department resisted, believing that, because of the confrontation there with the Soviet Union, US credibility was at stake. The diplomats finally acceded to Pentagon pressure in mid-1949. The internal situation in South Korea had improved somewhat since the previous fall, and intelligence reports indicated that North Korea would continue its efforts to subvert the ROK from within rather than through overt attack. Short of a dramatic incident, the State Department had too many irons in the fire elsewhere to persist in its resistance to the final troop withdrawal. Reinforcing the predisposition for withdrawal was the lack of enthusiasm in Washington for the volatile, autocratic Rhee, who threatened to mobilize his troops and march north.

The State Department believed that the United States had an important stake in the survival of the ROK, however, and North Korea’s attack focused attention on the peninsula as never before. American leaders regarded the attack as Soviet-inspired aggression. Once it became clear that ROK survival was in jeopardy and that no other attacks were in the works along the Soviet periphery, the commitment of US ground forces, readily available in occupied Japan, was virtually automatic. As Secretary of State Acheson put it, decisive action was necessary “as a symbol [of the] strength and determination of [the] west.” To do less would encourage “new aggressive action elsewhere” and demoralize “countries adjacent to [the] Soviet orbit.”⁸

Intervention of US troops under a UN umbrella prevented a quick North Korean victory and ensured broad international involvement in the struggle to come. Intervention in the Taiwan Strait by the United States, its stepped-up aid to the French in Indochina, and its use of Japan as a launching pad for operations in Korea added a critical regional dimension to the conflict. While the United States and the Soviet Union showed an inclination to avoid a direct military confrontation, heightened tension in East Asia had a clear impact on Europe, where a divided Germany and a divided Berlin within the Soviet zone possessed some similarities to Korea. The potential for escalation of the fighting beyond Korea was obvious to all.

8 D. Acheson to Ambassador Alan Kirk in Moscow, June 28, 1950, Record Group 84, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.

Stages

The Korean War may be divided into four stages. The first constituted the period of North Korean offensive, which lasted from June 25, 1950, until the middle of September of the same year when the military balance on the peninsula changed dramatically. During this time, DPRK forces pushed southward to a perimeter around the southeastern port of Pusan, nearly driving units under General MacArthur's UN Command (UNC), established in early July, out of Korea. Yet, major uprisings within South Korea in support of North Korean troops failed to materialize as anticipated, and extended supply lines made them increasingly vulnerable to UNC airpower. Moreover, by early August, the North Koreans were outnumbered by the combined ground forces of the ROK and the United States.

Meanwhile, beyond Korea, governments made plans and took actions that set the stage for future developments locally, regionally, and globally. In China, Mao commenced a "hate America campaign," focused on US intervention in the Taiwan Strait and ordered a large-scale buildup of his armies in Manchuria in preparation for a possible move into Korea. At the beginning of August, the Soviet Union returned to the UN Security Council to block further US action in that body. In the United States, which had initially defined its objective in Korea as restoration of the thirty-eighth parallel, the Truman administration began considering the possibility of a military campaign to unite the peninsula under the ROK. It also commenced plans for a military buildup at home and in Europe that, pending approval by North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, would include West German rearmament. In Japan, with US forces departing rapidly for service in Korea, MacArthur implemented plans for a 75,000-man National Police Reserve Force, in effect commencing rearmament of the enemy in the Pacific war. In Washington, officials resolved to move forward with negotiations for a peace treaty that would permit American forces to remain on Japanese territory. Finally, in New York, the United States succeeded in getting commitments from twenty-nine UN members for military, economic, or medical assistance for the Korean venture.

The second stage of the war constituted the period of UN counteroffensive, which began on September 15, with MacArthur's flanking operation at Inchon. By the end of the month, North Korean forces were in a disorganized retreat across the thirty-eighth parallel and UN troops had authorization from Washington to destroy them through operations north of the old boundary. The UN General Assembly endorsed a move to unite Korea on October 7. As

UN forces advanced rapidly northward, however, Mao, under pressure from the DPRK and the Soviet Union to save the day, fearing the threat posed by US forces poised on China's border, and sensing an opportunity to advance his developing revolution at home, sent nearly 300,000 Chinese troops across the Yalu River into Korea. In late November, as overextended UN troops commenced a reckless advance to clear the peninsula of enemy forces, Chinese armies launched a major counteroffensive of their own, thus bringing the war into its third and most dangerous stage.⁹

During the second stage, potential cracks in the Western alliance appeared, first over the US proposal for West German rearmament and then over the US decision to continue offensive operations in Korea after Chinese troops first made contact with their UN counterparts in late October and early November. Although NATO allies supported US intervention in Korea, they feared it would result in American overcommitment to Asia, a secondary theater in the Cold War, thereby increasing Western Europe's vulnerability to Soviet aggression. The Chinese counteroffensive in Korea magnified this concern, as pressure skyrocketed in the United States to expand the war beyond the peninsula. This pressure became particularly acute after China pushed its forces southward below the thirty-eighth parallel at the beginning of 1951. In the midst of a Soviet scare campaign to prevent West German rearmament, allied governments mobilized politically to restrain the United States.

The focal point for diplomatic action in late 1950 and early 1951 was the UN General Assembly in New York, where US allies joined with neutrals, led by India, to delay American pressure for sanctions against China. That pressure reached a peak in mid-January, by which time Chinese troops in Korea had captured Seoul and had advanced in some sectors as much as fifty miles further south. In early February, the General Assembly finally passed a resolution condemning China as an aggressor in Korea, but delayed sanctions. By this time, UN forces in Korea had regrouped and were engaged in limited offensives northward. With UN evacuation from the peninsula no longer an early prospect, pressure for expanding the war in the United States temporarily subsided.

That pressure escalated again in April, when on the eleventh Truman fired MacArthur from all his commands, and eleven days later, when the Chinese commenced the first of two spring offensives in Korea. After UN forces recaptured Seoul in mid-March and moved to positions for the most part

9 See also Niu Jun's chapter in this volume.

slightly north of the thirty-eighth parallel, Truman had wanted to explore the possibility of a ceasefire. Yet MacArthur had objected to any end to the fighting short of unification, and he took his case to the public. The president feared that the imperious general would unnecessarily expand the war by attacking Manchuria, where hundreds of Soviet airplanes positioned themselves for possible intervention in Korea, action that would threaten UNC domination of the air. While Truman's move against MacArthur set off a firestorm at home, the Communists did not challenge UNC control of the air and UN forces successfully repulsed enemy offensives, inflicting huge casualties. By early June, the battlefield had stabilized, the General Assembly had imposed limited economic sanctions on China, and the United States had sent signals to the Soviets and the Chinese of a willingness to negotiate an end to the fighting. The Soviet Union returned the signals later in the month and, on July 10, talks began between the military commands on both sides in Korea at Kaesong along the thirty-eighth parallel.

Thus began the fourth stage of the war, that of stalemate, which lasted until an armistice was finally signed on July 27, 1953. During this time neither side attempted a major alteration of the stalemate on the battlefield. Despite Kim Il Sung's initial desire to fight on in pursuit of unification, Chinese forces had taken enough of a pounding from superior UN airpower and heavy artillery to believe that, unless they could persuade Stalin to provide more air support and more modern equipment, the effort was not simply likely to be in vain but might actually lead to further loss of territory. Since the UNC had resisted the temptation in early June to mount a sustained counter-offensive against badly mauled Chinese units, Mao believed negotiations appropriate. Stalin agreed.

For their part, and against the urging of Syngman Rhee, the Americans had little stomach for another military effort to unify the peninsula. During the third stage of the war, the United States had made considerable progress in building the NATO alliance by creating a command structure in Europe under the leadership of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, by exercising flexibility on the timing of West German rearmament, by sending two more divisions to Europe, by championing the case for the admission of Turkey and Greece to the organization, and by negotiating with allies for the rational distribution of raw materials in the process of rearmament. The United States had also moved forward on a peace treaty and military alliance with Japan. The two parties had concluded preliminary agreements and the United States had gone far in persuading its allies, in the Pacific and Europe alike, to accept relatively generous terms for a settlement that did not include either China or the Soviet

Union. Just as important, the United States had done much to stimulate economic recovery in Japan through its military operations in Korea. Japanese firms in sectors from textiles to shipping, automobiles, communications, and chemicals received large contracts from the US government, initially for Korea but eventually for military aid programs to other countries in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia. To the Truman administration, a settlement in Korea that was close to the territorial division of Korea prior to June 25, 1950, represented an adequate outcome, as it would greatly reduce US expenditures in an area of peripheral strategic significance and remove a source of tension with allies as well as at home.

Why, with relative balance achieved on the battlefield and with both sides willing to accept an end to the fighting far short of total victory, did it take over two years to conclude an armistice? Part of the answer is that, since neither side was willing to invest the resources or take the risks required to alter the military balance fundamentally, no one had a compelling motive to make the concessions necessary for an early end to the fighting. Each side understood that the struggle in Korea represented but a small portion of the global Cold War; yet they also recognized that the conditions under which the shooting stopped on the peninsula had implications locally, regionally, and worldwide. With neither side having achieved total victory, each sought tactical advantage through the negotiating process.

Reinforcing these circumstances were a series of deep divisions separating the two sides, which magnified the normal feelings of distrust and hostility that exist between contestants in war. First, there was the ideological division between Marxist-Leninists intent on promoting world revolution and liberal capitalists determined to build international stability and order. Then came the material division, that between on the one side the United States, the richest, most powerful nation on earth, and on the other the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, only one of which had industrialized and all three of which could barely imagine achieving the level of material comfort enjoyed by the enemy. Finally, there existed the historical divide between the Chinese and the Korean peoples just emerging from several generations of encroachment by other nations and the Americans, who had been among the encroachers. Among Americans, these last two differences bred a sense of superiority, even occasionally contempt; among the Communists, they produced extreme sensitivity to potential slights and a determination to hide any weakness, often with belligerent behavior. The opportunities for such behavior were increased by the setting of the talks, a neutral area surrounded by heavily armed units of the two sides.

Given the above circumstances, it should come as no surprise that it took four and a half months of acrimonious, intermittent talks to agree on an armistice line, namely the line of battle with a three-kilometer demilitarized zone separating the ground forces on both sides. Initially, the Communists had insisted on the thirty-eighth parallel, but since that line was indefensible and since the UNC held more territory north of the line than the other side occupied south of it, the United States demurred. In limited offensives during the fall, the UNC pushed its positions slightly farther north in the central and eastern sectors of the front, which persuaded the Communists to concede the point.

From December 1951 through March 1952, the two sides resolved the issues of postarmistice inspections and reinforcement of forces, leaving the return of prisoners of war (POWs) as the remaining stumbling block. With the UNC holding more than ten times the number of prisoners as the Communists, the United States insisted on the principle of no-forced-repatriation while the latter held to the traditional principle of an all-for-all exchange. The issue brought to the fore the ideological dimension of the Cold War, with the American position representing freedom of choice for the individual while the Communist stance reflected a statist approach. Since over 20,000 of the UNC-held prisoners were Chinese, the issue also had implications regarding the continuing conflict in China between the Communists and the Nationalists. In April, the UNC reported to the Communists that more than 15,000 of the Chinese prisoners intended to resist repatriation. Communist negotiators suspected that they had been coerced and, in any event, it took little imagination to realize that if the UNC had its way these prisoners would wind up in Taiwan. This result, in turn, would strike a serious blow to the PRC's claim to be the sole legitimate government of China. By this time, Kim Il Sung, having endured for nearly two years the brutal pounding of his territory by UNC bombers and seeing no chance for early unification, showed a willingness to compromise. With Stalin's encouragement, Mao decided otherwise. Since the agreement on an armistice line, the UNC had halted offensive operations on the ground. In addition, Mao's forces in Korea had been bolstered by an increased supply of heavy weapons from the Soviet Union and they had dug several layers of tunnels behind the battlefield to better protect themselves against UNC airpower and artillery. With no indication that the United States intended to escalate in Korea on a major scale, there was much reason to hold firm.

The stalemate showed no sign of ending until late March 1953. On the twenty-eighth, the Communists in Korea agreed to a UNC proposal for the

exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. Two days later, China wired the president of the UN General Assembly proposing that negotiations in Korea, which had been suspended since the previous October, resume immediately to expedite execution of the exchange and then to resolve the POW issue in its entirety. Stalin had died earlier in the month, and in subsequent meetings in Moscow, his successors and high-level Chinese officials attending the old dictator's funeral resolved to revise the Communist position on POWs so as to achieve an armistice. Even so, it took until April 26 to restart the talks in Korea, and it was not until June 4 that the Communists finally accepted the essentials of the US position on POWs.

The death of Stalin probably contributed to resolution of the issue, both because he had been one of the roadblocks to a settlement and because his passing created uncertainties in the Communist world that dictated a period of relative stability on the international front that could not be ensured without an end to the shooting in Korea. January 1953 had brought a changeover in Washington with Eisenhower replacing Truman in the White House, a shift that increased the prospect of military escalation on the peninsula and quite possibly beyond. By early March, the new president had announced that the United States would no longer prevent Nationalist forces in Taiwan from attacking the mainland and several other US officials had suggested that a more belligerent course in East Asia was on the horizon. In mid-May, after the Communists had advanced a new but still unacceptable proposal on POWs, the UNC began air attacks on several irrigation dams in North Korea, which previously had been among only a few targets in the DPRK that were off-limits. Two weeks later, the UNC presented its own proposal on POWs, noting that if it was not accepted the talks would be terminated and earlier agreements on neutral areas around the negotiating site would be voided. The pressure also appears to have included a threat to escalate the fighting beyond Korea and to use atomic weapons.

By the middle of June, details on the precise location of the armistice line had been resolved and an end of the fighting appeared to be only days away. On the eighteenth, though, Rhee created one final roadblock by releasing over 25,000 anti-Communist Korean POWs who were under the control of the ROK army. The Communists expressed outrage, but the reality was that they wanted an armistice. As for the ROK president, his dependence on US aid for survival put him in a weak position to defy Washington, which had already considered the possibility of a coup against him. During the weeks that followed, Chinese armies launched tactical offensives against ROK forces, now manning 70 percent of the UNC front lines, pushing them back as much

as six miles in some sectors. Meanwhile, the United States granted several face-saving concessions to Rhee, including the promise of a military security pact and huge amounts of military and economic aid over the next several years in return for assurances that he would not disrupt an armistice. The actions on both sides finally set the stage for the signing of the armistice on July 27.

Impact

After over three years of fighting and two years of on-and-off negotiations, the shooting finally stopped. Much of Korea lay in ruins. Koreans killed, wounded, or missing numbered approximately 3 million, a tenth of the population. Another 5 million became refugees and perhaps double that saw their families permanently divided. Although civil strife and guerrilla warfare never affected the overall balance, they combined with US air action to produce massive civilian casualties. Each side suffered destruction of over a half million homes and the bulk of their industrial plant. Yet the country remained divided and, despite the advance of plans for reunification on both sides, that division was bound to last indefinitely, a fact confirmed by the Geneva Conference on Korea in May 1954.

Nothing could compensate the Korean people for the death and destruction suffered, but by thrusting the peninsula into the limelight as never before in the Cold War, the war had its compensations. It ensured that the United States would never again let its guard down in Korea. In the war's aftermath, Washington quickly concluded a military defense pact with Seoul. It maintained in South Korea tens of thousands of its own troops as well as substantial air-power, and it provided massive aid for augmentation of the ROK Army. The ongoing American commitment to the ROK made unlikely the resumption of war by the Communists, and Washington's clear message to Rhee that support would end if he initiated a new conflict served to discourage adventurism by the ROK. A replay of June 25, 1950, by either side was a remote possibility.

Another compensation was greatly expanded economic assistance for reconstruction and development for both Korean governments. The ROK became the largest recipient of American largesse for the remainder of the 1950s and, as Charles K. Armstrong has recently written, the DPRK became "the most ambitious multilateral development project ever undertaken by the socialist countries during the Cold War."¹⁰ The Korean governments, though

¹⁰ Charles K. Armstrong, "'Fraternal Socialism': The International Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953–1962," *Cold War History*, 5 (May 2005), 161.

bitter enemies, held in common their dependence on outside powers, just as they had before the war and just as had exiled independence groups during the era of Japanese rule, but now the material benefits were far greater.

Although China did not become a scene of the fighting and thus avoided huge destruction to its property and civilian population, the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea – the euphemism for PRC armies – suffered nearly 400,000 casualties, including over 148,000 dead. They fought tenaciously in Korea, but their inferiority to US forces in the air and in firepower and mechanization on the ground cost them dearly, eliminating any chance of decisive victory and leading eventually to Chinese concessions on the armistice line and POWs. The Soviets provided major materiel assistance, but it was slow in coming and air support was limited to areas near the Manchurian border. The experience could not help but whet Mao's appetite to develop nuclear weapons, the shortest route to closing the gap with the United States.

Closing that gap was important not only for defensive purposes. When Mao intervened in Korea, he had hoped to use success there to achieve a favorable settlement regarding Taiwan. Success had been limited, and by 1953 the United States was in no mood to bargain on the last stronghold of the Nationalists. Indeed, if in early 1950 the Communist government on the mainland stood an excellent chance of capturing Taiwan within the next year, by July 1953 the United States was all but committed to defending the Nationalist position there, a commitment that became formal less than two years later.

The PRC did derive positive advantages from its Korean venture. At home, Mao used the war to mobilize the people and solidify his and his party's position. The war forced postponement of a first five-year plan for economic development, but China built up credit with the Soviets that paid important dividends in financial and advisory assistance later on. Stalin's successors eventually assisted Mao in a nuclear-weapons program that led in 1964 to a successful test of an atomic bomb. Further, PRC success in fighting the United States to a stalemate in Korea greatly elevated China's stature abroad. Less than a year after the armistice, China played a critical role in mediating the end of the first Indochina war and in 1955 it emerged as the star player at the Bandung Conference of African and Asian states. Whereas prior to the war China had played a secondary role to the Soviet Union in North Korea, it now was all but a coequal there. After generations of humiliation, China had returned to major power status in East Asia.

China's accomplishments served immediate Soviet interests, as they removed any chance for Sino-American rapprochement, protected the DPRK, and kept the United States deeply engaged militarily in a country of limited

strategic interest and far distant from Europe. For the long term, however, the rise of the PRC gave Beijing the self-confidence to define its own revolutionary agenda, both at home and abroad, and set the stage for the Sino-Soviet split, which proved a huge strategic setback in the Soviet Union's struggle with the United States.

What is more, the Korean War added immeasurably to Moscow's international burdens, as both North Korea and China became greater drains on Soviet resources; so did the arms race with the United States, which quadrupled its defense expenditures and assisted in the rearmament of Western Europe, including eventually West Germany. The arms competition was also a burden to the United States, but the greater economic capacity of the West made it far more bearable. Indeed, Japan's economic recovery was advanced exponentially by the sudden demand for industrial goods needed to prosecute the war in Korea, while the economies of the United States and its West European allies all emerged stronger in 1953 than they had been three years earlier. In contrast, the war led Stalin to push harder than ever for the rapid industrialization of Eastern Europe, one result of which was a decline in consumer goods and, in the aftermath of his death, the first signs of widespread unrest in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The Soviet Union would have been better off had the war never occurred and perhaps even had Korea been united under the ROK in late 1950.

Although through much of the war the Western alliance seemed in crisis, at its end the United States had four more divisions in Europe than when it began, Greece and Turkey had joined NATO, the European Coal and Steel Community was under way – signaling a major advance in cooperation between West Germany and France – and the potentially acrimonious issue of distribution of raw materials had been contained. Much carping continued back and forth across the Atlantic, to be sure, but US flexibility on such issues as escalation in Korea, rearmament of West Germany, and economic issues related to the military buildup of NATO countries helped solidify the alliance, as did Soviet scare tactics.

The war was far from an unqualified victory for the United States. While it achieved its initial objective of saving the ROK, its reckless campaign in North Korea in the fall of 1950 led to embarrassing setbacks at the hands of the Chinese and tied down hundreds of thousands of US troops in a country that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had long considered of marginal significance. The crisis of late 1950 and early 1951 led to a rebellion against US leadership in the UN General Assembly that, for the short term, reduced risks of the expansion of war beyond Korea, but later on discouraged the Truman administration

from applying the kind of sustained if limited military pressure on the enemy that might have induced the Communists to accept an armistice at a much earlier date. During the third and fourth stages of the war, India emerged as a clear leader among Third World neutrals, who were increasingly assertive in staking out their own course in the General Assembly. With the United Nations about to explode in numbers as a result of the achievement of nationhood by former colonial territories, majorities for US positions in that body were bound to become more and more difficult to obtain.

Of course, South Korea was an emerging nation as well, but for the moment its survival in the war was as much a liability as an advantage to US diplomacy in the Third World. The war solidified Rhee's position at the head of the ROK and, due to the clear US commitment to the ROK's defense and economic reconstruction, increased his capacity to manipulate Washington. Outside the United States and South Korea, Rhee was a most unpopular figure and American support for him had its price, especially among Third World neutrals such as India and Indonesia. If the war helped solidify US leadership in Western Europe and Japan, it left the contest between Communism and liberal democracy up for grabs among the emerging nations of the underdeveloped world. In fact, by tying the United States more tightly than ever to the colonial powers and by alienating it from and empowering China, the war complicated Washington's task in adjusting to the tide of change in Asia and Africa.

The position of the United States regarding Japan is especially revealing of the difficulty in balancing interests between First World allies and Third World areas. The Korean War had smoothed the path toward peace and security treaties between the two powers, ratified in 1952, and provided a great stimulus to the Japanese economy. Yet despite the sharply increased production of materiel for use in Korea and American aid programs in Southeast Asia, Japan continued to have a sizable balance-of-payments deficit. A possible solution to the problem was to reestablish pre-1945 levels of trade with China, but Washington adamantly opposed this approach for fear that it would lure Tokyo into the Communist sphere. That left as options either increased Japanese exports to North America and Western Europe, which would create domestic controversies in the nations involved, not to mention animosity toward the United States among European allies for promoting the idea, or increased Japanese exports to Southeast Asia, a process well advanced by 1953.¹¹

11 For more on US-Japanese relations, see Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu's chapter in this volume.

Two problems existed with this latter option, however: first, Southeast Asian markets were of limited size and alone were unlikely to enable Japan to erase its deficit; second, the region was highly unstable, especially given the ongoing French struggle against Communist-dominated nationalist forces in Indochina. Between 1950 and 1953, US support to the French had increased by leaps and bounds, in no small part because of concerns about Southeast Asia's perceived importance regarding Japan's economic well-being and diplomatic orientation and the view that if Indochina fell to the Communists, so would the rest of the region. Yet the French campaign showed no sign of success, largely because France proved unwilling to grant real power to anti-Communist nationalists. The Korean War did not create this problem, but the heightening of polarization between the United States and the Communist world that it ushered in served to compound Washington's difficulties in balancing the needs of leading allies with Third World realities.¹²

In the end, the Korean War was a clear-cut victory for no one, but it helped to stabilize the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States at a level below direct combat. The war sparked major rearmament in the United States, thus narrowing the gap in conventional forces between it and the Soviet Union, and solidified US commitments to and presence in Western Europe and Japan. These developments, in turn, made less likely than before a Soviet-initiated or -backed probe in a key area that would provoke an unanticipated American response and escalate into a global conflagration. Yet the war left a legacy that would exacerbate conflict in other areas. It may have helped avert a global bloodletting like that of 1914–18 or 1937–45, but its cost remained tragically high.

12 For a more detailed analysis of developments in the Third World, see Mark Philip Bradley's chapter in this volume.

US national security policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy

ROBERT J. McMAHON

US grand strategy during the presidencies of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy derived, in the broadest sense, from the same, deep-seated fear: that the Soviet Union's combination of implacable hostility, mounting military strength, and positive ideological appeal posed a fundamental – even existential – threat to US national security. The emergence of an equally hostile China as a military power in its own right deepened the perception they shared of an unusually menacing external environment. Eisenhower and Kennedy each accepted the basic goals of the containment strategy developed during the Harry S. Truman presidency, to be sure. But differing assessments about the precise nature and extent of the Communist threat, coupled with divergent judgments about how best to check it and what resources were available for the task, generated quite distinct tactical approaches to national security policy during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

Eisenhower's Cold War

Long before he assumed the presidency, Dwight D. Eisenhower had been giving serious and sustained thought to questions of strategy. As a West Point cadet, he had imbibed the fundamental precepts of Carl von Clausewitz's classic nineteenth-century treatise on warfare. Later, of course, he gained invaluable practical experience in the formulation and implementation of strategic plans as the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe during World War II. One of Eisenhower's deepest core beliefs held that national security encompassed much more than the physical defense of the homeland; it meant to him, in the broadest sense, protecting the nation's basic values, its economic system, and its domestic institutions. In that respect, Eisenhower was firmly convinced that the greatest threat to national security emanated less from the potential for military defeat than from excessive government spending; striking an appropriate balance between the cost of an adequate

defense and the need to maintain a healthy, solvent economy constituted, accordingly, a crucial aspect of strategy.

Eisenhower expressed that viewpoint with great consistency, both publicly and privately, during his pre-White House years. In a private diary entry of January 1952, for example, he wrote that "it is necessary to recognize that the purpose of America is to defend a way of life rather than merely to defend property, territory, homes, or lives. As a consequence of this purpose, everything done to develop a defense against external threat, except under conditions readily recognizable as emergency, must be weighed and gauged in the light of probable long-term, internal, effect."¹ This "Great Equation," as Eisenhower sometimes called it, found expression in several of his public addresses during the 1952 presidential campaign. In one, he criticized the steady rise in the Truman administration's defense budget over the previous two years, and questioned whether the nation could afford to sustain this elevated level of government spending. "We must achieve both security and solvency," he insisted. "In fact, the foundation of military strength is economic strength. A bankrupt America is more the Soviet goal than an America conquered on the field of battle."²

Eisenhower accepted many of the central premises of Truman's national security policy. Like top-level decisionmakers in that administration, Eisenhower believed that US security in the Cold War required the establishment of a preponderance of American power across the Eurasian heartland. He, too, accepted that the US stake in postwar Western Europe remained vital, and that an integrated Western defense effort, one that utilized and harnessed West Germany's latent economic and military power, formed an essential component of any such effort. As well, Eisenhower appraised the Soviet threat as exceedingly grave and recognized as imperative the containment of further Soviet territorial expansion. He also appreciated the corresponding need to maintain both a powerful American nuclear arsenal and adequate conventional forces so as to deter Soviet adventurism.

Eisenhower dissented, however, from the view of Truman administration policy planners that an escalating US military buildup was needed to meet a time of maximum danger. That time had been pinpointed in NSC 68 and other policy documents as arriving in 1954, when the Soviet Union would presumably attain sufficient nuclear capability to menace the United States and its

1 Dwight D. Eisenhower diary entry, January 22, 1952, in *The Eisenhower Diaries*, ed. by Robert Ferrell (New York: Norton, 1981), 210.

2 *New York Times*, September 26, 1952.

Western allies. Instead, he visualized US-Soviet competition as more of a long-term proposition, rejecting the time-of-maximum-danger hypothesis. Eisenhower considered it highly unlikely that Soviet leaders would court a conflict that would surely bring ruin on their country and likely break their own hold on power. He reasoned that the preservation of the regime would temper the behavior of Kremlin policymakers, whom he saw as essentially rational men intent on self-preservation. Accordingly, Eisenhower believed that greater efficiency and economy in defense spending could, and must, be achieved.

Immediately following his electoral triumph of November 1952, Eisenhower initiated the complex process of translating that vision into a concrete and cohesive national security strategy. After assembling an advisory team that mixed experienced foreign-policy and defense experts, such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, with staunch fiscal conservatives, such as Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, he encouraged a remarkably wide-ranging series of intra-administration debates about Cold War grand strategy. At the first meeting of Eisenhower's reconstituted National Security Council (NSC), which became the key sounding board and policymaking instrument of his administration, the new chief executive remarked that the "great problem" facing the council was to decide upon an appropriate defense posture "without bankrupting the nation." To that end, he authorized a broad-based reconsideration of the national security priorities established by the Truman administration. NSC 141, approved by Truman during his final weeks in office, had recommended substantial, though unspecified, increases in defense spending. Eisenhower called for a reexamination of the threat perceptions that lay behind those valedictory recommendations as well as a careful assessment of the suitability, and affordability, of current programs.³

What ensued was the first of many debates throughout the Eisenhower presidency about the appropriate balance between national security needs and fiscal solvency. During the course of the meeting, the president revealed his intent to cut several billion dollars from Truman's projected defense expenditures, stoutly resisting the military's pressure for increased defense spending. He achieved that goal by overturning the Joint Chiefs' focus on a so-called D-Day in 1954-55 and replacing it for planning purposes with an indeterminate, or "floating," D-Day; that allowed a reduction in the force objectives of

3 Memorandum of discussion, February 11, 1953, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), vol. II, 236-37 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number).



22. President Dwight D. Eisenhower (right) and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles meet to discuss foreign affairs.

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Along with the elimination of some waste and overhead and other cost-saving steps, Eisenhower thus demonstrated from the outset of his presidency his utter seriousness about reversing the trend toward upwardly spiraling defense expenditures.⁴

Although those initial budget-cutting moves laid down an important marker regarding Eisenhower's intentions, the task of defining and forging a consensus behind a new, integrated national security strategy remained. Eisenhower's core beliefs derived partly from an optimistic view about the ability over time of the freedom, openness, and pluralism of the American system to prevail over what he invariably disparaged as the tyrannical, freedom-denying depravities of Communism. At the same time, they

4 Memorandum of discussion, March 4, 1953, NSC Series, Whitman File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas). For the early strategic planning of the Eisenhower administration, see Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

emanated from a deeply pessimistic view about the civilization-destroying horrors of a general, nuclear war. Others, including chief foreign-policy adviser John Foster Dulles, at first took a more dire view of Soviet strength and harbored a less restrained view about the feasibility of nuclear war as an instrument of national policy.

During an informal meeting among senior policymakers on May 8, 1953, some of those differences in perspective surfaced. "It is difficult to conclude that time is working in our favor," Dulles observed. Insisting that "the Reds" held "the better position" throughout the world at the present moment and that the European allies remained irresolute and undependable, he advocated a more assertive, active, and risk-tolerant US policy. Otherwise, Dulles cautioned, "we will lose bit by bit the free world, and practically break ourselves financially." While agreeing that "present policy was leading to disaster" and hence needed to be changed, Eisenhower disagreed that time favored the United States' adversaries. He had long believed that the overall assets of the West – military, economic, political, psychological, even spiritual – were far superior to those of the Soviet bloc. Time, consequently, was the United States' friend, not its enemy. Displaying characteristic confidence about the inherent strengths of the West, he insisted that the momentum in the Cold War would eventually shift to the United States as people on both sides of the East–West divide came to "see freedom and communism in their true lights." In other words, a patient, long-term strategy was the one best designed to win the Cold War.⁵

"Operation Solarium," a unique exercise in the annals of American Cold War planning, grew out of that Eisenhower–Dulles colloquy and set the stage for the formulation of the administration's basic statement of national security policy, NSC 162/2. The president proposed that three separate teams of foreign-policy experts examine, refine, and present to the NSC for consideration three quite distinct strategic options for prosecuting the Cold War. Task Force A was charged with making the case for continuation of the Truman containment strategy; Task Force B with making the case for a more assertive policy that would precisely specify, and make clear to the Soviets, those areas that the United States would automatically defend in case of attack; and Task Force C with developing an aggressive plan for "rolling back" Communism. The completed task force reports, delivered and debated at a lively NSC meeting on July 30, succeeded in laying out some stark alternatives. While Task Force A, headed by former policy planning chief George F. Kennan,

5 All quoted in Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, 124–25.

contended that the prospects of a general war with the Soviet Union were highly unlikely for the foreseeable future, Task Force C identified a steadily growing Soviet threat that made the outbreak of general war a clear and present danger. The latter report rather ominously stated that the United States and the Soviet Union could no longer peacefully coexist and that the Soviet Union therefore “must and can be shaken apart” through the adoption of “a forward and aggressive political strategy in all fields and by all means.” Despite those, and other, fundamental differences in outlook, Eisenhower insisted that the three task forces combine their various analyses and recommendations around areas of common agreement.⁶

The New Look

The report the three task forces created constituted one of the foundation stones of NSC 162/2, the formal statement of US national security policy that Eisenhower approved at the end of October 1953 and that set forth the broad outline of his administration’s “New Look” defense strategy. Undergirding the New Look was a set of assumptions about the indispensability of nuclear weapons: as the most reliable deterrent to Soviet expansion; as critical instruments of offensive power that, in the event of hostilities, would be considered “as available for use as other munitions”; and as an essential substitute for ruinous spending on larger conventional forces. Under Eisenhower, the rapidly expanding American nuclear arsenal became the central element in its overall defense posture. “The major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe,” observed NSC 162/2, “is the manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory striking power if the area is attacked.” By redefining the role of nuclear weapons in US national defense strategy, Eisenhower believed he had unlocked the key to the most cost-efficient approach to waging – and ultimately winning – the Cold War.⁷ In his famous “massive retaliation” speech of January 12, 1954, Dulles called public attention to this central plank of the administration’s new strategy. The psychological calculus of deterrence – not just the possession of nuclear weapons but the *credible* inclination to use them – thus assumed center stage in US defense planning.⁸

6 Memorandum by Robert Cutler (Special Assistant for National Security Affairs), May 9, 1953, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. II, 323–28; memorandum of discussion, 30 July 1953, *ibid.*, 435–40.

7 NSC 162/2, *ibid.*, 577–97.

8 *US Department of State Bulletin*, 30 (January 25, 1954), 107–10.

Other emphases of the New Look approach also derived in substantial measure from Eisenhower's search for more efficient, cost-saving means of conducting the Cold War. One of those featured an increased reliance on the role of espionage, sabotage, and covert operations in the implementation of policy. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), headed by Eisenhower appointee Allen W. Dulles, the secretary of state's brother, became a favored instrument of New Look strategy since it promised efficient, cost-effective actions that could forestall the need for utilizing conventional armed forces. Moreover, covert operations, such as those that helped topple Left-leaning governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954, could plausibly be denied even if the veil of secrecy was breached. Those early successes, however, bred an unwarranted degree of overconfidence in the CIA's ability to manipulate events overseas, setting the stage for later problems – including major failures in Syria in 1957 and Indonesia the following year, each of which proved wholly counterproductive to US policy goals.

Eisenhower's national security strategy also attached greater value to the role of allies than had Truman's. A simultaneous strengthening and expansion of US bilateral and multilateral alliances would, in the conviction of Eisenhower, Foster Dulles, and other top decisionmakers, help compensate for the conventional force reductions they sought – reductions necessitated by ever-present fiscal constraints. The "pactomania" associated especially with the peripatetic secretary of state, which helped produce the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO), and new security alliances with Pakistan and Taiwan, among others, flowed logically from such calculations. A network of global alliances enabled the United States to encircle the Soviet Union and China with nations formally committed to the West, thereby discouraging Soviet or Chinese aggression against any of them. Perhaps most important, though, alliance systems held out the prospect of local manpower being deployed for wartime and peacetime needs, which would thereby lessen the pressure on US forces. Eisenhower wanted gradually to substitute allied for US manpower in such key areas as Western Europe. In broad terms, he envisioned an evolving division of responsibility between the United States and its regional partners in which the United States provided the nuclear umbrella considered imperative for deterring Soviet aggression, while allies bore the principal burden of supplying ground forces for regional defense.

The Eisenhower administration also accorded much greater weight to the place of psychological warfare, public diplomacy, and propaganda within overall Cold War strategy. Convinced that the political, psychological,

cultural, and ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union had become as pivotal as the military-economic struggle, Eisenhower directed that a concerted effort be made to court world public opinion. In initiatives ranging from the president's idealistic sounding "Chance for Peace" speech, after the death of Iosif Stalin in 1953, and his "Open Skies" proposal of 1955 to various international cultural exhibitions and touring troupes, Radio Free Europe broadcasts aimed at Eastern Europe, the manifold activities abroad of the ubiquitous US Information Agency, and much more, the United States vied to seize the moral high ground in the Cold War. This objective pervaded nearly all aspects of Eisenhower's foreign policy. A global public relations campaign aimed at highlighting the strengths and appeal of the American system and exposing the deficiencies of Communism thus came to occupy, for the first time, a central place in American grand strategy.

Threat perception invariably plays a large role in the formulation of any national security strategy. That certainly proved the case during the Eisenhower years. NSC 162/2 essentially codified the president's decision to abandon "fixed dates of maximum danger" – which he considered completely unknowable and hence unrealistic – as a basis for making and funding defense commitments. Instead, as Eisenhower explained in his January 21, 1954, budget message to Congress, his administration aimed for "a strong military position which [could] be maintained over the extended period of uneasy peace."⁹ Since careful threat assessment always comprises the appraisal of enemy *intentions* as well as enemy capabilities, it bears emphasizing that NSC 162/2 operated from the assumption that the Kremlin's rulers remained more cautious than reckless in their international behavior. Secretary of State Dulles used those exact words in offering his personal analysis of Soviet intentions to the NSC. "The verdict of history," he observed, "was that the Soviet leaders have been rather cautious in exercising their power. They were not reckless, as Hitler was, but they primarily rely not on military force but on the methods of subversion."¹⁰ Intentions aside, however, it was the projected growth of Soviet *capabilities*, especially in the nuclear sphere, that constituted the critical backdrop for the implementation, as well as the formulation, of the Eisenhower administration's strategic design.

The former general believed that the Kremlin's swelling arsenal of nuclear weapons transformed the nature of the Soviet-American conflict. With the

9 *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1954), 272–73.

10 Memorandum of discussion, December 21, 1954, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. II, 841.

emergence of hydrogen, or thermonuclear, weapons that were a thousand times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the prospect of a future nuclear exchange between the Americans and the Soviets deeply unsettled – indeed, frightened – the man who had so much intimate experience with war. Although the United States enjoyed vast superiority over its principal rival in both nuclear warheads and delivery systems throughout the 1950s, Eisenhower realized that rough nuclear parity between the two superpowers was just a matter of time. He also recognized that neither side could “win” a nuclear war in any meaningful sense. At an early NSC meeting, he stated that “there would be no individual freedom after the next global war,” just appalling chaos.¹¹ Following the stunning results of the powerful Bravo tests of 1954, Eisenhower mused: “Atomic war will destroy civilization. There will be millions of people dead ... If the Kremlin and Washington ever lock up in a war, the results are too horrible to contemplate.”¹² Similarly, he urged his colleagues on the NSC in January 1956 to keep in mind that “No one was going to be the winner in such a nuclear war. The destruction might be such that we might have ultimately to go back to bows and arrows.”¹³

In view of the frequency and passion with which Eisenhower delivered such warnings about the certain devastation, for both sides, of a nuclear conflict, it might at first glance seem surprising that he insisted that all war-fighting plans be based on the expectation that the United States would attack the Soviet Union “with all available weapons.”¹⁴ Eisenhower’s disdain for the concept of limited nuclear war helps explain the seeming paradox. The president considered limited nuclear war, an alternative backed by some military experts within his administration, to be a fatuous contradiction in terms. He was convinced that any general war between the United States and the Soviet Union would quickly and inevitably become a nuclear war, with each side using all weapons at its disposal. Ample evidence suggests, consequently, that Eisenhower insisted on planning only for total war because he believed that to be the best way to preclude any war from erupting – despite serious opposition within his own administration to the all-or-nothing policy. That approach, later decried by President Kennedy and his top defense advisers, can be seen then as the product of Eisenhower’s determination to

11 Memorandum of discussion, July 16, 1953, *ibid.*, vol. II, 397.

12 James Hagerty diary, July 27, 1954, *ibid.*, vol. XV, 1844–45.

13 Memorandum of discussion, January 12, 1956, NSC Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Papers.

14 NSC 5422/2, August 7, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, vol. II, 718.

avoid a nuclear holocaust that would assuredly destroy everything he held dear about American society.

Yet Eisenhower was willing to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, as he did on several occasions during his tenure in the White House, when he thought such threats served larger strategic purposes. In the opening months of his presidency, Eisenhower alluded indirectly but unmistakably to the possible use of nuclear weapons against the North Koreans and Chinese as part of his effort to hasten the end of the Korean War. When Beijing began shelling Nationalist Chinese-controlled islands in the Taiwan Strait, in 1954–55 and again in 1958, Eisenhower relied upon the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter the regime of Mao Zedong from launching an attack upon Taiwan. In the 1958 crisis, he went so far as to put the US military on full alert, rush a formidable naval armada to the Taiwan Strait, and authorize the dispatch of nuclear-equipped forces to the region. Planning documents suggest he was willing to launch nuclear weapons against Chinese military installations in retaliation for any military move against Taiwan or the offshore islands it claimed. Had Mao chosen to call Eisenhower's bluff, the latter would have had one of two unwelcome choices: either risk a major foreign-policy defeat, and the loss of credibility that would have resulted from a failure to follow through on earlier threats; or risk the likely international revulsion that would greet another crossing of the nuclear threshold, one virtually certain in this case to cause millions of civilian deaths. In retrospect, a strategy based on the use of heavy-handed threats to alter the behavior of a regime as radically unpredictable as Mao's seems, at best, excessively risky.

The United States and Europe

Implementation of the New Look strategy in Europe proved no less daunting and, in certain key respects, even less successful. Eisenhower, like Truman, considered the presence of US combat forces in Western Europe an essential requirement to deter the potential threat posed by superior Warsaw Pact forces. But Eisenhower, ever since his stint as NATO supreme commander, believed that stationing US troops on European soil was merely a temporary expedient. From his earliest days in the Oval Office, Eisenhower made clear his determination to withdraw US troops from Europe as quickly as possible by persuading Europeans to accept the principal responsibility for their own defense. Achieving that objective required that European troops be mobilized much more fully; it also necessitated a greater reliance on nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe.

Yet each of those prescriptions just exacerbated underlying allied tensions. The tensions arose especially from the discomfort of West European nations with their overdependence on the United States and from their corresponding unease about the prospect of their homelands becoming the principal battlefield in any Soviet–American military confrontation. As Secretary of State Dulles confided to the NSC on December 10, 1953: “While we regarded atomic weapons as one of the great new sources of defensive strength, many of our allies regarded the atomic capability as the gateway of annihilation.”¹⁵ Following the Bravo tests of March 1954, the secretary of state voiced concern that a “wave of hysteria” was “driving our Allies away from us. They think we are getting ready for a war of this kind. We could survive, but some of them would be obliterated in a few minutes.” He worried, consequently, that allied fears of nuclear war “could lead to a policy of neutrality or appeasement.”¹⁶

The European Defense Community initiative had, since the end of the Truman administration, offered the prime US hope for an expansion of allied military capabilities. Its rejection by the French National Assembly, in 1954, compelled an “agonizing reappraisal” of US policy, in Secretary of State Dulles’s memorable phrase. In line with a British proposal, the Eisenhower administration and its Western allies agreed upon the alternative solution of a West Germany rearmed within the constraining fabric of NATO. The subsequent assumption of sovereignty, in 1955, by a rapidly rearming Federal Republic of Germany helped resolve the key riddle of how to assimilate German power for European defense, while at the same time preventing Bonn from developing a fully independent military force. The broader problem for the Eisenhower administration, however, remained: how could Washington induce its NATO partners to accept a much larger share of the collective security burden, thus reducing the enormous costs being borne by the Americans?

Annoyed that the Europeans were “making a sucker out of Uncle Sam,” as he once put it, Eisenhower decided, early in his second term, that the only way to induce Europeans to assume more responsibility for their own defense was to grant them *de facto* control over tactical nuclear weapons.¹⁷ The controversial nuclear-sharing concept also grew out of Eisenhower’s desire to treat

15 Memorandum of discussion, December 10, 1953, *ibid.*, vol. V, 452.

16 Memorandum of telephone conversation, March 29, 1954, *ibid.*, vol. II, 1379–80.

17 Memorandum of conversation, November 5, 1959, *FRUS, 1958–1960*, vol. VII, 516.

European allies as full partners rather than as “stepchildren.” The question of whether overall US security would be enhanced, or compromised, if certain NATO partners – including West Germany – gained control over nuclear weapons proved intensely controversial among US defense planners and within the Western alliance. This critically important issue remained unresolved as Eisenhower’s tenure in office came to a close. By then, however, the president had gravitated to a more restrictive policy centered around the possible development of a multilateral nuclear force. Plainly, none of the administration’s various initiatives had brought the goal of a US troop withdrawal from Europe any closer to realization, leaving a cornerstone element of Eisenhower’s New Look strategy unfulfilled.

Eisenhower’s Third World policies

The New Look’s assumption that alliance-building would enhance overall US Cold War strength also fell well short of expectations. Pakistan, for example, which signed a mutual security pact with the United States in 1954 and then joined SEATO that same year and the Baghdad Pact the following year, pursued an agenda sharply at odds with the geopolitical calculations that drove US policy. It valued an alliance with the United States primarily as a form of protection against its regional rival, India, rather than from some amorphous Communist threat. As did many American allies, Pakistan thus frequently worked at cross-purposes with its superpower patron, all the while providing a negligible contribution to collective defense efforts. Similar patterns can to some extent be identified in the cases of Taiwan, Thailand, Iran, and Iraq, among other Third World allies. Each was eager to reap the bounty of formal ties with the United States, especially in terms of increased military and economic assistance, but remained much less enthusiastic about committing manpower to regional defense.

Nor did multilateral alliances, at least those outside NATO, add appreciable muscle to the containment strategy. They frequently did, on the other hand, alienate neighboring, non-Communist states. SEATO serves as an illustrative case. The defeat, in 1954, of the American-supported French at the hands of the Chinese-supplied and Soviet-supported Viet Minh in Indochina prompted the Eisenhower administration to cast about for ways of shoring up the crumbling Western position in Southeast Asia. At an August 12, 1954, NSC meeting, foreign-aid chief Harold Stassen lamented that the French defeat once again demonstrated that “a gain to the communists was a loss to us, no matter where it occurred.” Eisenhower concurred, adding that “some time we must

face up to it: We can't go on losing areas of the free world forever."¹⁸ What the administration feared, in particular, was unchecked Chinese expansion into the Southeast Asian region. Its response, though, amounted to little more than playing midwife to a weak grouping pledged vaguely to block Communist aggression, with no military force at hand to achieve that objective. In the end, SEATO emerged as a mere paper alliance, its capacity for dealing with either overt aggression or internal subversion well nigh invisible. The alliance did no more than signal a US commitment to the region – though it did, in keeping with the budgetary strictures of the New Look policy, limit the direct military costs to be borne by Washington.

In the Middle East, the US-sponsored Baghdad Pact of 1955 represented another deeply flawed response to perceived Western weakness. It brought together some of the region's pro-Western states – Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan – while leaving out all but one of the Arab states, most of whom staunchly opposed the pact. The alliance also pushed Egypt, the most important of those, to turn to the Soviet bloc for aid in order to counter its regional rival Iraq, now fortified by Western military support. The bitter chill in US–Egyptian relations that followed arguably owed much to the Eisenhower administration's misguided efforts to build strength through a Western-constructed defense pact that threatened, from Cairo's perspective, to upset the prevailing regional order.

Those flawed alliances bespoke a broader conceptual problem that plagued Eisenhower's grand strategy throughout his presidency: namely, the administration's persistent failure to gauge accurately and adapt effectively to Third World nationalism. The emergence of vigorous, broad-based, and assertive nationalisms throughout the developing world constituted the single most dynamic new element in international affairs during the Eisenhower years. On occasion, the president and other top officials displayed some keen insights about the challenges, and opportunities, this posed. "There is abroad in the world a fierce and growing spirit of nationalism," Eisenhower wrote British prime minister Winston S. Churchill in 1954. "Should we try to dam it up completely," he emphasized, "it would, like a mighty river, burst through the barriers and could create havoc. But again, like a river, if we are intelligent enough to make constructive use of this force, then the result, far from being disastrous, could redound greatly to our advantage, particularly in our struggle against the Kremlin's power."¹⁹ Eisenhower's conviction that the West

¹⁸ Memorandum of discussion, August 12, 1954, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. XII, 698.

¹⁹ Quoted in Matthew Connolly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 91; for developments in the Third World, see the chapter by Mark Philip Bradley in this volume.

derived a substantial measure of its overall economic strength from its access to crucial Third World resources – not least the fabled oil reserves of the Middle East – also lay behind his fixation on the developing world's crucial importance. He appreciated the economic interdependence of the global economy and repeatedly expressed concern about growing American dependence on Third World countries for a wide range of important raw materials.

Yet, the Eisenhower administration never found appropriate means for achieving the goals it sought. Instead, it frequently confused nationalism with Communism, sided with European allies in their disputes with colonies or former colonies, and alienated non-aligned states with its harsh condemnations of neutrality and its destabilizing alliance-building policies. In a wider sense, the administration reflexively wedded American interests to the status quo in areas undergoing fundamental social, political, and economic upheaval.

In the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union began to turn the United States' Third World problems to its own advantage. Using generous aid and trade offers, Communist Party leader Nikita Khrushchev launched a broad-based campaign to win Third World allies for Moscow. This new departure in Soviet policy sparked genuine alarm in Washington. A CIA report of November 1, 1955, warned that a "grave danger" existed that the new policy "will create an even more serious threat to the Free World than did Stalin's aggressive postwar policies."²⁰ John Foster Dulles solemnly proclaimed to the NSC that "the scene of the battle between the free world and the Communist world was shifting."²¹ For his part, Eisenhower fretted that because the Soviets were now challenging the United States not with military pressure but with economic weapons, they held a distinct strategic advantage. "This is the selectivity and flexibility that always belong to the offensive," the president pointed out in a private letter to Dulles. "The defensive must normally try to secure an entire area, the offensive can concentrate on any point of its own selection."²²

The Soviet economic offensive in the Third World, in the appraisal of top administration strategists, carried serious implications for US security. Eisenhower voiced the fear that this new Soviet challenge might prove just as difficult to meet as the military challenge. He authorized increases in US economic assistance programs to offset Soviet aid offers. A budget-conscious Congress balked at even those modest increases, however, slashing the

20 NIE100-7-55, "World Situation and Trends," November 1, 1955, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. XIX, 24-38.

21 Memorandum of discussion, November 21, 1955, *ibid.*, vol. X, 32-36.

22 D. D. Eisenhower to J. F. Dulles, December 5, 1955, *ibid.*, vol. IX, 10-12.

president's proposed foreign-aid budgets in 1956, 1957, and 1958. The self-imposed spending restraints of the New Look, in conjunction with the additional restraints imposed by Congress, produced, in the end, a remarkably tepid response to what the administration's own analyses identified as a dire threat.

This mismatch between strategic goals and resource allocations lays bare a significant shortcoming of the Eisenhower approach. In early 1956, the president commissioned a revision in the government's statement of "Basic National Security Policy" for the express purpose of reassessing the gravity of external threats in light of the recent shift in Soviet tactics. NSC 5602/1, approved by Eisenhower that March, warned not only that the movement of any additional country into the Communist camp would harm US security – a standard, long-held assumption – but emphasized that the resultant damage "might be out of all proportion to the strategic or economic significance of the territory involved."²³ This blurring of the distinction between vital and peripheral interests, so reminiscent of Truman's NSC 68, undercut a key assumption undergirding the New Look. How could the United States now distinguish between areas that needed to be defended and those that did not if the "loss" even of territories possessing minimal economic or strategic value could cause disproportionate harm to national security? Given such a worrisome prospect, how could the administration retain the flexibility and selectivity, along with the budgetary savings, that Eisenhower thought an asymmetrical containment strategy would bring? He never resolved those complex issues.

Eisenhower's legacy

Despite the shortcomings and contradictions emphasized above, Eisenhower's grand strategy displayed some marked strengths and was predicated on a number of keen insights. Eisenhower correctly grasped the long-term nature of the Cold War and began to plan accordingly. His administration's focus on the nonmilitary dimensions of Soviet-American competition led to a shrewd emphasis on the importance of public diplomacy and targeted propaganda initiatives designed to shape and influence world opinion. Perhaps most important of all, the president recognized more clearly than almost any of his contemporaries in the American policymaking elite that nuclear war could not be won and hence must not be fought. He displayed uncommon wisdom

23 NSC 5602/1, 15 March 1956, *ibid.*, vol. XIX, 242–68.

in comprehending that central reality of international relations in the middle of the twentieth century. Measured on its own terms, furthermore, the Eisenhower approach to national security did succeed in reining in defense spending, reducing the defense budget as a percentage of gross domestic product, and slashing the number of troops under arms. All the while, Eisenhower managed to ensure that the United States' overall military strength far surpassed that of the Soviet Union, a fact largely confirmed for him by the secret U-2 overflights of Soviet territory that began in 1956, and by the satellite reconnaissance missions that commenced in 1960.

In view of the above, it seems deeply ironic that, during his last several years in office, Eisenhower was hounded by criticisms about the presumed inadequacy of the US strategic posture, about declining American technological prowess, and about the Kremlin's rising capabilities. Technical breakthroughs by Moscow of an undeniably significant character triggered the complaints. The Soviets followed the first successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the summer of 1957 with the launch, in October, of Sputnik, the first artificial earth satellite sent into orbit. Those achievements prompted widespread concern on the part of ordinary citizens as well as many defense experts that the United States might actually be falling behind in the arms and technological races. A political culture shaped by the relentless assaults of McCarthyism, moreover, conferred a certain legitimacy on those who would accuse Washington officialdom of laxity and malfeasance – a political fact of life that not even a Republican White House could escape. Partly to quell fears about a developing “missile gap,” Eisenhower appointed a blue-ribbon commission to examine the actual state of the nuclear-arms balance. To his great frustration, the Gaither Commission's highly classified report, completed in 1958, found that such a gap did, indeed, exist – and some of the commission's more politically damaging conclusions were soon leaked to the press. Although the reality was the exact opposite, the imaginary missile gap became an effective political rallying cry. Democratic presidential aspirant Kennedy used it to good effect in his 1960 race against Eisenhower's vice president, Richard M. Nixon.

Kennedy and flexible response

During the presidential campaign and throughout his foreshortened presidency, Kennedy articulated a strategic vision that differed from Eisenhower's in key respects. Operating from the assumption that the purported missile gap between the Soviet Union and the United States was real – the evidence, in

fairness, was not yet conclusive that it was not – he pounded away in stump speeches about the need to bolster US defenses. This conviction formed an instrumental part of Kennedy's broader plea for the United States to prosecute the Cold War with greater vigor. He wanted to regain the initiative that he thought the Soviets had seized from the Americans, and he believed that spending additional dollars to enhance both the nation's conventional military capabilities and its long-range missile forces was imperative.

Like Eisenhower, the Democratic chief executive personally harbored a deep unease about the sure-to-be horrific consequences of any nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Quite unlike Eisenhower, however, Kennedy was convinced that expanding the full range of the nation's nonnuclear capabilities would reduce that threat by allowing the United States to tailor its responses appropriately to each kind and level of threat: from limited war to conflict on the periphery to insurgency to subversion. Such enhanced flexibility would eliminate, in his view, the all-or-nothing straightjacket imposed by the Eisenhower policy of massive retaliation, a policy he had blasted during his senatorial years. Kennedy's counterdoctrine of "flexible response," perhaps his administration's most distinctive innovation in the national security sphere, flowed directly from that supposition. The increased defense spending that the new president set as his highest priority was made possible by a Keynesian-influenced economic philosophy that, in sharp contradistinction to Eisenhower's conservative orthodoxy, held that the American economy was more than capable of absorbing increased defense expenditures – without suffering the deleterious effects that so exercised his predecessor. In that important respect, Kennedy's embrace of Keynesianism freed him from the tight budgetary constraints within which Eisenhower operated. Kennedy also advocated a more innovative, tolerant, and activist policy toward the Third World. Convinced that the primary scene of the struggle between the United States and its Soviet–Chinese adversaries had shifted to the developing areas, he elevated the battle for the Third World to a first-order priority in overall Cold War strategy.

The distinctive features of Kennedy's national security strategy emanated mostly from a heightened perception of the dangers posed to US security by the Soviet Union and China. Certain that the United States' adversaries were growing both stronger and more adventurous, he and his chief foreign-policy advisers considered a more activist US approach essential to meet the rising external threat those adversaries presented. "I think there is a danger," he declared in one campaign speech, "that history will make a judgment that these were the days when the tide began to run out for the United States.



23. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk (middle), and President John F. Kennedy.

These were the times when the Communist tide began to pour in.”²⁴ Those concerns dominated the president’s first state-of-the-union message of January 1961. In it, he implored Congress to provide sufficient funds for “a Free World force so powerful as to make any aggression clearly futile.” Neither the Soviet Union nor China, he said, “has yielded its ambitions for world domination.” He offered an exceptionally bleak vision of the global situation in the address, noting that he spoke “in an hour of national peril” and declaring it “by no means certain” that the nation would endure. “Each day the crises multiply,” Kennedy stressed. “Each day their solution grows more difficult. Each day we draw nearer the hour of maximum danger as weapons spread and hostile forces grow stronger.”²⁵

Kennedy and the Third World threat

That heightened perception of threat can be traced to the analysis, accepted by virtually all senior Kennedy administration planners, that the United States

²⁴ *New York Times*, August 25, 1960.

²⁵ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1962), 19–22 (hereafter PPP: *Kennedy*, with year).

now found itself on the defensive – not only in relationship to the inflated number of ICBMs that they mistakenly thought the Soviets possessed, but throughout the Third World. A steady stream of troubling international developments fed that view. In January 1961, to the disquiet of Kennedy and his top advisers, Khrushchev boldly vowed to support wars of national liberation across the developing world. The success of the Fidel Castro-led revolution in Cuba, the subsequent establishment of close ties between Moscow and Havana, the raging Communist-directed insurgencies against US-supported governments in Laos and South Vietnam, the postcolonial turmoil and resultant anti-Western upsurge in the Congo – all seemed to lend credence to the rambunctious Khrushchev's boasts that international trends were moving in a decidedly pro-Communist direction. To make matters even worse, leading foreign-policy analysts within the administration viewed China as a veritable outlaw state that was becoming an increasingly hostile and militant enemy. As the Sino-Soviet split deepened, American policymakers feared that Chinese policy might actually become even bolder and more aggressive, especially in Asia. They worried, relatedly, that the intense ideological competition with their Chinese rivals might in turn encourage the Soviets to become more adventuresome in the developing world.

Kennedy, who as a senator had championed anticolonial nationalism while blasting the Eisenhower–Dulles approach to the Third World, was determined to reverse those worrisome trends. He tried to do so, from the outset of his presidency, by pursuing a more tolerant, tactful, supportive, and generous policy toward key non-aligned countries such as India, Indonesia, Egypt, and Ghana. Kennedy believed such an approach essential in order to undo the damage caused by his predecessors' overemphasis on military alliances and hostility to neutralism. "We cannot permit all those who call themselves neutral to join the Communist bloc," Kennedy lectured the NSC. If we "lose" the neutrals, "the balance of power could swing against us."²⁶ The president and his senior foreign-policy advisers saw generous economic aid, tailored to the specific needs of individual national aspirations and development programs, as the most effective tool available to the United States in its bid to win favor with the non-aligned nations.

He feared as well that the balance of global power could shift away from the United States if it were not more attuned to the underlying socioeconomic

²⁶ Remarks by J. F. Kennedy to the NSC, January 22, 1963, NSC Files, National Security File (John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts).

conditions that fueled Communism's appeal across the Third World. In the wake of the Cuban revolution, that peril seemed particularly acute in Latin America; indeed, Kennedy tagged Latin America "the most dangerous area in the world."²⁷ The Alliance for Progress, the administration's boldest and most ambitious Third World program, sought to use economic largesse to spur modernization, alleviate poverty, and address pressing educational and health needs. For all the idealistic rhetoric that surrounded its launch, the alliance was designed for the overriding purpose of undercutting the appeal of Communism within the hemisphere. The Peace Corps program, perhaps the most idealistic and most popular of Kennedy's global initiatives, served similar goals. Kennedy believed that young, idealistic Peace Corps volunteers serving selflessly in many of the world's least-developed countries would help counter the negative image of Americans being propounded by the nation's enemies. It, too, sprang from a wider strategic vision that emphasized the need to wage the Cold War in the Third World with greater imagination and effectiveness.

Defeating revolutionary insurgencies formed another cornerstone of that plan. The president worried that wars of national liberation, from Southeast Asia to Latin America to various points in between, were being inspired and led by radical nationalists, or Communists, allied with Moscow, Beijing, or both. In order to defeat the insurgencies, Kennedy pushed hard for the development of sophisticated, counterinsurgency techniques. Counterinsurgency became a virtual obsession for Kennedy; he took great pride in elevating Special Forces units, including the much ballyhooed Green Berets, to a prominent place within an expanded American tool box for combating the Viet Cong, the Pathet Lao, and other popular guerrilla movements. In fact, General Maxwell Taylor, Kennedy's top uniformed military adviser, identified Indochina as a "laboratory" for the employment of counterinsurgency tactics.²⁸ Kennedy fully concurred. Indeed, his decision, late in 1961, to commit rising numbers of US combat advisers to the war against Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam proved one of the most significant, and fateful, of his presidency.

The implementation of these new Third World initiatives rarely proceeded as smoothly or as efficaciously as administration strategists hoped. The embrace of, and actual tilt toward, certain non-aligned states brought the predictable cry from Third World allies of the United States that the benefits

27 Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 19.

28 Quoted in Thomas G. Paterson, *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 12.

of formal alliance with the superpower were rapidly eroding. Unwilling to embitter allies and disrupt alliances, which a wholesale policy shift might have entailed, Kennedy backtracked; he recognized that the United States simply could not tilt too far toward the non-aligned without paying a steep cost elsewhere in the Third World. The Alliance for Progress, for its part, never lived up to Kennedy's high hopes. Funding limitations, the durability of the prevailing social structure, the sheer magnitude of the modernization project, and the inability of external capital to spur growth rates higher than a dismal 1 percent per annum during Kennedy's tenure combined to doom the touted alliance. Nor did counterinsurgency efforts provide the magic bullet craved for the fight against popular guerrilla movements in Indochina and elsewhere. By the final months of his presidency, Kennedy faced a rapidly deteriorating situation in South Vietnam in particular, despite the infusion of over 16,000 military personnel.

Kennedy and the Atlantic alliance

Implementation of the flexible-response strategy in Europe proved equally frustrating. Since that strategy called for a marked enhancement of the options for limited war available to the United States and its chief allies, it demanded a strengthening of NATO's conventional deterrent. That, in turn, meant inducing European partners to make a greater contribution to NATO's active-duty forces. Two problems immediately ensued. First, NATO allies proved unwilling to bear the expense of additional troop commitments. Second, they displayed apprehension about the future implications of the new administration's push to lessen NATO's dependence on nuclear deterrence. Although Kennedy had no intention of reducing the US commitment to European security, leading continental statesmen, always wary about American reliability, sensed a move in that direction. After all, if NATO's conventional forces grew, would the American nuclear deterrent not become less central in NATO defense plans? Could they be sure, then, that the United States, in a crisis, would treat an attack on Bonn, Paris, or London as they would an attack on New York or Washington? The overriding specter that haunted the United States' NATO partners, in short, was that the Kennedy initiatives might set in motion the long-dreaded decoupling of the United States and Western Europe.

The president tried to reassure European leaders that his concept of flexible response signified no diminution whatsoever in the American security commitment. In June 1961, he told French president Charles de Gaulle that, if the

Soviets ever appeared poised to overrun Europe, the “US must strike first with nuclear weapons.” An attack on Europe, Kennedy stressed, “would be physically and automatically an attack on us.”²⁹ Those reassurances could not, however, allay European fears about Washington’s newfound emphasis on scenarios for fighting limited wars.

Some of the inherent difficulties with the application of the limited-war concept to specific arenas of confrontation were brought to a head by the Berlin crisis of 1961. Following a tense summit meeting with Kennedy in Vienna that June, Khrushchev renewed earlier threats that he had made to cut off allied access to West Berlin. The first phase of the Berlin crisis had erupted in 1958 after Khrushchev issued a blunt ultimatum to the West, in effect threatening to sever West Berlin’s all-important transit links. Recognizing that vulnerable West Berlin simply could not be defended by conventional means, and yet could not be abandoned without severely diminishing US credibility, Eisenhower held firm. He accepted, and so signaled, that nuclear weapons would be used to defend West Berlin if needed. In light of the city’s weighty symbolic value, Eisenhower was willing to run the risk of general war to retain its current status.

Kennedy quickly, if reluctantly, reached the same conclusion. Concerned that backing down in West Berlin would deal a severe blow to American credibility and simply invite aggression elsewhere, he adopted an equally tough policy. In a public speech of July 25, 1961, the president declared: “We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force.” Kennedy offered a chilling depiction of the stakes in play. “In the thermonuclear age,” he warned, “any misjudgment on either side about the intentions of the other could rain more devastation in several hours than has been wrought in all the wars of human history.”³⁰ Fortunately for him, Kennedy was not faced with the prospects of a nuclear showdown. Khrushchev once again backed away from his threats and helped defuse the crisis – this time with the erection of the soon-to-be-notorious Berlin Wall. US vulnerability in Berlin rendered anything less than a willingness to employ nuclear weapons impracticable. “It is central to our policy,” Kennedy conceded as the crisis began to ease, “that we shall have to use nuclear weapons in the end, if all else fails, in order to save Berlin, and it is fundamental that the Russians should understand this fact.”³¹

29 Quoted in Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 292.

30 PPP: Kennedy, 1961, 533–35.

31 Kennedy to General Lucius Clay, October 8, 1961, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. XIV, 484–86.

Mutual deterrence

On broader issues of nuclear strategy, as on Berlin, a surprising convergence can be detected between Kennedy's evolving views and policies and those of the predecessor he initially sought to distance himself from. By September 1961, satellite reconnaissance yielded unmistakable confirmation that no missile gap existed between the Soviets and the Americans. In fact, according to an authoritative National Intelligence Estimate, the Soviets possessed not the 140–200 operational ICBMs originally suspected, but a mere 10–25. Needless to say, Eisenhower's cool confidence in superior American strength began to appear more prescient than the caricature promulgated by the Kennedy campaign of a complacent commander-in-chief asleep at the switch. The chief architect of Kennedy's security policy, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, had his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, publicly reveal the marked US advantage in all three legs of nuclear force structure – strategic bombers, ICBMs, and nuclear-armed submarines – to send a clear message to the Soviets while reassuring the American people.

An early proponent of developing limited-nuclear-war options as a less gruesome alternative to Eisenhower's all-or-nothing stance, McNamara gradually grew disillusioned with the notion that any nuclear conflict with the Soviets could stop short of all-out war. Kennedy, McNamara, and other top officials arrived at the conclusion, by no later than the end of 1962, that the only alternative to a savagely destructive nuclear war was to harp constantly on the horrors of such a conflict and rely on mutual deterrence as the safest preventative measure. By the end of the Kennedy administration, mutual deterrence – or mutually assured destruction, a more graphic term for the concept – had virtually acquired the status of official doctrine.

The movement toward that doctrine was hastened by the sobering lessons learned during the climactic Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. At the height of the crisis, Kennedy acknowledged that even though Soviet ICBMs might not be completely reliable, they almost certainly possessed sufficient firepower to hit American cities and cause between 80 million and 100 million casualties. “[Y]ou’re talking about the destruction of a country!,” he exclaimed.³² After having come closer to a nuclear holocaust than at any point during the entire Cold War, US and Soviet leaders recognized the need to avoid future Cuba-type confrontations and began to take some significant

32. Sheldon M. Stern, *Averting “The Final Failure”: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 127.

steps in that direction. These included the Limited Test Ban Treaty of August 1963, a signal achievement. At American University in Washington, DC, in June of that year, Kennedy delivered the most conciliatory speech of his presidency, urging that more attention be directed “to our common interests and to the means by which differences can be resolved.”³³

Scholars will long debate the relative efficacy of the national security policies crafted by Eisenhower and Kennedy during this exceptionally dangerous phase of the Cold War. Working within a broad consensus on strategic goals, they plainly adopted different tactical priorities. Those tactical shifts distinguished the two administrations from each other in significant respects – while distinguishing both from the Truman administration that preceded them. Yet the fundamental continuities that obtain between the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations are perhaps more striking. Each saw the Cold War as a long-term struggle that encompassed not just military competition but political, economic, social, cultural, and ideological competition as well. Each, moreover, was committed not just to waging the Cold War but to *winning* it.

³³ PPP: *Kennedy, 1963*, 462–63. For more on the Cuban missile crisis, see the chapter by James Hershberg in volume II.

Soviet foreign policy, 1953–1962

VOJTECH MASTNY

The decade between the death of Iosif Stalin and the Cuban missile crisis was one of great promise and great peril. The promise consisted in the possibility of reversing the Cold War confrontation, the peril in its turning into real war. This chapter attempts to explain why the promise remained unfulfilled and why the peril, despite an initial turn toward *détente*, subsequently increased rather than diminished. Soviet foreign policy, to be sure, is only a part of the explanation, but it is an indispensable one. Rather than divert attention to other countries, the discussion that follows aims to assess the policy on its own merits. Benefiting from inside evidence that was not available at the time but is now, it will focus on what policymakers wanted to accomplish and what they actually did accomplish.

As Soviet leaders always proudly emphasized, their foreign policy was unlike any other, as was their state. The policy was unique in the extent to which their Marxist-Leninist beliefs determined their perception of why other states behaved the way they did. The unique feature of the Soviet state most relevant to foreign policy was the vast power wielded by the supreme leader, which made its exercise highly personalized. As the following discussion will show, the post-Stalin decade abounds in vivid, and sobering, examples of what a difference a man and a system could make to foreign policy.

A missed chance?

Stalin's legacy left a formidable challenge to his successors, none of whom could hope to fit into his oversized shoes. They inherited from him a sullen empire, which he had acquired by extending his power to Eastern Europe as the main safeguard of Soviet security as he understood it. His manner of doing so, however, had precipitated confrontation with the world's most powerful nation, the United States, thus making the Soviet Union more insecure. As the Cold War became militarized, the buildup of nuclear weapons, whose



24. Soviet leaders at Stalin's funeral: in this heavily doctored photo we see, from left, Nikita Khrushchev, Lavrentii Beria, Georgii Malenkov, Nikolai Bulganin, Kliment Voroshilov, and Lazar Kaganovich.

supposed utility was but dimly understood, added to the challenge. Tantalizing fragments of evidence suggest that the despot's timely demise may have saved not only most of his entourage but also much of the outside world from possible destruction because of the far-fetched military schemes he may have been entertaining in the twilight of his life.

Stalin's successors acted with a palpable sense of emergency. Premier Georgii M. Malenkov tried swiftly to reassure the West by proclaiming that there were no international problems that could not be resolved peacefully. As their first foreign-policy priority, the new men in the Kremlin decided to terminate the potentially explosive Korean War, which Stalin had preferred to keep festering, and subsequently brokered an armistice. How much farther were they willing, or able, to go in winding down the East–West confrontation? On the answer to this question hinges the claim that a unique opportunity to terminate the Cold War was lost because of a lack of Western response at this critical time.

The return to the Foreign Ministry of Viacheslav M. Molotov did not inspire confidence. He had been a most conscientious executor, rather than creator, of Stalin's policies, which had brought the country into the Cold War, during which time he gave scant evidence of independent thinking. In acting now to improve relations with Yugoslavia, Molotov tried to undo one of Stalin's most egregious mistakes, in which he had been deeply complicit. To an internal party audience, he explained his "so-called peace initiative" as a tactic to sow "confusion in the ranks of our aggressive adversaries."¹ This was vintage Stalin.

1 "Delo Beriia (Plenum TsK KPSS, iul 1953 goda: stenograficheskii otchet)" [The Beriia Affair: Stenographic Record of the July 1953 Plenary Session of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee], *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, January 1991, 171.

Another member of the new ruling team, Nikita S. Khrushchev, later vividly described its predicament: "Terribly vulnerable, we went on as before, out of inertia. Our boat just continued to float down the stream, along the same course that had been set by Stalin, even though we all sensed that things were not right."² He was alluding to the interdependence of their foreign and domestic policies, in which the internal and external dimensions of their insecurity were intertwined. Their overriding priority of preserving the system that kept them in power while cautiously moderating its excesses was not conducive to embarking upon risky initiatives abroad.

In May, one such initiative nevertheless caused a commotion in the ruling party presidium in connection with its debate on a "New Course" of controlled reform the leadership was trying to introduce in Eastern Europe. Lavrentii P. Beriia, the head of the Soviet security services, floated the unorthodox idea that the creation of a unified and neutral Germany by sacrificing Communism in its eastern part would be in the Soviet Union's best interests. Such a way of tackling the crucial German question would have altered radically the premises on which the Cold War was being fought – the reason for Beriia's retrospective reputation as a statesman allegedly capable of bringing about a breakthrough that might have led the conflict to an end.

A person less qualified to accomplish such a feat can hardly be imagined. He was the most blood-stained of Stalin's former henchmen, justly feared even by his peers for his ruthlessness and utter lack of principles. His position as the nation's top spymaster, steeped in deceit and suspicion, was a hindrance rather than an advantage in his trying to gain the confidence of Western interlocutors. In any case, there is no evidence that he ever tried to do so before an uprising in East Germany intervened in June.

The revolt was not of Western making but was instead the consequence of the kind of system Moscow had imposed upon the country and was now belatedly trying to rectify. No sooner did the uprising break out than Beriia closed ranks by joining the rest of the presidium in a unanimous decision to crush it, thus showing that his deviation from orthodoxy did not go very far. The reversal did not save him from being arrested a few days later in a plot devised by his colleagues to strip him of the arbitrary power he had acquired within the Soviet system; he was subsequently tried on trumped-up charges and summarily executed.

2 Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1974), 220; Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1990), 73.

Among those charges, any blame for the East German crisis was conspicuously missing. The responsibility for it, as well as for Beria's downfall, lay ultimately with the workings of the system. The emergency highlighted the vulnerability of the embattled Kremlin leaders, making them even more reluctant to take risks in foreign affairs than they had been before. The fleeting chance for winding down the Cold War thus disappeared before it could even emerge.

Molotov's blunders

The conduct of foreign policy under Molotov was Stalin's without Stalin. Molotov resurrected Stalin's abortive proposal for the unification of a neutral Germany from March 1952. That proposal had differed from Beria's by not envisaging the liquidation of Communist East Germany but rather the creation of a united "democratic" Germany built upon the foundations of the regime in its eastern rather than its western part. Molotov's amended version was not an improvement. It called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country, but only after a peace treaty had been signed with an all-German government, formed by following procedures Moscow deemed necessary to ensure its "democratic" character.

Such a prescription for the future of Germany was grist to the mill of West Germany's staunchly anti-Soviet chancellor Konrad Adenauer, ensuring his electoral victory in September 1953, which Moscow had badly wanted to prevent. Undeterred, Molotov continued to insist on unification through negotiations between the two German states as equals – known to be anathema to both West Germany and the United States. He made the solution of the German question on Soviet terms a precondition for ending the four-power occupation regime in Austria as well. Given such positions, the failure of the January 1954 Berlin meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was a foregone conclusion.

Molotov's policies followed from the doctrinaire assumption that inherent contradictions among capitalist states would make it possible for the Soviet Union to drive a wedge between Washington and its allies, split the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and expel the United States from Europe. The durability of that assumption despite recurrent disappointments may be explained by a development that gave reason to believe that it would ultimately be proven right. The spreading perception in Western Europe of a diminishing threat made Washington's pursuit of the European Defense Community (EDC) – the centerpiece of its policy aimed at West Germany's rearmament – an uphill struggle.

Molotov's truly original response was his "Monroe doctrine in reverse," proclaiming the Soviet Union to be Europe's benevolent protector from outside interference. He called for a European security conference, to which the United States and Canada would not be invited. Ignored, he followed up with a proposal that NATO prove its peaceful intentions by admitting the Soviet Union as a member. Only the belief that the Western alliance was on its last legs could justify such proposals.

Having attended the Geneva conference on Indochina in July 1954, Molotov came to believe there was growing discord within the capitalist camp. The rejection next month of the EDC project by the French National Assembly seemed to corroborate that impression, and vindicate the soundness of Soviet policy. Moscow rushed to congratulate the French on their "patriotic" decision, reiterating the proposal for the security conference as the blueprint for Europe's future. (Ironically, it would become such a blueprint twenty years later in the form of the Helsinki conference that would ultimately help terminate both the Cold War and the Soviet Union.)

Had the Kremlin shown a conciliatory face at that moment of American distress, Washington would have found it difficult not to respond in kind. That, however, could have happened only if the person in charge of foreign affairs in Moscow had not been a product of the Soviet system as Molotov had been. In any case, the chance passed, and two months later the bankruptcy of his policy was laid bare. For the failed EDC, the West ingeniously substituted the Paris Agreements that provided for German rearmament within NATO. The date set for West Germany's admission into the alliance – May 1955 – also set the timeframe within which the Soviet Union would either have to reverse this unexpected development or else start cutting its losses. Only now was the stage set for a substantive change in Soviet foreign policy, and the results were little short of spectacular.

Khrushchev's innovations

The setback precipitated the next stage in the Kremlin power struggle, of which Malenkov – the spokesman for peaceful resolution of East-West conflicts – became the main victim. He had broken with Stalinist orthodoxy by proclaiming that a nuclear war would be an unmitigated disaster not only for capitalism but also for socialism, although he had subsequently recanted. British prime minister Winston Churchill considered him the best hope

for a rapprochement with Moscow, but Khrushchev more aptly described Malenkov as a good Bolshevik but without “backbone.”³

The shakeup marked a victory for hardliners such as Molotov and Khrushchev, but in the longer term ensured the ascendancy of the latter and gradual demise of the former. Khrushchev held the key position of party secretary but had no experience in foreign affairs although, having been the one who had brought down Beria, proved to be an accomplished schemer. Otherwise, he had given no more signs of independent thinking than Molotov, but in responding to the Western challenge in the aftermath of the Paris Agreements Khrushchev displayed a much more innovative mind.

At first, Molotov tried to deal with the challenge in the old way. Hoping to sow discord in the enemy camp, he convened a “European” security conference in Moscow, but only Soviet allies came. Reluctantly, he began to collaborate with Khrushchev on reversing policy, leading to the conclusion in May 1955 of the state treaty with Austria on less favorable terms than those Molotov had previously opposed. It provided for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country and the recognition of its neutrality. “If you are for war then it would be right to stay in Austria,” Khrushchev pointedly admonished the rival. “It is a strategic area, and only a fool would give up a strategic area if he is getting ready to go to war. If we are against war, we have to leave.”⁴

The novelty of Khrushchev’s thinking derived from his belief that the Soviet Union could afford to reduce its reliance on military power and benefit from a demilitarization of the Cold War. Once West Germany’s admission to NATO became certain, Moscow put forward on May 10 its most credible disarmament proposal to date. Incorporating most of the previous Western demands, the document had been drafted in the expectation that it would lead to negotiations. This appeared incongruous with the proclamation four days later of the Warsaw Pact as the Soviet bloc’s new military alliance, designed on the NATO model. That design, however, conveyed in its own way a desire to negotiate as well.

May 1955 was the most eventful month in Soviet diplomacy since the onset of the Cold War. Khrushchev stirred up movement in different places, hoping that in the end the Soviet Union would emerge as the winner. This

3 Record of party plenum, January 31, 1955, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (CWIHPB), 10 (1998), 34–35.

4 Record of party plenum, July 12, 1955, *ibid.*, 42–43 (retranslated from the original).

was a vision rather than a strategy, and did not always work. Khrushchev's sensational visit to Yugoslavia, intended to placate its independent Communist leader, Josip Broz Tito, deny the country to NATO, and lure it back to Moscow's fold, fell short of expectations. Soviet forays into the Third World, however, exceeded them, beginning to compensate for Soviet setbacks in Europe.

Secret Soviet arms sales to Egypt with Czechoslovakia as an intermediary and the Soviet leader's triumphant tours of India, Burma, and Indonesia played well on those countries' anti-Western sentiments. Although the long-term consequences of deepening involvement in areas where Moscow could not control events the way it could in Eastern Europe remained to be seen, the expansion of the Cold War into the Third World positioned Khrushchev to turn the tables on the West in a nonmilitary competition amidst diminishing rather than rising East-West tension.

The fruits of détente

Among the top Soviet leaders, Khrushchev was the last true believer in the ideals of Communism. He sincerely believed his country could beat its capitalist foes because of its system's supposed ideological assets, political strength, and superior economic performance. Such a belief may seem naïve in retrospect, but at the time even sophisticated Western intellectuals, of both the left-wing and the right-wing variety, were prepared to believe that the West could not compete with a system capable of mobilizing seemingly inexhaustible human and natural resources. Khrushchev expected the capitalists to realize eventually that they had no future and to start making concessions out of necessity. He tried to induce them by taking the lead to demilitarize the Cold War, thus making possible what came to be known as the "first détente."

In July 1955, détente flowered when Khrushchev met President Dwight D. Eisenhower in Geneva at the first summit conference since the beginning of the Cold War. The Soviet Union resubmitted its disarmament proposal, which the United States opposed on the well-founded suspicion that it might be meant seriously. The Kremlin also submitted an ambitious draft of a collective security treaty, designed to lead to the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Although the proposals were not accepted, Khrushchev considered the summit a success. At the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting that followed, the Soviet delegation proposed the collective security treaty again, with no better results.

The “indefatigable dynamism” and “patent self-confidence of the Soviet leaders” impressed Western diplomats in Moscow.⁵ Khrushchev responded to West Germany’s entry into NATO by inviting Adenauer for talks in the Soviet capital, luring him with promises of lucrative trade and the prospect of the release of remaining German prisoners of war. He bested Adenauer by inducing the seasoned politician to reluctantly agree to the establishment of diplomatic ties while the status of East Germany remained unaffected, thus undermining West Germany’s claim to speak on behalf of all Germans.

Playing on neutralist feelings in the Nordic countries, Khrushchev outlined his vision of a peaceful Soviet conquest of Western Europe to the visiting Norwegian prime minister, Einar Gerhardsen: “How far do you want us to pull our forces from our common borders in the North? Just tell us, and we’ll do it; we’ll establish zones with control posts ... In this way we’ll safeguard yours and Sweden’s position, and then Denmark, Holland, and Belgium will follow suit. France will then say to [it]self that [it] cannot fail to do something similar.”⁶ Without asking anything in return, Moscow relinquished its military and naval base near Helsinki, ensuring the election of its favorite as Finnish president. Soon the Icelandic parliament would ask for the closure of the American air base in that country, too.

This was demilitarization in deeds rather than merely words. In the Far East, the Soviet Union returned to the Chinese Communists the base at Dairen that the military-minded Stalin had considered it necessary to keep. Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev wanted foreign Communists to recognize Moscow’s primacy because of ideological affinity rather than superior power. He did not see international Communism as mere handmaiden of Soviet foreign policy. He dissolved the Cominform, created by Stalin to secure the unquestioning obedience of European Communists, and encouraged those in Western Europe to work with social democrats as potential allies. Some of them were ready to respond in kind.

In Khrushchev’s historic denunciation of Stalin in February 1956, foreign policy did not figure prominently. His pronouncements nevertheless fatally undermined it in two critical ways. The condemnation of Stalin’s crimes

5 William G. Hayter to John Selwyn Lloyd, January 18, 1956, FO 371/122, 782, Public Record Office, London; Maurice Dejean, quoted in Elena Calandri, “La détente et la perception de l’Union soviétique chez les décideurs français: du printemps 1955 à février 1956,” *Revue d’histoire diplomatique*, 1993, 2, 189.

6 Note on N. Khrushchev’s statements at Norwegian embassy reception, November 14, 1955, in Sven G. Holtmark (ed.), *Norge og Sovjetunionen, 1917–1955* [Norway and the Soviet Union] (Oslo: Cappelen, 1995), 521.

infuriated Stalin's Chinese disciple, Mao Zedong, encouraging him to bid for the leadership of international Communism against Khrushchev, thus leading to the Sino-Soviet split. The repudiation of Stalin's practices also emboldened the restive peoples of Eastern Europe to test what they regarded as a sign of Soviet weakness rather than strength, thus paving the road to the eventual demise of the empire he had created at their expense.

The challenge in Eastern Europe

Khrushchev faced his moment of truth in October 1956, when revolts against Moscow's subservient regimes in Eastern Europe cast doubt on his key assumption of an irreversible progress toward Communism. From the evidence available now of what was going on behind the scenes, the Soviet response appears in a very different light than it did at the time. Once a nationalist leadership had taken control of the Polish Communist Party in the aftermath of workers' riots, and gained widespread support in the country, Khrushchev's instinctive reaction was to consider using force against "counterrevolutionaries." The main reason force was not used was the timely support for the Polish party's independent course from Beijing, communicated to Moscow in no uncertain terms – striking evidence of the Chinese Communists' rising role as strategists of international Communism as well as of disarray in the Kremlin.

The Soviet leaders had not entirely ruled out the military option when the Polish situation became overshadowed by the incipient collapse of Communist rule in Hungary. Moscow's declaration on October 30 proclaiming its readiness to treat foreign Communist parties as equals and respect their countries' sovereignty was a landmark in Eastern Europe's transition from an appendage of the Soviet Union to an object of its foreign policy. The critical issue of the time was the possibility of Hungary following the example of Austria by choosing neutrality and other Communist countries following suit.

It was a measure of Soviet distress that the Kremlin did not rule out such a possibility. Even Molotov was briefly inclined to let Hungary go its own way, while Khrushchev was undecided. This time, however, the Chinese made clear their preference for intervention to save the country for Communism, and the Soviet decision not to intervene was reversed overnight. Even so, before troops actually moved in, Khrushchev found it advisable to consult with East European leaders and even undertake a grueling trip to Yugoslavia to solicit approval by Tito – a far cry from the self-confidence he had radiated earlier.

The coincidence of the intervention with the wrongheaded decision by British and French governments to invade Egypt in their dispute over the Suez Canal has encouraged speculation that the Western intervention made possible the Soviet one or at least justified it retrospectively. In reality, the connection between the two developments was quite different. The crack-down in Hungary was already in full motion when the attack on Egypt was called off in response to an American ultimatum. At this point, Moscow chose to issue its own ultimatum, demanding that the attack cease immediately and threatening to destroy London and Paris with nuclear missiles, which the Soviet Union did not possess.

Here was a new, and disturbing, face of Khrushchev – the author of the ultimatum. Not only did he claim credit from his colleagues for having turned back Western aggressors, but he also convinced himself that he actually did. To visiting Egyptian officials, he expressed his conclusion that the one “with the strongest nerves will be the winner.”⁷ This was a dangerous self-delusion. Having proved a poor manager of the crisis he had unexpectedly had to face in Eastern Europe, Khrushchev showed a propensity for gratuitously creating an unnecessary crisis to divert attention from his shortcomings.

“Lacking confidence and bluffing”

In diagnosing what was wrong with Soviet leaders in the aftermath of Hungary, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai got it right. While their “arrogance and self-importance have not been completely eliminated,” he wrote to Mao, “an atmosphere lacking discipline and order is spreading ... They appear to lack confidence and suffer from inner fears and thus tend to employ the tactics of bluffing or threats in handling foreign affairs.”⁸ Nonetheless, Kremlin leaders kept behaving as if nothing had happened.

Even while Soviet tanks were rolling into Hungary, Moscow once again called for disarmament talks, tentatively accepting President Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” proposal it had previously rejected. It proceeded with an array of further disarmament and nonaggression proposals, though none was sufficiently attractive to be acted upon. By April 1957, high-ranking party officials in Moscow were telling visiting comrades that “things are now settling down,”

7 Sergei N. Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 211; quote from Mohamed Heikal, *The Sphinx and the Commissar* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 128.

8 Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, “My Observations on the Soviet Union,” *CWIBPB*, 6–7 (1995–96), 154.

and that the time for resuming détente had come.⁹ While publicizing his view that Washington and Moscow could come to terms, Khrushchev simultaneously escalated his bellicose rhetoric.

Khrushchev later berated the “capitalist countries” for having instigated the “putsch” in Hungary, accusing them of wanting to do the same in East Germany and warning them that “we will rap your knuckles.” He tried to intimidate Denmark and Norway – the countries he had previously tried to charm – by threatening them with nuclear annihilation if they allowed US forces on their territories. He boasted of having “a bomb so big ... that we cannot even test it inside the vast area of the Soviet Union. If we set it off on the North Pole it would melt the ice-cap and send the oceans spilling over the world.”¹⁰

In June, at the secret party plenum at which Khrushchev routed an intra-party plot to unseat him, the record of his foreign policy was scrutinized in a characteristically Soviet way. The defeated Molotov chided him for not doing enough to exploit divisions in the capitalist camp and for undermining Soviet prestige by undignified behavior, such as spending hours naked in a sauna with the president of Finland. In backing the winner, the otherwise perceptive Anastas A. Mikoian claimed that, in exploiting “the contradictions of imperialism in the interests of communist policy, there has never been such a broad practice, such rich results,” as under Khrushchev’s skillful leadership.¹¹ In fact, initiatives to integrate Western Europe, culminating in the March 1957 Treaty of Rome that established the Common Market, signified the opposite.

Nor was Khrushchev’s management of the growing contradictions within Communism’s own camp very skillful. He tried to ostracize the Polish Communists, whose foremost ambition was to be recognized by Moscow as its most valuable clients. In courting Tito’s Yugoslavia, Khrushchev withdrew Soviet troops from neighboring Romania, thus making it easier for its devious rulers subsequently to shake off Soviet tutelage with impunity. The rapprochement with Yugoslavia did not last, but was enough to further antagonize the Chinese, despite the rash promise of Soviet assistance in the development of their nuclear program. More than ever before, Khrushchev needed a success.

9 *New York Times*, April 17 and 19, 1957.

10 Statements by N. Khrushchev, March 19 and April 1957, collected in USSR Biographical Files (Marshal Georgii A. Zhukov), p. 4, box 136, HU OSA 300-80-7, Open Society Archives, Budapest.

11 Record of party plenum, June 24, 1957, *CWHPB*, 10 (1998), 55.

The Sputnik effect

It was a godsend when Soviet scientists in October 1957 launched Sputnik, the first artificial satellite of the Earth. Although their feat was unrelated to military technology, it added to US perceptions of a “missile gap” in favor of the Soviet Union. In trying to exploit the misperception for what it was worth, Khrushchev ran the risk of overdoing it. This became apparent in his handling of the German question, which remained his top priority as the increasingly influential West Germany became NATO’s key European member and the United States expressed a readiness to share its nuclear weapons with its European allies.

Outsiders have been too willing to take at face value Moscow’s professions of alarm at the prospect of West German “militarists” getting hold of the weapons – whose control Washington was clearly determined to keep in its own hands and which the increasingly antimilitaristic German society did not want. In reality, Khrushchev was not as obsessive about the supposed German threat as Stalin had been. According to the perceptive Soviet diplomat Oleg Grinevskii, “The idea of nuclear weapons in German hands frightened neither him nor the Soviet military, whose huge arsenal of nuclear missiles filled them with pride and conceit. But in order to shake up the West Europeans with a possible nuclear threat by the Federal Republic to try to break up their alliance ... Khrushchev was ready to unleash the most furious propaganda campaign.”¹²

Any Soviet leader, however, had to be concerned about the political and economic impact of West Germany’s thriving democracy on the stability of the artificial East German state. Its leader, Walter Ulbricht, assiduously cultivated Soviet resentment of the disruptive influence of West Berlin, surrounded by East German territory, and clamored for the elimination of the enclave. Having tried to blockade it in 1948–49 and failed, Moscow was not to be pushed by an impetuous underling. In the summer of 1958, however, its calculations began to change in view of two unrelated developments, neither of which was of Soviet making while both had the potential of growing into military conflict.

The first was the coup by left-wing military officers in Iraq; the United States seemed initially inclined to respond with armed intervention, but then decided against it. While the decision was still pending, the Soviet Union

12 Oleg Grinevskij, *Tauwetter: Entspannung, Krisen und neue Eiszeit* (Berlin: Siedler, 1996), 36.

staged military maneuvers in the country's vicinity and Khrushchev sent a threatening message to Eisenhower, urging him to desist. When no US intervention ensued, he convinced himself – much as in the aftermath of the Suez affair – that the threat had worked. As his son's mixed metaphor would have it, "In a dogfight, father felt like [a] fish in water."¹³

The second development was the crisis provoked, primarily for domestic reasons, by the Chinese Communists' shelling of the offshore islands of Quemoy (Jinmen) and Matsu (Mazu), controlled by the Nationalist government in Taiwan. The provocation came on the heels of Khrushchev's attempt to placate Mao at a disastrous meeting in Beijing, during which the Chinese strongman exquisitely humiliated his hapless guest. Although Khrushchev had previously signaled his approval of Beijing's attempt to seize Taiwan, the way Mao went about it, without prior consultation with Moscow and daring the United States to step in to save its protégé, alarmed Khrushchev. As the Communist invasion of the islands seemed to be imminent in early September, he publicly warned Washington not to move, while privately trying to prevent the Chinese from acting without appearing to them as less daring than they.

This was the setting in which Khrushchev started moving toward confrontation over Berlin. In mid-August, Moscow had already commissioned a proposal from East Germany for four-power talks on a German peace treaty that the West was certain to reject. Once it did, Khrushchev still took several weeks before deciding to force the issue, reportedly against the advice of experts in the Foreign Ministry. According to one of them, Georgii M. Kornienko, what clinched the decision to test the West's resolve was the public warning by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that Quemoy and Matsu mattered to the United States as much as Berlin did. "Let the Chinese do their thing with their shitty islands; for us the time has come to scare the hell out of Dulles in Berlin," was the Soviet statesman's compulsive reaction.¹⁴

The making of the Berlin crisis

Khrushchev launched the confrontation in accordance with the maxim attributed to Napoleon: "First engage, and then see." His ultimatum of November 11 threatened to cut the Western powers' access routes to the divided city unless they agreed to sign a peace treaty with Germany on Soviet terms within

¹³ Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, 396.

¹⁴ Georgii M. Kornienko, "Kholodnaia voina": svidetelstvo ee uchastnika [The "Cold War": A Testimony by a Participant] (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2001), 89.

six months. As he confided to the Polish party chief Władysław Gomułka, squeezing the allies out of Berlin “like an ugly pimple out of the nose” was but the beginning of the struggle for a larger goal. He did not specify what this was, but admitted that it would require “a great deal of cold blood” although “war [would] not result from it.” He just assumed that “the leaders of the United States [were] not such idiots as to fight over Berlin.”¹⁵

As the clock set by the ultimatum kept ticking, without a clear Western response, Khrushchev vacillated. He first treated British prime minister Harold Macmillan rudely on his mission to Moscow to negotiate, and then proposed the seemingly conciliatory interim solution of making West Berlin into a “free city.” Since its freedom would be hostage to Soviet goodwill, the proposal was a nonstarter. Khrushchev finally pinned his hopes on a personal meeting with Eisenhower.

At the meeting, which took place in September 1959 at the presidential retreat at Camp David, Eisenhower was genial but noncommittal, but Khrushchev chose to believe what he wanted to believe, namely, that American concessions on Germany were forthcoming. During his grand tour of the United States, he was carried away by the attention he received, dismissing the hostility he encountered as the last gasps of capitalism in decline. Under the influence of the “spirit of Camp David,” he fielded yet another radical disarmament proposal at the United Nations before proceeding to Beijing to convince Mao that détente was working.

Mao listened contemptuously to the upbeat account of the rapport Khrushchev believed he had established with the commander-in-chief of the leading capitalist power. It was a measure of Khrushchev’s incurable optimism that soon after his return home he initiated the deepest unilateral troop reductions the Soviet Union had ever undertaken (at least until the end of the Cold War). In justifying them to the party presidium, he cited the need to convince the world of his country’s peaceful intentions. “Should we have such a big army as we have now?” he asked rhetorically. “This doesn’t make sense ... We have powerful armaments ... What country or group of countries in Europe would dare to attack us?”¹⁶

This was Khrushchev’s finest hour, but it was short-lived. He had only himself and his ideology to blame for misjudging American readiness to surrender on Germany. Seen as a capitulationist by the Chinese, he took it

15 Quotes from minutes of N. Khrushchev–W. Gomułka conversation, November 10, 1958, *CWHPB*, 11 (1998), 202, and Valentin Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen* (Munich: Knauer, 1993), 336.

16 Memorandum by N. Khrushchev to party presidium, December 8, 1959, *CWHPB*, 8–9 (1996–97), 418.

personally when Eisenhower failed to deliver what Khrushchev had expected. Although Khrushchev was looking forward to another summit, scheduled to meet in May 1960 in Paris, he prejudged its outcome. He threatened to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the kind of agreement he wanted on Berlin was not reached at the summit.

The summit was thus doomed even before the accidental shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory wrecked it. Since the pilot was alive in Soviet hands, Khrushchev had the choice of how best to turn the incident to his advantage. Instead, he turned it to his disadvantage by deliberately embarrassing Eisenhower and breaking up the summit, without knowing what he would do next. In Mikoian's retrospective judgment, by indulging in "inexcusable hysterics," he became "guilty of delaying the onset of détente for fifteen years."¹⁷

Khrushchev decided to postpone further action on Berlin until the next US administration took office six months later. In the interval, he behaved petulantly. At the UN General Assembly, he banged his shoe on the desk and proposed to take the organization out of New York, to be entrusted to



25. Nikita Khrushchev showing the Supreme Soviet photos of Soviet military installations taken by the US U-2 spy plane before it was shot down in 1960.

¹⁷ Quoted in William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), 468.



26. Nikita Khrushchev angered at a press conference in Paris during the 1960 summit meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

a “troika” of Soviet, Western, and Third World caretakers. As tensions continued to rise, the Soviet military began to substitute an offensive plan for war in Europe for Stalin’s defensive one – a telling counterpoint to Khrushchev’s hopes five years earlier to conquer Western Europe peacefully by demilitarizing the Cold War.

To the brink of war

Having scuppered negotiations with a Republican administration, Khrushchev had every reason to show a friendly face to the incoming Democratic one. From the intelligence he received about John F. Kennedy, the new president was much more disposed to making concessions than his predecessor. In

anticipation of a forthcoming summit, Khrushchev assured a closed gathering of East European leaders in March 1961 that he “really wanted to achieve an improvement of relations” with the United States and would “not needle without reason.”¹⁸ Yet this was precisely what he was going to do at the summit with Kennedy in Vienna in June.

Before that, in April, Khrushchev saw a display of the new administration’s ineptitude, as Washington first supported the abortive invasion of Cuba by anti-Communist exiles and then left them to their fate by ruling out the use of US forces in a prime area of American strategic interest. Having gained the impression that Kennedy “is not very smart,” Khrushchev decided to intimidate rather than conciliate the president. In outlining his plan to the party presidium at the end of May, he revealed his intention to go ahead with the signing of a separate peace treaty with East Germany that would terminate allied rights in West Berlin. “If we want to carry out our policy, and if we want it to be acknowledged, respected and feared, it is necessary to be firm,” he explained. “The risk that we are taking is justified. If we look at it in terms of a percentage, there is more than a 95 percent probability that there will be no war.”¹⁹

This was the only time during the Cold War that a responsible leader is known to have embarked upon a policy he estimated ran as much as a 5 percent risk of leading to a war that could escalate to a nuclear disaster. In a more open system of government, there would have been a discussion, and he would most probably have been stopped. In the Soviet system, only one member of the ruling group, Mikoian, dissented, rating the risk higher, but his opinion did not matter. On his way to Vienna, Khrushchev reiterated his estimate when he shared his plan with a select group of high-ranking Czechoslovak party officials as well, none of whom voiced a critical opinion either.

Kennedy, though ill-prepared for Khrushchev’s aggressiveness, did not behave at the summit like a weakling. He made it clear that the probability

18 Speech by N. Khrushchev, March 28 or 29, 1961, AÚV KSČ, 02/2, 303, 387, Central State Archives, Prague; also at “Records of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, 1955–1990,” www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/.

19 Quotes from records of N. Khrushchev’s meeting with Czechoslovak party leaders, June 1, 1961, in “‘Lenin tozhe riskoval’: nakanune vstrechi Khrushcheva i Kennedi v Vene v iune 1961 g.” [“Lenin Took Risks, Too”: On the Eve of the June 1961 Khrushchev–Kennedy Meeting in Vienna], *Istochnik*, 1998, 3, 89, and of presidium meeting, May 26, 1961, in Aleksandr A. Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1964* [Presidium of the CC CPSU, 1954–1964], vol. I, *Chernovye protokolnye zapisi zasedanii: stenogrammy* [Draft Minutes and Stenographic Records of Meetings] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004), 503.

of a war provoked by unilateral Soviet action might be greater than Khrushchev estimated, but he stood his ground. He seemed to confirm Khrushchev's belief that US policy was unpredictable, presumably because of the influence of "certain groups" that could lead to decisions "not based on logic."²⁰ It was, however, the logic of his own decision to proceed toward the separate peace treaty that determined what would happen as long as the decision remained in effect.

Moscow prepared plans for a military contingency before Kennedy's announcement on July 26 of the dispatch of US reinforcements to Europe. Since the contingency would be triggered by Soviet rather than by American action, however, Soviet armed forces did not go on high alert. The American move did not alter Khrushchev's intention to proceed toward the treaty, although it must have influenced his estimate of the risk involved. Moscow finally authorized the insulation of West Berlin from the surrounding East Germany while the manner and timing of the measure apparently remained open.

When Khrushchev disclosed the imminence of this operation at a special secret meeting with East European leaders in Moscow on August 3–5, plans had been drawn both to sign the treaty and to deal with its likely consequences. They allowed for the possibility of not only a negotiated settlement but also military conflict. Once the work on sealing off West Berlin started on August 11, the Soviet Union thus moved closer to the brink of war. How close can now be reconstructed in considerable, though not full, detail.

The Wall and its aftermath

The sealing off proceeded in stages – first with barbed wire and only later by the construction of a concrete wall, all on Soviet-controlled territory. The procedure initially served to test the West's reaction to the violation of the agreements that allowed Berliners free movement through the whole city. Thereafter, steps were planned to block the allies' right to move freely in and out of their sectors. For them, however, it was the boldness of the challenge rather than its residual caution that mattered, all the more so since it caught them by surprise.

Available evidence disproves the common belief that the Wall had a stabilizing effect. Moscow let its East German clients plan on the assumption that a separate peace treaty would be signed. The possibility of a Western military response continued to be taken into account. The nature of the

²⁰ Record of presidium meeting, May 26, 1964, in Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium*, 503.

conflict expected to follow may be gleaned from the Warsaw Pact exercise, codenamed "Buria," organized in deepest secrecy at the headquarters of the Soviet forces in Germany in the second half of September.

The starting point of the exercise, whose codename meant "nuclear war," was the putative signing of the treaty on October 1, to which the allies would then respond by demonstrative displays of their military power. Moscow knew what form the displays might take because it was privy to their "Live Oak" secret contingency plans, spirited out by a French officer on the NATO staff. The options ranged from an attempt by the Western Allies to force their way through the Berlin autobahn by using armor to a demonstrative detonation of a nuclear bomb in the air above. The next step, according to the Buria scenario, was to be a massive thrust by Warsaw Pact forces into Western Europe, with extensive use of nuclear weapons, ending with the seizure of most of the continent within a few days.

Whatever the absurdity of such a scenario, it was believed to be feasible by its architects and remained the core of Soviet strategic planning as late as 1987 – the most disconcerting long-term legacy of the Berlin crisis. In the short term, however, uncertainty about the West's reaction continued to exercise a restraining influence on Khrushchev, postponing his final decision unilaterally to "normalize" the Berlin situation.

On the one hand, Moscow's ostentatious resumption of nuclear testing on September 1 may have been designed to discourage Western military response to the impending conclusion of the crucial treaty. On the other hand, the blasting, which climaxed in the detonation in the Arctic of the most powerful, if otherwise useless, nuclear device ever built, could also be seen as a cover-up of Khrushchev's incipient retreat from the brink of war to which he had been maneuvering himself.

Most probably, Khrushchev was still undecided. A document prepared for, though never submitted to, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union some time in September stated revealingly: "The draft of a peace treaty with the [German Democratic Republic] is essentially ready, but it would be appropriate to return later to make precise the provisions of this treaty by taking into account discussions with the Western powers."²¹ No such discussions were forthcoming; instead, what resulted was a showdown with the Chinese, who regarded Khrushchev's handling of the Berlin issue as more proof of his incompetence as a Communist leader. The manner in which the

21 Copy of the undated document from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation at the National Security Archive, Washington, RussEE Data #2175.

China factor increasingly influenced his foreign policy at critical times would become an ongoing feature of how the Soviet system operated.

On October 17, Khrushchev finally announced the cancellation of his deadline for the signing of a German peace treaty at the same gathering of Communist parties in Moscow at which the Sino-Soviet rift first came into the open. To the unhappy Ulbricht, he later explained that “we achieved the maximum of what was possible.”²² The erection of the barrier that prevented access to the western sectors by East Germans, but allowed it to Westerners, resolved the Berlin question in practice; the solution of the larger German problem, however, would have to wait until the end of the Cold War.

The Cuban adventure

Khrushchev’s repeated attempts to reopen the issue of the peace treaty showed how unhappy he, too, was with the outcome that fell short of the high expectations he had entertained when he had first instigated confrontation over Berlin three years before. Meanwhile, Washington added to his distress by publicly announcing that the “missile gap” in favor of the Soviet Union did not exist; the gap was actually to Washington’s advantage. At the same time, the dénouement of the Berlin crisis coincided with tiny Albania’s brazen defiance of Soviet authority and its defection to the Chinese side – the first, though not the last, attack on the integrity of the Warsaw Pact.

As in 1955, Khrushchev tried to compensate for Soviet setbacks by expanding the geographical horizons of the Cold War – only this time by employing military force. Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov, who advocated breaking US maritime supremacy, went to Egypt to establish a base for the Soviet navy’s permanent presence in the Mediterranean. Moscow also meddled in the civil war in the faraway former Belgian Congo. And it responded to pleas by Cuban leader Fidel Castro, who had recently declared himself a Communist, for Soviet arms to help protect his country from another US-backed invasion. In February 1962, Soviet intelligence confirmed that the Pentagon was planning to overthrow Castro by October – which was accurate as regards intentions, but no plan had yet been approved.

Enough evidence has filtered out of Russian archives to conclude that the main motive behind the Soviet decision to install offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba secretly was the desire to save the Cuban revolution from an American

22 Quoted in Douglas Selva, “The End of the Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962: New Evidence from the Polish and East German Archives,” *CWIHPB*, 11 (1998), 221.

attack genuinely believed to be looming. Khrushchev himself made the decision, and it was endorsed in May by the inner core of the Kremlin leadership. Only afterward was it communicated to Castro, who approved enthusiastically. That Khrushchev could make such a weighty decision, and receive unanimous support from his colleagues, attested to the sway ideology held over all of them. The aging Bolsheviks were both captivated by the youthful Cuban revolutionaries and impelled to refurbish their own faded revolutionary credentials because of the growing pressure from the Chinese.

Even so, the idea of surreptitiously placing the deadly weapons in the United States' backyard was so far-fetched that no Washington official imagined that it could be seriously entertained. True to form, Khrushchev did not consider what he would do after triumphantly announcing the presence of the missiles during a projected visit to Havana in November. Nor did he have a backup plan in the likely event the deception would be exposed.

The operation, incongruously codenamed "Anadyr," after the capital of the Chukotka region in easternmost Siberia, started on July 4, the US national holiday. Astonishing in its magnitude and complexity, it eventually entailed transporting to Cuba 42,000 Soviet military personnel and 230,000 tons of materiel on 86 ships making 183 voyages. To conceal the main goal, the missiles and the troops to service them went last. Contrary to expert advice, however, four submarines, armed with nuclear torpedoes, left early and were all but certain to be detected by US sonar while sailing through the only channel they could take to Cuba.

Having set the risky operation in motion, Khrushchev was remarkably negligent in managing it. The United States was carefully monitoring Soviet movements by aerial surveillance and on September 4 warned the Soviet Union not to deploy any significant offensive capability there. Although Khrushchev suspected that the Americans had an inkling of what was going on, he did not desist. He went ahead not only with the installation of strategic missiles, which could be used for bargaining, but also with the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, whose sole purpose was use in combat.²³

The precautions Moscow took against a potentially catastrophic release of the nuclear-armed missiles that were already in place were woefully inadequate. The Defense Ministry wanted to authorize the local Soviet commander in Cuba to fire them on his own responsibility in case of an emergency. The written order, however, was never sent. Whether the

23 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "The Pitsunda Decision: Khrushchev and Nuclear Weapons," *CWHPB*, 10 (March 1998), 223–24.

communication was transmitted orally and, if so, how it was understood, will probably never be clarified.

The discovery of the strategic – though not the tactical – missiles by US aircraft and the announcement on October 22 of Kennedy's imminent public address understandably threw Soviet leaders into a panic. The record of their emergency session shows Khrushchev lamenting the predicament he had gotten himself into: "The point is that we do not want to provoke war; we wanted to frighten the United States and deter it with regard to Cuba. The problem is that we have not focused on all that we should have done and have not made public an agreement. What is tragic is that they might attack, and then we will respond. This might lead to a major war."²⁴ How the tragedy was avoided is discussed elsewhere in this *Cambridge History*.²⁵

The tragedy of Soviet foreign policy

There was a deeper tragedy in the trajectory of Soviet foreign policy from Stalin's death to the Cuban drama. If his immediate successors could not afford to risk accommodation with the West because of their weakness within the Soviet system, Khrushchev dared to risk détente because of his belief in the system's fundamental strength. He went further than his predecessors in attempting to loosen Soviet dependence on military power abroad and on instruments of terror at home. In trying to demilitarize the Cold War, he was more farsighted than his Western adversaries, but the system ultimately let him down. When the upheaval in Eastern Europe exposed its vulnerability, he reverted to reliance on force.

Unlike the cynical and calculating Stalin, Khrushchev was an impatient improviser and compulsive schemer; if Stalin often calculated badly, Khrushchev often did not calculate at all. The Berlin crisis, gratuitously provoked by him and then aggravated by his mismanagement, was in an important sense even more dangerous than the later Cuban crisis. Neither side realized how close they came to a military conflict that could have occurred because of Khrushchev's disregard of the likely consequences of his actions. The perilous situation was an indictment less of his personal flaws than of those of the system that had brought him to power, allowing him to act the way he did. That peril would not pass with the passing of Khrushchev but only with the passing of the Soviet Union.

²⁴ Record of presidium meeting, October 22, 1962, in Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium*, 617.

²⁵ See James G. Hershberg's chapter in volume II.

East Central Europe, 1953–1956

CSABA BÉKÉS

During the period following Iosif Stalin's death, the fate of the East Central European region was determined by, on the one hand, the political status quo worked out at Yalta in 1945, and on the other hand, by the unstable and undefined New Course in Soviet policy under the dictator's successors.

The framework for ensuing developments in Eastern Europe was established at the end of World War II. Both superpowers attributed a pivotal importance to the tacit agreements reached by the Allies at the end of the war to recognize each other's spheres of interest. This mutual consent came to function as an automatic rule of thumb even in the chilliest years of the Cold War era, and in the coming decades it was to be demonstrated by the West's continuous inaction whenever the Soviets suppressed sporadic internal conflicts within their bloc. After Stalin's death, preserving the status quo remained a top priority for Moscow. Even though the incoming administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower launched a propaganda campaign for the "liberation of the captive nations," the new Soviet leaders never contemplated the surrender of the East Central European Communist states.

The two main elements of the post-Stalin New Course were a strategy of peaceful coexistence and some modification of the Soviet model. The former meant a more flexible foreign policy and the deepening of political and, especially, economic cooperation with the West, with the aim of improving the Soviet Union's chances of surviving the intensifying competition between the two blocs. At the same time, in addition to fostering East–West rapprochement, Moscow made efforts to penetrate the Third World and to restore the unity of the Soviet bloc by working toward a reconciliation with Yugoslavia. Within this post-Stalinist vision of a new international order, Moscow endeavored to create a special role for its European allies in which they would act as emancipated and sovereign actors that the West – especially Western Europe – and the Third World could accept as legitimate partners.

Modification of the Soviet model reflected specific local historical and economic factors as well as the geopolitical location of the East Central European region. The crises that occurred soon after Stalin's death in some of these countries reinforced the new leadership's belief that significant changes ought to be introduced in both the domestic life and the foreign policy of the empire. Remarkably, crises or semi-crisis situations occurred in the *relatively more developed* countries of the bloc – the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia, and Hungary – which demonstrates that these societies, and particularly the working class and the intelligentsia, were far less tolerant of the experience of Sovietization than peoples in the other parts of the Soviet empire with significantly different economic, political, social, and cultural traditions. In Bulgaria, for instance, significant problems for the regime were seen only in the most developed branches of industry, as evidenced by the strikes in tobacco plants in 1953. Thus, boosting the political stability of East Central Europe by introducing economic and political reforms and by transforming the nature of cooperation with its allies became a top priority for Moscow.

There was a remarkable difference between the first uprisings that took place just after Stalin's death and the revolts of 1956 in Poland and Hungary. The first crises in 1953 stemmed from the Stalinist experience; that is, the people taking part in mass movements were motivated by essentially *economic* concerns. The revolts of October 1956, however, were the product of the de-Stalinization process directed from Moscow, and they can be regarded as predominantly *political* actions. The events in Poland and Hungary also clearly demonstrated the limits of the Soviet new course. The radically different means of handling the two crises illustrated the real boundaries of Soviet tolerance: Polish reforms preserving Communist rule and the unity of the Soviet alliance system were still tolerable, but the Hungarian revolution, which was rightly seen as the transformation of the regime into a Western-type democracy, had to be crushed. This pattern shows clearly that Moscow deemed the orderly political and economic functioning of these frontier states as vital to the Soviet empire.

The first crises

With the implementation of the Soviet model in Eastern Europe, the Communist system was built up within a few years, but an extremely rapid pace of investment in heavy industry, especially in armaments and agricultural collectivization campaigns, soon exhausted the economies of these countries.

Omens of a potential crisis appeared as early as 1952, so an intervention by the Soviet Union in order to consolidate the economic situation and maintain political stability would have been necessary even if it had not been for the crisis that Stalin's death produced. By late 1952 or early 1953, bleak assessments of the deteriorating economic situation and the growing dissatisfaction of the population of East Central Europe had reached Moscow via the network of Soviet advisers that existed at every level of the local administrations. In Hungary, during the summer of 1952, there were the first cases of mass resistance to the system of compulsory agricultural deliveries then in effect. Strikes, refusals to meet quotas, and even acts of violence occurred.¹

By the spring of 1953, the Communist regimes of East Central Europe had fallen into a state of persistent economic and political crisis. In the months following Stalin's death, a series of events took place in the region that exposed the dubious stability of the governments established on the Soviet pattern. The most striking feature of the revolts was that the demonstrations generally started with predominantly economic grievances, but that then the slogans quickly assumed an openly political and anti-Communist character, including calls for the resignation of the government and the holding of free elections.

On May 3, 1953, workers in tobacco factories near Plovdiv and Khaskovo in the southern part of Bulgaria, the country seen as most loyal to the Soviet Union, went on strike and organized a demonstration against inflated productivity demands. On-the-spot negotiations led by a top-ranking Communist official soon put an end to the unrest, but the organizers were severely punished nevertheless.² Shortly afterwards, in Czechoslovakia, a revolt took place that revealed the existence not only of popular dissatisfaction with the economic situation, but also of doubts as to the legitimacy of the Communist regime itself. In April–May 1953, strikes and protests took place in more than a dozen cities on news of an imminent monetary reform that might severely endanger the public's savings. Then, on June 1, a genuine anti-Communist uprising broke out in Plzeň where workers and citizens seized the city hall and took local power in their own hands. They demanded that the

1 János M. Rainer, *The New Course in Hungary in 1953*, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper No. 38 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2002), 1.

2 For a contemporary Bulgarian report on the events, see Christian F. Ostermann (ed.), *Uprising in East Germany 1953: The Cold War, the German Question and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2001), 86–89.

government step down, that Communist rule cease, and that free elections be held. Internal security and the armed forces cracked down on the revolt very severely; thousands of participants were arrested and sentenced to lengthy imprisonment.³

Less than two weeks later, social unrest exploded in East Germany as well. Moscow was keenly aware that the economic situation was on the verge of crisis. East Germany's mounting social unrest was vividly demonstrated by the burgeoning refugee crisis during the spring of 1953.⁴ Having fruitlessly urged the Socialist Unity Party to enact reforms in April and May, the Soviets summoned East German leaders to Moscow for consultations on June 2–4, where they instructed them to introduce a New Course of more liberal and flexible political direction and to terminate immediately the forced program of "Socialist Construction" that had originally been launched on Stalin's order in the summer of 1952.⁵ The new political line was announced in an unexpected government communiqué on June 11. The new approach reduced production in heavy industry and correspondingly boosted the output of consumer goods, but it also reduced restrictions on foreign travel, suspended the collectivization of agriculture, and ended constraints on religious practices. The Soviets intended all these concessions to alleviate social discontent and, additionally, to foster a better climate for future negotiations with the West on the potential reunification of Germany.

Despite all these precautions, the Berlin uprising in June 1953 erupted because GDR leaders were reluctant to follow instructions from Moscow and also because their significant concessions were announced without any preparatory propaganda. People saw it all as a sign of the regime's weakness. When it turned out that the leadership – contrary to expectations – was unwilling to revoke the almost 10 percent increase in labor quotas introduced at the end of May, workers in the construction industry went on strike. The revolt soon spread to the entire country, and there is reason to believe that it would have led to a rapid collapse of the Communist system if not for the presence and intervention of Soviet troops.

The demonstrations began as protests over economic conditions, but very soon evolved into an anti-Communist uprising that demanded the resignation

3 Ostermann (ed.), *Uprising in East Germany*, 113–27 and 128–32.

4 Mark Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making," part I, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1 (1999), 12–15.

5 For the records of the meeting of the GDR and Soviet leaders, see Ostermann, (ed.), *Uprising in East Germany*, 137–38.

of the government, the creation of non-Communist parties, and free elections. Protestors opposed the formation of an East German army and called for a general strike. News of the events in Berlin quickly spread to the whole country, particularly through newscasts by Western radio stations. According to some estimates, about half a million people took part in often rather violent incidents in 560 cities of the GDR.⁶ The revolt, which endangered Communist rule and might well have resulted in its total collapse, was emphatically quelled by the tanks of the Soviet army.

Soviet leaders were well aware of the economic situation in Eastern Europe since the spring of 1953, and they understood the meaning of events in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. What might have been especially worrying for them was how the demonstrations had started out as demands of an economic nature, but had evolved in a matter of hours into widespread protests calling for the elimination of the Communist system by the industrial working class, a segment of the population that should have been the ideological base of the regime.

In order to avoid such developments and maintain political stability, Moscow believed that radical changes needed to be introduced in the East Central European countries. The model for these changes was the New Course imposed on the GDR by the Soviets, the implementation of which was made obligatory first for the Hungarian and then for the Albanian leaders at a Moscow briefing in June 1953. Similar consultations with Czechoslovak, Romanian, and Bulgarian leaders were also scheduled in Moscow, but were canceled amidst the uncertain situation following Beria's arrest at the end of June.⁷ Instead, the leaders of these countries received their respective directives on how to introduce the new political line through conventional channels. Accordingly, from July to September the New Course was also announced in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania. The reform package generally featured the following policies: the lightening of repressive measures against the people, a reduction in mass terror and violence, a qualified amnesty for political prisoners (starting with imprisoned Communists), a general "restoration of socialist lawfulness," significant cuts in heavy industrial output, drastic reductions in the hitherto-prioritized defense industry, significant output increases in light industry – especially in the production of consumer goods that could provide the supplies necessary to raise living

⁶ *Ibid.*, 165.

⁷ Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle," 31.

standards – and, lastly, the termination of forced collectivization in agriculture or, at least, a decrease in the pace of establishing cooperative farms.

Thus, at least some elements of the New Course appeared in one form or another in each country. Local political conditions had a significant influence on the process; the formerly Stalinist leaders were willing to apply the new policy in a selective fashion, with most of their decisions subordinated to the goal of retaining political power at any cost.

In most cases the Soviets delegated implementation of the new policy to the very same local leaders who had until recently been in competition with each other for the title of Stalin's best student. Fundamental changes in the leadership personnel occurred only in Hungary, where the Soviets ordered Mátyás Rákosi to relinquish the office of prime minister to Imre Nagy, who had previously been criticized as a nationalist deviationist. Moscow's expectation of a successful implementation of the new policy by the old cadres can largely be attributed to the fact that these leaders had always eagerly executed every order without hesitation. They had been willing to allow their economies to be exploited by the Kremlin to help expedite the overall rearmament of the Eastern bloc and to hasten reconstruction within the Soviet Union. Consequently, when the time came to introduce relief measures, the Soviets hoped that Stalin's minions in Eastern Europe would be just as eager to implement policies aimed at improving the general conditions of their people. In several cases, Moscow's reasoning proved to be flawed: some of these local leaders actually preferred to preserve the Stalinist mechanisms of power.

Nevertheless, the Soviets did try to reduce the concentration of power that was so strongly reminiscent of the Stalinist era. The main way to achieve this goal was to promote the Soviet practice of collective leadership in each country. The Soviets made it a habit to deal with a group of senior partners in each of the satellite states rather than the official leader of each country alone. On the basis of the new Soviet model, the position of prime minister, and the role of the state administration more generally, was reevaluated. Since the Soviets believed that removing the head of a ruling Communist Party was too risky, no such attempt was made until the summer of 1956. However, in the spirit of collective leadership, there were changes in the top echelon of almost every country in the course of 1953–54. Whereas previously the offices of party leader and prime minister had typically been filled by the same person, they were now usually separated.

During 1953–54, the most notable developments took place in Hungary. Following Moscow's directives, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party passed a secret resolution in June 1953 that severely criticized

the former leadership for its Stalinist policies and called for several important changes of personnel.⁸ Subsequently, the newly appointed prime minister, Nagy, announced an ambitious reform program with main points that were roughly in accordance with the original Soviet concept of the New Course. The implementation of the plan began in the fall of 1953 and, although no structural changes were introduced in the system, these reforms significantly ameliorated living conditions and raised public support for the regime. However, a struggle for power soon unfolded between Nagy and the Stalinist Rákosi. With the fall of Soviet premier Georgii Malenkov, the Soviet leadership eventually took the side of the latter. In April 1955, Nagy was relieved of his responsibilities.

Soviet–East European relations in transformation

The permissible pace and scope of post-Stalin political reform in East Central Europe depended greatly upon which faction happened to have the upper hand in the incessant power struggles within the Soviet leadership, but there was never any question in Moscow that the satellite states should remain inside the Soviet empire. At the same time, Soviet leaders were ready to figure out and employ a more flexible and reliable model of cooperation, a model which would be more predictable for both parties in the course of normal, day-to-day relations between Moscow and the East Central European states. While previously this had generally meant direct and exclusive contact between Stalin and the top leaders of each East European country – the local “little Stalins” – the Soviet leaders now did their best to strengthen the local collective leadership in each country and to maintain contact with them. Another new feature was that the occasional ad hoc consultations that formerly had occurred were replaced by regular bilateral and multilateral meetings at a senior level.

As early as June 1953, during talks with the Hungarian leadership, the Soviets explicitly stated that they wanted to rejuvenate their relationship with their allies in Eastern Europe. According to Lavrentii Beria, the relations had not evolved in a productive fashion. “In the future we will create a new kind of relationship, a more responsible and serious relationship,” he promised. Malenkov said that the paradigm would be entirely different from that

8 For the text of the resolution, see Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, and János M. Rainer (eds.), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2002), 24–33.

of the past, and Beria added that Moscow would keep its allies informed, hinting at the preparation of a special memorandum containing new directives.⁹ While no such document emerged until October 30, 1956, interactions with the allies did change remarkably between 1953 and 1955. However, this did not mean any radical adjustment of the subordinate status of the East European satellite states; the changes merely regulated and rationalized the established hierarchy. When Soviet leaders believed they could achieve their goal only by brutal political intervention, they sharply rebuked the leaders of East European countries in tones that often outdid even Stalin. In January 1955, when the Hungarian leaders were again summoned to Moscow for consultations, Khrushchev practically threatened Nagy with execution.¹⁰ In perceived emergencies, when Soviet imperial interests seemed at risk, the men in the Kremlin did not shrink from using the most drastic means possible. In October 1956, they threatened to intervene militarily in Poland, and in November they invaded Hungary and put an end to the revolution there.

Nonetheless, Moscow hoped to improve relations. The Warsaw Pact, established in May 1955, was designed to promote unity and also to strengthen Soviet dominance within the bloc. But this political-military alliance gradually came to be the catalyst for a new era in Soviet–East Central European relations. The Warsaw Pact imitated the organizational framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and in theory was a voluntary alliance of sovereign and equal states. The scheduling of multilateral and regular meetings constituted a qualitative change with respect to former conditions. Previously, only bilateral consultations were held regularly, and they were normally initiated by the Soviets; likewise, multilateral discussions and interbloc summit meetings could be instigated by Moscow alone. Thus, in interesting ways, the establishment of the Warsaw Pact increased the international reputation of the allied states, heretofore referred to as “Soviet satellite states” in the West. Thereafter, Moscow encouraged its allies to use their diplomatic stature for the benefit of the entire Eastern bloc. Their task was to promote the success of Soviet goals in Europe and, even more so, in the Third World, especially in Asia, the Arab states, and Latin America. In Europe, they were supposed to develop economic ties with

9 *Ibid.*, 22; quoted from the Hungarian document in Kramer, “The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle,” 40.

10 “You are not without merits. But then again, Zinoviyev and Rykov were not without merits either, perhaps they were more meritorious than you are, and yet we did not hesitate to take firm steps against them when they became a threat to the party”: Békés, Byrne, and Rainer (eds.), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 63.

West European states; in the Third World, their job was to facilitate Soviet economic and political penetration, and to ensure the Kremlin's lasting influence.¹¹

At the beginning of January 1956, hardly a month before the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), leaders of the European Communist countries participated in Moscow's most important summit since Stalin's death. At the meeting, Khrushchev stressed the importance of the new "active foreign policy" doctrine, by which the socialist camp was to strengthen its international position. "It is true that the Soviet Union is the great force of our camp," said Khrushchev, "but if we organized our work in a more flexible way, the Soviet Union would not always have to be the first to take action. In certain situations one or another people's democracy could take action and then the Soviet Union would support that country."¹²

Although no initiatives had yet been taken, this strategy became the model for cooperation among the states of the Soviet bloc, especially from the mid-1960s until the collapse of the Communist regimes in East Central Europe. From 1954 on, Moscow kept its allies informed on matters of international politics, often outlining actions that the Soviets planned to take in the area of East-West relations. This practice meant radical change: between the last session of Cominform in November 1949 and Stalin's death in March 1953 only one such meeting seems to have occurred, but seven summits took place from November 1954 to January 1957.

Nikita S. Khrushchev wanted to remake the basic foundations of intrabloc relations essentially by modifying the terms of those relations from those of *colony* to *dominium*. In formal terms, the position of the allies was even more promising: they could now participate in shaping bloc policies as equal partners in the Warsaw Pact and in the Comecon (which was roused from dormancy in the spring of 1956). It was an important element of Khrushchev's thinking that the Eastern bloc enjoy at least ostensibly equivalent capabilities and conditions in its peaceful competition with the West.

11 For the text of a complex policy paper on the future role of the Soviet bloc in world policy, prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry for the summit meeting of European Communist leaders in Moscow in early January 1956, see *ibid.*, 106–15.

12 Speech by N. S. Khrushchev at the meeting of the European socialist countries' leaders, Moscow, January 4, 1956, Hungarian National Archives, M-KS-276.f.-62/84.ő.e., quoted in Csaba Békés, "The Warsaw Pact and the Helsinki Process, 1965–1970," in Wilfried Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou (eds.), *The Making of Détente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–1975* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 216, n. 3.

De-Stalinization and destabilization

The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, in February 1956, brought fundamental changes to the East Central European countries. The principle of peaceful coexistence, which was articulated by the Soviet leadership as early as 1953, now acquired the status of long-term doctrine, and would be in force until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This principle, based on the thesis that war between the socialist and capitalist camps was *not* inevitable, enabled the countries of the Soviet bloc to concentrate their resources on internal development to a much greater extent than before.

This was a promising development from the point of view of East–West relations in general, and it also led to significant changes within the Soviet bloc, both in terms of the relationship between the Soviet Union and its allies (as mentioned above) and in terms of the internal development of each East European country. Khrushchev's vision for the Soviet bloc was to ensure sustainable political stability through a general process of de-Stalinization, in which each state could maintain economic growth and provide sufficient food supplies and tolerable living conditions *without* changing the basic structure of the Leninist–Stalinist Communist system.

The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 created the necessary conceptual preconditions for this move. Although party leaders in Eastern Europe were not invited to the meeting at which Khrushchev delivered his secret report on the crimes committed by Stalin, they were subsequently sent the full text of the speech. In Poland, against the wishes of Soviet leaders, the speech was circulated for three successive weeks in April 1956 to a much wider audience, including nonparty members.¹³ Nor did the Kremlin anticipate that the text would fall into the hands of Western intelligence services. The US State Department then published the full text on June 4, and, thereafter, it was broadcast on Radio Free Europe in the various languages of the region.

Just as the original process of Sovietization between 1944 and 1949 was different in each Eastern bloc state, de-Stalinization took a significantly different course in several of these countries. Seeking to maintain political stability at any cost, the Soviets did not impose truly radical changes, so they left de-Stalinization mostly in the hands of “local Stalins.” In turn, the leaders of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Romania claimed that their countries did not

13 Pawel Machcewicz, “Social Protest and Political Crisis in 1956,” in A. Kemp-Welch (ed.), *Stalinism in Poland 1944–1956: Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies*, Warsaw, 1995 (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 102–04.

need any new, significant changes because they had been evolving since 1953. Nevertheless, large numbers of political prisoners were granted amnesty in the spring and summer of 1956 in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.¹⁴

The attitude of the leaders in Bulgaria was very similar, although they could not avoid sacrificing some of their colleagues. Vulko Chervenkov, the Bulgarian dictator, was forced to hand over leadership of the party to Todor Zhivkov as early as 1954, and in April 1956 he lost the office of prime minister as well. A revised outcome to Trajcho Kostov's show trial in 1949 transpired soon after. However, Chervenkov kept his position in the leadership with the dual role of deputy prime minister and member of the Politburo, and he was quite successful in sabotaging the process of de-Stalinization until 1962. Nevertheless, since Chervenkov was the first top-level victim of de-Stalinization in the Soviet bloc, his downfall had an important impact in the whole region and inspired hope for similar changes in other countries, especially in Hungary.

In Poland, the situation was also unique. Bolesław Bierut, the leading Polish Stalinist, fell ill while attending the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and died in Moscow. Khrushchev nominated his successor, Edward Ochab, who appeared to be the optimal candidate to implement the Soviet policy of de-Stalinization. In April, in the spirit of controlled liberalization, a general amnesty liberated and rehabilitated several thousand political convicts, and in the same month the parliament engaged in a real discussion of important national issues.¹⁵ Władisław Gomułka, the former head of the party who had managed to survive the Stalinist show trials that befell his counterparts elsewhere in the region, emerged from prison, raising the question of whether he might return to the country's leadership. From the beginning of 1955, ferment spread in the party and the larger society. After the publication of Khrushchev's speech, people not only ridiculed the most extreme aspects of the Stalinist system and the mass terror, but they also clamored for more political freedom and national sovereignty.

In Hungary, Rákosi managed to muster Soviet support to stay in power until July 1956, although conditions for an anti-Stalinist turn had been ripening since the fall of 1955. Writers, journalists, and other intellectuals exerted pressure for change, especially after Rákosi had been forced to admit his personal responsibility for some of the worst show trials of the late 1940s.

¹⁴ François Fejtő, *A History of the People's Democracies*, 2 vols., translated by Daniel Weissbort (New York: Praeger, 1971), 68–70.

¹⁵ Machcewicz, "Social Protest and Political Crisis," 107.

Within the Petőfi Circle, founded as the official discussion forum of the party's youth organization, opposition to the established leadership began to surface, and Nagy emerged as the reformers' choice for the top leadership post.

Meanwhile, communications and interactions within the Soviet bloc also began to change. Since 1949, the citizens of "fraternal" countries were almost hermetically closed off from one another, but in the summer of 1956 the obligatory visa system was partially abolished. Officials passed other measures to promote tourism and freer movement. Easier contact and direct communication between the societies of East Central Europe were to play important roles in the revolutionary events that broke out in the fall.

The normalization of relations with Yugoslavia – suspended in 1948 – was an element of the change taking place.¹⁶ The rapprochement took place under continuous Soviet leadership, since for Khrushchev it was very important to reintegrate Yugoslavia into the Eastern bloc. Apart from reestablishing the unity of the Communist camp and dissolving the Cominform, Soviet leaders hoped to establish a foothold in the Mediterranean. Rapprochement with Yugoslavia, however, did not imply that Moscow was prepared to accept the Yugoslav model of socialism for its East Central European allies. In fact, the Kremlin was wary of Yugoslavia's growing influence in the region, most notably in Poland and Hungary. Soviet officials suspected that the Yugoslav socialist model – with an active popular front, extensive workers' self-management, and a record of attentiveness to local and national concerns – might prove more appealing than the Soviet system. Thus, the Kremlin's main purpose for convening a Soviet bloc summit in late June 1956 was to inform the allies about Tito's recent two-week visit to the Soviet Union and to insure they did not misinterpret the evolving relationship. Later in July, the presidium of the CPSU sent a secret communiqué to the leaders of the allied countries, cautioning them that the Soviet Union would take a dim view of any exaggerated promotion of the Yugoslav model.¹⁷

At the same time, the Soviet leadership started worrying about the course of internal developments in East Central Europe. Their concerns were not without foundation, for on June 28, 1956, an armed uprising broke out in the industrial city of Poznań in Poland, in the course of which the workers fought a real battle with Polish military and state security troops. The events unfolded along the lines of the pattern seen before in Plzeň and East Berlin: a mass demonstration began with demands of an economic nature, but quickly turned

¹⁶ On the Soviet–Yugoslav rapprochement, see Svetozar Rajak's chapter in this volume.

¹⁷ Békés, Byrne, and Rainer (eds.), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 136–42.

into an anti-Communist uprising. The insurgents seized the police headquarters, armed themselves, and then broke into the public prosecutor's office. They stormed prisons, freed prisoners, and then assaulted the headquarters of the security forces. The violence claimed the lives of seventy-three civilians and eight members of the armed forces, while several hundred people were wounded.¹⁸

Following the Poznań uprising, the Soviets were eager to avoid further outbreaks of social discontent in the region and decided upon political intervention as their method. They decided to replace Rákosi as the head of the Hungarian party in July 1956, thereby hoping to ease political tensions in the country. CPSU presidium member Anastas Mikoian went to Budapest, and advised the reluctant Hungarian Workers' Party Central Committee to elect Ernő Gerő, another leading Stalinist, as first secretary of the party. This displeased the Hungarians who – since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU – had been expecting a more flexible and reformed Communist system. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, Mikoian informed local leaders that the Soviet Union would not hesitate to assist the Hungarian party.¹⁹ Khrushchev passed a similar message to Tito through Veljko Micunovic, the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, informing him that, should conditions deteriorate, the Soviet leadership was prepared to use all possible means to deal with the situation in Hungary and prevent a breach in the socialist camp.²⁰

October 1956: revolts in Poland and Hungary

Immediately after the Poznań uprising, events moved swiftly in Poland. Social ferment grew, and people began calling openly for reform and change. With patriotic fervor and nationalist sensibilities soaring, there was a genuine danger that the existing leadership of the party, distracted by internal factionalism, might fail to diffuse the situation. In mid-October 1956, to coopt public sentiment, the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party decided to elect the once-discredited Gomułka as first secretary and to exclude the most discredited Stalinist officials from the top levels of the party. These radical personnel changes were approved by the Eighth Plenum of the party's Central

18 Andrzej Paczkowski, *Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom*, translated by Jane Cave (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003), 202.

19 Mikoian's report to the CPSU CC, July 14, 1956, published in Vjacseszlav Szereda and Alekszandr Sztikalin (eds.), *Hányzó lapok 1956 történetéből: dokumentumok a volt SZKP KB levéltárából* [Missing Pages from the History of 1956: Documents from the Archives of the Former CPSU CC] (Budapest: Móra, 1993), 40.

20 Veljko Micunovic, *Moscow Diary, 1956–1958*, translated by David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 86 (July 15, 1956).

Committee (CC) that began on October 19. Since Gomułka's election evoked enthusiasm across the country, these decisions meant that the reformist forces within the party had achieved a real victory, offering the possibility that they could ease social discontent and pacify the country.

However, Soviet leaders were not consulted about this fundamental change, an unprecedented occurrence in the Soviet camp. They feared that it might be a prelude to the collapse of the entire Communist system. Khrushchev and a top-level Kremlin delegation quickly made a surprise visit to Warsaw on October 19 and confronted Polish authorities. They also prepared to authorize the Red Army to intervene, if necessary. Soviet troops, already stationed in Poland, began to move toward Warsaw. Khrushchev wanted to demonstrate power, but his actions threatened to initiate armed conflict between the Soviet Union and its biggest East European ally.

Eventually, in a dramatic faceoff between the two men, Gomułka convinced Khrushchev to accept the leadership changes in Poland in return for assurances that the political reforms would threaten neither local Communist rule nor the unity of the Soviet bloc.²¹ This agreement made a peaceful solution of the crisis possible, thereby avoiding a social explosion and a military clash.

Poles expressed their support for Gomułka in thousands of mass rallies and demonstrations all over the country. The acclaim constituted a notable achievement for the party because the majority of people shared an anti-Soviet and basically anti-Communist attitude. Nonetheless, Poles believed that Gomułka was protecting the "Polish path to socialism," and inaugurating a bold anti-Soviet move.²²

At the same time, Gomułka cleverly played a nationalist card of a different sort. Although Poles had taken to the streets calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops (as many Hungarians would also do, several days later), Gomułka convinced the people that "Polish state interests" required the Red Army to guarantee the country's western borders. At the end of World War II, Poland had acquired German territory in the west as compensation for territory lost to the Soviet Union in the east. However, no peace treaty guaranteeing Poland's territorial integrity had been concluded. Thus, just a decade later, fear of West German revanchism was widespread in Poland, and Gomułka sought to allay these apprehensions and placate the Kremlin at the same time.

21 For contemporary Polish accounts of the talks with the Soviet delegation, see L. W. Gluchowsky, "Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomułka and the 'Polish October,'" *CWIHP Bulletin*, 5 (1995), 40–43.

22 Machcewicz, "Social Protest and Political Crisis," 116–18.

In Hungary, the situation had been extremely tense since the summer of 1956 because party leaders were reluctant to make significant concessions even after Rákosi's replacement. In early October, at the reburial ceremony of László Rajk and his companions, who had been executed after a show trial, more than a hundred thousand people silently demonstrated against an inhumane system. On October 16, at a mass rally, university students in Szeged established an independent student organization, and on October 22, at another rally, their fellow students in Budapest listed their demands in sixteen points. In addition to wanting the appointment of Nagy as prime minister and the convocation of an extraordinary party congress – desires shared by the party's internal opposition – the students' sixteen points included more radical demands, including the withdrawal of Soviet troops, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and fair multiparty elections.

In Budapest, on October 23, these university students began a peaceful pro-reform demonstration to declare their solidarity with reformers in Poland. The demonstration escalated into an armed revolt by evening. To repress the uprising, the leadership requested the intervention of the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary. After much hesitation, the CPSU presidium agreed. But the decision produced unintended results: instead of rapidly pacifying the situation, sporadic armed incidents evolved into a widespread anti-Soviet battle for liberation.

While the use of local forces, as Mikoian had suggested in the meeting of the CPSU presidium, might have offered a slim chance of a peaceful resolution of the crisis, the Soviet intervention radicalized the Hungarian population and exacerbated the situation. In a few days the revolution spread across the country, a general strike took place, and all over Hungary workers' councils and revolutionary committees snatched power from local authorities.

Although Nagy was appointed prime minister on October 24 in the hope that he would be able to calm the crowds, there was little chance he could do so under prevailing conditions. Nagy realized that the fate of the revolution was entirely in the hands of the Soviet Union. From the very outset of negotiations with a high-ranking Soviet delegation led by Mikoian and Mikhail Suslov, he endeavored to convince them that with adequate support he could stabilize the situation.²³ But, rather than suppressing the armed resistance, he argued that the most effective way to bring it under control

23 The Soviet delegation that arrived in Budapest on October 24 consisted of Politburo members A. I. Mikoian and M. A. Suslov, KGB head I. Serov, and deputy chief of staff M. S. Malinin.



27. Hungary 1956: a man burning a picture of a statue of Lenin.

was to place the party at the head of the mass social movement that undergirded the revolution.

Events during the following days seemed to vindicate Nagy's policy. Pledging to stabilize the situation in Hungary, he sought to extract further concessions from the Soviets. On October 28, Moscow agreed to the new government's program, calling events in Hungary a "broad national movement," instead of a "counterrevolution," promising to dissolve the secret police, legalize the revolutionary organizations, and withdraw Soviet troops from Budapest. On October 29, Red Army units began to pull back from the capital. The next day, the Soviet government issued a declaration with an explicit promise to lay a new foundation for relations between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries based on mutual equality and

noninterference in domestic affairs. In addition, the declaration promised to consider the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary entirely, a core demand of the revolutionary groups since the beginning of the revolt.

The Soviet leadership was serious about all this: on October 30, the presidium – under pressure from a Chinese delegation that had been sent to Moscow – unanimously decided that Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Hungary.²⁴ But the possibility of such a withdrawal did not mean the Kremlin was willing to “give up” Hungary. It was in fact the maximum political concession that Soviet leaders were willing to make in order to avoid a recourse to military intervention, an action they knew was the worst possible solution. In fact, had Nagy’s government been able to consolidate the situation, *without jeopardizing the Communist regime and the integrity of the Soviet bloc*, the Kremlin would not have intervened militarily.

The Malin notes of the discussions at meetings of the presidium make clear that the withdrawal would have been considered only if the Hungarians had satisfied Moscow’s two conditions. Foreign Minister Shepilov explained: “With the agreement of the government of Hungary, we are ready to withdraw troops. We’ll have to keep up a struggle with national-Communism for a long time.”²⁵ Even Mikoian, who consistently represented the most liberal viewpoint among Soviet leaders, said at a session of the presidium on November 1: “We simply cannot let Hungary be removed from our camp.” Meanwhile, however, he did try to convince the others that a political solution was still possible and that they should wait another ten to fifteen days before invading.²⁶

While considering the withdrawal of troops, Soviet leaders never intended to allow the restoration of the capitalist system. Instead, they hoped to restore a situation akin to that in Poland. They were prepared to accept a reformed Communist system, displaying more independence internally, but remaining loyal to Moscow and within the confines of the Soviet bloc.

Yet, on October 31, one day after taking the decision to pull out their troops, the Kremlin abruptly reversed its position. Soviet leaders canceled their previous order and decided to mount an even more massive military operation. Alarming news from Hungary explains this radical aboutface, news that

24 For the ambiguous role of the Chinese leadership in the Polish and Hungarian crises in 1956, see Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC, and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 145–62.

25 “The ‘Malin notes’ on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956,” translated and annotated by Mark Kramer, *CWIHP Bulletin*, 8–9 (Winter 1996–Spring 1997), 392.

26 *Ibid.*, 394.

suggested a general disintegration of the regime: the installation of a multi-party system, the dissolution of the secret police, the collapse of the party leadership, the passivity of the armed forces, the freedom of the press, and violent acts against Communist officials. The Kremlin realized that Communist power in Hungary was on the verge of collapse, and this assessment led Soviet leaders to conclude that the possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the crisis had been exhausted.

Inside Hungary, signs of Moscow's prospective intervention multiplied at an alarming rate: on October 31 came the first reports that fresh Soviet troops were entering the country and occupying all the important strategic locations. It was at this point, when it became clear that a Soviet invasion was imminent, that the Cabinet decided to make a heroic last-ditch effort to preserve the revolution. On November 1, it announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and declared the country's neutrality. At the same time, Nagy sent an appeal to the secretary-general of the United Nations requesting that the four great powers assist in the defense of Hungary's neutrality and that the matter be urgently placed on the agenda of the upcoming General Assembly.

On November 4, the Soviets launched a massive invasion and crushed the revolution in a few days. A countergovernment led by János Kádár was installed, while Nagy and his associates temporarily took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. After this second Soviet intervention, some 200,000 people fled the country to the West. During the revolution, 2,700 people were killed. Communist reprisals and terror led to the detention of 13,000 people, the imprisonment of over 20,000, and the execution of 230 – including Prime Minister Nagy and several of his closest associates.

The legacies of the Polish and Hungarian revolts

The most obvious outcome of the failed revolution in Hungary for international politics was that the Western states, by not intervening, had proved once and for all their unconditional acceptance of the postwar European status quo. Despite all their propaganda about the "liberation of the enslaved nations," it meant nothing. This was a great consolation for the Soviet leadership: beyond any previous agreement they had had with the Western states, the noninterference of the West in November 1956 reassured Kremlin officials that, should any future conflict occur within the boundaries of their empire, they would have a free hand.

Western condemnation of the Soviet intervention was limited to the arena of propaganda and to debates in the United Nations General Assembly.

Nevertheless, after several years of ineffectually condemning Soviet behavior, the United States adopted a more pragmatic policy. In secret talks between US officials and the Kádár regime, Washington agreed to remove the Hungarian question from the General Assembly's agenda in December 1962 in exchange for which the Hungarian government in 1963 granted a general amnesty to the majority of those who had been imprisoned because of their participation in the 1956 revolution.

In the decades following 1956, the Hungarian revolution yielded several legacies in East Central Europe. The leaders of the various regimes learned from Hungary's example that attempts at radical party reform could easily lead to the collapse of the Communist political monopoly. They also learned that in such cases the Soviets would not hesitate to restore order by any means necessary, including the most brutal ones. Conversely, however, the Hungarian revolution also demonstrated that East Central European leaders ignored social demands and public opinion at their own peril. Even though they had seen that any threatened regime could rely on Soviet help in the event of some political crisis, local leaders could also expect to be held responsible and to be replaced.

In these ways, the Hungarian revolution largely contributed to the success of the effort to build a post-Stalinist Communist order in the Soviet Union and throughout East Central Europe. The October 1956 Polish crisis, with its contrasting positive outcome, also strengthened the same trend. The Polish example demonstrated that a limited campaign of moderate reforms which did not imperil the political system, or threaten the security of the Eastern military bloc, could be implemented even against the will of the Soviet leadership. More than anything else, this Polish precedent motivated the Czechoslovakian Communist reformers in 1968.²⁷

The final lesson of the events of 1956 was that they ended any hopes in East Central Europe that the Soviet yoke could be thrown off by active revolt. The inaction of the West, the brutality of the Soviet intervention, and the broad scope of retaliatory measures combined to dispel that illusion. In the course of the decades that followed, this understanding undergirded all reform activities in Eastern bloc states. While consciously taking the security interests of the Soviet Union into account, those wishing for change worked gradually but effectively to liberalize the Communist system. They no longer aimed to overthrow it.

27 For 1968 and its aftermath, see the chapter by Anthony Kemp-Welch in volume II.

The Sino-Soviet alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954–1962

SHU GUANG ZHANG

The superpowers' competition for allies constituted a large part of the Cold War in Asia. The alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in February 1950 seemed to be a major diplomatic victory for Moscow. How to maintain the alliance proved a serious challenge. Conventional wisdom dictates that the commonalities in ideological, economic, political, and security interests between the two Communist powers would sustain the compact. Along with the personal idiosyncrasies of Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev, cultural, racial, and domestic factors, nevertheless, eroded the cohesion of the Sino-Soviet alliance. This chapter aims to reconstruct how Beijing and Moscow tried to maintain the alliance, and how the corrosive Sino-Soviet partnership affected the course of the Cold War in Asia.

From the Korean War to the Hungarian uprising

From the outset, the Sino-Soviet alliance was loaded with expectations and aspirations. When the alliance treaty was signed, China wanted more than the Soviet Union was willing to give: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders aspired to secure Moscow's commitment to defending China, not only to thwart a perceived threat from the United States, but also to ensure that the Kremlin would be a more reliable partner in the future than it had been in the past. They still remembered Stalin's reluctance to support the CCP fully during China's anti-Japanese war (1931–45) and his making deals with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) during the civil war (1945–49).¹ Ideologically, however, Mao had mixed feelings toward Stalin-style Communism. Although

¹ Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese–American Confrontations, 1948–1958* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 13–33; Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet–American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944–1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 32–36.

identifying himself as a Marxist, Mao aimed to apply Marxist-Leninist principles to Chinese realities. His open proclamation to “lean” to the Soviet side in 1949 was more a political move – intended to contain calls within and outside his party for taking a “third road” rather than following Soviet or American models – than an ideological requirement.² For economic reconstruction, Beijing intended to learn from the Soviet experiences but without necessarily relying on Soviet assistance. Although trying to avoid expected Soviet interference, Mao found it unrealistic to be completely self-reliant, given China’s war-torn economy and political instability.³

The Korean War was the first serious test of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Soviet military aid – materiel and personnel – supporting China’s intervention in Korea was evidence of Moscow’s will to keep its promise. Mao’s decision to confront the United States in Korea was in part to prove to Stalin that the former was not an “Asian Tito” but a trustworthy partner.⁴ After the conflict came to a halt in July 1953, Beijing began to amend its expectations of the alliance. With the security situation in East Asia more stable, the CCP was filled with anxieties, wanting to expedite economic reconstruction, upgrade defense capability, and minimize the impact of the Western economic embargo on China. To these ends, it expected Soviet economic and technological aid to play a crucial role.⁵ By sacrificing itself to save North Korea on the Soviet Union’s behalf, Beijing expected Moscow to reciprocate with favors.

Khrushchev’s Kremlin did not disappoint Beijing in the immediate post-Korean War years. In May 1953 (only two months after Stalin’s death), Anastas Mikoian and China’s Vice Premier Li Fuchun signed an agreement in Moscow that the Soviet Union would provide technology and equipment to build up to ninety-one defense-related projects.⁶ A large number of Soviet experts began to arrive in China, and even larger numbers of Chinese students were

2 John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 63–64. See also Michael Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

3 Di Chaobai, “The Great Implications of the Sino-Soviet Agreement on Loans,” *Renmin ribao* [People’s Daily], March 2, 1950, 2.

4 Chen Jian, *China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 17–20; Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 55–84.

5 Shu Guang Zhang, *Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 59–68.

6 *Dangdai Zhongguo duiwai maoyi* [China Today: Foreign Trade], vol. II (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo, 1992), 258–59 (hereafter DDZGDWY).

accepted to study advanced science and technologies in top Soviet universities. Mao, in turn, supported Khrushchev's political position in the USSR.⁷

Once Khrushchev's control over the Kremlin was more secure, there was substantial improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Khrushchev visited China from September 29 to October 16, 1954. He and Mao met several times while others conducted comprehensive negotiations on further Sino-Soviet cooperation at different levels. The two leaders then issued two communiqués to declare their common assessment of and policy toward the current international situation as well as toward Japan. Khrushchev also confirmed that the Soviet Union would assist in China's economic reconstruction so as to "defeat" the "imperialist" economic sanctions.⁸ Moscow's aid to China consequently increased. In late 1954, the Soviet Union financed fifteen new projects to aid China's energy and raw and semi-finished materials industries.⁹ In March 1955, sixteen more projects to upgrade China's defense and shipbuilding industries were aided by the Soviets.¹⁰ Moscow also helped Beijing to construct 116 industrial plants with complete sets of equipment and 88 plants with partial equipment – from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.¹¹

A significant portion of Soviet and East European aid to China comprised industrial and military technology. With the Sino-Soviet agreement on technology transfer signed in October 1954, Beijing obtained similar commitments from East European countries. These agreements enabled China to acquire more than 4,000 technical devices and inventions. While East European governments focused on providing agriculture and forestry technologies, the Soviet Union supplied advanced technologies such as smeltery, ore dressing, petroleum prospecting, locomotive manufacturing, hydraulic and thermal power plants, hydraulic turbine manufacturing, machine tools, high-quality steel manufacturing, and vacuum apparatus. Not liable to pay for the patent rights, Beijing obtained these technologies practically for free.¹²

7 Soviet Embassy in Beijing to Chinese Foreign Ministry, March 24, 1954, K109-10500-01, Foreign Ministry Archives, Beijing (hereafter FMA); Ministry of Higher Education, "On the Dispatched Students in the Soviet Union," April 2, 1954, K109-10500-01, *ibid.*; Foreign Ministry to Ministry of Higher Education, "On the Fees Related to the Dispatched Students in the Soviet Union," May 19, 1954, K109-00500-01, *ibid.*

8 *Renmin ribao*, October 12, 1954, 1.

9 *Dangdai zhongguo jiben jianshe* [China Today: Capital Construction] (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Press, 1989), 52–53 (hereafter DDZGJBS).

10 *Ibid.*, 53.

11 Chinese Embassy in Warsaw to Foreign Ministry, "On Zhou Enlai's Visit to Poland," August 20, 1954, 32–89, K117-00385-02, FMA; Mao's talk with a Polish delegation, September 28, 1954, 1–9, K109-00409-01, *ibid.*

12 DDZGJBS, 56–57.



28. A Soviet engineer conferring with Chinese colleagues, Wuhan, 1956.

Moreover, to help the Chinese to master the new techniques, the Soviet and East European states dispatched more than 8,000 advisers to China and hosted as many as 7,000 Chinese for advanced training through the end of the 1950s.¹³

What pleased Beijing was that Khrushchev appeared more sensitive than Stalin had been to Chinese national sentiment. Understanding the CCP's sensitivity about its sovereignty, during his October 1954 trip Khrushchev proposed that four Sino-Soviet joint adventures established in 1950–51 – oil and nonferrous metal manufacturing plants in Xinjiang and civil aviation

¹³ *Ibid.*, 54.

and shipbuilding companies in Dalian – be turned over to sole Chinese ownership and operation. Khrushchev also accepted China's request to withdraw Soviet forces from naval bases in Lüshun (Port Arthur) and promised that an infantry division and several hundred military advisers would leave before May 31, 1955. China could then resume its authority over these bases.¹⁴

The Sino-Soviet collaboration was also effective on the diplomatic front. A much-celebrated case was the Geneva Conference of 1954. From the start of the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings in Berlin on February 8–12, Moscow not only kept Beijing informed of the talks, but also pushed to have China invited as “an equal partner” to a five-power conference on conflicts in Asia.¹⁵ In early April, V. M. Molotov met with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in Moscow to strategize how to negotiate at the conference.¹⁶ In May, he passed to Zhang Wentian, the Chinese ambassador to Moscow, a Soviet proposal regarding the agenda, North Vietnamese representation, the appropriate number of Chinese delegates, transportation, safety, press relations, and activities outside the meeting rooms. The Soviet Foreign Ministry even ran a training program on protocol for Chinese diplomats.¹⁷

At Geneva, Molotov and Zhou collaborated with one another. They persuaded North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh to accept the conditions set by the Mendès-France government of France, including a temporary partition of Vietnam and self-determination and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia under the supervision of an international control commission.¹⁸ Such arrangements paved the way for the final signing of the Geneva Accords on Indochina on July 21, providing for an immediate ceasefire in Indochina, a partition of Vietnam, and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia.¹⁹ Although

14 Shi Zhe, *Zai lishi juren shenbian* [Together with Historic Giants: Shi Zhe Memoirs] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1991), 570–71. See also Soviet Embassy to the Foreign Ministry, “The Schedule for the Soviet Armed Forces to Withdraw from Port Lüshun and Transfer Material to the Chinese Government,” February 2, 1955, K109-00593-01, FMA.

15 Soviet ambassador in Beijing to Chinese Foreign Ministry, February 17, 1954, K109-00396-01, *ibid.*

16 Zhou to Mao, “On the Talks with the Soviet Leaders [on Geneva],” April 7, 1954, 206-Y0054, *ibid.*

17 Ambassador Zhang's meeting with Molotov, May [undated] 1954, 1–9, K109-00496-02, *ibid.*

18 Zhou to Mao, July 10, 1954, *Zhou Enlai nianpu* [The Chronicle of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1997), vol. II, 396–97 (hereafter ZELNP); Zhou to Mao, July 12, 1954, *ibid.*, 397; Zhou to Mao and Liu Shaoqi, “On Revised Positions of the Soviet and Vietnamese Leaders,” July 15, 1954, 206-Y0051, FMA; Zhou to Mao and Liu, July 22, 1954, 206-Y0051, *ibid.*

19 Xiao Donglian, *Wushinian guoshi jiyao: waijiao juan* [Fifty Years of State Affairs on the Record: A Volume on Diplomacy] (Changsha: Hunan renmin, 1999), 125.

achieving no final settlement of the Korean conflict, CCP leaders were encouraged that, with Soviet support, they could play a respectable and responsible role in multilateral diplomacy.

Although these developments were very encouraging, the long-sustained suspicion and hard feelings on the Chinese side were persistent. During Khrushchev's visit to China in 1954, Mao bluntly dismissed the possibility that China would be part of the Soviet economic system. After listening to Khrushchev's proposal that China could develop faster by joining the East European economic community, Mao replied that he saw "no need" for such an arrangement. In his view, China would be better off if it were self-reliant and established its own way of development.²⁰

Mao suspected that the Soviets might want to take advantage of China. The first half of the 1950s saw a rapid increase in Soviet manufactured exports to China, which convinced the Chinese that Soviet industries depended on China's market.²¹ More importantly, over 30 percent of China's exports to the USSR were raw materials, especially those of "strategic importance" including tungsten, tin, antimony, lithium, beryllium, tantalum, molybdenum, magnesium, and sulfur mineral ore and pellets. More than 70 percent of the annual yield of rubber manufactured in China's Hainan Islands was being sold to the Soviets at "preferential prices." The Chinese believed that these strategic materials were indispensable to Soviet military programs.²² Given its special relations with Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, and other Asian countries, China had also been acquiring materials that the West had been seeking to embargo to the Communist bloc, and had been carrying on an *entrepôt* trade on behalf of the Soviet Union. Between 1953 and 1957, China imported goods for the Soviet Union worth a total of \$330 million from third countries. Moreover, the Chinese leaders believed that China's agricultural products, which made up more than 48 percent of China's exports to the Soviet Union, proved essential to Soviet efforts to survive the Western trade embargo. Meanwhile, China paid back Soviet loans with gold and hard currency. Understanding that the Soviets were short of US dollars, Beijing paid Moscow a total of \$156 million in cash.²³

Unhappy about this Sino-Soviet trade, Beijing initiated negotiations with Moscow in July 1956, requesting that the Soviets rectify the "unreasonable" pricing system and "inequitable" payment. CCP trade authorities even

20 Shi Zhe, *Zai lishi juren shenbian*, 580–81.

21 DDZGDWY, vol. II, 259.

22 *Ibid.*

23 *Ibid.*, 260.

criticized Moscow for failing to comply with the principle of mutual respect and equality in treating fraternal socialist countries, and expressed “serious” concerns over Soviet “chauvinism.”²⁴ To placate the Chinese, Moscow returned the money it had allegedly overcharged China in trade and agreed to an “equitable” pricing system.²⁵

Chinese leaders, however, remained unhappy when the Soviets were not supportive of China’s nuclear program. Moscow had sent a group of geologists to China to prospect for uranium early in 1950. Partly because of that, in his 1954 talk with Khrushchev, Mao requested Soviet assistance for China’s atomic weaponry program. To the Chinese leader’s disappointment, Khrushchev refused and stressed that, as long as China was under Soviet nuclear protection, it would be “a huge waste” for China to build its own bomb. If China wanted to develop a nuclear-energy industry, Khrushchev told Mao, the Soviet Union could consider providing a small atomic reactor but purely for scientific research and education.²⁶

While refusing to aid China’s atomic program, Moscow kept asking for access to China’s uranium mines. When Soviet scientists discovered uranium in southwestern China in late 1954, the Kremlin pushed for “a joint effort” to mine uranium, but with the Soviets taking the lead. The CCP leadership then responded that it would accept the Soviet request if Moscow changed its mind on aiding China’s nuclear program.²⁷ After several rounds of negotiations, Soviet leaders agreed in April to provide technology and equipment to China in order to construct a high-water-moderated reactor and a cyclotron accelerator. They also promised to help the Chinese to build a laboratory for nuclear research. Moscow, however, stipulated that Soviet nuclear technology would be “for peaceful use” only.²⁸

While becoming increasingly skeptical about Soviet support, Mao by the mid-1950s began to change his perspective on China’s development.

24 Office of Soviet and East European Affairs, Foreign Ministry, “Some Major Events concerning Soviet Internal and External Policies and Sino-Soviet Relations: As Background for Premier Zhou’s Visit to the Soviet Union,” December 24, 1956, K109-00788-01, FMA.

25 *Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao* [China Today: Diplomatic Affairs] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui Kexue, 1987), 31 (hereafter DDZGWJ).

26 Shi Zhe, *Zai lishi juren shenbian*, 572–73.

27 Shu Guang Zhang, “Between ‘Paper’ and ‘Real Tigers’: Mao’s View of Nuclear Weapons,” in John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (eds.), *Cold War Statesmen Confronting the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 202–05.

28 *Dangdai Zhongguo hegongye* [China Today: Nuclear Industry] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui Kexue, 1987), 20–21 (hereafter DDZGHGY).

Although endorsing the first Five-Year Plan (1953–57) with an emphasis on building heavy industry, he believed that the CCP's priority should be to elevate agricultural productivity.²⁹ Noting differences with the Soviet experience, he thought that China's farm collectivization could and should move faster than Soviet leaders had advised. Between September and December 1955, Mao personally drafted more than 104 instructions to expedite "a high wave of socialism" in villages nationwide. He believed that the CCP needed to hasten the country's socialist transformation in order to defeat conservative impulses within the party, consolidate national unity, and prepare for contingencies.³⁰

One such contingency was Khrushchev's de-Stalinization move at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1956. Upset at not being consulted in advance, CCP leaders protested. Khrushchev rebuffed their concerns and claimed that he had no need to consult Beijing or others.³¹ Not prepared to sever the relationship and himself highly critical of Stalin, Mao at first endorsed Khrushchev's de-Stalinization. He was subsequently pleased when the Kremlin suddenly changed its attitude toward the CCP by admitting "errors" in its China policy and promised more aid to China.³² Chinese Communist leaders then supported Khrushchev's crushing of the Hungarian uprising in the fall of 1956.³³ At the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in November, Mao advocated tolerance of "small-scale democracy" to cope with domestic criticism, "resolute opposition to 'Great-Han'ism" in treating ethnic minorities, and "firm objection to Great Nation chauvinism" in international relations.³⁴

From dissonance to crisis

Khrushchev's and Mao's efforts to accommodate one another were short-lived. The already fragile alliance was tested by a series of Beijing–Moscow

29 For the first Five-Year Plan, see *Jianguo yilai zhongyaowenxian xuanbian* [Collected Key Documents since the Founding of the PRC], (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1993), vol. VI, 405–571 (hereafter JGYIZHYWXXB).

30 Mao's instructions, September and December 1955, *Jianguo yilai Maozedong wengao* [Mao's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC] (Beijing: Central Archives and Material Press, 1991), vol. V, 488–547 (hereafter JGYIMZDWG).

31 Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 212.

32 Office of Soviet and East European Affairs to Zhou Enlai, December 24, 1956, 109-00788-01, FMA.

33 Jin Chongji (ed.), *Zhou Enlai Zhuan* [Biography of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1998), vol. III, 1274–78, 1282–87 (hereafter ZELZ).

34 Mao's speeches, November 1956, JGYIMZDWG, vol. VI, 245–47.

interactions over domestic and external affairs in 1957–58. Again, hard feelings, strong beliefs, erroneous perceptions, and historical memories proved more difficult to overcome than policy differences.

The first encounter was economic. China's first Five-Year Plan seemed successful. In 1957, production of steel reached 5.35 million tons, iron 5.8 million tons, electric power 19.3 billion kWh, and coal 131 million tons, each exceeding the aims of the plan (which stood at 4.12 million tons for steel, 5.75 million tons for iron, 15.9 billion kWh for electric power, and 113 million tons for coal).³⁵ The success made the CCP more anxious to implement industrialization quickly. Toward the end of the plan, Mao had declared his "firm belief" that it might take just three "Five-Year Plans" to "build a powerful socialist country" in China. He anticipated that China, already not too far behind the United States in iron and steel production, would soon catch up with other industrial countries.³⁶

Moscow, however, doubted Beijing's aspirations, and the CCP felt disgruntled. In an economic development review in early 1957, the Soviet Far East Economic Committee was very critical of China's economic policies. After seeing the report, the PRC Foreign Ministry protested and singled out every "error" the Soviet report contained. Refuting the Soviet claim that Chinese peasants opposed collectivization, for example, Chinese officials argued that the pace of China's "agricultural collectivization" was welcomed nationwide. The Foreign Ministry then pointed out that Soviet experts "deliberately distort and obliterate" China's achievements simply because they were unhappy with the CCP's not following their model.³⁷

Mao, in particular, was bothered by Soviet skepticism about China's success. He believed that Moscow harbored an unnecessary fear that an industrialized China would seriously challenge Soviet leadership in the international Communist movement. Some Soviet leaders, Mao said to a Yugoslav delegation in September 1957, wanted "China's socialist construction ... to fail." They wildly imagined that China might become "an imperialist state," reviving the adventures of Chinggis Khan, and resulting in another "Yellow

35 Bo Yibo, *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu* [My Recollections of Decisionmaking on Several Important Policies and Events] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1993), vol. I, 295–96; JGYIZHYWXXB, vol. VI, 291–92, 297.

36 Mao's speech, June 14, 1954, JGYIMZDWG, vol. IV, 505–06; Huang Xiangbing, "How the Policy of 'Overtaking Britain and Catching up with America' Was Formed in the Late 1950s," *Dangshi yanjiu ziliao* [CCP History Study Materials], No. 4 (1988), 22.

37 PRC Foreign Ministry to the USSR Embassy in Beijing, March 13, 1957, fond 100 (1957), opis' 50, papka 423, delo 4, Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, Moscow (hereafter RFMA).

Peril.” Their real intention, he asserted, was to discredit the CCP as a Marxist-Leninist party.³⁸

Soviet skepticism in part prompted Mao to aim unrealistically high for China’s development. During a high-profile visit to Moscow in November 1957, he boasted at a meeting of world Communist leaders that China would overtake Britain in iron, steel, and other heavy industries in the next fifteen years and would soon beat the United States in these areas as well.³⁹ In April 1958, he proclaimed that it might not take fifteen years for China to overtake Britain and the United States. CCP leaders began to plan to surpass Britain in seven years and to catch up with the United States in eight or ten years.⁴⁰ The result of Mao’s dreamlike aspirations was the Great Leap Forward campaign, calling for a 19% increase in steel production, 18% in electricity, and 17% in coal output for 1958. Buoyed by unrealistic optimism, the CCP leaders kept raising the production goals in hopes of achieving an unprecedented rate of growth.⁴¹

Interestingly, Moscow tried to adapt itself to Beijing’s quest for quick economic success. In its report to the presidium dated July 26, 1958, the Soviet Foreign Ministry said that it felt “very positive” about China’s economic performance. “The sharp rise of the PRC economy,” it stated, “creates the conditions for a significant shortening of the time necessary to liquidate China’s economic backwardness.” It was not unrealistic for China to catch up with Britain in industrial production within fifteen years. If China’s second Five-Year Plan was as successful as the first, the report predicted, China could even realize this aim in some areas “in the next 2–3 years.”⁴² China welcomed this changed Soviet attitude and subsequently expected more aid from Moscow.

The CCP, however, was disappointed at no significant increase in Soviet aid and dismayed, in particular, by continual Soviet reluctance to help with China’s atomic project. In September 1957, Marshal Nie Rongzhen – in charge

38 Mao’s conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist union delegation, Beijing, [undated] September 1957, *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan* [Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Affairs] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian and Shijie zhishi, 1993), 251–62 (hereafter *MZDWJWX*).

39 Huang, “How the Policy of ‘Overtaking Britain and Catching up with America’ Was Formed in the Late 1950s,” 22. See also Bo, *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu*, vol. II, 691–92.

40 Bo, *Ruogan zhongda, juece yu shijian de huigu*, vol. II, 692–98.

41 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 655–57.

42 S. Antonov to the presidium, July 26, 1958, Document 16, in David Wolff, *One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events: New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948–1959*, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper No. 30 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2002), 49–51.

of China's nuclear program – led a mission to Moscow to secure Soviet nuclear assistance. Nie's trip ended with the signing of another protocol in October, in which the Soviets agreed to provide a model of an atomic bomb. But the Soviets did not specify exactly when it would be delivered and what it would entail. When Nie pressed, the Soviet leaders said they were not yet ready.⁴³ Even when Moscow dispatched 102 Soviet missile specialists to China with two Soviet P-2 short-range ground-to-ground missiles late in 1957, and when it sent another delegation to Beijing to talk about transferring atomic technology in August 1958, the Chinese leaders were under the impression that the Soviets were trying “to find all possible excuses not to help us.”⁴⁴

Although aspiring to acquire Soviet nuclear technology, Beijing did not want the USSR to build a missile base in China. Early in 1957, Khrushchev remarked to a Chinese news delegation that if the United States “openly” installed missiles in Taiwan, the USSR would do the same in China. Meeting with Soviet ambassador to Beijing Pavel F. Iudin on May 22, Zhou Enlai rejected the Soviet offer on the grounds that a US missile base in Taiwan served only to tighten Washington's control over Jiang with “no intention” to provoke a large-scale war. As “a counterthreat,” he said, a Soviet missile base on the mainland would “intensify the situation.”⁴⁵ What Zhou did not state was his concern that Moscow would exploit such an arrangement to control China. Later, Beijing became even more alarmed when it noted that some Soviet officials “casually” suggested that the Chinese should consider a “two-China” solution to the Taiwan problem. Calling in Iudin for a meeting on October 22, Zhou demanded that Moscow must firmly support China's “opposition to a two-China scheme.”⁴⁶

What transformed Chinese leaders' attitudes from suspicion to anger was Moscow's “intention” to incorporate China's coastal defense into its East Asian security system. In an April 18, 1958, letter to Peng Dehuai, Soviet minister of defense Marshal Radion I. Malinovskii suggested that they jointly build a radio communications station linking the Chinese navy with the Soviet navy in East Asia. Malinovskii said that the USSR would provide the technology and finance the construction.⁴⁷ Meeting with Mao on July 21,

43 DDZGHGY, 19–22.

44 Premier Zhou's meeting with P. F. Iudin, June 15, 1957, 109-00786-14, FMA; Zhou to Liu Xiaom and Peng Dehuai, December 2, 1957, 109-00791-03, *ibid.*

45 Zhou's meeting with Iudin, May 22, 1957, 109-00786-13, *ibid.* It is interesting to note that an entire paragraph right after Zhou's explicit rejection of the Soviet offer remains classified.

46 Zhou's meeting with Iudin, October 22, 1957, 109-00786-18, *ibid.*

47 P. I. Malinovskii's letter to Peng Dehuai, April 19, 1958, cited in DDZGWJ, 112.

Soviet ambassador Iudin also proposed that the Soviet navy would like to form a joint fleet of nuclear-powered submarines with China in the Far East. Although the Soviet coastline was not appropriate for the Soviet navy's newly developed submarines, Iudin explained, China's "harbor conditions" were suitable for them.⁴⁸

Moscow's proposals led Chinese leaders to believe that the long-suspected Soviet intention to control China was becoming real. Should China agree to build a joint radio station, Mao insisted on June 6, 1958, it would finance the project itself in order to ensure Chinese ownership; otherwise, there would be no deal. Should the USSR agree to provide technological help, Mao stressed, China would be willing to negotiate with Moscow about using its facilities.⁴⁹ Six days later, Mao urged Defense Minister Peng to stick to these principles in his response to Malinovskii, allowing no compromise on China's sovereign rights.⁵⁰

In response to Iudin's "joint submarine flotilla" suggestion, Mao decided to call in the Soviet ambassador for a private meeting on July 22, 1958. He bluntly told Iudin that he was angered by the proposal because the Soviet Union intended to control China through a joint Sino-Soviet ownership scheme. To him, such an attitude was racial: "[To you] the Soviets are the first-class [people] whereas the Chinese are among the inferior who are dumb, careless," and untrustworthy. Should the Soviet Union continue in this vein, Mao said that Moscow might as well take control of China's army and economy, leaving the CCP "only to maintain a guerrilla force."⁵¹

Driven by Russian chauvinism, Mao explained to Iudin, the Kremlin had long ordered the CCP around. An unforgettable example was Stalin's demand to turn the northeast of China and Xinjiang into Soviet "spheres of influence" and insistence on joint ownership and operation of four newly built plants. It was all because Stalin regarded the CCP as "the Second Tito," and treated China "as a backward nation"; other Soviets followed the example by "looking down upon the Chinese people." The Sino-Soviet relationship, Mao asserted, had become a "father-son or cats-mice" one, and the CCP had to accommodate the USSR. Thus, the CCP "never openly" challenged Khrushchev's

48 Mao-Iudin meeting, July 21, 1958, *ibid.*, 113. Mao clearly stated that "first of all we ought to establish a principle; that is, we will be mainly responsible for the program only with your assistance" (*ibid.*).

49 Mao's instruction, June 7, 1958, *MZDWJWX*, 316-17.

50 Peng to Soviet Ministry of National Defense, June 12, 1958, *DDZGWJ*, 113.

51 Mao-Iudin meeting, July 21, 1958, *DDZGWJ*, 114; minutes, conversation between Mao and Iudin, July 22, 1958, *MZDWJWX*, 322-33.

peaceful-evolution idea; it had been consistently backing the Kremlin whenever there was a dispute among the Communist Parties in Eastern Europe. To assist Moscow in resolving the Polish crisis of 1956, Mao told Iudin that he personally tried to persuade the Polish leaders not to challenge Soviet dominance.⁵²

This time, Mao declared, the CCP would stand up against Russian chauvinism. It was his determination that China “won’t get entangled with you.” It was all because Khrushchev’s Kremlin intended to extend Soviet influence to China’s coast with the two proposals. Although bitterly angry with Moscow, Mao did not seem prepared to break the alliance. “It still is possible,” he assured Iudin, that the two governments could “cooperate in many other areas.” Finally, Mao requested that the Soviet ambassador should report back “exactly what I have remarked without any polishing,” which would remind Khrushchev that “he has criticized Stalin’s policies but now adopts them himself.”⁵³

Mao’s protest alarmed the Kremlin. Coming to Beijing on July 31, 1958, Khrushchev affirmed that Moscow would provide only loans and technology for building the radio station, which China would completely own. He also explained to Mao that the Kremlin never intended to establish a joint nuclear submarine force in China, and that Iudin’s proposal was the result of a “misunderstanding.” Although apologetic, Khrushchev reminded Mao that it was Soviet economic power and “rockets” that were “holding back” the United States, implying that China would still need Soviet protection and assistance. Mao conceded that China still needed to rely on the alliance.⁵⁴

Whether or not Beijing would still need Soviet protection was soon tested. Late in August 1958, shortly after Khrushchev’s visit, the PRC began shelling the Nationalist-held offshore islands (Jinmen), initiating the second Taiwan Strait crisis.⁵⁵ Worried about the US reaction, Khrushchev asked the Soviet embassy in Beijing on September 5 to request an urgent meeting between Mao and his personal envoy, Andrei A. Gromyko, who planned to visit Beijing secretly. Intending to draft a letter to Washington to warn the United States not to overreact, Moscow needed to know the CCP’s view. Beijing appreciated Moscow’s offer but suggested the insertion of stronger words in the letter which, it believed, would help to “compel” the United States to talk

52 MZDWJWX, 333.

53 *Ibid.*, 333.

54 Mao–Khrushchev talks, July 31, 1958, DDZGWJ, 114; the Russian version of the minutes is in Wolff, *One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events*, 51–56.

55 For Mao’s decision to shell Jinmen, see Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, 233–37.

with Beijing about a solution to the Taiwan problem.⁵⁶ Assured that China's bombardment of Jinmen was not a prelude to an attack on Taiwan, Khrushchev wrote to President Dwight D. Eisenhower on September 7 that any nuclear attack on China would result in a Soviet nuclear retaliation. Late that month, to reinforce his stance, he sent another letter – which was preapproved by Mao and slightly edited by Zhou – urging Washington to negotiate with Beijing.⁵⁷ When Khrushchev suggested sending a third letter to propose multilateral talks on resolving the Taiwan issue, Beijing declined because the CCP did not want to appear “so anxious” that it might give “the impression of weakness.”⁵⁸ Khrushchev gave in to the Chinese.⁵⁹

But Soviet attitudes toward the CCP remained in flux. PRC ambassador to Moscow Liu Xiao reported on October 20, 1958, that Khrushchev on several occasions stated the Chinese were right “that war must not be feared and peace cannot be begged for.” Other Soviet leaders willingly admitted that China could be a major player in international politics. Khrushchev, moreover, began to stress the need to speed up Soviet economic performance in the “race against time” to prevent general war. These changes, Liu asserted, were positive, but future developments were still uncertain. The Kremlin still “lacked” an accurate understanding of Chinese strategy and tactics for socialist transformation, doubted the People's Commune program, and disagreed with Beijing's anti-imperialist propaganda.⁶⁰

Uncertain of Moscow's reliability, Mao and his colleagues, again, stressed self-reliance as a basic principle of CCP policies. What China had learned in its nationbuilding experience, Mao told two Brazilian journalists in September 1958, was to do away with “blind faith in foreigners.”⁶¹ At the fifteenth session of the Supreme State Conference that same month, he declared that growing “international pressure” compelled the Chinese people to “rely on themselves.”⁶² Partly to prove that China could develop quickly on its own, Mao became even more resolute in pushing the Great Leap Forward. After its

56 Zhou's meeting with a Soviet consular official, September 5, 1958, 109-00833-4, FMA.

57 DDZGWJ, 115-6; Zhou's meeting with Soviet chargé d'affaires, September 19, 1958, 109-00823-01, FMA.

58 Soviet Embassy to Premier Zhou, September 27, 1958, enclosed in Zhou's meeting with Soviet chargé d'affaires, September 29, 1958, 109-00823-02, FMA.

59 Zhou's meeting with Soviet chargé d'affaires, October 7, 1958, 109-00833-02, *ibid.*

60 Liu Xiao to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 20, 1958, in JGYIMZDWG, vol. VII, 486-87.

61 Minutes of conversation, Mao and two Brazilian journalists, September 2, 1958, *ibid.*, vol. VII, 373-74.

62 Mao's speech at the fifteenth meeting of the Supreme State Conference, September 5 and 8, 1958, *ibid.*, vol. VII, 387-89.

launch in the spring of 1958, he kept raising its production goals in hopes of achieving an unprecedented rate of growth without relying on Soviet aid.⁶³

From crisis to collapse

At the end of the 1950s and the start of the 1960s, the growing internal difficulties embedded in the Sino-Soviet alliance evolved into open estrangement. As bilateral differences over domestic and foreign policies became increasingly deep, the mutual distrust that was profoundly rooted in personal, cultural, and racial factors would loom so large that temporary goodwill could not prevent the alliance from collapsing.

At the end of the 1950s, the CCP still hoped to sustain the alliance. Beijing toned down its harsh attitude toward Moscow and expected the latter to do the same. Liu, the ambassador to Moscow, suggested on January 13, 1959, that, in order to save the relationship, the CCP should stop “publicly criticizing” Soviet policies even if they were “wrong” and should be “more sensible” and “more modest” toward Soviet advisers in China.⁶⁴ Endorsing Liu’s suggestion, Mao instructed the rank and file to learn from the Soviet and other Communist countries’ “advanced experiences” as long as they “fit” China’s realities.⁶⁵ He also told the Soviet ambassador and ambassadors of ten other socialist states on May 6 that “all of you are our teachers, but the most important teacher is the Soviet Union.”⁶⁶

The Kremlin also made accommodating gestures toward the CCP. The PRC embassy in Moscow reported on January 24, 1959 that the draft of Khrushchev’s speech for the Twenty-First CPSU Congress contained a statement characterizing the CCP as “loyal to Marxism-Leninism.” Although the CCP “adopt[ed] different methods in constructing socialism,” the draft stressed that Moscow had no “objection” to it. Moreover, the draft speech recognized that “all the socialist states will help and exchange experiences with one another on an equal basis so as to realize Communism simultaneously.” The third draft of the speech, moreover, omitted the word “peace-loving” when characterizing the American people, which was in line with China’s position.⁶⁷

63 Zhang, *Economic Cold War*, 218–23.

64 Liu Xiao to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 13, 1959, in *JGYIMZDWG*, vol. VIII, 5–6.

65 Mao’s instruction, February 13, 1959, *ibid.*, vol. VIII, 41–42.

66 Mao’s speech at the meeting with the delegation of eleven ambassadors, May 6, 1959, *ibid.*, vol. VIII, 248–49.

67 PRC embassy in Moscow to Foreign Ministry, January 24, 1959, 108-00919-09, FMA.

Despite the more relaxed political relationship, CCP leaders remained extremely sensitive about Moscow's criticism of China's economic development, especially when Mao's Great Leap Forward was in grave trouble. On July 2, 1959, the PRC's embassy in Moscow alerted Beijing that some Soviet advisers who had just returned from China had spread "rumors" that the CCP was facing economic chaos. As these stories about China's disaster circulated in Moscow, the embassy stressed, Soviet officials might conclude that the CCP leadership had "committed grave errors." Profoundly concerned about this report, Mao added a note to it which read, "Some Soviet Comrades Are Criticizing Our Great Leap Forward," and directed his associates to "study this matter" further.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, the Kremlin kept trying to press Beijing to adopt a "moderate" policy toward Taiwan and India. When rebuffed by the CCP, Soviet officials complained that Beijing's stubbornness would cause troubles "in the near future."⁶⁹ Pushing for a new *détente* with the United States, Khrushchev expected the CCP to support his initiative.⁷⁰ Invited for an urgent visit to Beijing in late September and early October 1959, Khrushchev held a seven-hour meeting with Mao and other top CCP leaders on October 2 and accused Mao of taking great risks in his belligerence toward Taiwan and India. Irritated by Khrushchev's criticism, Mao and his associates viciously refuted the Soviet leader by calling him a "time-server." The agitated Khrushchev shouted back that Mao intended to "subordinate" him.⁷¹

After Khrushchev left, Mao prepared the rank and file for a tough stance against the Kremlin. At a meeting with his top associates in December 1959, Mao vehemently accused Moscow of seeking to dominate China. He alluded to ten incidents between 1945 and 1959, the most recent attempt coming from Khrushchev. Because the politically "immature" Khrushchev had such a limited understanding of Marxism-Leninism, he was "easily deceived by imperialists." Knowing little about China, he refused to learn, trusted "false intelligence reports," and talked "too freely." Khrushchev, Mao said, was

68 PRC embassy in Moscow to Foreign Ministry, July 2, 1959, enclosed in Mao's instruction, July 19, 1959, JGYIMZDWG, vol. VIII, 367. See also S. Skachkov to the Central Committee, CPSU, July 2, 1959, "On the Present Economic Situation in the PRC," in Wolff, *One Finger's Worth of Historical Events*, 63–64.

69 Political report for 1959, Soviet Embassy in Beijing, cited in M. Y. Prozumenshchikov, "The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," *CWIHP Bulletin* (Winter 1996/97), 252.

70 Chen Yi's meeting with A. Gromyko, October 2, 1959, 204-00078-01, FMA.

71 Minutes of Mao-Khrushchev meeting (Russian version), October 2, 1959, in Wolff, *One Finger's Worth of Historical Events*, 64–68.



29. Nikita Khrushchev (left) and Mao Zedong: a difficult toast during the 1959 meeting in Beijing.

“fearful not only of imperialism but also of Chinese-style Communism, because he is worried that East European and other [Communist] parties will trust not them, but us.” In Mao’s view, all these problems were “historically rooted.” He was certain that Russian chauvinism under Khrushchev would “one day” become much worse. In future years, Mao predicted, Khrushchev might be toppled if he refused to change his policy and attitude.⁷² At another meeting that month, Mao chastised Khrushchev for treating China as a child, preventing its rapid development, refusing to provide the best assistance, and seeking to sabotage China’s current leadership.⁷³

Soviet officials, too, were growing embittered. To prepare his central committee for a possible Sino-Soviet split, Khrushchev circulated a report to the Politburo by senior member Mikhail Suslov on his recent visit to China. Elaborating on the policy differences between Moscow and Beijing, Suslov attributed the Sino-Soviet dispute primarily to Mao. The CCP chairman, he said, tended to “embellish” his successes to the extent that his head had “gotten somewhat dizzy.” Much like Stalin, Suslov reported, Mao was

72 Mao’s speech at the CCP Politburo meeting, December [undated] 1959, *JGYIMZDWG*, vol. VIII, 599–602.

73 Mao’s speech at a meeting in Hangzhou, December [undated] 1959, *ibid.*, vol. VIII, 604.

developing “a cult of personality,” portraying himself as “a great genius” and insisting that he alone made all the crucial decisions. Furthermore, Mao regarded himself as the original Marxist, maintaining that he was infallible and that his work must be viewed “as the final word on creative Marxism.”⁷⁴

It is interesting to note, though, that the CCP still wanted to keep the “internal” dispute from going public. When a U-2 spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union, Beijing openly supported Khrushchev’s protest. On May 8, 1960, Vice Premier He Long proclaimed in Budapest that any “provocative aggression” against the USSR would also mean war against China, suggesting the alliance was still operative.⁷⁵ In private, the PRC Foreign Ministry instructed its embassy in Moscow “not to provoke quarrels” with the Soviets, in particular, when dealing with an international crisis. Whatever the Kremlin said about the alleged American aggression, the embassy should express agreement with it.⁷⁶ Beijing wanted its embassies abroad to assume a “low profile,” hoping to avoid leaving an impression that Khrushchev’s hardened attitude toward Washington was a result of “our influence.” Should the issue be raised, Chinese diplomats were instructed to say that “China and the Soviet Union remain united.”⁷⁷

But efforts to sustain Sino-Soviet unity proved fleeting. At a meeting with his top associates on February 22, 1960, Mao decided that the CCP should prepare a public critique of Khrushchev’s “opportunism” and “revisionism.”⁷⁸ Under Mao’s close supervision, a group of CCP “theorists” drafted a series of articles accusing Khrushchev of betraying Lenin.⁷⁹ In response, Khrushchev orchestrated a “surprise attack” on the CCP at the Budapest gathering of fifty-one Communist and labor parties on June 24–26, which resulted in a resolution criticizing Beijing’s radical domestic and foreign policies.⁸⁰

What started as an ideological polemic soon turned into a diplomatic crisis in Sino-Soviet relations. On July 16, 1960, the Soviet embassy notified the Chinese Foreign Ministry that all Soviet experts would be immediately

74 Suslov’s report, December [undated] 1959, in *CWIHP Bulletin* (Winter 1996/97), 244 and 248; Wolff, *One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events*, 69–72.

75 Foreign Ministry to all embassies, May 11, 1960, 109-00917-01, FMA.

76 PRC embassy in Moscow to Foreign Ministry, May 5, 1960, 109-00917-01, *ibid.*; Foreign Ministry to PRC embassy in Moscow, May 6, 1960, *ibid.*

77 Foreign Ministry to all embassies, May 11, 1960, 109-00917-01, *ibid.*

78 Li Danhui, “A Last Effort: The Sino-Soviet Struggle and Reconciliation in the Early 1960s,” March 27, 2007, www.coldwarchina.com/zgyj/zsjm/002110.html.

79 Mao’s instruction on revisions of the draft *Red Flag* editorial, “Long Live Leninism,” April [undated] 1960, *JGYIMZDWG*, vol. IX, 139–42.

80 *DDZGWJ*, 116–17.

withdrawn from China because of “their unsatisfactory treatment.”⁸¹ Without waiting for China to reply, on July 25, Moscow instructed all Soviet personnel to depart by September 1. Meanwhile, the Kremlin held back more than 900 experts already scheduled to head for China. Within one month, altogether 1,390 Soviet experts had returned, and Moscow had terminated twelve agreements on aid and over 200 cooperative projects on science and technology.⁸²

Although furious, Chinese leaders attempted to minimize the damage. Soviet actions caused huge problems in China, as two-thirds of the 304 Soviet-aid projects were not yet completed. In its first response to Moscow on July 31, Beijing asked the Kremlin to reconsider its decision or, at least, to allow experts to stay until their contracts expired. At a meeting with Soviet ambassador to Beijing Stepan Chervonenko on August 4, Vice Premier Chen Yi asked Moscow to stop “severing the friendship between the two countries.”⁸³ Since the Sino-Soviet estrangement would only benefit their common adversaries, Chen suggested to the Soviet deputy foreign minister two weeks later that Moscow and Beijing should both try to save the alliance.⁸⁴

Thinking hard about Chen’s suggestion, the Soviet ambassador in Beijing tried to mollify his boss’s anger. In a telegram to Moscow, he warned that unilateral termination of aid agreements “would be a violation of international law.” Urging the Kremlin to permit Soviet advisers to stay until their contracts were up, he hoped “things would get patched up at the top.”⁸⁵ Khrushchev, however, refused to yield. He was now resolved to teach the Chinese a lesson. Speaking at the plenum of the Central Committee in 1960, he complained that, whenever he met with Mao, he felt as if he were “talking with Stalin and listening to Stalin,” something that he could no longer tolerate.⁸⁶

Seeing no change of policy on the Soviet part, Chinese leaders began to harden their attitudes. Accusing Moscow of “seriously violating” international law, the PRC Foreign Ministry asserted that China would now prove that it could never be intimidated by “socialist imperialist blackmail.”⁸⁷ Meeting with

81 Soviet Embassy in Beijing to Foreign Ministry, July 16, 1960, 9–16, 109-00924-01, FMA. Another source indicated that the note was dated July 18, 1960: *CWIHP Bulletin*, (Winter 1996/97), 249–50.

82 *DDZGWJ*, 117–18.

83 *Ibid.*

84 Chen Yi’s meeting with Soviet deputy foreign minister, August 20, 1960, 135–37, 109-00933-15, FMA.

85 Cited in William Taubman, “Khrushchev vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the Sino-Soviet Split,” *CWIHP Bulletin* (Winter 1996/97), 247.

86 Khrushchev’s speech is cited in Prozumenshchikov, *ibid.*, 252.

87 PRC Foreign Ministry to Soviet Foreign Ministry, August 13, September 20, and October 23, 1960, f. 0100, op. 2, p. 453 (1960), RFMA.

a high-ranking Soviet delegation in September, Deng Xiaoping admitted that the withdrawal of experts had hurt China, but retorted that the Chinese people would be mobilized “to make up for the losses and build our own nation with our own hands.”⁸⁸ At an enlarged Politburo meeting on November 17, Zhou Enlai pointed out that the termination of Soviet aid provided an opportunity for the CCP to demonstrate that “difficulties” could be overcome through “self-reliance.” Believing that a nation would have a better chance to develop “under strenuous circumstances,” Zhou wanted to galvanize the nation to work “with one will to make the country strong.”⁸⁹

Mao felt that the Sino-Soviet estrangement liberated the CCP. At a meeting of the Central Committee on January 18, 1961, he urged his associates not to fear conflict with the Soviets. The worst outcome might be a break in cultural and economic relationships. As long as China was prepared for these contingencies, he believed, “we will not be intimidated in the least” even if Khrushchev severed all relations with China.⁹⁰

Nor would Mao be placated by Moscow’s offer to provide relief when a devastating famine, resulting from the Great Leap Forward, afflicted China. Khrushchev offered to loan 1 million tons of grain and half a million tons of sugar, both desperately needed in China, but Mao no longer trusted Khrushchev, and he rejected the assistance.⁹¹ Later, when Moscow offered a five-year deferment on payments for commercial transactions in 1960 (up to the amount of 288 million rubles), the CCP turned it down. Instead, Mao somehow found the money to pay the Soviets two years ahead of the due date.⁹² Whereas the Chinese regarded the Soviets as “evil-minded,” the Kremlin viewed the Chinese as stubborn and “ungrateful.”⁹³

The Sino-Soviet rift dramatically changed the Cold War in Asia. Moscow notified Beijing in August 1961 of its acceptance of a US proposal for a treaty that would ban certain forms of nuclear testing, that would forbid any nuclear power from transferring nuclear technology to any nonnuclear country, and that would prohibit nonnuclear countries from producing or acquiring

88 DDZGWJ, 118.

89 Zhou’s speech, November 17, 1961, ZELNP, vol. I, 370.

90 Mao’s remarks, January 18, 1961, cited in Yang Kuisong, “Toward the Split: How the CCP Faced the Sino-Soviet Crisis,” unpublished paper, Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, 10.

91 Zhou’s meeting with Chervonenko, March 8, 1961, ZELNP, vol. II, 397.

92 DDZGDWY, vol. III, 263.

93 John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics, 1963–1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 141–42.

nuclear technology. Such stipulations would endanger China's ongoing nuclear projects. Beijing reacted angrily, protesting that Soviet acceptance of the treaty would violate China's sovereignty.⁹⁴ Regarding the treaty as Moscow's attempt to collude with the United States to contain China, the CCP decided to speed up China's atomic project. In early November 1962, it set the year 1964 as the best time to explode its first bomb.⁹⁵ At the same time, wary of Indian "expansionism" and suspicious of Khrushchev's siding with Jawaharlal Nehru in the Sino-Indian border dispute, Beijing did not hesitate to attack India in October 1962. Zhou Enlai explained to the Soviet ambassador to Beijing that China could no longer stand India's provocation and was "determined to counterattack."⁹⁶ The Chinese leaders suspected that Moscow was colluding with New Delhi, thereby assisting a dangerous enemy on their border.

Why did the alliance collapse?

Both Moscow and Beijing should have benefited from a Cold War alliance. Indeed, the leaders in both capitals had tried to maintain the alliance by resolving differences through direct communications and through what they regarded as a fair exchange of resources. But unlike the key Western Cold War alliances, the Sino-Soviet one failed in the end. In explaining the Sino-Soviet estrangement, some historians have pointed to the differences in leaders' personality and psychology; others credited it to US attempts at driving a wedge between the two.⁹⁷ More recent scholarship argues that culturally bound factors such as values, beliefs, and historical memories contributed to the collapse of the compact.

The historical consciousness of Chinese leaders largely shaped their attitudes toward Moscow. Given their strong sentiment about "foreign devils" and "national humiliations," the CCP leaders could hardly relinquish their memories of Russian chauvinism, which they continued to see in Stalin's behavior regarding aid, trade, and advisers. Within this context, they treated Khrushchev's reluctance to offer the most advanced (especially atomic) technology, his proposal for further integration, and his harsh criticism of Mao's

94 DDZGWJ, 119–20.

95 ZELZ, vol. IV, 1745–47.

96 Zhou's meeting with Chervonenko, October 8, 1962, cited *ibid.*, 1657.

97 Taubman, "Khrushchev vs. Mao"; Jack L. Snyder, "The Psychology of Escalation: Sino-Soviet Relations, 1958–1963," RAND Paper, P-6191, 1978.

domestic and foreign policies as new evidence of a chauvinistic and expansionist USSR.

The Russian ethnocentric view of the Chinese formed the basis of the Kremlin's China policy. Seeing the world through the prism of their own beliefs, Soviet leaders could not allow the CCP to take a different path from theirs. Locked in their own belief system, Soviet officials expected their "junior partner" to adopt the Soviet model of socialist transformation. While denouncing Mao for his misunderstanding of the Cold War's big picture, Khrushchev failed to respect the Chinese emphasis on independence, sovereignty, and self-reliance in foreign relations. Kremlin leaders often found it hard to understand why the Chinese seemed so "stubborn" on these principles, even at the risk of losing badly needed Soviet aid.

Coming from different traditions, the Chinese and the Soviets harbored different expectations of the partnership. The Chinese tended to stress personal trustworthiness in a relationship: you can only deal with a person when there is trust. Believing that policy stances reflected a person's character, Mao took all policy differences as personal affronts. Stalin and then Khrushchev, in his view, did not pay due respect to him, and were thus untrustworthy. On the other hand, the Soviets attached greater importance to structural interests in a partnership. They believed the Chinese were in need of assistance and that Beijing had little to offer in return. Regarding the alliance as asymmetric, they were frustrated about the CCP's emphasis on building personal relations and found it hard to understand why the Chinese stressed equality and reciprocity.

The personal clashes between Khrushchev and Mao were defined by cultural differences. Having acted in official capacities under Stalinism, Khrushchev showed a limited ability to tolerate challenges and believed in the utility of coercion to resolve differences. A good student of Chinese traditions, Mao overreacted to challenges because he saw them as threats to his long-term plans. From this perspective, he regarded Khrushchev as a short-sighted opportunist: when in need of Beijing's support, Khrushchev was willing to accommodate; otherwise, he never shied away from coercion. In Khrushchev's judgment, Mao became China's Stalin: the only way for Mao to secure control was to build a cult of personality, not just in China but eventually within the world Communist movement.

Mao believed Khrushchev tried to dominate him while Khrushchev thought Mao treated him as a "subordinate." The same feeling, ironically, seemed rooted in the same oriental traditions. Bound by natural ties of kindness on one side and devotion on the other, the oriental way of relationship-building requires favors in exchange for loyalty. Both Mao and Khrushchev thought of

themselves as benefactors: Mao supported Khrushchev politically, and Khrushchev aided Mao economically. Each leader expected his largesse to be reciprocated with appreciation and deference; when this did not happen, each viewed the other as returning kindness with ingratitude. The mutually patronizing attitude invariably produced mutual animosity.

The increasingly difficult relationship between Beijing and Moscow between 1954 and 1962 shows that common interests in fighting common enemies were not enough to sustain an alliance between the two Communist powers. China and the Soviet Union failed to overcome the perceptions and misperceptions derived from their culturally bound ethnocentrism.

Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962

DAVID HOLLOWAY

Nuclear weapons are so central to the history of the Cold War that it can be difficult to disentangle the two. Did nuclear weapons cause the Cold War? Did they contribute to its escalation? Did they help to keep the Cold War “cold”? We should also ask how the Cold War shaped the development of atomic energy. Was the nuclear-arms race a product of Cold War tension rather than its cause?

The atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War

The nuclear age began before the Cold War. During World War II, three countries decided to build the atomic bomb: Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Britain put its own work aside and joined the Manhattan Project as a junior partner in 1943. The Soviet effort was small before August 1945. The British and American projects were driven by the fear of a German atomic bomb, but Germany decided in 1942 not to make a serious effort to build the bomb. In an extraordinary display of scientific and industrial might, the United States made two bombs ready for use by August 1945. Germany was defeated by then, but President Harry S. Truman decided to use the bomb against Japan.

The decision to use the atomic bomb has been a matter of intense controversy. Did Truman decide to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order, as he claimed, to end the war with Japan without further loss of American lives? Or did he drop the bombs in order to intimidate the Soviet Union, without really needing them to bring the war to an end? His primary purpose was surely to force Japan to surrender, but he also believed that the bomb would help him in his dealings with Iosif V. Stalin. That latter consideration was secondary, but it confirmed his decision.¹ Whatever Truman’s motives, Stalin regarded the use

1 I here follow Barton Bernstein’s interpretation. See his “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1995, 135–52.



30. Mushroom cloud over Nagasaki, 1945.

of the bomb as an anti-Soviet move, designed to deprive the Soviet Union of strategic gains in the Far East and more generally to give the United States the upper hand in defining the postwar settlement. On August 20, 1945, two weeks to the day after Hiroshima, Stalin signed a decree setting up a Special Committee on the Atomic Bomb, under the chairmanship of Lavrentii P. Beria.² The Soviet project was now a crash program.

² The decree is in L. D. Riabev (ed.), *Atomnyi proekt SSSR: dokumenty i materialy*, vol. II, *Atomnaia bomba 1945–1954*, book 1 [The Atomic Project of the USSR: Documents and Materials, vol. II, The Atomic Bomb 1945–1954, book 1] (Moscow: Nauka, 1999), 11–13.

In 1946, the United States and the Soviet Union, along with several other countries, began negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations to bring atomic energy under international control. These negotiations failed. It was national governments rather than international organizations that were to determine the future of atomic energy. The United States built up its nuclear arsenal, slowly at first, but with increasing urgency as relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated. In September 1948, Truman endorsed a National Security Council paper (NSC 30), "Policy on Atomic Warfare," which concluded that the United States must be ready to "utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic weapons, in the interest of national security and must therefore plan accordingly."³ The atomic air offensive became the central element in US strategy for a war against the Soviet Union. The Strategic Air Command (SAC), which had been established in March 1946, was the spearhead of American military power.

In 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) set up a committee to examine how effective an atomic air offensive would be, and it reported in May 1949 that an atomic attack on seventy Soviet cities would not defeat the Soviet Union.⁴ That assumption was written into the "Offtackle" Emergency War Plan, which was approved by the JCS in December 1949 and remained operative for two years. This envisaged a war in several stages. The Soviet Union would launch offensives in Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East; it would also bomb Britain, assail Allied lines of communications, and try to attack the United States by air. Strategic bombing would not stop the Soviet offensives. The Western Allies would be too weak to hold Western Europe; they would have to try to secure the United Kingdom and hold on to North Africa. The resulting situation would be like that of 1942–43. The Allies would carry out strategic bombing attacks, build up Britain as a major base, and begin to move outwards from North Africa with the aim of reentering the European continent. World War III would be decided by campaigns like those of 1944–45.⁵

The Soviet atomic project was an enormous undertaking for a country that had been devastated by the war. The first Soviet test took place on August 29, 1949, twenty months later than the target date established by the Soviet

3 "NSC 30: United States Policy on Atomic Warfare," September 10, 1948, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, vol. I, pt. 2 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), 628 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

4 David Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960," *International Security*, 7, 4 (Spring 1983), 16.

5 Walter S. Poole, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, vol. IV, 1950–1952 (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1980), 161–62.

government in 1946, but several years earlier than the Central Intelligence Agency thought probable.⁶ The Soviet Union strengthened its air defenses to deal with an American atomic air offensive and enhanced its capacity to conduct large-scale strategic operations by restructuring its ground and air forces. From the fragmentary evidence available, it appears that in 1950 the Soviet image of a future war was very much the same as the American: an atomic air offensive by the United States, which would not succeed in defeating the Soviet Union, and large-scale Soviet offensive operations to push the Western powers out of Europe and the Middle East.⁷ In the first five years after the war, neither American nor Soviet military planners saw the atomic bomb as a weapon that would by itself win a world war.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers grew steadily worse in the five years after World War II. The role of nuclear weapons in this deterioration was subtle but important. Truman did not issue explicit nuclear threats against the Soviet Union, but the nuclear factor was present even when not specifically invoked. The most overt use of the bomb in support of foreign policy took place in July 1948, when Truman dispatched B-29 bombers to Europe during the Berlin crisis. Though not modified to carry atomic bombs, these bombers were intended to signal that the United States would defend Western Europe with nuclear weapons if necessary. For the United States, the bomb provided a counterweight, in psychological and political as well as military terms, to Soviet military power in Europe.

Stalin feared that the United States would use the bomb to put pressure on the Soviet Union, and he was determined not to let that happen. He adopted a policy of what he called “tenacity and steadfastness.”⁸ This first became apparent in September 1945 at the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, where the Soviet Union took a tough stand on issues relating to the postwar settlement. Instead of proving more pliable and willing to compromise, as the Americans had hoped, Stalin adopted a policy of stubbornness, for fear of seeming weak and inviting further pressure.

In spite of the growing international tension of the late 1940s, there was little expectation that a new world war would break out soon. All three Allies

6 Riabev (ed.), *Atomnyi proekt SSSR*, 435; David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 220.

7 Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 227–42.

8 I. V. Stalin to V. M. Molotov, G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria, A. I. Mikoian, December 9, 1945, in *Politburo TsK VKP(b) i sovet ministrov SSSR 1945–1953* [The Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR 1945–1953] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002), 202.

demobilized, though to varying degrees. The bomb nevertheless cast a shadow over relations. It gave the Americans confidence and enhanced their willingness to make security commitments, most notably the commitment to Western Europe embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949. The bomb had a dual effect on Soviet policy. It inspired caution and restraint, but it also made the Soviet Union less willing to compromise for fear of appearing vulnerable to intimidation. The bomb made the postwar relationship even more tense and contentious than it would have been in any case.

Nuclear weapons and the Korean War

On September 24, 1949, almost four weeks after the Soviet nuclear test, the Soviet Politburo instructed the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, not to attack the South. North Korea, it said, was not prepared in military or political terms for such an attack. Four months later, on January 30, 1950, Stalin let Kim know that he was now willing to help him in this matter.⁹ Why did Stalin change his mind? When Kim visited Moscow in March and April, Stalin explained to him that the Chinese communists could now devote more attention to Korea. The Chinese Revolution was evidently more important than the Soviet bomb in Stalin's decision to support Kim. Stalin cannot have thought that the nuclear balance of forces had changed very much, because the Soviet arsenal grew very slowly; it was not until November 1 and December 28, 1949, that the Soviet Union had enough plutonium for its second and third bombs.¹⁰

The war did not turn out as Moscow and Beijing had hoped. The United States intervened under the auspices of the United Nations and, as UN forces advanced into North Korea, the Chinese, who had supported Kim's plans, had to decide whether or not to enter the war. Those opposed to entry feared that the United States would use the atomic bomb in order to avoid defeat. Those in favor argued that China's alliance with the Soviet Union, which now had the bomb, would deter the United States from using nuclear weapons.¹¹ Stalin stiffened Chinese resolve by reassuring Mao Zedong that the United States

9 A. V. Torkunov, *Zagadochnaia voina: koreiskii konflikt 1950–1953 godov* [The Mysterious War: The Korean Conflict 1950–1953] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000), 46, 55.

10 Protocol of the meeting of the Special Committee, October 22, 1949, in Riabev (ed.), *Atomnyi proekt SSSR*, 392.

11 Sergei N. Goncharov, John Wilson Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 164–67.

was not ready for a “big war” and that, in any event, China and the Soviet Union together were stronger than the United States and Britain.¹²

China’s entry into the war caused alarm in Washington. On November 30, 1950, Truman created the impression, in answer to a reporter’s question, that the atomic bomb might be used in Korea at General Douglas MacArthur’s discretion. This caused an outcry. Clement Attlee flew to Washington on December 4 for reassurance that Truman was not actively considering the use of the bomb and that the decision to use it would remain in the president’s hands.¹³ Truman did not seriously consider using the bomb during the Korean War. He deployed nuclear-capable B-29s to Britain and to Guam in July 1950 but without nuclear weapons. The purpose was partly, as in the Berlin crisis, to signal American resolve and partly to enhance strategic readiness for a possible war. The bombers in Guam were soon withdrawn. In April 1951, Truman authorized the deployment of B-29 bombers and nuclear weapons to Guam. This was the first time since 1945 that the United States had sent nuclear weapons abroad. The purpose of the deployment was to be ready to respond in case the Soviet Union should enter the war. The bombers and the weapons were withdrawn in July, once the armistice talks began.

The Pentagon and the State Department studied at various times the possible use of the atomic bomb in Korea, but the studies only pointed up the difficulties. There were few good targets in Korea itself: using the bomb on the battlefield would produce little effect if Chinese and North Korean forces were dispersed, and it might harm UN forces if the two sides were engaged in close battle. Using the bomb against Chinese or Soviet bases in Manchuria, or against Chinese cities, would lead to an expansion of the war, which Washington wanted to avoid. Besides, United States allies in NATO were strongly opposed to the use of the bomb, and to use it once more against Asians might undermine the American position in Asia.

Truman was forthright in defending his decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki but he did not want to use this terrible weapon again. President Eisenhower was more willing to contemplate its use. He told the NSC on February 11, 1953, that the United States should consider employing tactical atomic weapons in Korea. At the same meeting, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles spoke of inhibitions on the use of the bomb, and of “Soviet success to date in setting atomic weapons apart from all other weapons as being in a

12 Torkunov, *Zagadochnaia voina*, 116–17.

13 Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 398–401.

special category.”¹⁴ At an NSC meeting on March 31, Eisenhower commented that he and Dulles “were in complete agreement that somehow or other the tabu which surrounds the use of atomic weapons would have to be destroyed.”¹⁵ The Eisenhower administration dropped hints that it would resort to nuclear weapons to bring the Korean War to an end, and it deployed nuclear weapons to Guam. Eisenhower later claimed that it was the threat to use the bomb that made possible the armistice signed on July 27, 1953. Recent evidence from the Russian archives suggests that, whatever role indirect nuclear threats may have played, it was Stalin’s death on March 5 that was the key event in bringing the war to an end.¹⁶

Military planners thought of the bomb as another weapon to be used in war, but policymakers, influenced perhaps by the peace movement and public opinion, saw it as being in a class of its own. Eisenhower and Dulles regarded this as a constraint and complained about it. Putting the bomb in a special category made it more difficult to use, because its use would have to be justified by special factors. The distinction between “conventional” and “nuclear” weapons began to emerge at the end of the 1940s, reinforcing the idea that the bomb belonged in a special category. Each side was willing to put intense pressure on the other, but – as Soviet and US policy in the Korean War made clear – neither wanted what Stalin called the “big war.” Viacheslav Molotov said many years later that the Cold War involved pressure by each side on the other, but “of course you have to know the limits.”¹⁷ The bomb, because it was so clearly in a category of its own, marked one important limit: to use it would mean crossing a significant threshold on the path to general war.

The hydrogen bomb

The hydrogen bomb, which uses a fission bomb to ignite thermonuclear fuel, marked a new and extremely important stage in the nuclear-arms race. Los Alamos worked on the hydrogen bomb during and after World War II, but did not come up with a workable design. The Soviet test of August 1949 provided a new impetus, and on January 31, 1950, Truman announced that the

14 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 131st Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, February 11, 1953,” *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. XV, 770.

15 “Memorandum of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council on Tuesday, March 31, 1953,” *ibid.*, 827.

16 Torkunov, *Zagadochnaia voina*, 272–90.

17 *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: iz dnevnika F. Chueva* [One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov: From the Diary of F. Chuev] (Moscow: Terra, 1991), 88–89.

United States would develop the superbomb, as the hydrogen bomb was known. The “Mike” test on November 1, 1952, produced an explosive yield of 10 megatons, demonstrating that the United States had now mastered the basic design concepts (staging and radiation implosion) that made the superbomb possible. In the spring of 1954, the United States conducted a series of thermonuclear tests in the South Pacific, and one of the devices tested was more than 1,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima (15 megatons of TNT equivalent, as opposed to 13.5 kilotons). The Soviet Union did not lag far behind. In August 1953, it tested an intermediate type of hydrogen bomb, and in November 1955 it conducted a test that showed that it too knew how to build a superbomb.

Public opinion around the world was shocked by these tests and by the dangers that thermonuclear weapons presented; the tests gave a powerful impetus to antinuclear movements in the United States, Europe, and Asia. The political leaders of the three nuclear powers – Britain had tested a fission bomb in October 1952 – were also shaken. After his election as president, Dwight D. Eisenhower received a report on the US Mike shot. He was troubled by the report and in his inaugural address declared: “science seems ready to confer upon us, as its final gift, the power to erase human life from this planet.”¹⁸ On March 9, 1954, Winston Churchill, who was once again prime minister, wrote to Eisenhower after reading an account of that same Mike shot: “You can imagine what my thoughts are about London. I am told that several million people would certainly be obliterated by four or five of the latest H Bombs.”¹⁹ On March 12, 1954, the Soviet premier, Georgii M. Malenkov, made a speech in which he said that “a new world war ... with modern weapons [would mean] the end of world civilization.”²⁰

Eisenhower was convinced that the Soviet leaders did not want war, because war would put at risk their hold on power, but the prospect of growing Soviet nuclear strength impelled him to make sure that the Soviet leaders understood just how destructive a nuclear war would be. At the Geneva summit in July 1955 – the first meeting of Soviet and Western leaders since Potsdam ten years earlier – he made a special effort to impress upon them the terrible

18 Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, *Atoms for Peace and War 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 3–4, 34.

19 Winston Churchill to Dwight D. Eisenhower, March 9, 1954, in Peter G. Boyle (ed.), *The Churchill–Eisenhower Correspondence 1953–1955* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 123.

20 “Rech’ tovarishcha G. M. Malenkova” [Comrade G. M. Malenkov’s Speech], *Izvestiia*, March 13, 1954, 2.

consequences of a nuclear war, pointing in particular to the danger of nuclear fallout. At dinner one evening he explained with great earnestness that the development of modern weapons was such that the country that used them “genuinely risked destroying itself.”²¹ Because of the prevailing winds, he added, a major war would destroy the northern hemisphere.

The Geneva summit did not yield any major agreements, but Eisenhower returned to Washington believing, as he put it in a television broadcast, that “there seem[ed] to be a growing realization by all that nuclear warfare, pursued to the ultimate, could be practically race suicide.”²² Anthony Eden, the British prime minister, drew very much the same conclusion: “Each country present learnt that no country attending wanted war and each understood why ... this situation had been created by the deterrent power of thermo-nuclear weapons.”²³ Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs that he returned from Geneva “encouraged, realizing that our enemies probably feared us as much as we feared them.”²⁴

By the mid-1950s, the political leaders of each of the nuclear states understood that nuclear war was unacceptable in some profound, if ill-defined, way. Each of them knew that the others understood this too, and each of them knew that each knew that the others understood it. The unacceptability of nuclear war had thus become “common knowledge” among those who had the authority to launch nuclear weapons.²⁵ The situation was neatly summed up by a comment Khrushchev made to an American official in April 1956: “Nearly everyone knew that war was unacceptable and that coexistence was elementary.”²⁶

Nuclear deterrence

Washington did not expect its nuclear monopoly to end so quickly. Truman called for a study of the implications of the August 1949 Soviet test. The

21 “Memorandum for the Record of the President’s Dinner, President’s Villa, Geneva, July 18, 1955, 8 p.m.,” *FRUS, 1955–1957*, vol. V, 376.

22 Quoted in McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988), 302.

23 Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (London: Cassell, 1960), 306.

24 N. S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, vol. I (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), 427.

25 Something is “common knowledge” in a group if each member knows it, knows that the others know it, knows that each one knows that the others know it, and so on. It is important for coordinated action. See David K. Lewis, *Convention: A Philosophical Study* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 52–60.

26 “Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, April 25, 1956,” *FRUS, 1955–1957*, vol. XX, 380. The official was Harold Stassen.

resulting paper, NSC 68 (“United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”), warned that within four or five years the Soviet Union would be able to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States and called for a rapid buildup of air, ground, and sea forces, and of nuclear forces too.²⁷ This recommendation seemed unrealistic when NSC 68 was submitted in April 1950, but it gained a new relevance when the Korean War broke out in June. The United States and Britain began major rearmament programs, and NATO committed itself to ambitious force levels.

The economic impact of these programs soon caused concern. The British Chiefs of Staff argued in the spring of 1952 that the primary deterrent against Soviet aggression should be provided not by expensive conventional forces, but by the threat of nuclear retaliation. Eisenhower took the view that the federal budget – including the defense budget, which had grown threefold between 1950 and 1953 – had reached the point where it was damaging the economy. His “New Look” national security policy, which was set out in NSC 162/2 (“Basic National Security Policy”) and adopted on October 30, 1953, aimed to reduce the defense burden. Its most striking innovation was the emphasis it placed on nuclear weapons: “in the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions.”²⁸ The United States would rely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter large-scale aggression by the Soviet Union. Any major war with the Soviet Union would be a nuclear war.

NSC 162/2 took a more sanguine view of the Soviet threat than NSC 68 had done. It backed away from the idea of an imminent year of maximum danger. The Soviet Union, it argued, was unlikely to launch a general war against the United States in the near future, and it foresaw the time when the two countries would have so many nuclear weapons that there would be “a stalemate, with both sides reluctant to initiate general warfare.”²⁹ The main challenge was rivalry “over the long pull”; that was why economic strength was so important.³⁰ NSC 162/2 argued that local aggression by the Communist powers could be inhibited by the threat of a nuclear response, even though that threat would become less effective as Soviet nuclear forces grew.

Nuclear deterrence was now the organizing principle of US national security policy. Eisenhower rejected the idea of preventive war against the Soviet

27 Ernest R. May (ed.), *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68* (Boston, MA: Bedford Books, 1993), 23–82.

28 “Basic National Security Policy,” *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. II, 593.

29 *Ibid.*, 581. See also Robert J. McMahon’s chapter in this volume.

30 *Ibid.*, 582.

Union, which seemed to some senior officers to be a realistic option in the early 1950s; "there are all sorts of reasons, moral and political and everything else, against this theory," he told a press conference in 1954.³¹ He expedited the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), as well as reconnaissance satellites. He deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Europe and other theaters. The basic Cold War structure of US nuclear forces took shape during his presidency.

Eisenhower's New Look policy was widely criticized in the United States for lacking credibility against all but the most extreme threats. The United States, in the eyes of the critics, would have to respond to limited aggression by choosing between doing nothing and starting a general war. Credibility was understood to be essential for deterrence, and the problem of making credible threats came to occupy a central place in theoretical analyses of deterrence and in discussions of US national security policy. It was a particular problem for NATO as Soviet nuclear forces grew: was it credible for the United States, once it became vulnerable to Soviet nuclear strikes, to threaten to use nuclear weapons to defend its allies?

Soviet policy after Stalin's death in March 1953 ran parallel to American policy in some key respects. The Soviet Union cut back the conventional forces that it too had built up in the early 1950s. It placed increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons and on ballistic missiles as the means to deliver them; in December 1959, it created a new military service, the Strategic Rocket Forces, which now became the spearhead of Soviet military power. The post-Stalin leaders moved away from the idea of an imminent year of maximum danger, which Stalin had adopted in the early 1950s. The concept of "peaceful coexistence," which suggested that war could be postponed indefinitely, was the Soviet equivalent of Eisenhower's rivalry "over the long pull." Nikita Khrushchev, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), attacked Malenkov for his statement that a new world war would mean the end of world civilization, but he did declare, at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, that war was no longer fatally inevitable, because the Soviet Union now had the means to prevent it.³²

The Soviet Union was very secretive about its armed forces, and overstated rather than underplayed its military power. In the absence of firm information, exaggerated fears erupted in Washington, reinforced by bureaucratic interests. There was a "bomber gap" scare in 1955 when air force intelligence

31 Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, 251.

32 Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 335–45.

predicted that the Soviet Union would soon have far more bombers than the United States. A second scare, the “missile gap,” was triggered by the launch of Sputnik in October 1957, which demonstrated that the Soviet Union could deliver a warhead on an intercontinental trajectory. Khrushchev added to American anxieties by bragging about Soviet superiority.

Eisenhower did not share the prevailing sense of alarm. He was skeptical of the claim that the Soviet Union was rapidly overtaking the United States. He knew that the photographs obtained by the U-2 spy plane, incomplete though their coverage was, showed no evidence of a rapidly growing Soviet ICBM force. The missile gap was laid to rest only when John F. Kennedy, who had criticized Eisenhower for complacency in the face of mortal danger, became president. By the summer of 1961, it was clear from satellite photographs that whatever gap existed was in favor of the United States.

Throughout this period the United States maintained a considerable superiority in nuclear forces. Between 1950 and 1962, the US nuclear stockpile grew from 369 weapons to over 27,000, while the Soviet stockpile grew from a handful of bombs to about 3,300. The American capacity to deliver nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union was much greater than the Soviet capacity to launch nuclear strikes against the United States. The United States had many more long-range bombers than the Soviet Union, and it also had bases close to the Soviet Union, in Europe, Asia, and North Africa, as well as forward-deployed aircraft carriers. The Soviet Union had no aircraft carriers and no bases close to the United States. For technical as well as strategic reasons, the Soviet Union focused first on the deployment of medium-range – rather than intercontinental – bombers and missiles that could strike the bases and carrier groups from which US forces could attack Soviet territory. In spite of the early Soviet lead in ICBM development, the United States moved forward more quickly with deployment. By 1962, the United States had 203 ICBMs and 144 SLBMs, compared with the Soviet Union’s 36 ICBMs and 72 SLBMs.³³

By 1960, the United States and the Soviet Union had an image of a future war that was very different from the one they had shared in 1950.³⁴ First, each side conceived of a nuclear war as starting with a full-scale strategic nuclear

33 Archive of Nuclear Data on the National Resources Defense Council website, www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp.

34 *Sovremennaiia voina* [Modern War] (Moscow: Academy of the General Staff, 1960), a study carried out under the direction of Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, chief of the General Staff; and Scott D. Sagan, “SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy,” *International Studies*, 12, 1 (Summer 1987), 22–51.

attack against a mix of targets. In each case, the most urgent targets would be the other side's strategic nuclear forces, but centers of military and government control, as well as industrial and transportation centers, would also be attacked. Second, each side aimed to win. Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, chief of the General Staff, declared in 1960 that World War III would inevitably end in the victory of Communism. He did, however, assert his military professionalism by emphasizing that victory had to be prepared for and would not come by itself.³⁵ General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, chairman of the JCS, assured Kennedy in 1961 that execution of the SIOP (the Single Integrated Operational Plan) "should permit the United States to prevail in the event of general nuclear war."³⁶

Third, each side feared a surprise attack by the other. That fear was compounded by memories of the German attack on the Soviet Union and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Each side regarded it as essential to be able to preempt such an attack. In the 1950s, each side had a strong incentive to preempt by striking first. The United States might have been able to destroy a large part of the Soviet strategic force, thereby reducing the impact of a Soviet retaliatory strike. The Soviet Union, by the same token, could have lost a great part of its strategic force if it failed to go first; preemption, on the other hand, would allow it to blunt an American attack by destroying US forward-based systems.


Some analysts worried that the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack" might create a spiral of anxiety and suspicion that would result in one side's attacking for fear that the other was about to do so, but that did not happen.³⁷ Preemption would have been a difficult strategy to implement. It required accurate warning of an impending attack, and the danger of "going late" was counterbalanced by the danger of "going early," in the sense of starting an unnecessary and unwanted war. Moreover, neither side believed that it could escape retaliation if it launched the first strike.³⁸ Even though each side regarded retaliation as a less desirable option than preemption, both sides tried to make sure they would be able to launch a retaliatory strike. Besides, the political leaders of the nuclear states believed that nuclear war would be a catastrophe, and each knew that the others

35 *Sovremennaia voina*, 53.

36 Sagan, "SIOP-62," 51.

37 Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), ch. 9.

38 *Sovremennaia voina*, 50; Sagan, "SIOP-62," 50.



3. US–USSR/Russian nuclear stockpile, 1945–2002.

Source: www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/dafig11.asp.

knew that, and so on. That common knowledge served as a factor of restraint and reassurance at a time when the strategic balance offered incentives for preemption.

Britain and France

The United States stopped nuclear cooperation with Britain at the end of World War II, much to the annoyance of the British government. There was widespread agreement in the country that Britain should have a bomb of its own, and this was reinforced by two specific anxieties. The first was that Britain did not want to repeat the experience of 1939–41 when it had stood virtually alone against Germany; the second was the fear that the United States, which was less vulnerable to attack than Britain, might rashly precipitate war. Britain hoped that the bomb would help it both to deter the Soviet Union and to influence the United States.

Britain tested the atomic bomb in October 1952 and the hydrogen bomb in May 1957. In 1958, the United States amended the Atomic Energy Act to permit close cooperation in nuclear weapons research, design, and production with countries that had already made “substantial progress” on their own. Britain achieved what Prime Minister Harold Macmillan called “the great prize,” when agreements were signed in 1958 to establish the basis for collaboration in

the design and development of nuclear weapons.³⁹ Cooperation extended to the coordination of strike plans and the transfer of US nuclear weapons to Britain in the event of war.

French nuclear policy followed a quite different course. After the war, France focused on the peaceful uses of atomic energy; the decision to build the bomb was taken later and in stages. In 1952, the government decided to build two reactors suited to plutonium production; in December 1954, the government decided that France should build the bomb; two years later, a secret committee was set up to bring together the scientists and the military chiefs. On April 11, 1958, Prime Minister Felix Gaillard signed the order to make and test the bomb. General Charles de Gaulle reaffirmed this decision when he took power in June of the same year, and in February 1960 the first French bomb was tested in the Sahara.

Several different motives shaped the French decision, but the most important was the insistence on having a voice in decisions affecting France's survival as a state. This was true of the governments of the Fourth Republic, which were concerned that without nuclear weapons they would have no influence on NATO's strategic planning. It was even more true of General de Gaulle, who doubted the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee to Western Europe. He proposed in September 1958 that a triumvirate consisting of the United States, Britain, and France be formed in NATO with the power to take joint decisions on questions affecting global security and to draw up joint strategic plans. This was so important to France, he said, that it would withdraw from NATO's military organization if his proposal were not adopted.⁴⁰ Eisenhower was willing to promise regular consultations, but that did not satisfy de Gaulle.

Nuclear threats and nuclear crises

Leaders on both sides tried to exploit nuclear weapons for political advantage. Eisenhower concluded from the Korean War that nuclear threats worked. That belief underpinned his New Look policy, which aimed to use nuclear threats to deter local aggression. As Dulles explained, the United States "would depend primarily on a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by

39 Alastair Horne, *Macmillan 1957–1986: Volume II of the Official Biography* (London: Macmillan, 1989), 56.

40 Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur: politique étrangère de général de Gaulle, 1958–1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), 117–25.

means and at places of our own choosing.”⁴¹ Eisenhower and Dulles considered using nuclear weapons in three crises in Asia. The first was in Indochina, where France was facing a Communist insurgency in Vietnam. There was discussion in the administration in 1954 of the possibility of using nuclear weapons to relieve French forces under siege in Dienbienphu. In the event Eisenhower took no action and made no overt nuclear threat.

The second and third crises concerned the islands of Jinmen and Mazu (Quemoy and Matsu), which lie only a few miles off the coast of China and were still controlled by the Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan. In 1954 and 1958, the Chinese Communists bombarded the islands with artillery. Eisenhower concluded in each case that the defense of Taiwan required that the offshore islands be held. He was willing to use nuclear weapons if they were attacked, and he made that clear in March 1955 and in August 1958. These threats were not a bluff. Eisenhower gave serious consideration to the possibility of using nuclear weapons. He was not eager to do so, and he was well aware of the normative restraints on their use, but he did believe that nuclear threats could be used for political purposes. In each case the crisis ended when the Chinese expressed their desire for a peaceful settlement. Mao's main purpose appears to have been to make a political point, to show that China was a force to be reckoned with, rather than to seize territory from Nationalist control. In 1958, he had the additional goal of using international tension to mobilize Chinese society for the Great Leap Forward, a radical and ill-considered plan to industrialize China.

Ironically, Khrushchev, like Eisenhower, was persuaded of the utility of nuclear threats by a crisis in which the effect of such threats appears to have been negligible. Khrushchev conducted his first experiment in nuclear diplomacy during the Suez crisis. On November 5, 1956, he sent notes to London and Paris threatening them with missile attacks if they did not withdraw their forces from Egypt, where they had landed with the intention of regaining control of the Suez Canal. He sent a similar note to the Israeli government, which had allied itself with Britain and France. On the following day, Britain decided to end the Suez operation, and France was obliged to follow suit; Israel withdrew its forces later. Most historians assign a minor role to Soviet threats in explaining the collapse of the Suez operation; they give much greater weight to Eisenhower's opposition and US financial pressure. Khrushchev concluded otherwise. He was apparently convinced by the Suez

⁴¹ Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, 254.

crisis that nuclear threats were effective – and also that bluffs worked, since he could not have carried out the threats he made.⁴²

Khrushchev wanted to make political gains by exploiting Soviet successes in nuclear technology and in space. He knew that a nuclear war would be catastrophic, and he knew that Eisenhower knew that too. If he could press hard enough, however, Eisenhower might back down. “I think the people with the strongest nerves will be the winners,” he remarked in 1958. “That is the most important consideration in the power struggle of our time. The people with weak nerves will go to the wall.”⁴³ He believed that he could wage an effective war of nerves against the West.

On November 27, 1958, Khrushchev announced that he would conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) within six months, thereby effectively revoking the rights of the occupying powers in Berlin. This was a serious challenge for the United States and NATO. The Soviet Union had overwhelming conventional superiority around West Berlin; if the Soviet Union decided to take Berlin, NATO might have to respond with nuclear weapons. Would the United States be willing to use such weapons, knowing that the Soviet Union would, in all likelihood, respond with nuclear strikes of its own? Eisenhower used this quandary to NATO’s advantage by consistently denying that war in Europe could remain conventional. He sought thereby to deny Khrushchev any leverage from the overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority around Berlin.

In the note that precipitated the crisis, Khrushchev warned Washington: “only madmen can go to the length of unleashing another world war over the preservation of the privileges of the occupationists in West Berlin.”⁴⁴ The difficulty for Khrushchev was that it was equally true that only a madman would start a war in order to *end* those privileges. Eisenhower knew that Khrushchev understood that a nuclear war would be catastrophic for everyone; he knew that Khrushchev knew that he (Eisenhower) understood it as well. In March 1959, after Khrushchev had dropped the six-month deadline, Eisenhower stated, in a television broadcast, “global conflict under modern conditions could mean the destruction of civilization. The Soviet rulers,

42 Sergei Khrushchev, *Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy: kniga ob otse* [Birth of a Superpower: A Book about My Father] (Moscow: Vremia, 2000), 185.

43 Mohammed Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World* (London: Collins, 1978), 98. See Vojtech Mastny’s chapter in this volume.

44 “Note from the Soviet Government to the United States Regarding the Question of Berlin, 27 November 1958,” in Gillian King (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs 1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 163.

themselves, are well aware of this fact.”⁴⁵ The best way to reduce the risk of war, he went on, was to stand firm over Berlin. Eisenhower stood his ground and Khrushchev did not carry through on his threat.

Khrushchev reopened the Berlin crisis at the Vienna summit meeting in June 1961 when he handed Kennedy an *aide-mémoire* demanding that West Berlin become a free city and that peace treaties be signed with the GDR. Once again he set a six-month deadline, and again he applied pressure on the Western powers. He hoped that Kennedy would be more susceptible to pressure than Eisenhower, but he was mistaken. He did not follow through on his threat to sign a peace treaty. In August 1961, he decided to erect the Wall in order to staunch the flow of people to the West. This action, though it was followed by some tense confrontations between American and Soviet forces, provided the basis for a *modus vivendi* on Berlin.

When the Central Committee presidium (as the Politburo was then called) removed Khrushchev from power in October 1964, it drew up two indictments. The milder of these, which was read to the Central Committee, made little mention of foreign policy. The harsher indictment, which was written by D. S. Polianskii, a member of the presidium, was prepared in case Khrushchev was not willing to resign at the presidium’s request. It is worth quoting from its comments on the Berlin crisis. Comrade Khrushchev, it stated, “gave an ultimatum: either Berlin will be a free city by such and such a date, or even war will not stop us. We do not know what he was counting on, for we do not have such fools as think it necessary to fight for a ‘free city of Berlin.’”⁴⁶ Comrade Khrushchev, it continued, “wanted to frighten the Americans; however, they did not take fright, and we had to retreat, to suffer a palpable blow to the authority and prestige of the country, our policy, and our armed forces.”⁴⁷ It is hard to disagree with these judgments.

Both Eisenhower and Kennedy stood firm against Khrushchev’s pressure, but there was an important difference between them. Eisenhower was willing to confront Khrushchev with the prospect of general war. Kennedy wanted to have more options at his disposal: he increased US forces in Germany and explored the possibility of a limited first strike against the Soviet nuclear forces. In Berlin, Eisenhower’s policy proved to be effective, but that did not stop the Kennedy administration’s search for flexible options.

45 Radio and television address, March 16, 1959, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1959* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), 276.

46 “Takovy, tovarishchi, fakty” [Such, Comrades, Are the Facts], *Istokhnik*, 1998, 2, 112.

47 *Ibid.*, 113.

The Cuban missile crisis

In May 1962, Khrushchev decided to deploy in Cuba a group of Soviet forces consisting of 50,000 troops armed with medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, fighter aircraft, light bombers, cruise missiles, naval vessels, and submarines, as well as strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. It was planned to build a submarine base as part of the Soviet presence.⁴⁸ The defense of Cuba against a US invasion was one crucial motive for this decision, but the composition of the group of forces suggests that a more important goal was to strengthen the Soviet strategic position vis-à-vis the United States. After the setbacks over Berlin, Khrushchev believed that it was important to increase pressure on the United States.⁴⁹

Khrushchev wanted to present Kennedy with a *fait accompli*. The Soviet operation was organized in great secrecy, but on October 15 the Kennedy administration discovered that missile sites were being constructed in Cuba. The missiles were not yet operational, so the administration had several days to deliberate in private. Various responses were discussed, including air strikes against Cuba and an invasion of the island. On October 22, Kennedy announced that the United States would impose a naval quarantine on Cuba and insisted on the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles.

Khrushchev was in an extremely difficult position. His goal, he told the presidium, was not to unleash war but to deter the United States from attacking Cuba. The tragedy was, he said, that, if the Americans attacked Cuba, Soviet forces would respond, and that could lead to a "big war."⁵⁰ The United States placed its strategic forces on higher alert and assembled forces in Florida to prepare for an invasion of Cuba. The Soviet Union also increased the readiness of its forces. The crisis, which had begun with a serious miscalculation by Khrushchev about Kennedy's reaction to the placing of missiles in Cuba, was now acquiring a dangerous momentum, in which a further miscalculation by one side could elicit an unwanted reaction from the other, leading to an uncontrollable spiral ending in war. An accident or an

48 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Castro, Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958–1964* (London: John Murray, 1997), 188–89.

49 A. A. Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964*, vol. I [The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU 1954–1964] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), 545. For a fuller discussion of Khrushchev's motives, see Vojtech Mastny's chapter in this volume and William Taubman and Svetlana Savranskaya's chapter in volume II. See also the discussion in Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 439–45.

50 Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964*, vol. I, 617.

unauthorized action by one side could produce the same result. The situation was in danger of slipping out of control.

Khrushchev expressed this fear vividly in a letter he wrote to Kennedy on October 26, objecting to the quarantine and proposing steps to resolve the crisis:

If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive of what this might lead to, then Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter the knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.⁵¹

Khrushchev understood how terrible a nuclear war would be and counted on Kennedy's understanding of the same point. When Fidel Castro suggested in a letter to Khrushchev, on October 26, that the Soviet Union be prepared to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the United States if it invaded Cuba, Khrushchev reacted strongly. Such a strike would start a thermonuclear war, he wrote, explaining how terrible such a war would be. In a later letter he tried to convince Castro that Kennedy understood that too.⁵²

The crisis was finally resolved on October 28 when Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles in return for a commitment by Kennedy not to invade Cuba. A secret agreement was also concluded in which Kennedy promised to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey as long as Khrushchev did not make that promise public. In October 1964, the presidium's harsher indictment was direct in its condemnation of Khrushchev. His decision to put missiles in Cuba (which almost all members of the presidium had supported) "caused a very profound crisis, brought the world to the brink of nuclear war; it gave a terrible fright to the man who organized this dangerous undertaking."⁵³ The indictment went on to say that it was of course sometimes necessary to threaten the imperialists with the force of arms, in order to sober them up; but it was wrong to turn threats of war into a method for conducting foreign policy, as Khrushchev had done.

⁵¹ *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. VI, 177.

⁵² F. Castro to N. S. Khrushchev, October 26, 1962, and N. S. Khrushchev to F. Castro, October 30, 1962, *Granma (International Edition in English)*, December 2, 1990, 1–4; N. S. Khrushchev to F. Castro, October 31, 1962, in *Vestnik ministerstva inostrannykh del*, No. 24 (82) (December 31, 1990), 78.

⁵³ "Takovy, tovarishchi, fakty," 113.

The Cold War and the arms race

The four nuclear powers, and especially the United States and the Soviet Union, devoted considerable resources to building up their nuclear stockpiles and acquiring the bombers, submarines, missiles, and guns to deliver the nuclear weapons to target. The origins of the nuclear-arms race can be traced to the political rivalry between the wartime allies, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain. By the 1950s, nuclear threats were permanently embodied in the forces that each side deployed against the other. Each side feared that the other was seeking the capacity to launch a surprise attack and each stressed the importance of preempting such an attack if it appeared to be imminent. Nuclear threats were both a product of the Cold War and a factor contributing to the great tension of those years. Over time, the weapons laboratories, the defense industry, and the armed forces became increasingly influential in the formulation of policy. In his farewell address to the nation on January 17, 1961, Eisenhower warned of the need to guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence by the military-industrial complex. A similar phenomenon became apparent in the Soviet Union at a somewhat later date.



31. The Soviet Union sharply expanded its nuclear arsenal in the 1960s; here Soviet citizens watch ICBMs in Red Square, Moscow, on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, 1969.

Nuclear weapons also helped to keep the Cold War “cold.” By the mid-1960s, a situation had been created in which each side could inflict massive death and destruction on the other. A set of conventions and understandings emerged between the two sides to help them manage their nuclear relationship. The distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons provided a threshold, which helped the two sides conduct their rivalry short of the general war neither of them wanted. The idea that general nuclear war was in some profound way unacceptable became common knowledge among the political leaders of the three nuclear powers, that is, among those who had the authority to use nuclear weapons. That common knowledge constituted a basic premise of the Cold War and shaped the nuclear politics of the following years. Political leaders were willing to make nuclear threats, but they understood the difference between threat and action. Khrushchev exploited the fear of nuclear war to wage a dangerous and unsuccessful war of nerves, but he was limited in what he could threaten by the common knowledge that nuclear war was unacceptable. He knew that the other side wanted to avoid nuclear war, but they knew that he did too, and he knew that they knew he did. This was nevertheless a very dangerous period, because there was the danger that miscalculation or unauthorized acts could lead to an uncontrollable spiral toward war.

The Cuban missile crisis was a turning point in the Cold War. It drove home the lesson that crises are dangerous and should therefore be avoided. The first steps toward arms control had been taken in the late 1950s and early 1960s in talks on surprise attack and negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, but no significant agreement had been concluded before the Cuban missile crisis. That crisis gave a new impetus to efforts to make the nuclear relationship more stable and to reduce the risk of war.⁵⁴

54 For a more detailed analysis of the missile crisis and of the continuing arms race in the 1960s and 1970s, see G. James Hershberg's and William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg's chapters in volume II.

Culture and the Cold War in Europe

JESSICA C. E. GIENOW-HECHT

In Graham Greene's postwar screenplay, *The Third Man*, American pulp author Holly Martins is invited by an old friend, Harry Lime, to Vienna, a city once known as the high cultural bulwark of Europe now occupied by the Allied forces, to give a talk at the British Cultural Re-education Centre. Ignorant of high culture, Martins represents the American innocent and ignorant abroad who refuses to believe that his well-educated friend now worships dictators and crime. "Don't be so gloomy," Lime offers at one point. "[I]n Italy, for thirty years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror, murder, and bloodshed – they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the Renaissance. In Switzerland, they had brotherly love, 500 years of democracy and peace, and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock." In a nutshell, *The Third Man* encapsulates European cultural development in the Cold War: the bipolar conflict unfolding amidst the ruins of Europe; the intensifying propaganda war for the minds of men; the clash between high and popular culture, between tradition and modernity; the cliché that Americans have no culture; and the fact that, in the end, the winners do not take it all.

The Cold War as a cultural contest

Culture constitutes the transmission of ideas, dreams, mores, traditions, and beliefs from one generation to the next, from one continent to another, from one group of people to another in the form of schools, galleries, orchestra halls, shopping centers, department stores, and information centers. A painting, a composition, a poem, or a film constitutes part of culture when people

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receive, listen to, or look at it. It is the desire to pass on information that makes an artistic or intellectual inspiration part of culture. In Europe, the Cold War shaped a new way of transferring and selling ideas, values, productions, and reproductions. State interest, geopolitical strategy, ideological preconceptions, obsessive self-definition, and the continuous challenge of an enemy image dictated its contours to an unprecedented degree. In that sense, the Cold War was a war about two different *Weltanschauungen*, two ways to organize cultural life, two possibilities of defining modernity and grappling with its most daunting cultural challenge: how to preserve cultural tradition in the face of impending massive social change.

Beyond this change, the Cold War's influence on European culture was more qualitative than quantitative: it shaped existing disputes and developments more than it inspired new trends. We see in other chapters of this volume that many economic and social developments in Europe were not created, but rather reconfigured by the bipolar conflict.¹ Likewise, many developments, public debates, and social conflicts that moved to the foreground of European society after 1945 would have occurred without any reference to the clash between capitalism and Communism. Nonetheless, the Cold War provided new tools and new avenues for this cultural debate in a new context.

The Cold War played itself out against a background of tremendous cultural change, a transformation that would have taken place even if there had never been a Cold War. The debate over modernity, the menace of popular culture, mass society, and the relationship between the state and the economy had occupied Europeans since the early 1900s.² Cultural critics had long disagreed over how to preserve traditional values in the face of impending social change. This question rose again in European minds in 1945 when educators, clergymen, state reformers, politicians, and media experts pondered their continent's future. The Cold War did not trigger this debate, but it did shape its evolution and affect its outcome.

In Europe, the Cold War derived its cultural meaning from both historical and contemporary currents. On the one hand, it drew on cultural bonds and perceptions in place since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including trans-Atlanticism and the debate on modernity. At the same time, the culture of the Cold War attempted to draw together two very polarized

1 See the chapters by David S. Painter and Charles S. Maier in this volume.

2 See David C. Engerman's chapter in this volume.

continents – North America and Europe, including the Soviet Union – geographical areas that for centuries had watched each other with suspicion.³

This development began right after World War II, underwent a serious transformation in the 1960s, and ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the core of the Cold War was an international battle over how to modernize society; the organization, control, and administration of culture; and the challenge of popular culture. Between 1945 and 1989–91, cultural centers, including the Amerika Häuser in Germany, and artistic tours, such as those featuring the Bolshoi Theater, became significant arenas for the battle between ideologies. Even governments in countries that had formerly not prioritized the support of culture began to invest heavily in the promotion of music, literature, and the visual arts. Both superpowers deliberately employed psychological warfare and cultural infiltration to weaken the opponent and its client states on the other side of the Iron Curtain. In the United States, C. D. Jackson, a former special assistant to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, claimed that culture “is no longer a sissy word ... The tangible, visible and audible expression of national idealism is culture.”⁴ Only in the 1990s, when these structures and financial subsidies collapsed, did we begin to understand to what an extent the Cold War had subsidized postwar culture everywhere. In Germany, most of the Amerika Häuser were closed; in Moscow, musicians and ballet dancers struggled to finance overseas tours.

At the same time, the culture of the Cold War in Europe spawned antigovernment tendencies on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In nearly every West European country, the decades after 1945 witnessed protests against American culture, which the United States could never overcome. Likewise, popular protest movements in the East demanded a more open society and more exchange opportunities with the West. And on both sides of the Iron Curtain, people used popular culture to voice their political discontent.

This is the irony of the Cold War in Europe and the gist of this chapter. The bipolar conflict had a profound qualitative effect on the development of European culture and society. It shaped existing debates and conflicts on the continent’s transformation into modernity. The ideological confrontation

3 Frank Trommler, “A New Start and Old Prejudices: The Cold War and German–American Cultural Relations, 1945–1968,” in Detlev Junker (ed.), *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1968: A Handbook*, 2 vols. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), vol. I, 371.

4 Cited in Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta Books, 1999), 225.

between the United States and the Soviet Union led to a cultural cold war which scholars commonly believe the United States won thanks to the lure of popular culture. But the orientation toward a great cultural past constituted a central part of the struggle to define modernity. Early on, the Soviets mounted the most powerful argument in the battle for the minds of men and women: linking progress and modernity both to their history and to the future, the Soviets claimed that they looked back on a great cultural past. They said the Americans had not produced any high culture. Building on a massive propaganda crusade, American strategists worked hard to rebut this argument. But it was almost impossible to contest the Soviets' negative portrayal of American civilization because this vision had existed long prior to 1945 – since the American Revolution – and it would remain in place after the demise of the Warsaw Pact.

Ironically, the influx of American popular culture into Europe – condemned by Communists and conservatives, welcomed by young people, and regarded with concern by US propaganda strategists – eventually cemented both the victory and the failure of American propaganda in Europe. By providing a language of protest, popular culture successfully contributed to the defeat of Communist ideology. In country after country, people assimilated elements of US popular culture, thus often making it their own. But US popular culture did not enhance the image of the United States in Europe; instead, both conservatives and left-wing intellectuals used the same language of protest emerging within the United States in the 1960s and 1970s to voice longstanding concerns against American civilization. The legacy of the US triumph at the end of the Cold War continues to be a deep-seated anti-Americanism all over Europe.

Making Cold War cultures

In the rivalry between the Soviets and the Western allies after 1947, cultural life and cultural institutions moved from the sidelines to the center of the political confrontation. Both Soviet and American policymakers realized that to “win the minds of men” in Europe, they needed to appeal more to their cultural than to their political identity. Because much of this propaganda war concerned the division of Germany, Soviet and American policymakers dedicated more time, more activities, and more money to the cultural cold war in Germany than to any other region or continent. Consequently, we know more about the cultural cold war in Germany than in any other European country.



32. Kirov Ballet School, Leningrad (St. Petersburg), 1958: ballet performances were enormously popular abroad and counted among the most successful assets in Soviet cultural propaganda in Europe.

In the eastern zone, Soviet Military Administration in Germany (Sowjetische Militär Administration in Deutschland, SMAD) officials took culture much more seriously than their Anglo-American colleagues. While Americans regarded culture – above all, the fine arts – as elitist, Soviets viewed culture as intrinsically political and ideological; their efforts in this field preceded those of the Western allies. The Soviets presented themselves as the saviors of occidental culture (*Abendlandkultur*): their army had saved European culture from the onslaught of Adolf Hitler. This argument resonated powerfully in the smaller countries of Eastern Europe because it rested on two pillars: on the one hand, European high culture enjoyed more respect and a broader audience in the Soviet Union than in the United States. Communism did not just preserve high

culture; it made it accessible to everyone with the help of heavy state subsidies. On the other, the Soviets posed as the only true inheritors and saviors of European culture because they had defeated Nazism.

Soviet propagandists hurried to sell this vision to target audiences in Germany in order to win their sympathies. While Allied officials in the West were still busy screening artists who had applied to perform in the western zones, the Deutsche Theater in the Soviet sector had already offered some ten productions, among them Lessing's *Nathan der Weise* and Molière's *L'École des Femmes*.⁵ In May 1945, SMAD invited two hundred artists, writers, sculptors, and painters to discuss the future of German culture. Soviet officers in charge of cultural programs were intensely familiar with German history, language, and culture; often, they were descendants of the Russian Jewish bourgeoisie with a degree in literature or a related field.

Nonetheless, there is no doubt about their instructions. These officials worked hand in hand with cadres of the German Communist Party (KPD) who had spent the war in the Soviet Union, such as Walter Ulbricht. Soviet intelligence officers developed a tight system of overt and covert activities and tried to mobilize art for the defeat of capitalism and fascism in Germany. In the field of contemporary art, Soviet cultural policy sought to denounce abstraction, surrealism, and expressionism as outgrowths of corrupt capitalism and fascism. The strategy was to reach the German cultural intelligentsia with the help of incentives, threats, and coercion.⁶

The cooperation between German intellectuals and artists and Soviet officials was key to SMAD's propaganda strategy. This propaganda heaped praise on the Soviet Union and sought to diminish the image of the United States and, subsequently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In music, literature, and the visual arts, Communist propagandists argued that the West lagged behind and was, therefore, particularly aggressive. In the 1960s, the tone toward the United States changed and became more conciliatory. But the principal argument – the tension between Western imperialism and militarism on the one hand and Soviet pacifism on the other – remained in place until the 1980s.

5 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *In a Cold Crater: Cultural and Intellectual Life in Berlin, 1945–1949*, trans. Kelly Barry (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1998), 63–64.

6 David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 319–27, 459–64; Schivelbusch, *In a Cold Crater*, 34–37; Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 146.

In addition to these political charges the Soviets focused their cultural message on Russia's classical tradition, its music, paintings, history, and performing arts. Their productions of orchestral concerts and their fairy-tale ballets evoked dreamy visions of the past rather than the harsh modern reality of collective farms and oppressed peasants around the world. The export of Russian and Soviet art remained a standard duty of VOKS, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.⁷

This cultural nostalgia provided Communist cultural diplomacy with its strongest asset. When Communist propagandists devised their advertising campaigns, the preservation of "Old World culture" – above all, German *Kultur* – formed the thrust of their argument. The *Tägliche Rundschau*, the Red Army newspaper in the Soviet occupation zone, often published reports on the respect the Soviet people had for the works of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Ludwig van Beethoven. The subtext was clear: the Soviets had a high cultural background. Americans did not; they were dull and aggressive. Repeating their central argument over and over again, Soviet propagandists skillfully fanned the flames of anti-Americanism that had originated in the late eighteenth century.

Public opinion polls taken by the American military government in Germany between 1945 and 1950 confirmed the success of this propaganda approach: Germans clearly feared the adoption of democratic values at the expense of their cultural heritage. Letters to the US radio station in Berlin revealed that it lost many listeners due to its supposedly "Western" (jazz) music program. Communism evidently supported high culture to nurture the sensibilities of people. Democratic systems such as the United States, in contrast, anesthetized minds with popular culture and jazz.⁸

Communist media spokespeople relentlessly stressed the status of high culture in their society, often tying this message to political propaganda. The foremost instrument of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) for cultural propaganda was the broadcasting station Deutschlandsender. From 1948 to 1971, the station targeted audiences outside the Soviet zone and, later, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in an effort to convince listeners of the Communists' cultural priorities as well as their resistance to fascism, militarism, and the imperialism of the Atlantic alliance. The Deutschlandsender reached a significant fraction of the West German audience, above all because to many West Germans its classical music program constituted a welcome

7 David Caute, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 10, 28.

8 D. G. White, *US Military Government in Germany: Radio Reorientation* (Karlsruhe: US European Command, Historical Division, 1950), 114–17.

alternative to the modern music programs offered by local Western stations in the 1950s and 1960s.⁹

But, for all their anti-Western propaganda, East European Communist countries often combined cultural criticism in theory with cultural rapprochement in reality. As a result of internal political pressure, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Poland, and other states developed viable cultural contacts with West European countries in the 1950s. Many Communist countries experienced a series of internal conflicts and massive upheavals in the 1950s and 1960s. Domestic critics of these Communist regimes focused on their lack of openness and lamented the absence of an international dialogue. Such charges forced Communist policymakers to develop a more conciliatory foreign policy and cooperate culturally with the West.¹⁰

By the early 1950s, the Soviets had mounted a significant exchange program. Some 17,000 foreigners visited the Soviet Union in 1950. Three years later, their number had grown to 45,000.¹¹ In the mid-1950s, the Soviets joined UNESCO, where they soon embarked on a struggle for a new information order, an international press code, and a licensing system for journalists to facilitate state control of the press. In 1967, the Warsaw Pact states suggested the formation of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in order to improve the intra-European cultural and political dialogue along with confidence-building in military affairs. Their efforts were crowned by success: the CSCE first met in 1973; simultaneously, the European Council developed a number of cultural programs such as student exchanges between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

As in other East European countries, the GDR established an exchange program designed to develop permanent cultural contacts with the United States in the 1960s. In the spring of 1962, shortly after the building of the Berlin Wall, the East Berlin theater review, *Theater der Zeit*, invited West German dramatic advisers to visit theaters in Berlin, Weimar, Leipzig, Dresden, Halle,

9 Klaus Arnold, *Kalter Krieg im Äther: Der Deutschlandsender und die Westpropaganda der DDR* (Münster: LIT, 2002); Peter Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren: Medienkontrolle und Propagandapolitik unter sowjetischer Besatzungsherrschaft in Deutschland* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996); Adelheid von Saldern and Inge MarBolek (eds.), *Zuhören und Gehörtwerden II. Radio in der DDR der Fünfziger Jahre: Zwischen Lenkung und Ablenkung* (Tübingen: Edition Diskord 1998).

10 See the sections on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried (eds.), *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, forthcoming).

11 These numbers are US estimates: Walter Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 8.

and Magdeburg.¹² The GDR Peace Council also extended an invitation to Western intellectuals: in 1966, a small group of Americans visited the GDR, where they were welcomed by leading officials such as Walter Ulbricht and Willi Stoph, chairman of the Council of Ministers. In 1972, Günter Kunert worked as a visiting writer at the University of Texas in Austin for five months.

East German officials used cultural relations to establish the GDR as a state celebrating high and working-class culture. By doing so, they hoped to gain international recognition of their state. Throughout the 1970s, GDR officials lobbied for a cultural treaty that would cement US–GDR relations, though with little success. In Washington, officials feared that the Communists would exploit any exchange program as an avenue for espionage. East Berlin officials, in turn, insisted on the right to select American exchange visitors according to their own ideological criteria.

Nonetheless, the GDR maintained a number of international cultural programs. The state participated in the activities of the New York-based International Research Exchange Board. The board organized academic exchange programs between the United States and the countries of the Warsaw Pact. The GDR also managed to sign on with exchange programs at various US universities. The export of GDR orchestras, paintings, and performing artists likewise formed part of the country's effort to establish lasting cultural ties with the United States. But the ends often conflicted with the means as well as with each other: ideologically, GDR officials fought and ridiculed the imperialist United States; politically and culturally, they hoped for rapprochement and recognition.¹³

Propaganda and cultural offensives

While Warsaw Pact propagandists hammered home a clear message all across Europe, it remains much harder to define what US propagandists were trying to do. Instead of outlining utopian goals – as propaganda typically does – US propaganda remained primarily defensive. Americans thought that they had already developed the best society in the world. Their propaganda therefore lacked vision and tended to be mostly unappealing, dismissing other societies while extolling their own.

12 Helmut Karasek, *Auf der Flucht: Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Ullstein, 2006), 264–67.

13 Heinrich Bortfeldt, "Im Schatten der Bundesrepublik: kulturelle Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und den USA", in Detlev Junker (ed.), *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges*, vol. II, 1968–1990 (Stuttgart: DVA, 2001), 467–75.

Such a lack of vision clearly slowed the development of US propaganda programs. For the first five years after the war, Washington had very little interest in cultural matters in Europe. US officials disputed cultural policy; they were skeptical about whether the promotion of American values and culture abroad was appropriate at all; and they remained indifferent to the implementation of cultural policy in postwar Europe. For example, media guidelines from the State and the War Departments to the division charged with the reconstruction of the German press often came late or were lost. If these directives trickled down to their point of destination, US information strategists in Germany disregarded them without informing their superiors in Washington, DC.

US propagandists in Europe were often confused about what they wanted. Many US information officials in Germany, for example, remained unwilling to tear down the icon of German music from its international pedestal, partly because they themselves admired it and partly because they were intimidated by Germany and its *Kultur*. Others, in contrast, were tremendously reluctant to make any concessions to the quality of *Kultur*, believing that such an acknowledgment would echo Joseph Goebbels's propaganda tune that "Americans are money-hungry barbarians with no cultural life of their own." Such concessions, US propagandists feared, would enforce the Germans' "national feeling" that their life and culture were superior to any other way of life. As a result, American officers' definition of American "culture" – supposedly a viable alternative to fascist *Kultur* – remained fuzzy.

When US propaganda strategists in Washington finally designed their own cultural program in the early 1950s, everything they did and said was a response to Communist faultfinding, European anti-Americanism, and the Korean War. Because Soviet propagandists had already seized the initiative, their US counterparts had no choice but to follow suit. And, as we have seen, the parameters of Soviet and East German Communist propaganda embraced *Bildung* (knowledge, education) and *Kultur* and ridiculed the absence of both in the United States. The effort to defy the criticism that the United States had no high culture and no tradition remained at the heart of US cultural propaganda in Europe throughout the Cold War.

The European charge that Americans lacked culture had been a standard fare of European anti-Americanism since the Revolution of 1776. The European obsession to eliminate everything "American" from contemporary values and terminology, and the refusal to see the United States as having a separate culture rather than being a shrill deviation from Europe, originated in the decades after the American Revolution. Because European

criticism had such a long history, US officials in the 1950s found it difficult to counter it effectively.¹⁴ They designed a “Campaign of Truth” during the Korean War to refute Soviet propaganda and to show a “full and fair picture” of American society and culture. A few, such as Shepard Stone, a cultural diplomat in the early years of the High Commission in Germany, grasped that the United States had to focus on the positive in the history of transatlantic relations. A successful political partnership between Europe and the United States could flourish only if it was grounded on a cultural alliance as well.

US officials believed that, to revise Europeans’ unfavorable impressions of American culture, they needed to learn more about US academic and high cultural achievements. They needed to be reminded of their longstanding cultural relations with the United States, which had tied the two continents together for over a hundred years. The United States had to cease telling foreign audiences how to be more like Americans; instead, programs should reveal how much the country and Europe resembled each other on the cultural level.

These were the goals of all the institutions, information programs, and cultural exchanges created after 1950, such as the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Fulbright program. They aspired to export American culture, including literature, music, art, and science abroad, while simultaneously stimulating academic exchange. By 1956, the United States had already sent some 14,000 people to Germany alone, while 12,000 Germans had visited the United States on such programs. Countless European and American researchers would visit scientific laboratories on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean for periods ranging from a month to a year. In the social sciences and in psychology in particular, an intense internationalization took place.¹⁵

As in the Soviet Union, the media played a decisive role in this propaganda scheme. The US radio station in Berlin and Radio Free Europe were among the most important channels for Western propaganda. After Stalin’s death, Radio Liberty was created; the BBC also broadcast programs in Russian

14 Volker Depkat, *Amerikabilder in politischen Diskursen: deutsche Zeitschriften von 1789 bis 1830* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998).

15 Karl-Heinz Füssl, “Between Elitism and Educational Reform: German–American Exchange Programs, 1945–1970,” in Junker (ed.), *The United States and Germany*, vol. I, 409–16; Mitchell G. Ash, “Science and Scientific Exchange in the German–American Relationship,” *ibid.*, 417–24.

designed for audiences behind the Iron Curtain. The Voice of America likewise formed the United States' major channel for criticism of the Soviet Union, airing programs in Russian, English, Ukrainian, Georgian, Armenian, Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian.¹⁶

Classical music, symphony concerts, and music competitions for soloists became some of the foremost arenas in the bipolar competition for cultural preponderance. For example, the Soviets often won the prizes at the renowned Queen Elizabeth competition in Brussels prior to World War II. As late as 1951, Soviet citizens occupied the first, second, fifth, and seventh place, while Americans were left with the ninth and eleventh. The US State Department subsequently initiated the formation of a review committee to select talented American contestants for future competitions. The initiative was a success: in 1952, Leon Fleisher, one of eight Americans sent to Brussels, placed first. The State Department also supported 23-year-old Van Cliburn from Texas: in April 1958, he won first prize at the International Tchaikovsky Competition in Moscow, with an interpretation of Rachmaninoff's Piano Concerto No. 3 and Tchaikovsky's Piano Concerto No. 1.¹⁷

In their effort to convince Europeans of the cultural attractiveness of the United States, US propagandists employed not only overt but also covert operations. Funneled through dummy organizations, including the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations not only spent millions of dollars on exchange programs but also created American information centers and sponsored guest professorships, books, and libraries in Western Europe.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) managed a sizable portion of the US cultural program. Between 1945 and 1967, the CIA fostered the translation and worldwide distribution of more than 1,000 books by American authors, such as John Steinbeck and Ernest Hemingway. In Germany, authors such as Philip Roth, Henry Miller, Vladimir Nabokov, William Faulkner, Truman Capote, and Tennessee Williams remained in vogue for decades after the occupation, thanks to the formal introduction of

16 Nick Cull, "'The Man Who Invented Truth': The Tenure of Edward R. Murrow as Director of the United States Information Agency during the Kennedy Years," in Rana Mitter and Patrick Major (eds.), *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 30–33.

17 Joseph Horowitz, *The Ivory Trade: Music and the Business of Music at the Van Cliburn International Piano Competition* (New York: Summit Books, 1990), 21–29.

American literature after 1945. Between 1968 and 1990, American literature comprised one-third of all translated books on the German market.¹⁸

At the center of the CIA's activities was the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), an organization formed in Europe as an intellectual forum for cosmopolitan intellectuals and as a response to leftist and Communist influences. The CCF aimed to support US culture among European leftists; it had offices in some thirty-five countries. The Congress organized exhibitions, award ceremonies, international conferences, and music concerts; it published magazines; and it ran a news service. Other organizations benefited from CIA funds as well, often without being aware of the original source of their funding.

These covert actions have recently stirred a heated debate among British and German historians over the issue of political control and cultural independence in Europe. For many years the United States attempted to influence and guide the political tactics of the British Left. The CIA specifically targeted the intelligentsia, youth and women's groups, students, trade unions, left-wing literary intellectuals, political parties, and especially the British Labour Party, as well as the magazine *Encounter*, in an effort to strengthen anti-Communist tendencies and promote Atlantic harmony. Some scholars have argued that these operations deprived intellectuals, artists, and even governments of their freedom of expression; if they did not "behave," the CIA would cut their funding.¹⁹

Yet the American vision of a transatlantic alliance based on a shared set of cultural values always encountered serious problems in Europe and the United States. Even when funded by the CIA, US organizations proved unwieldy instruments of state propaganda. Sponsored by the Ford Foundation and designed as forums of elitist opinions, transatlantic institutes were often preoccupied with internal conflict over staff hierarchies, objectives, and personnel policy, creating more disagreement than harmony. Other organizations gladly accepted US funds but still went their own way with no regard for the aims of the United States. And almost all transatlantic groups grappled with profound national differences in Europe. For example, the CCF never managed to establish its Scandinavian headquarters in Denmark because its

18 Willi Paul Adams, "Amerikastudien in der Bundesrepublik," in Junker (ed.), *USA und Deutschland*, vol. II, 451–65; Martin Meyer, "American Literature in Germany and Its Reception in the Political Context of the Postwar Years," in Junker (ed.), *Germany and the United States*, vol. I, 425–31.

19 Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford (eds.), *The State-Private Network: The United States Government, American Citizen Groups, and the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2005).

first chief organizer was mostly interested in extending his own covert network rather than promoting the goals of the CCF.²⁰

The Marshall Plan, to cite another example, was designed to catalyze European integration and economic activity while also sending a cultural message stressing modernization. US policymakers gambled that Europeans would reject Communism once they understood the “superiority” of the American way of life. But European public debates over the plan were inextricably intertwined with fears of “Americanization.” In France, recipients managed to take advantage of US aid, but they rejected the political message that came with it and often refused to visit and even damaged US exhibitions extolling modernity and efficiency in the United States. The story of the Marshall Plan and “the creation of the West”²¹ followed a much bumpier road than the view from Washington suggests. It was one thing to finance West European economies, but it was quite another to forge political and cultural consensus.²²

Europeans and American culture

From the beginning, Europeans encountered the influx of American culture with both admiration and resistance. The European debate on modernization, already prevalent in the 1920s and 1930s, became an integral part of the Cold War in the 1950s and beyond, coupled with an increasingly intense debate over the downside of American culture.

Even if there had been no Cold War, the debate over modernization would have taken place. But the presence of American popular culture imported by American GIs and manufacturers aggravated and personalized these changes. The cultural implication of American movies, cartoons, and paintings in Europe was not merely their ostentatious display of consumer goods or dark heroes, but recipients’ social use of these artifacts in the creation of

20 Ingeborg Philipsen, “Out of Tune: The Congress for Cultural Freedom in Denmark, 1953–1960,” *ibid.*, 237–53.

21 See William I. Hitchcock’s chapter in this volume.

22 Oliver Schmidt, “Small Atlantic World: US Philanthropy and the Expanding International Exchange of Scholars after 1945,” in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (eds.), *Culture and International History* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 115–34; the essays by Anthony Carew and Valerie Aubourg in Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (eds.), *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–1960* (London: Frank Cass, 2004); and those by Hugh Wilford, Alexander Stephan, Dag Blank, Günter Bischof, David Ellwood, Nils Arne Sorensen, and Klaus Petersen in Alexander Stephan (ed.), *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism after 1945* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006).

their own new identity. The Cold War thus politicized European historical hopes and fears.

Historians have described the controversial appeal of American popular culture among Europeans in the 1950s. In France, for example, the “American Way of Life” fascinated a generation of young men and women attracted to consumerism, better living standards, and economic growth.²³ At the same time, older speakers continuously denounced the Americanization of French culture, language, and the arts. For many French people, the United States represented a scapegoat in the discourse over the future and the modernization of French society: whatever seemed to go wrong in France, it was the United States’ fault.

The European film industry served as a powerful catalyst in the debate over the continent’s cultural future. Soviet propagandists denounced American movies as imperialist and capitalist trash while West European critics deplored the demise of an independent European film scene. But in some countries American movies quickly gained a significant share of the market, often more than 50 percent within a few years.

Much of this success originated in the controversial appeal of American movies to younger Europeans. The influx of American films shaped a new West European youth culture, but it also antagonized their parents and teachers. In France and Italy, workers and young people adored Hollywood movies. At the same time, Communist Parties in those countries, as well as films such as Jacques Tati’s *Jour de Fête*, made it clear that their work ethos and labor tradition differed significantly from the consumerist orientation of workers in the United States. In blue-collar areas in Italy, the advent of Hollywood productions accelerated the break between traditional local culture and the new world. It estranged rural families from their urbanized children and it divided the proletariat from the mass rallies of organized labor. Watching Hollywood movies allowed workers and young people to understand these transformations.²⁴

The protests against American culture in the 1950s remained partial and local. They were typically limited to a particular cause (anti-jazz,

23 Brian McKenzie, *Remaking France: Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005).

24 Fabrice Montebello, “Hollywood Films in a French Working-Class Milieu: Longwy, 1945–1960,” 213–46, T. P. Elsaesser, “German Postwar Cinema and Hollywood,” 283–302, and Bruno P. F. Waroij, “Dollars and Decency: Italian Catholics and Hollywood (1945–1960),” 247–65, all in David Elwood (ed.), *Hollywood in Europe: Experiences of a Cultural Hegemony* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994).

anti-Western), profession (workers against the Marshall Plan), or generation (youth against parents). But beginning in the 1960s, a nascent leftist movement identified American expansive capitalism both as the driving force behind the conflict between East and West and as representative of consumerism, modernity, organization, and the conflict between society and the individual.

In Europe, this change of climate may be attributed in no small part to generational reasons. Many of the networks founded during the late 1940s and 1950s were created by émigrés, prisoners of war, and, later, exchange students who had spent several years in the United States, as well as by tens of thousands of US civil engineers who had worked in Europe. The generation coming of age in the 1960s had not had such experiences. They did not remember the Berlin airlift, the Marshall Plan, or the democratic reconstruction of Italy and West Germany. Instead, they witnessed the assassinations of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King and watched the urban riots of 1968.

Disillusionment arising from those events as well as the presence of US troops and student revolts alienated a culturally significant portion of the West European population who came to despise NATO and the benefits of a free-market economy. In West Germany, the war in Southeast Asia destroyed the credibility of the US government and its image as a Camelot of the Western world. Instead, young Germans began to perceive the United States as imperialist and materialist. "My entire liberal education began in the [information center] Amerika-Haus [sic] where I studied the American Declaration of Independence," one young man stated; "what happens now is an open assault on these ideals."²⁵

This move toward open rejection manifested the emancipation of young Europeans: in liberating themselves from their identification with the United States, West Germans began to come to terms with their own identity. Consequently, much of the cultural development taking place in the areas of music, film, theater, literature, and the performing arts after 1968 derived its emancipatory character and legitimacy precisely from the postwar right to protest and reject. Although American popular culture permeated European life, European intellectuals, artists, and consumers advocated cultural tropes celebrating the rejection of US culture.

25 Cited in William J. Weissmann, *Kultur- und Informationsaktivitäten der USA in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland während der Amtszeiten Carter und Reagan: Eine Fallstudie über Alliierten-Öffentlichkeitsarbeit* (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990), 66. See also Jeremi Suri's chapter in volume II.



33. American jazz musician Louis Armstrong at a bookstore on rue de l'Odeon in Paris's Latin Quarter, 1948. US officials wanted to export high culture, but American pop culture resonated throughout Europe.

Curiously, the European rejection and acceptance of American culture were always joined at the hip. American artists such as Bob Dylan and Bruce Springsteen continued to regard a tour of Europe as a mandatory part of their global trekking because they often found their European audiences even more enthusiastic than their American fans. Modern German pop, in turn, borrowed from the American model. In the 1970s and 1980s, singers such as Udo Lindenberg, Nina Hagen, or Herbert Grönemeyer, as well as groups such as BAP, Die Toten Hosen, or Einstürzende Neubauten, reflected the musical heritage of pop, rock, and new wave while their texts criticized US hegemony and reflected the tradition of German Liedermacher.²⁶ Musicians – like the public – borrowed a language framed in the United States to make statements critical of that country.

Audiences in the East likewise accepted American popular culture, but they used it to criticize their own governments. During the first decade of the Cold War, consumer culture became a way to delineate the boundaries between

²⁶ Edward Larkey, "Experimente und Emanzipation: die deutsche populäre Musik und das anglo-amerikanische Vorbild," in Junker (ed.), *USA und Deutschland*, vol. II, 517–28.

East and West, both as a way of life and as a means of expressing cultural and political protest. Throughout the 1950s, East and West Germans shared a common interest in and consumption of American popular culture, including music and dance, movies, fashions as exhibited in music halls, broadcasting programs, stores, and television. Jeans, jazz, and stars such as Elvis Presley reached adolescents in both the Federal Republic and the GDR, who enthusiastically embraced the new styles.

After the building of the Berlin Wall, legal and physical restrictions seriously hampered the influx of popular music, movies, and artifacts behind the Iron Curtain. Both East and West German authorities began to contain Americanized youth culture in their respective regions. Their efforts reflected a continuation both of the cultural cold war and of the old debate over modernity. From then on, critics in the East could no longer openly use the language of popular culture when criticizing their governments.²⁷ Instead, popular culture – notably rock and roll – became a way to silently protest against the government as well as against state-run cultural productions and artifacts.

Still, a society in which the state organized culture did not effectively ban all popular culture. Take, for example, science fiction. For both American and Soviet societies, outer space served as a screen on which to project their fears and expectations. Heroes of technological advancements, such as the astronauts Neil Armstrong and Yuri Gagarin, became symbols of human progress. Both democratic and Communist countries rallied around the celebration of the “scientific-technological revolution.” Stalinist science fiction evoked visions of stunning inventions and new sources of raw materials in order to depict a perfect society. Some authors, such as Stanislaw Lem, opted for a “third way” and developed a vision of a future in which Communism and capitalism had merged into a hybrid.²⁸ Science fiction thus became a form of social protest (the “forbidden fruit” of popular culture) and a vision of an alternative future.

Nowhere was the European debate around the challenge of modernity and the organization of culture more evident than in the field of new technologies and the visual arts. Hollywood significantly shaped the West European

27 Uta Poiger, “Cold War Politics and American Popular Culture in Germany,” in Junker (ed.), *The United States and Germany*, vol. I, 439–44; Edward Larkey, “Popular Music in Germany: The Genesis of a New Field of Discourse,” *ibid.*, 445–49.

28 Science fiction did not fare well everywhere behind the Iron Curtain. See Patrick Major, “Future Perfect? Communist Science Fiction in the Cold War,” in Mitter and Major (eds.), *Across the Blocs*, 71–96.

perception of American popular culture. Hollywood film studios lobbied successfully with the State Department in order to export much of their production on the West German market. But local filmmakers strove to remain independent and successful at the box office until the 1960s, focusing on crime thrillers, *Heimatfilme* (nostalgia), musical revues, and the like.²⁹ German film directors such as Volker Schlöndorff (*The Tin Drum*) attempted to found a new German cinema, which would neither oppose mainstream commercial productions nor revive the spirit of German productions prior to 1945. Still, their ideas about German postwar identity typically revolved around the relationship between Germans and Americans, and their funds often originated in the United States.³⁰

Culture in and from the Eastern bloc

Behind the Iron Curtain, film likewise developed into a powerful medium, but remained officially subordinated to propaganda rather than existing as popular culture. Depending on the time period, Soviet officials differed on the extent to which they exerted this control. Soviet cinema had not been censored much during the war, but the Cold War induced a much more interventionist state policy. As tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States escalated, Communist propagandists recognized cinema as a key weapon in the war of ideas. In 1946, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union created a Ministry of Cinematography for propaganda and agitation purposes. Stalin felt that directors should portray the Soviet people as strong, modern, and forward-looking. Soviet cinematography should also distance itself from Hollywood productions and portray Soviet citizens as moral people. Movies, such as *Admiral Nakhimov*, an epic filmed in 1943 about the famous admiral of the Russian fleet who successfully fought the Turks at the battle of Sinope in 1853, were reworked into new productions in an effort to put this message across.³¹

The Soviets controlled film far beyond their national boundaries. After the war, they supervised more than 70 percent of Germany's movie facilities, once the property of the Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft (UFA), which the Soviets turned into a state monopoly, DEFA (Deutsche Film AG).

29 Daniel J. Leab, "Side by Side: Hollywood and German Film Culture," in Junker (ed.), *The United States and Germany*, vol. I, 457–63.

30 See Nicholas Cull's chapter in volume II.

31 Sarah Davies, "Soviet Cinema and the Early Cold War: Pudovkin's *Admiral Nakhimov* in Context," in Mitter and Major (eds.), *Across the Blocs*, 49–70.

Originally, well recognized even outside the Communist world, DEFA eventually lost influence due to the rise of television but also because of its growing production of propaganda movies. After the surprisingly ambivalent *Die Mörder sind unter uns* ([Murderers Among Us], 1946), a story about a German doctor striving to forget his memories with the Nazi army, DEFA produced a variety of films celebrating socialist realism at its best. Movies such as *Roman einer jungen Ehe* ([Story of a Young Couple], 1952), *Frauenschicksale* ([Women's Fate], 1952), and *Das verurteilte Dorf* ([The Condemned Village], 1952) all focused on American military forces as oppressors.

Curiously, Communist propaganda neglected one of its most fashionable cultural productions. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, various Warsaw Pact states produced a multitude of children's films and television series that became tremendously popular among Western audiences due to their high artistic standard. Celebrating timeless fairy tales, magic, and the vision of a world inhabited by sorcerers, monarchs, and elves, these films avoided overt propaganda and enchanted several generations of children and their parents on both sides of the Iron Curtain. For example, *Pan Tau*, a German–Czechoslovakian series starting in 1967, featured the adventures of a man who could change his appearance into a puppet by tapping on his magical bowler hat. Still popular on European television stations today, films such as DEFA's canny 1974 production *Drei Nüsse für Aschenbrödel* [Three Nuts for Cinderella] – a covertly sociocritical adaptation of the Brothers' Grimm *Cinderella* – offer a glimpse on how successful Communist film propaganda could have been had it fully embraced its crusade of high culture. In focusing on straightforward propaganda, Communist cinematography ignored a potentially powerful instrument in its battle for cultural preponderance.

Modernity, culture, and Cold War

The Cold War embedded two different ways of organizing culture and defining modernity. While the Soviets' early engagement in cultural propaganda gave the Warsaw Pact states a tremendous edge in the battle for high culture, popular culture unexpectedly provided the vehicle for the United States' triumph in 1989–91. Fostered by technological innovations such as satellite television, US films, cartoons, and fashion appealed to people in many regions east and west of the Iron Curtain before the Wall came down. In Western Europe, the arrival of consumerism went hand in hand with the internalization of many values such as productivity, efficiency, and the eternal quest for a higher living standard, as well as the development of a

service sector, suburbs, youth culture, and the increasing preponderance of visual culture.

Still, this is not a story of winners and losers. For one thing, despite the domination of the two superpowers in the Cold War, their client states and peoples chose a process of cultural adaptation and rejection. West European consumers dismissed or reinterpreted many US products, often in an open effort to attack the United States. In Eastern Europe, the embrace of popular culture became part of the language of silent protest. Because popular culture bred the lure of capitalism and evoked opposition to the status quo, Warsaw Pact governments remained opposed to it.

Ironically, neither American nor Soviet officials intended to focus their cultural crusade on popular culture. In contrast, propagandists on both sides of the Iron Curtain concentrated their campaigns on the preservation and appeal of European high culture, and they shied away from openly employing popular culture for political ends. Communist officials everywhere derided the threat of popular culture while the USIA worked hard to rid the United States of the stigma of mass culture before realizing, toward the end of the Cold War, that popular culture helped to promote US influence abroad.

As a result of the bipolar competition for ideological and cultural preponderance, the Cold War privileged culture and cultural relations in Europe to an unprecedented degree. High culture remained front-page news despite a continuous shortage of government funds. Never before and never afterwards did governments, hegemonic powers, nongovernmental organizations, and private individuals invest as much money, energy, and thought in the promotion of the arts, academic exchange, and cultural representation. Never again did Europeans enjoy so many state-subsidized performances, exhibitions, and shows as during these decades. If Communist states suffered from a vacuum in the area of popular culture, they continued to score points by celebrating and exporting their classical dancers and soloists. And they never lost the argument that high culture flourished in the East.

US propagandists, in contrast, never realized the full dimensions of the battle they fought. They failed to see that Europeans continuously discussed culture, modernization, and the future of their countries in historical opposition to the United States. Instead, Americans were convinced that the United States had to win two cultural battles in the Cold War: one against the Warsaw Pact states and the global influence of Communism, and another against deeply rooted negative images of American civilization. Hoping to change what could never be changed, US propagandists failed to see that the European image of the United States reflected everything Europeans feared

about modernization: materialism, individualism, and loss of cultural identity. The United States may have won its “first” cultural war in 1989–91. But it did not win the second one, the battle against anti-Americanism with all its negative connotations about American culture.³² Like Holly Martins in Vienna, Americans in Europe remained innocents abroad, their ideological message triumphant but their cultural image forever tainted.

³² Jessica Gienow-Hecht, “Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century,” *American Historical Review*, 111, 4 (October 2006), 1067–91.

Cold War mobilization and domestic politics: the United States

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As United States policymakers charted a more aggressive internationalism at the end of World War II, it was not immediately clear how ordinary Americans might be affected by this new course. Early Cold War blueprints mentioned a role for civilians in the emerging East–West conflict, but this amounted to fervent but still fuzzy calls for heightened public interest in current events. As US–Soviet relations grew chillier, Cold War architects such as George Kennan sermonized that morally flabby Americans would have to strengthen their civic muscles and “measure up” to earlier generations of revolutionary Americans whose courage and commitment had preserved the nation. In more muted and sterile policy parlance, other Cold Warriors grimly foretold a future of higher taxes, cuts in nondefense spending, and the restraint of civil liberties for the promise of internal security. By 1950, however, a National Security Council policy paper, NSC 68, warned more starkly that the Cold War was not merely a clash of ideologies but rather “a real war in which the survival of the free world [was] at stake.” To meet the challenge, Americans would have to summon their better selves and demonstrate their “ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity.”¹

Such were the stakes for mid-century Americans, but few of them readily understood their new civic burdens. National security planners talked more to one another than to their publics, and much of this early reflection about the Cold War’s domestic impact would be held closely within policy circles. And yet, to get the needed public engagement, presidents and a vast array of

1 “American Relations with the Soviet Union: A Report to the President by the Special Counsel to the President,” September 24, 1946, 70; Moscow Embassy Telegram #511, “The Long Telegram,” February 22, 1946, 62–63; George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 89–90; and NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 1950, 402–03, 435–36, 442, all in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978).

military and civilian administrators had to somehow translate and disseminate these plans to American citizens. From the immediate postwar years to the early 1960s, policymakers tasked the Cold War's home-front institutions – state and local governments, schools, businesses, labor unions, civic organizations, and media – with the same objective of containment they would pursue at higher levels through military and covert means. The job was formidable: how could they popularize national security goals in a civilian vernacular? How could they reorient a nation-state around national security objectives while still maintaining the legal, economic, and cultural traditions that most citizens identified as “the American way of life”? Even NSC 68 acknowledged that the American people and American institutions would have to be mobilized through a “traditional democratic process” that respected basic values and institutions and the slower tempo of consensus-building.²

For several decades now, historians of the Cold War United States have grappled with the question of how foreign-policy priorities reconfigured the home front. In essence, scholars have tried to understand what Kennan called the “point at which domestic and foreign policies meet.”³ A focus on this encounter can reveal how so-called high policy, made in secretive and rarefied environments, shaped everyday life, where the pronouncements of American Cold Warriors were subject to popular interpretation by those well outside the circles of power. Anyone who has studied this encounter, however, has faced the limitations of the historical method. It is difficult to measure precisely how American political institutions, cultural fantasies and fears, and daily practices surrendered themselves to Cold War mindsets. How did a set of strategic decisions projected outward to countries most Americans knew little about shape the political culture, domestic institutions, and values of ordinary people?

To answer this, most studies have carved out a particular slice of the home-front experience or focused on a particular flashpoint to see how Cold War ideology may have insinuated itself into and then manifested itself in the domestic realm. In recent decades, scholars have produced a rich and varied literature on the domestic Cold War, generated by new sources and questions, and a new kind of interdisciplinary adventurism that has blurred the lines between diplomatic and social-cultural histories of the era. We now see culture – language and symbol – not merely as window dressing but as a dynamic historical force on its own, capable of framing states of mind

2 NSC 68, *ibid.*, 402–03. 3 “The Long Telegram,” *ibid.*, 63.

and state policies alike. Implicit in such an approach is an assumption that the Cold War contest with the Soviet Union permeated every institution and interaction, from schools to religion to sexuality. As Chris Appy has commented, “who can name a realm of human endeavor untouched by Cold War competition?”⁴

Some historians now maintain, however, that such arguments about the Cold War’s reach are overdetermined. They seek to complicate the relationship between the foreign and the domestic, not so much to overturn the thesis that Cold War diplomacy shaped political culture but to capture more of the nuances of how this happened – and where it did not. Peter Kuznick and James Gilbert, for example, dispute the notion that there was a monolithic postwar culture driven by national security concerns. American culture after World War II, they contend, was an amalgam of longer-term social and political trends interacting with some genuinely new features of the Cold War. They reject “Cold War culture” as a shorthand term to describe all of postwar society, arguing that the “Cold War [was] not synonymous with American culture, even at the height of its impact.”⁵

This chapter forges a path somewhere between older and newer interpretations, staking out not so much an ambiguous middle ground but a position that firmly acknowledges the Cold War’s potency and reach but that also recognizes its internal paradoxes and limits. Drawing on newer approaches that fuse disciplinary styles and that define “politics” and “political culture” very broadly, this chapter explores how the foreign and the domestic engaged one another from the end of World War II to the early 1960s. Language and culture are taken seriously, but not as being self-contained or wholly determinative. The domestic Cold War was fought through language, symbols, and images, and, yet, it also had formidable institutional muscle in the new national security state. That state grew into a powerful multilayered bureaucracy that shaped political discourses and possibilities, and its elected and appointed officials used the machinery available to reward and punish. Nonstate actors, too, are part of this history, and it will be shown how some movements fused national security with liberal advocacy for older, pre-Cold War political agendas.

4 Christian G. Appy (ed.), *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 3.

5 Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, “US Culture and the Cold War,” in Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert (eds.), *Rethinking Cold War Culture* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 1–13.

Looking at the early Cold War, then, as a trio of discourse, state policy, and popular politics, it becomes clear that it emerged with less coherence and momentum than those who lived through it may remember. It was fought in several arenas, with different players and tools, and with different intensities. There were periods of crisis and panic, along with slower and more subtle but still incremental transformations. Domestic Cold Warriors could mark some important successes, and scholars have detailed many of these: the reorganization of government – in both structure and tone – around national security, the enhancement of executive branch power, the narrowing of political speech, the destruction of the Left and of left-liberal coalitions, and the rise of a popular consumer culture preoccupied with “red” villains and flag-waving heroes. As Michael Sherry has aptly summed up this period: “War – as deed or state of mind or model ... moved to the center of American political culture in a more lasting way.”⁶

And, yet, there were still systems and social dynamics where the Cold War did not have an impact. In tracing the encounters between the foreign and the domestic, we must avoid imbuing the Cold War with an ideological and institutional solidity it did not have. The Cold War’s political reach, popular applications, and cultural meanings were neither consistent nor complete. The United States after World War II was simply too messy and diverse a society to fold neatly into an ideological crusade. As Michael Hogan has said, “Although the national security mentality pressed relentlessly toward cultural and ideological conformity, it never achieved that goal.”⁷

The Cold War’s “many McCarthyisms”

Many historical surveys of the domestic Cold War begin with the dramatic story of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s rise to power. In some ways, this is appropriate, for it forces us to acknowledge up front just how potent and destructive – even if not complete – the Cold War’s national security mentality could be. “McCarthyism” is the term generally used to describe those early years of the domestic Cold War but, as historians have documented, its reach went well beyond the man himself. McCarthyism drew heavily on the dualistic language (good and evil) and binary frameworks (aligned and

6 Michael Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 124.

7 Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 424.

non-aligned) deployed by foreign policymakers, but the synergy between McCarthyism and the Cold War did not mean they were one and the same. In fact, red scares marked earlier historical periods, as was the case after World War I and during the heated battles over the New Deal. Furthermore, although the Cold War certainly gave McCarthy his vigor and stature, that same Cold War nudged him out of mainstream politics. Thus, the relationship between McCarthyism and the Cold War is complex, with each giving the other some vigor and credibility, but also some ideological instability.

Scholars have long debated McCarthyism's emergence, its reconfiguration of postwar politics, and its eventual ebb. Early observers first suggested that McCarthy was the product of a kind of homegrown conservative populism, whose followers harbored class resentments and were particularly susceptible to the remonstrations of irrational fanatics. A new generation of scholars emerged in the 1970s, rejecting the psychological inflections of this earlier work, revealing that McCarthy himself was not the story. As Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis then claimed, McCarthy "was the product of America's cold-war politics, not its progenitor," and his followers could not be cast as premodern malcontents.⁸

Most historians now agree that McCarthyism "was primarily a top-down phenomenon," not a grassroots social movement. Its more elite progenitors came from the political mainstream, from both parties, from various branches of government and law enforcement, and from corporations and civic arenas. As Ellen Schrecker has shown, "there was not one, but many McCarthyisms, each with its own agenda and *modus operandi*." Its diverse sources did not prevent coordination and coherence, however. As Schrecker reveals, the campaign against Communism "was, above all, a collaborative project." Still, initially, it was the power of a smaller group, McCarthy among them, but J. Edgar Hoover in particular, who managed to convince a larger group of political elites that outing and then ousting Communists should be the state's full-time pursuit. They did so by borrowing heavily from diplomatic discourses that exaggerated dangers and simplified complexities, and then by showing how such a politics of fear could reap myriad tangible gains in political, economic, and cultural arenas. Once the logic and rhetorical frameworks of Cold War anti-Communism were in place, political leaders (the sitting and the aspiring) had a readymade set of speeches and shaming rituals

8 Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis (eds.), *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), xi.

at their disposal, and corporate and civic elites could borrow heavily from these scripts to conduct their own crusades.⁹

A few examples of McCarthyism in action in different settings can illustrate its diverse applications, its destructive power, and its limitations. The massive strike wave after World War II has been well documented by historians as part of a larger story of American workers seeking their share of capitalist abundance – the peace dividend, in effect, promised to them during the war. Labor remained an important constituency in the eyes of American foreign-policy leaders; its productive muscle and political power would be crucial for a smooth reconversion and for future economic security. The postwar strike waves, however, hinted that restive workers might have their own blueprint for the postwar world, one that prioritized domestic prosperity above national security – although the two were not mutually exclusive, as Cold Warriors liked to point out. To gain labor's firm backing, Secretary of State George Marshall warned the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1947 that it had a special obligation to oppose "enemies of democracy" who might attempt to erode workers' faith in internationalist plans, such as his own.¹⁰

The political background noise for Marshall's speech was the brewing Cold War, as President Harry S. Truman's loyalty program and his landmark Truman Doctrine were pushed forward that same year. These larger policies touched labor directly through the Taft–Hartley Act of 1947, a piece of legislation that attacked labor's actual and potential power – which seemed even more formidable after the strike waves. A clause contained in Taft–Hartley required union leaders to sign an affidavit avowing they were not Communists and, although this was but a small part of the Taft–Hartley legislation, it nevertheless signaled an anti-Communist offensive against the labor movement's most visionary and progressive wing. Corporations could now use the loyalty pledge to pursue longstanding anti-union agendas; buttressed by patriotic bluster and national security justifications, management could refuse to negotiate with unions whose leaders had not signed.

Taft–Hartley also emboldened anti-Communists within the CIO, who saw an opportunity to weaken their own left flank. Indeed, the loyalty pledge resurrected bitter internecine conflicts within the movement about the role of Communists in progressive causes. After the war, labor's moderates were hoping for a new power-sharing arrangement with government and business,

9 Ellen Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1998), x–xvi.

10 George Marshall, as quoted in George Lipsitz, *Rainbow at Midnight: Labor and Culture in the 1940s* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 190–91.

and they could ill afford the taint of radicalism. The CIO's top leadership thus played the loyalty game, sacrificing some of its own progressive membership to broker a closer relationship with President Truman, whose veto of Taft–Hartley persuaded them that the White House was the best guarantor of labor's interests.¹¹ In the end, this whole episode of domestic anti-Communism “wiped out an entire generation of activists,” argues Schrecker. Rather than pushing new initiatives forward or moving outward into new industries, “the labor movement turned inward and raided its own left wing.” More than that, the Taft–Hartley fight diminished the power of ordinary workers; it diverted attention and resources from fighting for the bread-and-butter issues that mattered most to those who punched the clock and signed a union card, but who might not have otherwise thought of themselves as particularly political.¹²

Taft–Hartley's passage in Congress – over Truman's veto – suggests that anti-Communism had gained currency among elected officials who saw no political risk to themselves or their party for supporting it. As a piece of legislation, Taft–Hartley represents a moment in the domestic Cold War when politicians began to codify the ideology of anti-Communism into state policy. Its non-Communist affidavit was part of a larger phenomenon in which federal, state, and municipal governments began to use their regulatory and enforcement powers to screen, investigate, and remove, if necessary, alleged subversives. The use and abuse of this power illustrate how McCarthyism increasingly intersected with the formation of the evolving national security state.

This new Cold War security state was a massive bureaucracy or, as Daniel Yergin has put it, “a state within a state.” It encompassed the federal government's powers of surveillance, investigation, lawmaking, and enforcement. Emerging in the late 1940s, it grew to include a wide swath of elected leaders, appointed officials, affiliated intellectuals, think tanks, law-enforcement officials and courts, and their cultural brokers – nongovernmental organizations such as the American Legion and the Boy Scouts, and parts of the national media, who put the security threats into terms everyone could understand. The term “national security” itself was common parlance in the Cold War, and its potency was its elasticity and ambiguity. It was a cluster of ideas about

11 Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, 336–39; Lipsitz, *Rainbow at Midnight*, 182–203.

12 Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, 379–81. See also David M. Oshinsky, “Labor's Cold War: The CIO and the Communists,” in Griffith and Theoharis (eds.), *The Specter*, 116–51; and Nelson Lichtenstein, *State of the Union: A Century of American Labor* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 98–118.

foreign and domestic affairs that framed all global developments as potential threats to US interests. "National security" was used widely, many would say recklessly, to understand a whole range of issues, seemingly disconnected from US diplomacy. The energy and resources devoted to the creation of this state set a new cultural tone – a kind of ambient militarism in which military priorities and mindsets came to dominate popular discourse.¹³

The new national security state was what Gary Gerstle has called a "disciplinary state," a government with formidable powers to spy, prosecute, and purge.¹⁴ Nowhere was McCarthyism's state power more clear than in the actions of J. Edgar Hoover and his Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), whose maneuvers were more covert but just as harmful as Congress's show trials. In fact, Schrecker argues that McCarthyism's "bureaucratic heart" was in the FBI, and that McCarthyism might more accurately be called "Hooverism." Her research shows that it was Hoover's FBI that "designed and ran much of the machinery" of the government's pursuit of Communists. From 1946 to 1952, the Bureau added close to 3,500 staff to investigate some 2 million federal employees. Truman's loyalty program had Hoover's imprint, with its capricious standards for what constituted credible evidence, and its refusal to allow the accused to know or confront their accusers.¹⁵ Truman himself was a liberal anti-Communist who was more than uneasy about the Bureau's overreach. He especially disliked Hoover's tactics. As Congress continued to pass legislation that further narrowed the range of acceptable speech, such as the 1950 McCarran Act, Truman cautioned against excesses. He warned it was "entirely contrary to our principles" to ban the Communist Party, and that the FBI was bordering on Gestapo-like tactics in its approach.¹⁶

But as was the case for perhaps all elected officials in this first blush of the Cold War, Truman's political calculations circumscribed his own speech and actions. Even as he tried genuinely to curb anti-Communist hysteria, he wanted to protect his own diplomatic and domestic agendas and to insulate his party from red-baiting. Thus, he made concessions, such as the federal loyalty program, that gave momentum to the very political forces he hoped to restrain. The same was true for Dwight Eisenhower, a more moderate

13 Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War*, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin Press, 1990), 5, 193–220; Laura McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 12–15, 152–56.

14 Gary Gerstle, *American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 242.

15 Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, 203–04, 210–11.

16 Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 252–56; Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, 232–33.

Republican, less indulgent of his fellow conservatives' red panics, but more worried about how an outright confrontation with McCarthy and the myriad anti-Communist factions in and around Congress might fracture his own party. Both presidents, then, had principled objections, but both backed away from taking strong and sustained public stands against either McCarthy's or Hoover's abuses of power. As some have argued, McCarthyism had legs because of both the "actions *and* inactions" of elected officials in the White House and Congress.¹⁷

McCarthyism's political clout went well beyond party politics and the formal powers of the national security state. As an elite-inspired phenomenon, it trickled down into state and local bureaucracies, private corporations, and civic groups. The familiarity of McCarthyite rhetorical frameworks, the "one size fits all" approach to identifying Communists, and the showy shaming rituals allowed even amateurs to play the game. Many citizens participated in a kind of grassroots anti-Communism, taking their cues from those higher up and fashioning a generic national anti-Communism into a style that fit their local situations. Much has been written about Cold War culture – the films, television shows, comic books, and advertising that reflected and projected Americans' fears of Communism. Though fascinating, these are limited indices of how citizens responded to and participated in the red scare. How did people actually "do McCarthyism," so to speak? Or as Richard Fried asks: "How did anti-Communism settle into people's lives at times HUAC [House Un-American Activities Committee] or McCarthy ... were not in the news?"¹⁸

Studies of Cold War parades and public commemorations suggest that anti-Communists' efforts to reach the grassroots yielded mixed results. In 1948, New York City's Veterans of Foreign Wars organized locally what later became a national Loyalty Day whose purpose was "to show before the world that Americans rejected communism," as Fried puts it. Hundreds of thousands of regular citizens across the nation marched from the late 1940s into the mid-1950s, mainly tugged by their unions, schools, churches, or ethnic

17 Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 64–72, 80–82; Griffith (drawing on Michael Paul Rogin's argument), in "American Politics and the Origins of 'McCarthyism,'" in Griffith and Theoharis (eds.), *The Specter*, 5 (emphasis added).

18 Richard M. Fried, *The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming! Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold-War America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), ix.



34. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy waves a document while delivering a “report” on Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, 1952. His anti-Communist attacks helped shape American political culture during the early Cold War.

associations. But this patriotic pageantry did not capture the nation; presidents paid homage but did not attend, and citizens’ interest ran hot and cold.¹⁹

Even something like the Freedom Train, a traveling exhibition of the United States’ most sacred documents, demanding no participation – just genuflection – could not compel citizens to practice Cold War anti-Communism in the way sponsors intended. Traveling to hundreds of cities, loaded with documents already sanitized by organizers to remove any hint of conflict over race or New Deal class struggles, the Freedom Train attracted massive crowds but also pointed criticism. Poet Langston Hughes and actor Paul Robeson raised the painfully obvious contradictions of taking a Freedom Train to the Jim Crow South. Often, the Train’s visit to a city or town motivated locals to organize a Rededication Week, where they would pledge to practice anew what the Freedom Train preached. But here, too, people drew different lessons and

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 51–66.

interpreted the nation's documents in ways that departed from the Train's anti-Communist origins. Rededication Week in Iowa City, for instance, urged racial tolerance and celebrated women's rights, and in Cincinnati one club used the week to organize a "Stop the Bigot" rally.²⁰

Such fickle applications of Cold War dogma have made it difficult for scholars to quantify McCarthyism's impact. Schrecker offers some numbers: two deaths – Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, several hundred imprisoned, and some ten thousand to twelve thousand dismissed from their jobs. Griffith has tallied 135 congressional investigations, led mainly by the House Un-American Activities Committee, from 1945 to 1955. His analysis of public opinion polls reveals both support for and sentiment against McCarthy himself but a persistent intolerance for Communism, in general. Polling data also show, however, that anti-Communism did not always trump other concerns. In partisan politics, for example, Richard Fried catalogs the national and state elections in which red-baiting increasingly permeated election rhetoric. He detects a "full-blown electoral McCarthyism" by 1950, when establishing one's anti-Communist credentials became a central motif in victorious Senate, House, and gubernatorial campaigns. And yet, he argues, McCarthyism's electoral impact was never as great as politicians and the press believed at the time. Polls from the early 1950s show that voters' motivations for casting a ballot did not turn on the issue of Communism; their concerns were more immediate, such as the high cost of living and taxes. Certainly, candidates could handily transform these issues into anti-Soviet screeds, but politicians' rhetoric has never been a reliable index of voter rationale and intent. Thus, "while the specter of communism has haunted US politics since 1917," Fried concludes, "it never prowled full-time."²¹

The Cold War and the liberal state

If McCarthyism left an indistinct imprint on partisan politics, the same could be said about its footprint on other features of the postwar landscape: liberalism, racial politics, religious affairs, and gender relations. All of these were in flux after World War II, and, in order to examine how they intersected with McCarthyism, it is important to widen the lens. From this vantage point,

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 38–43; Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 426–34.

²¹ Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, xiii; Griffith, "American Politics," 2–4; Richard M. Fried, "Voting against the Hammer and Sickle: Communism as an Issue in American Politics," in William H. Chafe (ed.), *The Achievement of American Liberalism: The New Deal and Its Legacies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 99–127.

though, the relationship between McCarthyism and the Cold War becomes even blurrier, for although they were not the same, and they did not march in lock step, McCarthyism and the Cold War mingled with one another in complex ways – always in conversation, but sometimes talking past or even interrupting one another. Indeed, the Cold War's priorities and interests abroad could undermine some of McCarthyism's domestic political goals. An examination of the liberal state – in particular, the ideological struggles around its size and function, as well as of postwar racial, religious, and gender politics – can reveal some of the Cold War's contradictory effects on domestic politics and social relations.

McCarthyism's practitioners accused government officials and their agencies of disloyalty, creating a culture and bureaucratic structure to root out subversives. In essence, this amounted to an attack on government itself, ironically, just as Cold Warriors were trying to expand government to fulfill national security objectives. This ideological tension between a passionate antigovernment conservatism and an equally insistent Cold War statism marked the first decade of the postwar era. As policymakers rolled out expansive plans for the United States as global policeman, conservatives began to fear that those plans might give rise to a highly bureaucratized "garrison state," in which private enterprise would be subject to state regulation and citizens would have to surrender personal freedoms, all for the sake of national security. Such fears, as Hogan has written, were articulated mainly by Republican conservatives who, with some Democrats, argued that building a national security state would concentrate too much power in the military and executive branch, and that expenditures for defense might lead to higher taxes and, worse, economic controls. The ambitious Cold War foreign-policy agenda implied a turn away from small government and decentralized authority and toward new encumbrances on private enterprise and self-reliant working homeowners. Indeed, at the very moment when conservatives saw the opportunity to shrink the New Deal state, an ever larger state, this time organized not around welfare but around warfare, seemed to be taking shape.²²

The conflicts between conservatives and liberals about the fate of the state are not easily unraveled, because the Cold War reconfigured politics around international stability and national security, bipartisan values that no politician dared challenge after 1950. Earlier, however, at the end of World War II, left-liberal coalitions had put forward an ambitious social-welfare agenda that

22. Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 7–9; McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home*, 20–23.

called for a more interventionist state, more responsive to the interests of workers and consumers than to the designs of the private sector. This idealistic, collaborative liberalism sought to democratize the postwar American economic system, but it soon met resistance as events abroad began to nudge their way into every discussion of domestic reform. As Jonathan Bell shows, in state political campaigns across the country, liberal politicians increasingly “saw their commitment to social democracy held up as a liability” by those who linked any state expansion with Soviet-style totalitarianism.²³ Of course, the Cold War did not invent antistatism; rather, it stretched its meanings and popularized it. Conservatives could now use a red-baiting antistatism to fight anything from tax increases to civil rights. In response, liberals operated from a more defensive crouch, cognizant that many Americans still endorsed statist measures, such as social security and the GI Bill, but equally aware that any call for additional social-welfare programs had to be matched with a zealous defense of individual rights and private enterprise.²⁴

After the foreign-policy crises of 1949 and 1950, conservative and liberal debate turned not on whether to endorse national security doctrine but on *how* precisely to enact it in government structures and policies. As Hogan argues, “At issue in all of these debates was the central question of state making,” specifically, the size and scope of the budgets, policies, laws, and bureaucracies created to preserve national security. President Truman’s Fair Deal liberalism and President Eisenhower’s moderate Republicanism were both pulled in different directions because of the tensions of trying to build an impressive national security state while containing its size. Conservatives, in particular, notes Bell, had “to wrestle with the thorny problem of how to fight communism without enlarging the power of the state.” Both Truman and Eisenhower argued that their policies would obviate the rise of a garrison state, but they also acknowledged that it was a difficult balancing act. As Eisenhower confessed, “the whole thing ... was a paradox.”²⁵

In the end, these conflicts about the fate of the New Deal state – how to dismantle it, shore it up, or graft a national security state onto it – resulted in a hybrid system in which no one vision prevailed. National security boosters

23 Jonathan Bell, *The Liberal State on Trial: The Cold War and American Politics in the Truman Years* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), xv.

24 Meg Jacobs, *Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 221–45; for a different view of consumers and the liberal state, see Laura McEnaney, “Nightmares on Elm Street: Demobilizing in Chicago, 1945–1953,” *Journal of American History*, 92 (March 2006), 1265–91.

25 Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 21; Bell, *Liberal State on Trial*, 273; D. D. Eisenhower, quoted in McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home*, 22.

did not get everything they wanted. It is true that, by Eisenhower's departure, they *had* succeeded in building a massive state, dominated by the worldviews of military planners, scientists, and defense intellectuals, whose visions of a high-tech atomic diplomacy made budgets and bureaucracies fatter. But as Hogan has shown, although taxes, deficits, and government all swelled in the early Cold War, none of this amounted to "the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state." And both liberals and conservatives found themselves compromising some of their core values to build the security state. As Hogan succinctly puts it: "Liberal intellectuals were willing to put the containment of communism ahead of the welfare state while conservative intellectuals were prepared to give antistatism a back seat to anticommunism."²⁶

Such tradeoffs are evident as well in other arenas of the domestic Cold War. Questions about black-white race relations grew more insistent after World War II. Fighting for the "double V," victory over fascism abroad and over racism at home, returning African-American veterans and home-front workers found new opportunities in the postwar years to push forward older reforms. Just as Cold War anti-Communism could and did hamper liberal movements, it could also create openings for liberal advancement. Working through local and national organizations, African-Americans pressured elected officials to deliver the freedoms promised to non-aligned peoples abroad to deserving Americans at home. Here, they forged a new kind of national security liberalism that actually undermined the prevailing McCarthyite antipathy to social change while remaining faithful to Cold War doctrine. The story of black-white racial politics illustrates how Cold War foreign policies could generate such unintended opportunities, and how social movements capitalized on these possibilities to force the government to make good on its own freedom rhetoric.

After World War II, American claims to global leadership came under fire from the international community when media images of American-style apartheid traveled overseas like other US exports. Historian Mary Dudziak has analyzed how a case, such as *Brown v. Board of Education*, for example, played out abroad and became a decisive facet of Cold War geopolitics. Cases such as *Brown* mattered during the Cold War, Dudziak argues, because "segregation harmed US foreign relations." Secretary of State Dean Acheson

26 Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 22, 461. Sherry makes a similar point in *Shadow of War*, 504. See also Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

noted that segregation was “a source of constant embarrassment to this Government,” and State Department reports from all over the world showed that Jim Crow was drowning out Uncle Sam, making it difficult for diplomats to fight the Cold War with credibility. American officials tried to disseminate a particular narrative of American race relations imbued with Cold War simplicities and dualisms. As Dudziak shows, it was “a story of progress, a story of the triumph of good over evil, a story of US moral superiority.”²⁷

But civil-rights activists told a different story, advancing a more compelling “counternarrative of racial oppression” that exposed the hypocrisies of Cold War rhetoric. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), whose membership had grown dramatically during the war, tested Cold Warriors’ commitments to real democracy at home, petitioning the United Nations in 1947 to lodge an international protest against Jim Crow. Using words such as “barbaric” (a term used historically by Americans to describe peoples from Africa), the NAACP’s petition said the real threats to African-Americans were coming from inside the building, so to speak – from Southern segregationists and from national leaders who endorsed a laissez-faire approach to race relations. Such claims did not go unnoticed or unpunished. In McCarthyite fashion, segregationists tried to associate racial reform with Communism and quash it. When nine school children in Little Rock, Arkansas, exposed *Brown’s* limits, state officials charged that local NAACP activists were part of a larger Communist conspiracy.²⁸

The domestic civil-rights movement, however, was both victim and perpetrator in this Cold War drama. As Eric Foner has commented, “Every political and social organization had to make its peace with the anti-Communist crusade or face destruction.” The NAACP made that peace in the same way labor did: it purged its Communist membership to display its Cold War credentials, hoping that its support for US foreign policy would win concessions on domestic policy. Thus, African-American liberals became civilian Cold Warriors themselves. Paradoxically, they adapted Cold War language to silence their progressive wing while pushing vigorously for racial progress in a conservative climate. And they found some success in this strategy. For example, they were able to pressure President Truman to desegregate the military in 1948, and they found an ally in the Justice Department when it filed an amicus brief for the *Brown* case. The Cold War thus provided race liberals

27 Mary L. Dudziak, “*Brown* as a Cold War Case,” *Journal of American History*, 91 (June 2004), 34, and Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 13.

28 Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 44–45, 61–77, 124–25.

an opening, a way to attach the urgency of national security to their arguments for equity.²⁹

And, yet, this opening remained a fairly narrow one throughout the 1950s. As long as race liberals framed equality as Cold War necessity, it would be hard to advance a more far-reaching vision. Of course, there were movement activists who did see the struggle in more expansive terms. Jo Ann Gibson Robinson, one of the organizers of the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott, described her group's motivations: "Justice in the end was the coveted goal that helped and inspired me and fifty thousand others," she wrote. Indeed, she hoped her own fight would have a ripple effect outside the United States, so that "oppressed people the world over" could become "more optimistic that their own fate could be improved."³⁰ But this progressive internationalist vision was increasingly unusual in this period, for rights talk was almost always yoked to containment and war. As Sherry has argued, "national security was the dominant rationale" for racial advancement in this early Cold War era, and thus the "[p]reoccupation with national security ... made the reform impulse both urgent and limited."³¹

The perils and possibilities of Cold War reform can be seen, as well, if we examine women's status in the postwar era. Here, too, we see compatibility and collision among varying post-World War II political currents: McCarthyism, Cold War containment, and a reenergized liberal feminism. Until recently, the history of postwar gender and family ideals has followed the now-familiar narrative of Elaine Tyler May's groundbreaking *Homeward Bound*. May argues that the Cold War fostered a conservative political culture in which men and women looked for security in conventional gender roles and domestic pursuits – home ownership, childrearing, and consumption. Kennan's containment doctrine, she says, offered "an overarching principle" to postwar Americans; indeed, more than just rhetoric, the doctrine "would guide them in their personal and political lives."³²

Some demographic data point to a pro-family mood in the 1950s. Earlier marriage, higher birthrates, and lower divorce rates, along with the suburban migration to single-family homes, all suggest a national pursuit of privacy,

29 Eric Foner, *The Story of American Freedom* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), 257; Sherry, *Shadow of War*, 145–49.

30 Jo Ann Gibson Robinson, *The Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Women Who Started It: The Memoir of Jo Ann Gibson Robinson* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1987), 3, 100.

31 Sherry, *Shadow of War*, 147.

32 Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 10–15.

domesticity, and security. But scholars have also suggested that at least some of these trends could have emerged without the Cold War. Early marriage and childbearing, for example, were a logical aftermath of a decade of economic depression and warfare, during which family formation was disrupted or delayed. In fact, the baby boom began before the Cold War heated up. Perhaps the Cold War merely intensified a heterosexual family consumer culture that would have materialized anyway after such dislocation.³³

Another way to measure the Cold War's effect on gender arrangements is to examine female activism from 1945 through the early 1960s. Historians have argued recently that the Cold War did not circumscribe gender roles as neatly or completely as May had suggested. Joanne Meyerowitz was one of the first to claim "the Cold War had no fixed association with the domestic ideal." While Meyerowitz acknowledges anti-Communism's toxic effects on women's postwar reform, she also argues that "the Cold War offered a new vocabulary for extending democratic ideals and demanding individual freedom."³⁴ In fact, increasing numbers of studies are showing that professional and working-class women's groups found a fairly hospitable environment in the Cold War years for their activism. Meyerowitz's own study of popular women's magazines reveals that Cold War ideology was not a uniform prescription for female domesticity; indeed, magazines such as the *Ladies' Home Journal* told women it was their civic obligation to participate in politics, especially during political crises.³⁵

Still, there were limits to the liberal adaptability of the Cold War credo. Like their partners in the civil-rights movement, female activists struggled to find ideological harmony between Cold War militarism and social liberalism. Women who fought for a role in home-front civil-defense programs offer a good example of this tension. These clubwomen, union members, and ordinary housewives used a range of arguments to nudge their way into debates about citizen obligation in a nuclearized Cold War. They were ardent Cold Warriors, but they were also maternalists who believed that the experience of motherhood made them uniquely qualified to join men's

33 Jane Sherron De Hart, "Containment at Home: Gender, Sexuality, and National Identity in Cold War America," 124–55, and Peter Filene, "'Cold War Culture' Doesn't Say It All," 156–74, both in Kuznick and Gilbert (eds.), *Rethinking Cold War Culture*.

34 Joanne Meyerowitz (ed.), *Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945–1960* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 8; Joanne Meyerowitz, "Sex, Gender, and the Cold War Language of Reform," in Kuznick and Gilbert (eds.), *Rethinking Cold War Culture*, 107.

35 Joanne Meyerowitz, "Beyond the Feminine Mystique: A Reassessment of Postwar Mass Culture, 1946–1958," in Meyerowitz (ed.), *Not June Cleaver*, 229–62.

conversations about nuclear preparedness. They held some feminist beliefs, too, pushing hard for female representation in government and policymaking. This strand of women's organizing was a strange hybrid of Cold War militarism, domesticity, and older female reform traditions, but it could take activists only so far. Cold War national security discourse ultimately valorized masculine toughness and made only token gestures to accommodate maternalist or feminist reform.³⁶

Making peace with the bomb

The participation of nonstate actors, such as these women's clubs, in nuclear-preparedness debates brings us to a final but important feature of the early Cold War's political and cultural landscape: nuclear fear. As Presidents Truman and Eisenhower embraced atomic weapons as the basis of US military and diplomatic power, citizens found themselves in a Cold War with ever-sharper atomic teeth. Much has been written about how Americans began to sense their own nuclear peril after their leaders dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. Some have noted a correlation between escalating nuclear-age insecurities and a rise in religiosity. Membership in mainly Christian churches spiked in this era, perhaps a sign that organized religion provided some comfort amidst global instability. Higher church attendance certainly meshed with the postwar culture's emphasis on what *McCall's* magazine termed "togetherness." The image of nuclear families huddled together in church and in the other sacred space – the suburban home – was a fitting Cold War counterpoint to the allegedly "godless" Soviets. Political leaders, too, sponsored measures to bring church and state closer together, putting God on currency and into the Pledge of Allegiance.

These were clearly symbolic gestures, but it is too cynical to argue that they held no real meaning for citizens. People of faith leaned on churches in times of crisis, as they always had, but it is simply impossible to determine precisely how religious practice and Cold War nuclear fears interacted. For some, religious conviction endorsed preexisting views about the bomb and Communism, generally. Television evangelists and prophecy writers told their millions of followers that nuclear war was part of God's design; thus, opposition against the inevitable end time was futile. The "new evangelicalism" of the postwar years was a diverse movement, with moderates, such as Billy Graham, and hardliners, such as the Christian Anti-Communist

³⁶ McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home*, 88–122.

Crusade's Fred Schwarz, but all of its leaders saw the growing nuclear faceoff as a call to preach a steady sermon of anti-Communism – using their burgeoning media outlets. For other people of faith, in contrast, the bomb generated urgent and fundamental questions about human fellowship, national leadership, and the fate of the planet. Faith-based organizations were a significant presence in some of the early nuclear activism, offering both moderate and radical critiques of the arms race. Their critiques resurfaced decades later in the antinuclear protests of the Ronald Reagan era.³⁷

Looking at more secular manifestations of nuclear fear, studies of films, television, science fiction, comic books, and music suggest that from August 1945 through the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, citizens vacillated between elation, horror, fear, and hope. Paul Boyer's study of Hiroshima's immediate aftermath reveals that "there was an almost compulsive post-Hiroshima effort to trivialize the event and avoid its deeper implications."³⁸ Initially, Americans endorsed the use of the bomb; they were war-weary and open to Truman's rationale for using the weapon. But as the months and years went on, there was a growing ambivalence, despite both Truman's and Eisenhower's efforts to hail atomic energy's salutary and "peaceful" uses.

The atomic bomb was obviously the technological creation of World War II, but the Cold War gave that technology its most menacing cultural meanings and images: genetic mutation, social chaos, the mushroom cloud, and apocalypse. The duck-and-cover exercise, too, has now become a staple of our cultural memory of the era. Still, to catalog the ample metaphors and maneuvers of Cold War nuclear fear becomes redundant – even if instructive as a history lesson. It is more useful to historicize that fear by giving it a more concrete policy and social history, grounded in the ideological and political currents of the Cold War. Most Americans had what one policymaker called a "bomb consciousness," and it could certainly be heightened during periods of international crisis. Still, a cultural consciousness about the bomb did not translate into a grassroots national-preparedness movement, as planners had hoped. Policymakers asked citizens to stock supplies, learn civil-defense techniques, and build shelters; leaders endorsed a privatized nuclear preparedness, financed, built, and practiced by citizens themselves. Most Americans,

37 Paul Boyer, *Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America's Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1998), 129–61; Scott Flipse, "Below-the-Belt Politics: Protestant Evangelicals, Abortion, and the Foundation of the New Religious Right, 1960–1975," in David Farber and Jeff Roche (eds.), *The Conservative Sixties* (New York: Peter Lang, 2003), 127–41.

38 Boyer, *Fallout*, 10.



35. Children test the escape hatch of their family's bomb shelter in Bronxville, New York, 1952. Bomb shelters were publicized, but largely rejected.

however, rejected this kind of self-help defense. Only a tiny minority built family shelters, for example.³⁹

In a sense, Cold War citizens were private pacifists but public militarists. That is, they refused to practice self-help defense inside their homes, largely rejecting nuclear readiness as daily practice. But this rejection should not be read as a no-confidence vote on the national security state. Citizens made political choices to tolerate a much higher level of preparedness outside their homes. As taxpayers and voters, they endorsed the principles of national security, anti-Communism, and an arms buildup through several presidential

³⁹ McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home*, 40–67.

administrations. Policymakers may have successfully raised people's bomb consciousness, but most of these fears found material expression in horror films, comic books, and other forms of Cold War pop culture, not in actual state-sponsored shelter programs, nor in civil-defense efforts in the urban neighborhoods and suburbs populated by nuclear-age Americans.⁴⁰

The limits of Cold War culture

This chapter has tried to make sense of the encounters between the foreign and the domestic in the early Cold War. Historians have yet to fully uncover and explain the layers and meanings of these encounters, for the disciplinary fluidity between diplomatic, social, and cultural history is still relatively new. Our histories of the Cold War are now richer as a result of that fluidity, but the question remains about whether or not we can identify a distinctive "Cold War culture" in the first decades after World War II. The phrase "Cold War culture" itself, as Peter Filene has observed, is "irresistibly convenient," for it fuses the diplomatic and domestic with a conciseness that still makes room for lots of interpretive possibility.⁴¹ It suggests the fantasy of a neat and overarching framework to explain all domestic developments through a singular conflict. But the Cold War was no monolith and, though that is not an original statement, it bears repeating in any essay on Cold War political culture. There was popular consensus that Communism was bad and national security was good but, beyond this, there was debate and dissent about the degree to which daily life should be given over to these principles.

Although our popular fascination with the Cold War has centered on its more dramatic showdowns and shadowy covert intrigue, ultimately, the more absorbing history is found in its fissures and ambiguities. The Cold War did not create the red scare, but it certainly gave it legitimacy, lethality, and longevity. Indeed, Schrecker has called McCarthyism "the most widespread and longest lasting wave of political repression in American history."⁴² And, still, the same Cold War political culture that allowed Senator McCarthy to capture center stage also gave him the hook when his act wore thin. Similar complex dynamics played out in social movements. Cold War politicians demanded loyalty from labor and African-American groups, but these movements' patriotism was always conditional – expectant of rights at home in

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 152–56.

⁴¹ Filene, "'Cold War Culture' Doesn't Say It All," 156.

⁴² Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, x.

return for support of adventures abroad. And in the so-called private realm of gender and family relations, too, containment does not hold up as a metaphor. There were simply too many ideological crosscurrents at work: one can find pairings of Cold War doctrine with a whole range of conservative and liberal gender worldviews. Richard Nixon's Cold War triumphalism at the "kitchen debate," where he held up homemakers and their gadgets as a sign of American supremacy, was the conservative variant; female activists who pushed for more rights, using the very language of postwar domesticity, was the liberal version.

In the end, it was the diversity, plurality, and the decentralized individuality of postwar American society – the very characteristics celebrated by Cold War boosters – that made Cold War political culture less sturdy and steady than its adherents had hoped. The Cold War's cultural authority was constantly tested by these more resilient and long-evolving features of American political culture. As literary scholar Donald Pease has written, "the cold war framework was inherently unstable," for it tried to construct "a coherent national identity out of diverse constituencies whose differences could only be partially and unevenly repressed." It was a culture, he says, "whose stability had to be constantly renegotiated" on the ground – in response to the ways American people really lived their daily lives.⁴³ Cold War culture was not an abstraction. We know far too much to say its force was mainly rhetorical. But where it did materialize – in the state, in the law, in the workplace, in political movements, and in neighborhoods and families – its power was never absolute.

43 Donald E. Pease, "Hiroshima, the Vietnam Veterans War Memorial, and the Gulf War," in Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (eds.), *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 557–58.

Cold War mobilisation and domestic politics: the Soviet Union

DAVID PRIESTLAND

In May 1946, Iosif Stalin complained to writers about their excessive respect for Western culture: 'They [Soviet intellectuals] still feel themselves minors, not one hundred percent, they've got used to considering themselves in a situation of eternal pupils ... [a good Soviet man] adores some foreign bastard, a scholar who is three heads shorter than he. He loses his dignity.'¹ And, thirteen years later, Nikita Khrushchev revealed a similar anxiety about the dignity of the USSR on the eve of his trip to the United States. As he later reminisced: 'I'll admit that I was worried ... we had to express our point of view ... without letting ourselves be humiliated ... Stalin [had] kept trying to convince us that we ... were no good, that we wouldn't be able to stand up to the imperialists ... Stalin's words sounded in my head.'²

As both of these statements indicate, the Soviet leadership throughout the early Cold War was obsessed with the competition with the West, and was deeply anxious about its status and the need to improve its weak position. The enormous expenditures by the Soviet state on the military and military-industrial establishments, at the direct expense of consumption, also ensured that the Cold War had an enormous impact on the lives of ordinary Soviet citizens. Yet, it has not been common for historians to discuss the internal political and social developments within the USSR specifically through the prism of the Cold War, or even to emphasise the role of the Cold War in analysing Soviet domestic political and social developments during the period (though there are of course exceptions). This is in sharp contrast to historians of the United States, who are engaged in a sophisticated debate on whether it is reasonable to define the postwar era as one dominated by the Cold War.³

1 I. Stalin, quoted by Konstantin Simonov, translated in E. Van Ree, *Stalin's Political Thought* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 182.

2 William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (London: Free Press, 2003), 423–24.

3 See Laura McEnaney's chapter in this volume.

In part, this may reflect a form of parochialism within writings on the history of the USSR. One of the central questions addressed by the historiography has concerned the impact of Bolshevik Marxism on Soviet politics and society, and its relationship with non-ideological, 'pragmatic' concerns, such as economic or social pressures. This has sometimes led to a neglect of international context. Some historians, in particular those writing on the revolutionary and civil war period, have tried to redress this balance, but the 'internationalisation' of the historiography has not extended into the Cold War period to such an extent. So is the time now ripe for a reconceptualisation of post-1945 Soviet history in which the Cold War plays a central role?

This chapter will argue that the Cold War was of supreme importance to all aspects of Soviet politics, and that the literature on the period, which is still in an early stage of development following the opening of archives, certainly could pay greater attention to the interaction between domestic and international forces. However, the role of the Cold War should not be exaggerated, because the Soviet system was already well adapted to competition of a Cold War type.

The Soviet leadership had been engaged in ideological, economic, and military competition with the West and then with Germany and Japan since 1917. The regime was born during war, and many of its institutions and practices were designed during the civil war period to mobilise the population for war. Its economic system, established by Stalin in the late 1920s, was also, in essence, created for war, or at least military competition. At times, this competition was cooler and at times hotter, but throughout the interwar period the Bolsheviks believed that they were fighting an ideological battle against the capitalist West, and in much of the period they were fighting or preparing for wars against foreign enemies. The onset of the Cold War therefore merely confirmed Soviet leaders in their view that 'capitalist encirclement' was a reality and their responses were heavily conditioned by past experience. So, while the Cold War dominated the thinking of the leadership in 1945–62, it did not demand a special set of approaches to domestic politics, designed specifically for it. Indeed, very different domestic policies can be identified during the period, especially if one compares the Stalinist with the post-Stalinist period. In this respect, the experience of the Soviet Union contrasts with that of the United States. The Cold War arguably changed the politics of the United States much more substantially than the politics of the Soviet Union.

Also, changes in the politics of the Soviet Union after 1945 cannot necessarily be ascribed to the circumstances of the Cold War: the 'Terror' of 1936–38

and the Second World War were also important in determining the response of the leadership to its problems in the period. The chaos produced by the Terror showed that extreme repression combined with ideological purism could be counterproductive, and probably helps to explain why the campaigns of the postwar period were so much less radical and disruptive. But the experience of the 'Great Patriotic War' was much more significant for the politics of the postwar period. It caused enormous economic dislocation and destruction, while at the same time victory allowed the regime to feel more secure than it had in the 1930s. It also established a different relationship between state and society: those who fought were more confident and less willing to accept a rigid ideological orthodoxy than pre-war generations had been, and the Stalinist state was forced to dilute the Marxist-Leninist content of its ideology, making concessions to nationalism and religion; yet, on the other hand, there was much less open opposition to the regime than there had been before the war, at least from the peasantry. Hence, although the state did go some way to re-imposing the pre-war system, there was a degree of 'normalisation' of relations between the regime and society compared with the interwar period: the regime no longer pursued violent and divisive campaigns of 'class struggle', and, with some exceptions, there was less social and political conflict. Thus, the aftermath of the Terror and the Second World War contributed towards greater stability, while complicating the leadership's efforts to remobilise the population for the Cold War.

Yet, even if mobilisation for the Cold War did not create a fundamentally new political system or political culture, the specific characteristics of the Cold War did contribute to particular outcomes and ensure that some approaches to politics were more likely to be favoured than others. The Cold War forced the Soviet leadership to compete in two areas – the military and economic, and the ideological – the second of which many Soviet leaders saw as equally, if not more, important in the struggle with the West. In the military and economic spheres, the Cold War presented the USSR with a new set of challenges. Even though it was no longer threatened by an enemy determined to destroy it militarily, the USSR struggled to keep up with the West technologically (possibly to a greater extent than in the 1930s, when the Red Army had reached the technological level of the French and British armies).⁴ At the same time, for reasons described above, the regime was not as prepared to use

4 N. S. Simonov, *Voenna-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950-e gody* [The Military-Industrial Complex of the USSR from the 1920s to the 1950s] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), 323.

force to ensure stability at home as it had been before the war. The crucial distributional 'guns or butter' question which dominated high politics therefore became particularly difficult to resolve.

The Cold War placed the USSR in an equally difficult position in the ideological sphere. On the one hand, science and technology were particularly crucial in the nuclear age; but on the other the ideological conflict between the two superpowers was arguably sharper than it had been between the USSR and the Nazis, as both were struggling to present themselves as true heirs of the Enlightenment, and both were aware of the importance of winning hearts and minds, initially in Europe and then in the developing world. These peculiar conditions ensured that the perennial tension between the ideological and the technological in Soviet politics (*politika* and *tekhnika* in Bolshevik language) was particularly fraught, and this conflict also had implications for the institutional rivalry between the party (which had primary responsibility for ideology) and the state (which, among other things, managed the economy).

So, while in both the military-economic and ideological spheres, tensions – between industrial and defence investment and consumption, and between technocracy and ideology – had dominated Soviet politics since 1928, during the Cold War period they were arguably more difficult to resolve than before the war. The balance of forces changed over time, and the period 1945–62 can be divided into three: the late Stalinist period, when 1930s Stalinism was re-established after the war, but in a slightly more technocratic form; the years immediately after Stalin's death, when conflicts emerged within the leadership and Lavrentii Beria and Georgii Malenkov were condemned for an excessively technocratic and consumerist position; and the Khrushchev era, when attempts were made to establish a new equilibrium, combining a turn towards consumption with a new emphasis on ideology – one that proved to be highly unstable.

All leaders, whatever the strategies they adopted, put enormous energy into mobilising the population for the Cold War, and inevitably the conflict had a significant effect on the attitudes of the population. The war helped to forge a Soviet identity and a sense of patriotism to a much greater extent than had been the case in the 1930s, and this was reinforced during the Cold War. However, at the same time, the international situation complicated the leadership's attempts to maintain its legitimacy. In the 1930s, the West seemed to be failing economically and did not pose a significant ideological challenge. This changed after 1945, and the perception that the West was economically superior and possessed an attractive culture was reinforced by Red Army

soldiers who had been in the West. And, from the 1950s, a combination of short-wave radio, the appeal of Western youth culture and the Western propaganda effort ensured that the leadership found it even more difficult to insulate popular culture from foreign influences.⁵

Guns and butter

The tension between the demands of defence and heavy industrial production on the one side, and consumption on the other, had been a central question of Soviet economic policy, and politics more generally, since the 1920s. Even in the harshest period of Stalinist industrialisation in the early 1930s, the state was forced to balance the requirements of industrial development with the interests of the Soviet consumer. If the consumer was squeezed too much, there might be unrest; also the absence of material incentives, which depended on the availability of consumer goods, would damage labour productivity.

Even so, the Stalinist system favoured production at the expense of consumption, and Stalin regularly denounced any attempts to redress the balance as 'rightist' and 'capitalist' deviations. The Stalinist economic system was designed to reduce consumption and extract resources from agriculture, 'pumping' them into heavy (Group A) industries and defence, and the absence of material incentives ensured that the regime had to rely on high levels of coercion. This strategy reached its climax during the war, when over half of national expenditure was spent on defence and military industry; meanwhile, investment in light (Group B) industry was only 60 per cent of pre-war levels and personal consumption fell by 35–40 per cent. The regime relied on patriotism to overcome discontent but, even so, it was forced to enhance material incentives to some extent, and reduced restrictions on peasants' private plots and the markets where their produce was traded.

After the war, there was agreement within the leadership that spending on defence and military-industrial products be scaled down dramatically; the population had to be rewarded for its sacrifices. But, at the same time, Stalin insisted that investment be poured into the reconstruction of heavy industry, which would establish the Soviet Union's industrial and defence base in the longer term. The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946–50) was a compromise document: the first priority was to build up the industrial base, and the second was to develop agriculture and consumer-goods industries, while defence came

⁵ See Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht's chapter in this volume, and Nicholas Cull's in volume II.

only fifth in the list; Group A and B industries were to grow at more or less the same rate. Although these contrasted with pre-war plans, which gave heavy industry many more resources than consumer industries, they amounted to a severe squeeze on consumption, because living standards in 1945 were already at lower levels than before the war.⁶

A poor harvest in 1946 led to a serious famine, and standards of living deteriorated further. Estimates suggest that in 1948 real wages were 80% of their level in 1940, which were in turn between 25% and 40% lower than their level in 1928. Yet, despite this poverty, the leadership refused to cut its plans for heavy industrial investment. The international situation was in large part responsible, and in November 1947 the regime increased plans for the production of military hardware substantially.

At about the same time, however, the economy began to turn the corner, largely because better harvests improved food supply. The leadership decided that conditions allowed it to abolish rationing in December 1947, and from 1948–49 there was some economic recovery. Production began to reach pre-war levels, and living standards rose (although they remained very low) – in 1952 real wages were 25 per cent higher than in 1940. And this improvement allowed the regime to use slightly less coercion in its treatment of the Soviet working class from 1950 (even though, as will be seen, the regime was launching repressive campaigns against elite groups at the same time).⁷ Hence, although the beginning of the Korean War seems to have led to an increase in spending on the military, this did not have such a severe effect on the living standards of the population.⁸

In the years after 1945, therefore, competition with the West encouraged the leadership to retain the emphasis on heavy industry and defence of the 1930s, although it did not feel able to invest such a high proportion of the national product in industry and the military as it had in the early Stalinist period. While low living standards did not cause much open, organised discontent, they gave the population very few incentives to work, and the leadership as a whole recognised that there had to be limits to industrial and military investment.

6 Janet Chapman, *Real Wages in Soviet Russia since 1928* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 144–45; Donald Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 42–43.

7 Filtzer, *Soviet Workers*, 247.

8 Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 99.

Yet subterranean disagreements about where those limits lay are apparent. In 1952, for instance, Stalin admitted that a crisis in beef production was caused by poor incentives, and he established a commission headed by Khrushchev to investigate. Khrushchev proposed that procurement prices for meat be raised, but Stalin was willing to accept this only if it was financed by increasing the already very high taxes on agriculture as a whole; he was unwilling to sacrifice his heavy industrial programme. Tensions within the leadership were also evident on the question of labour in the prison camp system (Gulag). Beria and Malenkov, both leaders involved in the management of the economy, were aware of the inefficiencies of a system that relied on force and discipline rather than material incentives. Beria, who was in charge of the Gulag system and was expected to ensure that the camps fulfilled high plan targets, seems to have become convinced that forced labour was more inefficient than free labour, and was worried about the frequent unrest within the camps. He surreptitiously tried to introduce material incentives into the system and to release prisoners. Malenkov seems to have sympathised with his view, although neither criticised forced labour openly for fear of antagonising Stalin.

When Stalin died, an influential part of the successor leadership was convinced that the Stalinist model of heavy defence spending, a squeeze on consumption, and a reliance on force and discipline at the expense of material incentives had to change. The evidence suggests that domestic rather than international considerations were the driving force for change, but there obviously was a link between domestic and foreign policy, as the best way to increase consumption was to cut back on defence commitments and lower tensions with the West. Events outside the USSR also seemed to suggest that Stalinist rigidity in international relations and repression at home were not working. Unrest in Eastern Europe in 1953 forced the leadership to accept that reforms were needed in the satellite states; at the same time, there were genuine concerns that Stalin had pursued too risky a foreign policy, and that international tensions would escalate dangerously, leading to the use of nuclear weapons in Korea by the United States.

Initially, this consensus on the need for change extended even to more orthodox Stalinist figures such as Viacheslav Molotov. However, differences over the nature and extent of reform are evident throughout the post-Stalin period. These were largely generated by personal rivalries at the top, but, as was always the case in Soviet politics, leaders had to use ideology to advance their personal ambitions, and as a result programmatic differences did play a role. Additionally, leaders had to appeal to broader institutional interests, such as those in the military, the party apparatus, and heavy industrial ministries.

More generally, though, these conflicts were driven by the difficulty of solving the problem of how the USSR could maintain its role as a superpower while at the same time developing its economy and shoring up its legitimacy at home.

Stalin's successors argued for different solutions to this problem. Beria and Malenkov, as was to be expected given their involvement in economic management, adopted a more technocratic approach, emphasising more effective material incentives and, in the case of Malenkov, significantly greater investment in consumer industries. Malenkov also seems to have been particularly willing to make concessions on defence and foreign policy. Meanwhile, Khrushchev favoured, at least initially, an eclectic approach that combined commitment to heavy industry and defence with improvements in consumer industry, and he was less willing to dilute collectivism in the name of individualist, capitalist incentives. Molotov seems to have been more conservative on economic issues than the younger leaders, and was generally less prepared to make compromises in the Cold War.⁹

Immediately after the death of Stalin, Beria initiated a series of reforms that sought to end the reliance of the economy on forced labour, and to circumscribe the powers of the secret police in the economy – policies that are better seen as technocratic than liberal. He was also outspoken on the need to address difficulties in Eastern Europe, and particularly the German Democratic Republic (GDR), by making concessions and retreating from harsh Stalinist economic policies – although in this period there was a considerable degree of consensus, and all Soviet leaders recognised the need for change.

Policy differences were less important than personal rivalries in precipitating the coup against Beria in 1953: his colleagues clearly feared that he would start to move against them unless they launched a pre-emptive strike. Even so, Molotov, in particular, made attempts to blame Beria for excessive compromise with the West, which, it was alleged, had contributed to the East German uprising. And a similar fate befell Malenkov, who again tried to press for a radical departure from the Stalinist orthodoxy. In March 1954, he was calling for a redirection of resources away from heavy to consumer industries and arguing for an end to the confrontation with the West on the grounds that a war in the nuclear age would destroy world civilisation. But Malenkov, like Beria, found himself outmanoeuvred by his rival Khrushchev, in alliance with Molotov, and condemned for an excessively consumerist and pro-détente position. He was removed from the premiership in January 1955.

9 Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 261, 266–9.

Yet Khrushchev's condemnation of Malenkov for 'rightism' did not amount to a defence of the Stalinist orthodoxy. Rather, he sought his own version of reformism, which avoided Malenkov's radicalism and Molotov's more orthodox Stalinism, while squaring the circle: reforming the Soviet economy and enhancing the legitimacy of the regime at home by increasing consumption, without undermining the position of heavy industry and the USSR's international role. He did so by emphasising the role of the party and of ideology, arguing that the Soviet Union could solve its problems if the leadership remained true to its Leninist ideals and used them to inspire the population to achieve great feats. Thus, at least initially, he refused to accept that there was any need to reduce investment in heavy industry in the interests of consumption because mass mobilisation campaigns organised by the party, such as the introduction of wheat to the 'Virgin Lands' of Kazakhstan, could increase agricultural production cheaply. In foreign policy, he argued that the Soviet Union's role as a global power and promoter of socialism could be sustained at the same time as military expenditures were reduced by investing in cheaper nuclear technologies and transferring the competition with the West from the military to the ideological and economic spheres.

Predictably, Molotov criticised several of these initiatives from a more orthodox Stalinist position, condemning the Virgin Lands campaign as unrealistic, and objecting to Khrushchev's attempts to make peace with Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav leader. Relations between the two became increasingly tense, culminating in a final breach when Khrushchev denounced Stalin (and implicitly Molotov and others close to him) in 1956, and when Molotov participated in the attempt to remove Khrushchev in 1957.

Initially, Khrushchev's policy programme seemed to succeed in resolving the conflict between the demands of defence and consumption, and it was attractive to a significant section of the Soviet elite. Yet, it was ultimately impossible to sustain. Party mobilisation campaigns, while frequently attracting a good deal of support, often caused chaos and failed to provide a magic formula for the solution of economic problems. Moreover, Khrushchev found that his brand of aggressive ideological competition with the West was expensive and required military expansion. Therefore, once Khrushchev had emerged as *primus inter pares*, he found that serious choices on investment priorities had to be made. While he was consolidating his position within the leadership, Khrushchev supported cuts in consumer industries and increases in investment in heavy industry. However, as he became stronger in 1956 and 1957, he reversed his position and adopted a much more reformist programme, closer to that of Malenkov. He cut heavy industrial investment

and proposed that the Soviet Union compete with the United States in the production of food; he also promised that the USSR would overtake American production of meat, milk, and butter in three to four years. From 1959 to 1961, when Khrushchev's authority was at its highest, he redirected resources from heavy to consumer industries and agriculture. At the same time, he felt that he had the political strength to challenge the military establishment, and in January 1960 he announced a continuation of the substantial unilateral troop reductions begun in 1957.

Predictably, Khrushchev began to attract serious opposition from heavy industrial and military interests. His attempts at agricultural reform continued to be ineffective, and his efforts to shake up industry by increasing party control were disruptive. In foreign policy, his ambition to promote Communism outside Europe and his willingness to pursue a highly risky strategy in pursuit of these revolutionary goals conflicted with his hope that he could achieve détente and military cutbacks. In 1961, the 1960 defence cuts were reversed, and actual defence spending rose by 24.6 per cent.¹⁰ Heavy industry's priority was affirmed in 1961, and in May 1962 retail food prices on meat, sausage, and butter were substantially increased, while wages were reduced. The result was serious unrest throughout the industrial areas of the Soviet Union, most notably in Novocherkassk, where riots had to be put down by Red Army tanks.

The events of 1962 showed that Khrushchev had failed to resolve the problem of guns and butter. His ambitious attempts to enhance the legitimacy of the regime, while at the same time expanding the international influence of the USSR, exacerbated the problems of reconciling defence and consumption, and led to crisis.

Technology and ideology

Closely related to the conflict between supporters of consumption on the one hand, and heavy industry and defence on the other, was that between the ideologues and the 'technocrats'. Ideological supporters of heavy industry and defence tended to emphasise *politika*, taking a more hard-line stance internationally, while avoiding the use of 'capitalist' market incentives at home. Technocrats, in contrast, called for policy-making to be informed by scientific expertise and *tekhnika*, and usually argued for the 'pragmatic' use of market incentives; this required more investment in consumer industries for them to

¹⁰ Philip G. Roeder, *Red Sunset: The Failure of Soviet Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 159.

be effective, and less in defence. There were various ways of combining *tekhnika* and *politika*. We can identify a trajectory similar to that seen in the conflict over investment priorities: a late Stalinist compromise, in which *politika*, which still had the major role but did not have the power it had had in the 1930s, gave way after Stalin's death to a sharp policy conflict. Extreme technocrats had a brief prominence, but that period was followed by a new tense and unstable relationship between *tekhnika* and *politika* under Khrushchev. Yet, the nature of the debate did change under Khrushchev because his conception of the content of the ideology differed from Stalin's. Khrushchev's Marxism-Leninism was internationalist, rather than quasi-nationalistic and xenophobic, and it emphasised popular mobilisation, in contrast to Stalin's advocacy of elite control. He also attempted to reconcile a commitment to Marxism-Leninism with an economic policy that broadly favoured consumption.

The tension between *tekhnika* and *politika* was fundamental to Bolshevism.¹¹ For technocratic Bolsheviks, the best way of building a powerful and wealthy state was to rely on educated experts to plan the economy and organise the state rationally, using a mixture of discipline and material incentives (but not going so far as to introduce a market system). For more 'revivalist' Bolsheviks, these strategies did not take account of the peculiarly socialist nature of the regime: they created hierarchies of expertise and were too 'bourgeois'; they also neglected the economic and military advantages that true socialism could bring. If party spirit were revived and the population mobilised, revivalists argued, the system could achieve heroic feats because 'moral' incentives were much more effective than material ones. Thus, Bolshevik revivalism was closely connected with economic voluntarism – the notion that willpower and enthusiasm could generate economic miracles. This division over ideology and strategy was often, although not always, associated with the institutional division between party and state. As the party's role was to inspire the masses and ensure that the regime remained socialist, it was likely that it would stress the power of ideas to mobilise the masses, while the 'state' bureaucracy, which was dominated by the ministries that ran the economy, was more likely to adopt a technocratic approach.

Stalin's political position, like that of most Bolshevik leaders, changed over time, but it is possible to identify a reasonably consistent belief in the primacy of *politika*. Yet, his interpretation of revivalism was of a particular type: he was

¹¹ For this tension, see David Priestland, *Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization: Ideas, Power, and Terror in Inter-War Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), introduction.

interested in the mobilising power of Marxism-Leninism, but his views often had a xenophobic colouring. He was always worried about the power of foreign ideological influence to corrupt the population and undermine its willingness to build and fight for socialism. In the Terror of 1936–38, for example, he combined a populist ‘class struggle’ against officials and experts with xenophobic campaigns against particular ethnic groups within the USSR, such as Germans, Poles, and Koreans.

The Terror, and especially its antibureaucratic elements, was extremely damaging to economic success and military preparedness because it virtually destroyed expert bureaucracies. From the late 1930s, Stalin was forced to move away from *politika* towards *tekhnika*, and the power of managers and economic officials was strengthened against political interference. These trends continued during the war. Political commissars in the army were subordinated to officers, and Stalin himself delegated a great deal of authority over the economy to his subordinates. More generally, political and ideological restrictions were relaxed. The leadership used more explicitly Russian nationalist messages and made fewer efforts to associate them with socialist ideology once Stalin recruited the Orthodox Church to the patriotic cause in 1943. At the same time, the status and influence of scientists increased. They were credited with a major role in winning the war, and their importance in the nuclear-arms race was fully accepted. They were given a good deal of independence from the requirements of the party and ideology. They were also encouraged to collaborate with their Western colleagues so that they could learn from and overtake the West.¹²

However, soon after the war this ideological laxity was reversed, and Stalin pursued versions of the campaigns he had waged during the 1930s. Given his long-established concerns about the dangers of foreign ideas, it is probable that Stalin would have wanted to impose greater ideological conformity after the war, whatever the relations were with the West. There is a great deal of evidence that returning soldiers were particularly assertive and critical. They believed that their sacrifices in war had earned them a less repressive political system. Many had witnessed the higher living standards in the West, an experience that was an ‘emotional and psychological shock’, as the playwright Konstantin Simonov put it.¹³

12 N. Krementsov, *Stalinist Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), ch. 4.

13 Quoted in Elena Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945–1957* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 16–18.

Yet deteriorating relations with the West also contributed to Stalin's hardening line. In the spring of 1946, at a time of increasing tension, he began his ideological campaigns in earnest, using both Marxist-Leninist and Russian nationalist (and particularly anti-Semitic) themes to attack the West. In April, Stalin criticised the literary journals *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* for their openness to Western influences, and in August he used his chief ideologist, Andrei Zhdanov, to launch a broader condemnation of 'cringing before philistine foreign literature'.¹⁴ The next stage came the following April, shortly after Harry S. Truman's announcement of his 'doctrine'. Several months before, Stalin had criticised a new *History of Western European Philosophy* by the head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, G. F. Aleksandrov, for neglecting the achievements of Russian philosophy. Now, Stalin tried to use the case to signal a larger assault on Western values. At the same time, 'honour courts' were established in state institutions in order to stage trials of officials and academics accused of harbouring unpatriotic attitudes.

The socialist patriotic campaign also spread to the natural sciences, and scientists were accused of 'servility to the West'. The first significant attack on scientists came with the criticism of Nina Kliueva and her husband Grigori Roskin (the 'KR affair'), medical researchers who were accused of giving details of a cancer cure to the Americans. Even so, Stalin, while using the campaigns to promote a broader attack on the West and its culture, did not want to damage scientific research. Those criticised, including Kliueva and Roskin, were allowed to continue their work. Other established scientists also retained some influence. The antigeneticist 'Marxist-Leninist' biologist Trofim Lysenko, for example, failed to secure political support in 1947, even though he tried to use the patriotic campaign against his academic enemies.

It was only in the summer of 1948, again in response to a deterioration in East-West relations, that Stalin decided to intervene in support of Lysenko. Stalin deliberately used the Lysenko affair to demonstrate the fundamental differences between East and West and the superiority of Soviet science and the Soviet system more generally. The victory of Lysenkoism in biology certainly demonstrated that the party had extended its power in the scientific realm and that science had been subordinated to ideology; yet Stalin remained unwilling to jeopardise research in areas which he believed were of particular importance, such as physics and nuclear weapons. A conference designed to denounce 'Western' ideas in physics, planned for March 1949, was cancelled at

14 Quoted in Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace*, 34–35.

short notice, possibly because Beria realised that this might imperil the nuclear programme.¹⁵

In many respects, then, the socialist patriotic campaigns of the late 1940s echoed the revivalist campaigns of the late 1930s: the balance between *politika* and *tekhnika* was tipped in favour of the former, the party was allowed to interfere in some areas of technical expertise, and the ideological mobilisation of the population against the Western threat was the priority. While the 'ideology' promoted in the 1940s included more nationalistic elements than it had in the 1930s, this was not a conventional ethnic nationalism. 'Enemies' were still defined according to their relationship with socialism; the Jews thus took the place of the Germans, Poles, and Koreans as potential fifth columnists. Yet there were important differences between the campaigns of the 1930s and those of the 1940s. The revivalism of the postwar period was more limited and relied less on popular mobilisation than that of the 1930s. Science was never fully subordinated to ideology, possibly because the leadership had learned lessons from the 1930s, but also because science and expertise were now seen as crucial weapons in the Cold War. Stalin had never claimed that there was a special proletarian science, superior to bourgeois science, but in the 1930s he had argued that working-class 'practical people', such as the heroic Stakhanovite workers, could be as expert as qualified scientists and technicians.¹⁶ In the 1940s and 1950s, however, he expressed very different sentiments. While Stalin believed that he, as the 'coryphaeus of science', had the right to be closely involved in scientific debates, he insisted that there were objective scientific and economic laws independent of Marxism.¹⁷ For instance, in 1948, he crossed out Lysenko's statement 'any science is class-based' and wrote in the margin: 'HA-HA-HA!!! And what about mathematics? And what about Darwinism?'¹⁸ Stalin, therefore, did recognise, in theory, that science had to develop free from politics, although his willingness to launch political campaigns against scientists had a seriously detrimental effect on Soviet science.

15 David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 211–12.

16 I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia* [Works] (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1967), I (XIV), 275–77.

17 Ethan Pollock, 'Stalin as the Coryphaeus of Science: Ideology and Knowledge in the Post-war Years', in S. Davies and J. Harris (eds.), *Stalin: A New History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 284–85.

18 Quoted in K. Rossianov, 'Editing Nature: Joseph Stalin and the "New" Soviet Biology', *Isis*, 84 (1993), 728–45.

Stalin's campaigns against scientists were also much more targeted than they had been in the 1930s, and did not involve a populist 'class struggle'. They affected the scientific elite, and were propagandistic in intent, designed to mobilise the population against the West. The scientists themselves were generally not arrested, and these campaigns did not lead to purges of technicians throughout the country. More generally, the power and status of managers and technicians in relation to workers rose in the postwar period, and strict hierarchies were maintained in factories. Most obviously, the campaigns did not lead to mass violence against 'enemies'. Officials were executed in various purges of the period, but the victims were relatively few. It may be that Stalin was planning mass violence against Jews in 1952–53, just before his death, in connection with the so-called Doctors' Plot, but, given evidence currently available, this seems unlikely.¹⁹

This balance, which gave *politika* primacy but was more favourable to *tekhnika* than before the war, is also evident in the power structure that emerged at the very top during the postwar Stalinist period. Stalin used purges and aggressive bullying to restore some of the powers he had been forced to delegate to his inner circle during the war. Nonetheless, he knew that he could not exercise personal control over the economy. In February 1947, therefore, he acquiesced in granting the 'state' Council of Ministers (Sovmin) almost complete control over the economy. Stalin did not participate in Sovmin meetings which largely involved leaders interested in economic affairs, such as Beria and Malenkov. But he wholly controlled the party Politburo, which dealt with 'political' and foreign-policy questions. This was a departure from the 1930s, when Stalin had been closely involved in economic management. In the political sphere, Stalin maintained his arbitrary, personalistic form of rule, often involving his subordinates in terrifying late-night meetings. In contrast, Sovmin developed a formal bureaucratic structure and a hierarchy of specialised committees.²⁰

This balance between *politika* and *tekhnika*, and between party and state, made sense during the early Cold War, at a time when the Soviet Union was forced to compete with the West in a struggle that was both ideological and military, but it was clearly an unstable one. For the more technocratic Beria and Malenkov, political interference damaged scientific progress and the state's ability to manage the economy. For those associated with the party

19 Gorlizki and Khlevniuk deny that Stalin was planning a mass repression: Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace*, 158–59. For an alternative view, see J. Brent and V. P. Naumov, *Stalin's Last Crime: The Doctors' Plot* (London: Murray, 2003).

20 Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace*, ch. 7.

and interested in ideology, such as Khrushchev, the potential of Bolshevism to mobilise the population was being neglected: the 'Marxism-Leninism' promoted by Stalin was too elitist and xenophobic. The party apparatus, moreover, resented its subordination in economic affairs. In large part its discontent at the late Stalinist compromise was driven by institutional conflicts and long-established ideological tensions. But the international environment also had an influence. At a time when the Cold War was becoming associated with decolonisation struggles, an emphasis on the universalistic element of Marxism-Leninism clearly appeared attractive. The critics of Stalin's xenophobia, therefore, had powerful arguments in favour of change. At the same time, however, the nuclearisation of the Cold War strengthened those technocrats who argued both that conventional defence spending could be cut and that the world was too dangerous for continued ideological competition.

The first significant challenge to the Stalinist compromise came from Beria and Malenkov, both technocrats and leaders in the state apparatus. Beria rapidly moved to reduce the politicisation of justice and to undermine the power of the party over the ministries.²¹ He also criticised the Russian nationalist elements of late Stalinist ideology, condemning the power of Russians in high positions in non-Russian republics and criticising the dominance of the Russian language. On Beria's fall, Malenkov took up the baton and continued the departure from the Stalinist compromise. He tried to free the intelligentsia from ideological restrictions and asked for advice from leading economists and scientists. The former called for greater economic liberalisation, and the latter demanded an end to the power of Lysenko in the biological sciences.²²

However, the tense international environment in 1954–55 strengthened those who took ideology seriously both at home and in the struggle against the West. Khrushchev, the head of the party apparatus, was in a particularly good position to take advantage of this situation. For Khrushchev, the party was to retain its international ideological role, as promoter of world Communism. Inside the USSR, he adopted a revivalist position: the party had to be strengthened in its relationship with the state apparatus so that it could imbue the population with enthusiasm for a non-Stalinist 'democratic' socialism. This would strengthen the legitimacy of the regime and inspire people to work harder. He made more serious efforts than Stalin to reconcile these strategies

21 Amy Knight, *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 185–86.

22 Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 260.

with the demands of scientific autonomy, but understandably he found it difficult to resolve tensions between his encouragement of scientific excellence and his enthusiasm for a renewal of Marxism-Leninism.

Khrushchev's partial denunciation of Stalin in October 1956 allowed him to justify these policies. He did not condemn the essence of the Stalinist system – collectivisation, industrialisation, the plan, and the centralisation of political power – but concentrated on criticising the 1936–38 Terror. He presented it as a departure from Bolshevik 'democracy' and as an attack on the party (neglecting the larger numbers of non-party members persecuted under Stalin).

In many ways Khrushchev was returning to the populist revivalism of the Bolshevik Left in the 1920s. His ideas were universalistic and atheistic, rather than quasi-nationalistic. They emphasised the importance of 'democracy' and 'struggles against bureaucratism'. Attempts were made to raise the enthusiasm of the masses by 'democratising' the party and industrial management. The party rank and file and workers were encouraged to participate in discussions of decision-making. The masses were not to challenge party rule, but were to put pressure on 'bureaucratic' officials. At the same time, Khrushchev gave the party much more power over economic managers by destroying the economic ministries and creating regional economic councils (*sovmarkhozy*), which could be more effectively influenced by the party.²³

Party influence was also closely associated with economic voluntarism, particularly in agriculture, Khrushchev's particular area of interest. Khrushchev had a typical revivalist Bolshevik view of the miraculous power of labour heroism. When 'people come to know their own strength', he declared, 'they create miracles'. He did place a high priority on science, and he was sympathetic to the view that Stalinist controls had damaged the intelligentsia.²⁴ However, in a rather more populist vein, he at times had contempt for 'pointy-headed intellectuals' who did not understand production as well as 'working people'.²⁵ At the same time, he set himself the task of competing with the West in the area of consumption, and his voluntarism often won out in his disastrous pursuit of high plan targets against the advice of experts. His support for Lysenko, who promised agricultural miracles, showed he was still a revivalist, prepared to put pressure on scientists to endorse impractical economic goals. Lysenko did not regain the degree of influence over science he had held in the late Stalinist era, and scientific debate

23 G. Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 4–5, 75–77, 104–07, 127–31.

24 *Ibid.*, 387.

25 Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 374–75.



36. Women welders chatting, USSR, 1962.

remained much more open than it had been. But for many in the party leadership, one of Khrushchev's main faults was his subordination of science to politics. As *Pravda* declared in its explanation for his removal on 16 October 1964, he was guilty of 'unwillingness to take into account what science and practical experience have already worked out'.²⁶

A Cold War popular culture?

The competition with the West, therefore, clearly dominated the thinking of Soviet leaders, even if they advocated different ways of mobilising Soviet

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 620.

society. So how effective was this mobilisation, and how far did the population internalise the leadership's insistence on the primacy of the Cold War? Research on popular attitudes suggests that in crucial respects they accorded with official attitudes. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, fear of war with the West was high, and frequent incidents of panic buying were reported as rumours of war spread. Winston Churchill's Fulton speech and the outbreak of the Korean War, for example, were especially worrying to Soviet citizens. The evidence of discussions at electoral and party meetings also suggests that questions of foreign policy were of particular interest.

There is also some evidence that the experience of the war had given many people a highly critical attitude towards the West, and led many to sympathise with official Soviet patriotism. In particular, Soviet citizens expressed anger at the failure of the Allies to open a second front. They were dismayed by the high living standards in the West and poverty in the Soviet Union, despite the heavy losses sustained on the Eastern front. As Zdeněk Mlynář, the Czech Communist who spent some time in the USSR in the 1940s and early 1950s, reminisced, it was common at the time to believe that the Soviet people had made unique sacrifices in the war, and therefore deserved special respect. These sentiments accorded with the official view that the Soviet Union was a particularly moral nation, both because it had a collectivist political system and because it had freed the world of Nazism. But these views combined with a desire to avoid war at all costs, and with a reluctance to make any more sacrifices than were absolutely necessary. People complained about fraternal aid to East European countries and expressed scepticism about the rejection of the Marshall Plan.²⁷

Notwithstanding broad sympathy for official views on foreign policy, Soviet citizens did not like the rigid internal controls established during the early Cold War period. Elena Zubkova and others have argued that the experience of war created a generation that was more confident and less willing to accept control from above. People, who had experienced more mobility during the war and who had been permitted to communicate outside official channels, believed their wartime sacrifices now entitled them to

27 For popular opinion during this period, see especially Zubkova, *Russia after the War*; D. Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), ch. 14; Mark Edele, 'More than Just Stalinists: The Political Sentiments of Victors', in J. Fürst (ed.), *Late Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention* (London: Routledge, 2006), 167–91.



37. New housing in Novosibirsk, 1958.

more dignity and autonomy than they had previously received.²⁸ This interpretation, based on a range of archival sources, is confirmed by the Harvard Project's interviews after the war, which found that while most citizens accepted the system, they did want an end to arbitrary and harsh government, and felt that they were given too few rewards for their contributions to society.²⁹ However, Soviet citizens' opinions varied enormously. Some did make more fundamental criticisms of the Soviet system as a whole, and contact with the West convinced some veterans that there was an alternative. Meanwhile, others condemned the Soviet system from the opposite point of view, in the name of an idealistic and moralistic neo-Leninism.³⁰ Yet it is clear that many Soviet citizens had internalised the regime's patriotic message and saw the world as it was presented to them by the party – as made up of 'two camps', 'ours' (*svoi*) and the 'alien' (*chuzhoi*).

Yet official attempts to extend these nationalistic attitudes to the broader sphere of popular culture, and to create a moralistic and puritanical society immune from Western influence were less successful, partly because official policy was highly inconsistent. During the war, there had been some relaxation in popular culture more generally, and front-line soldiers were exposed to big-band jazz, for example. Likewise, American films were shown during and

²⁸ Zubkova, *Russia after the War*, 16–17 and ch. 3.

²⁹ D. Bahry, 'Society Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of *Perestroika*', *Slavic Review*, 52, 3 (1993), 515.

³⁰ Edele, 'More than Just Stalinists'.

after the war, as were German 'trophy' films, taken as part of reparations. With the new cultural policies of the postwar era, jazz was condemned as both Western and frivolous, and at times foreign films were criticised and banned. However, official policy was ambivalent in the late Stalinist period. Jazz tunes were sometimes rearranged as Soviet 'light music' and played in restaurants. Jazz could also be seen in trophy films, which were shown for much of the period, despite the concerns of local party and party youth (Komsomol) officials.

Western cinema and jazz were extremely influential in youth culture, and many youths imitated the dress and acting styles they saw in the trophy films. Listening to jazz and rock and roll on Western stations was also widespread. This Western culture was at the centre of *stiliachestvo* (literally 'stylishness'), a term coined by the authorities to describe a youth sub-culture devoted to stylish clothes, dancing, and music. The Komsomol was extremely worried about the *stiliagi*, but as in the case of trophy films, there was no coherent effort under Stalin to eliminate these potentially dangerous cultural phenomena. Policy changed dramatically under Khrushchev, who, as part of his attempts at ideological revival, sought to eliminate all signs of Western, bourgeois decadence from youth culture. Predictably, these campaigns met with little success.

The Komsomol certainly had something to worry about. The so-called *stiliagi* did, implicitly, challenge official norms by neglecting politics, while establishing their own collective life, separate from official organisations. Interest in Western culture did not necessarily imply political or even cultural opposition to the regime. But, even so, aspects of postwar Western culture, and in particular its emphasis on consumption, did help to undermine the collectivism and quasi-military ethos of sacrifice which was such an important element of Bolshevik culture. It would be wrong to exaggerate the novelty of the emphasis on consumption, but Khrushchev's attempts to transfer competition from the military sphere to that of the production of consumer goods, legitimised consumerism ideologically to a greater extent than before. 'Communism', as described by Karl Marx and the Bolsheviks, was a society of extraordinary plenty and so, in theory, there was no contradiction between ideology and high living standards. However, it was likely that Marxism-Leninism's emphasis on collective, as opposed to individual, interests would be threatened by the officially endorsed culture of consumption. By the 1970s, it was becoming increasingly clear that this was indeed happening.

Throughout the early Cold War period, therefore, popular opinion was particularly difficult for the regime to manage. If most people were probably

willing to accept the official line on foreign policy, there was clear evidence of dissatisfaction with the late Stalinist regime of austerity and discipline. It is not surprising, therefore, that Stalin's successors decided the balance between guns and butter had to be altered. Yet the question of *politika* and *tekhnika* was more difficult to resolve. The Communist Party's legitimacy depended on its claim that it was following a special path to modernity, one that relied on 'socialist' economic methods, such as mass mobilisation, rather than conventional technocratic ones. Some Soviet citizens were also committed to this idea, and Khrushchev's revivalist initiatives initially had some popular support. But their failure discredited them, and Khrushchev's successor, Leonid Brezhnev, presided over a more technocratic regime.

The struggle to keep up

The Cold War did not create a fundamentally different form of politics or a new official political culture because the Soviet system was already designed for the mobilisation of its population for war. Yet this is not to deny that the Cold War dominated the thinking of the Soviet leadership. As the weaker party in the superpower relationship, struggling to keep up economically and militarily and to gain equal status politically, it was inevitable that the Soviet elite should have been obsessed by the conflict, possibly even more so than its American counterpart. And the need to compete with an economically and ideologically powerful West arguably exacerbated the tensions within the elite that had been present before 1945 – over the balance of investment and consumption, and the relationship between ideology and technocracy. By the early 1950s, it was clear to many in the elite that Stalin's solution to these problems was not working. But neither Beria nor Malenkov could secure support for their alternatives, and by 1962 Khrushchev's solutions – filled with ambiguities and contradictions – appeared to have failed.

The influence of the Cold War on popular attitudes is less easy to ascertain. Nonetheless, it appears that, while Soviet citizens often followed the elite's view of the world as one divided into two camps, many people were less willing to accept cultural isolation and felt that they deserved rewards for their wartime sacrifices. It was not surprising that when, from the later 1960s, elites themselves started to lose faith in the ability of the Soviet system to compete with the West, they found it even harder to encourage popular sacrifices in the interests of superpower supremacy.

Decolonization, the global South, and the Cold War, 1919–1962

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In 1900, most of Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East were ruled directly or indirectly by the Euro-American colonial powers. As late as the outbreak of World War II, almost a billion of the world's people lived under direct colonial rule. But in the two decades after 1945 imperial order collapsed. At times peacefully, but often after protracted warfare and violence, the imperial powers eventually ceded independence to most of South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East by the mid-1950s. Independence movements ruptured much of the rest of the imperial world over the next decade. In Africa, the year 1960 alone brought independence to seventeen former colonies. Ten more African states would gain their independence over the next several years, as would former colonies in the Caribbean and Latin America. One dramatic measure of the rapidity and scope of this shift in the constitution of world political order was the enlargement of the United Nations. At its founding in 1945, the UN included 51 member states. In 1965, the number had more than doubled to 117, with a majority of the increase made up of states in the global South that formerly had been colonies.

Making sense of these complex events and processes – which crossed time, space, and cultures and were just as much highly contingent and local as they were part of larger shifts in global power and sensibilities – has presented conceptual difficulties for historians. The very terms by which to analyze the phenomena of decolonization have been unusually vexed. For historians of Euro-American empire, decolonization marks the final chapter of high imperialism. It is often viewed through the lens of actors in the metropole and colonial administrators on the ground, emphasizing the ways they shaped both the timing and the trajectories of independence. Historians of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, more concerned with the experiences of the colonized than the colonizers, have argued that such a narrative risks reinscribing patterns of Western imperial power and denies

agency to local actors. In this view, independence was not so much given as taken, and anticolonial actors and their construction of postcolonial states and society become central elements of the story. More recently, the meanings of empire and its dissolution have been seen as overlapping and intertwined processes in which the historical experiences of metropole and colony, albeit under considerable differentials of power, mutually constituted one another.

This vantage point is suggestive for approaching the interpretive puzzle at the heart of this chapter: the relationship between decolonization in the global South and emergence of the Cold War. From the Manichean perspective of most Cold War policymakers in the United States and the Soviet Union as well as some scholars, the movements for independence in the colonized world after World War II were seen as a subset of the bipolar geopolitical order dominated by the Soviet–American rivalry. Without question, the Cold War affected decolonizing states at multiple levels. They were, particularly after 1950, a central Cold War battleground, most dramatically illustrated by the Cuban setting of the missile crisis that marked the apex of Soviet–American tensions. More generally, the high modernist models of US liberal capitalism and Soviet (and later Chinese) state socialism offered powerful and competing ideological paths for realizing the efforts of postcolonial states to remake their societies. The Soviet–American rivalry also presented revolutionary movements and newly independent states with the benefits and the dangers of superpower patronage through weapons and arms, advisers and funds for civil and military development, and direct military intervention. Furthermore, it contributed to the intensity of wars of national liberation and the rise of repressive regimes under superpower sponsorship, producing massive human rights abuses and profoundly destabilizing the decolonizing world.

At the same time, however, the global move toward decolonization was rooted in local particularities that long preceded, ran parallel with, and ultimately persisted beyond the Cold War. Colonized peoples renounced imperialism and sought to escape from it in considerably less fixed ways than a Cold War framework would suggest. The Cold War, therefore, tends to obscure the significance of transnational postcolonial visions in the global South that imagined a world apart both from the bipolar international system and from the imperial order. This chapter limns the porous boundaries of the imperial, the postcolonial, and the Cold War to explore and situate the meanings of decolonization for the structures of international order between 1919 and 1962.

Imperialism and its discontents

The high imperialism of the nineteenth century encountered almost immediate resistance from many colonized peoples. Avoidance, sabotage, and flight were among the most common ways that ordinary people responded to the harsh conditions that colonialism imposed upon them. More organized forms of elite-led rebellion, sometimes aimed at restoring the precolonial order, confronted imperial authorities directly and violently. If some local elites collaborated with colonial powers, they frequently did so to serve their own ends. But beginning in the early twentieth century a more sustained challenge began to dominate the anticolonial politics of the imperial world. The nationalist movements that emerged in this period, with their diverse range of radical thought and action, directly shaped the wave of postcolonial independence after 1945.

World War I and its aftermath were critical in shaping the sensibilities of nationalist leaders. Hundreds of thousands of colonial subjects were conscripted during wartime. They returned from the battlefields of Europe with a deepened suspicion of the civilizational promises of their colonial masters and with an expanded political and social consciousness. The dynamics of Wilsonian peacemaking in the aftermath of the war and the potentialities of the Russian Revolution further radicalized anticolonial thought and action.

Woodrow Wilson's promotion of self-determination as one of the fundamental elements of the postwar peace brought a number of anti-colonial leaders to Paris in 1919, hoping to wrest some form of autonomy from colonial rule. Anticolonial figures from the Egyptian nationalist leader Sa'd Zaghlul to Bal Gangadhar Tilak of India and Nguyen Ai Quoc (later better known as Ho Chi Minh) of Vietnam presented petitions that drew on Wilsonian language to ask for relatively moderate reforms of colonial rule leading to gradual self-government and independence. Their entreaties met with silence from Wilson and the other European imperial powers. At the same time, the peace conference declined to support Japan's efforts to insert a racial equality clause into the provisions of the peace settlement. But, by articulating self-determination as an international norm, Wilsonianism both inspired anticolonial activists and opened up a space through which they could make claims for the legitimacy of movements for independence.

When it became clear that Wilson and his European colleagues had no intention of immediately extending self-determination, some of these frustrated leaders from the colonies began looking to the Bolshevik Revolution as a more alluring path to political independence and social transformation. Anticolonial

figures such as Jawaharlal Nehru in British India, Tan Malaka in the Dutch East Indies, and Ho Chi Minh in French-controlled Vietnam all became active in projects sponsored by the Comintern, the entity created by the Soviet Union in 1919 to foster worldwide revolution. Some Chinese Communist leaders, such as the cosmopolitan Zhou Enlai, were part of these global revolutionary networks. But Iosif Stalin's commitment to revolution outside the West was uneven. He ordered dramatic changes in the Comintern approach to revolution, with sometimes disastrous effects for local Communist Parties in the colonized world. Nonetheless, the Comintern organized training schools in the Soviet Union and brought thousands of activists from the colonial world to Moscow. They saw the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state as models for organizing anticolonial action and postcolonial state-making.

Others in the colonial world were drawn to alternative paths out of colonialism beyond Wilsonian internationalism or international socialism. Their efforts point to the persistent inclination of non-Western peoples to use the shared experiences of oppression to organize transnational anti-imperialist movements. In 1919, just as the great powers were meeting to map the postwar world, the first Pan-African Congress opened in Paris, with delegates from Africa, the Caribbean, and the United States. The congress was part of a broader pan-African movement that had its origins two decades earlier in the 1900 Pan-African Conference in London. Organized to influence the deliberations over German colonies in Africa at the Paris Peace Conference, the congress issued a series of resolutions to secure rights to land, capital, labor, education, medicine, hygiene, and culture for colonized peoples in Africa and sought their protection under the nascent League of Nations.

The transnational solidarities of the pan-African movement would continue to play a powerful role in African and Caribbean affairs in the interwar period and beyond. Many of the activities of the movement in this period centered on the African diasporic community in London and Paris. Among them was the Négritude movement led by Aimé Césaire of Martinique and Léopold Senghor of Senegal, who articulated expressions of shared African identities in the Francophone world in a variety of literary, philosophical, and political registers. In the English-speaking world, a radical form of pan-Africanism under the leadership of the West Indian George Padmore in the late 1930s combined Marxism, trade unionism, anti-imperialism, and an elastic definition of "coloured" that included Asians. Along with Césaire and Senghor, political and cultural elites from Africa, among them Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta, and from the Caribbean and the United States, including

I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson, C.L.R. James, and W.E.B. DuBois, were actively engaged in pan-African politics in this period. Nkrumah and Kenyatta would come to lead the anticolonial struggle and the first postcolonial states in Ghana and Kenya respectively.

Pan-Islamic and pan-Asian sensibilities also emerged in the first half of the twentieth century. In northern Africa and the Middle East, the pan-Islamic reform movement first emerged among the urban, educated Turks of the Ottoman Empire, but gradually spread to Cairo, Damascus, and other urban centers in the region. It sought to encourage Muslims to collapse their political and religious differences to unite against European imperialism by rethinking the principles and practices of Islam. Al-Azhar University in Cairo attracted students from throughout the Islamic world and became the center for the development and dissemination of pan-Islamic ideas. In Asia, during the first two decades of the century, some elites in China, Korea, and Vietnam responded to the dangers posed by European, American, and increasingly Japanese colonialism through a transregional dialogue and non-Western solidarity that looked to Egyptian reformism of the middle of the nineteenth century, the 1898 Philippine revolution against the United States, and the Turkish constitutional experiments of 1908–10 as sources of inspiration.

Against the impact of World War I and transnational currents of anticolonial thought, radical political and nationalist sentiment emerged more directly in British, French, and Dutch colonies throughout the 1920s and, with the coming of the global Depression, deepened in the 1930s. In Africa, the pan-African movement shaped anticolonial politics in Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya in the 1920s, including the formation of the West African Students' Union in 1925 as a regional vehicle for reclaiming political control from the imperial powers. In the 1930s, labor strikes and organizing pushed anticolonial politics in more radical social and economic directions. In French-controlled Africa, the Islamic-inspired Rif war and Istiqlal Party in Morocco and the Néo-Destour Party in Tunisia sought independence. Egypt emerged as a semi-independent state in the wake of massive demonstrations and strikes in 1919, but continuing British influence limited political independence and stymied efforts by secular and modernist Egyptian political elites to undertake political and economic reform. The 1930s brought a religious revival that sought to restore the supremacy of Islam in Egyptian public life. The Society of Muslim Brothers, which attracted a wide following among students and industrial workers, channeled popular opposition to the continuing British presence and offered proposals for economic reform based on Islamic and socialist principles. In the British West Indies, colonial subjects began to seek racial equality

in the franchise and civil services in the 1920s. A rising black and working-class consciousness in the 1930s further radicalized their demands for independence and socioeconomic change.

In Asia, Mohandas Gandhi came to lead a mass nationalist party in British India capable of mobilizing millions for its revolutionary noncooperation or *satyagraha* campaigns, most notably his march to the sea in 1930 to protest the colonial salt tax, aimed at securing Indian independence. In the Dutch East Indies, anticolonial parties drew on supralocal religious faith, socialist internationalism, and emergent discourses of the nation in an effort to transcend the diverse local particularities of the Indonesian archipelago, undertake socioeconomic reform, and ultimately drive out the Dutch. Similarly, in Burma, activist monks in the Young Men's Buddhist Association and later students in the Dobama Asi-ayone (We Burmans Association), whose influences included Irish nationalism, Fabian socialism, and Marxism-Leninism, challenged British colonial rule.

Vietnamese anticolonialism and visions of postcolonial independence in the interwar period reveal some of the larger dynamics and fluidities that animated and constrained anticolonial thought and practice more generally before World War II. The 1920s brought a new generation of nationalists to the Vietnamese political stage, among them the future leaders of Vietnamese Communism. Many of these young radicals were students, sons and daughters of traditional elites, who were impatient at the pace of change. They were as critical of French rule as they were of the precolonial Confucian political order and of what they perceived as the inability of an older anticolonial generation to effectively respond to the predicament posed by French colonialism. The movement also drew on a new social group in urban Vietnam, one that bitterly resented French colonialism. This urban intelligentsia was made up of shopkeepers, smaller traders, clerks, primary-school teachers, journalists, and technicians whose livelihoods emerged in the context of French colonialism. But they deeply resented their economic marginality and the limits the French placed on their opportunities for education and political participation.

Self-consciously experimental and iconoclastic, Vietnamese radical thought was never fully anchored around a body of shared principles. The radicals' disparate search for individual and societal transformation rested on an almost romantic belief in revolutionary heroism. Within this intellectual milieu, Ho Chi Minh founded the Viet Nam Thanh Nien Kach Menh Hoi (Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League) in 1925, which became the precursor of the Vietnamese Communist Party. The ideology of Thanh Nien emphasized the

immediate imperative of the national question rather than social revolution or class issues, borrowing as much from indigenous political discourse and the ideas of Thomas Jefferson, Gandhi, and Sun Yat-sen as it did from Marx and Lenin. Ultimately, Ho Chi Minh and many Vietnamese Communists envisioned progressive elites and peasant masses coming together through patriotic ties and the desire for social revolution to throw off French colonialism. Vietnamese radicals, like anticolonial activists elsewhere, were no closer to transforming colonial society and achieving independence at the end of the 1930s than they had been in the early decades of the century. Imperial power remained too strong, and nationalist movements were fragmented and diffuse, with only limited capabilities to mobilize urban and rural populations.

World War II and the coming of the Cold War

The experiences of World War II dramatically shifted the fortunes of many anticolonial movements in the imperial world. Even more than World War I, the war played a critical role in inspiring independence movements and in fostering radical change in the international system. The coming of war in the Pacific, especially the initial defeat of Western imperial powers by the Japanese, had a strong and immediate psychological effect on colonial peoples in Asia. Japanese occupation of much of Southeast Asia also dislodged the region's British, French, and Dutch rulers and revealed the tenuous nature of European control. As the war came to a close and the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the victorious powers, anticolonial actors sought to harness American and Soviet wartime commitments to a postcolonial future. In the power vacuum at the time of the Japanese defeat in August 1945, anticolonial forces in the global South moved to assert their independence. Aung San's efforts to create a provisional independent government in Burma, Sukarno's establishment of an Indonesian republic, and Ho Chi Minh's proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the summer and fall of 1945 were among the earliest manifestations of the impending wave of decolonization. In British India, sustained negotiations between Indian anticolonial leaders and British imperial agents began in 1945 about the terms of independence, discussions complicated by the increasing schism within Indian nationalism between Hindus and Muslims. At the same time, anticolonial actors in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan put pressure on Great Britain and France to relinquish their control in the Middle East. The most radical of these challenges to colonial order brought with them a commitment not only to independence, but also to the construction of postcolonial states that would

transform the political, social, and economic prospects of their urban and rural citizens.

Although the experiences of Latin American nations are usually separated analytically from these events, the sharp challenge to repressive regimes in the region from 1944 to 1946 and the calls for far-reaching societal restructuring paralleled these efforts to break away from the colonial order in Asia and the Middle East. In 1944, only five Latin American states – Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico – could call themselves even nominal democracies. In three short years, dictatorships throughout the region fell as popular democratizing forces were mobilized. In 1946, only El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic continued to be ruled by dictators. In the rest of the region, social democratic populist and progressive movements came to power, supported by vocal and muscular labor unions as well as Communist Parties whose ties to the Soviet Union before the 1940s had been muted during the wartime period. Like anticolonial leaders in Asia and the Middle East, Latin American actors were emboldened by World War II to attempt to effect change by drawing upon strong liberal and socialist political traditions that predated the war itself.¹

These early struggles to transform colonial and illiberal states emerged against the acceleration of transnational discourses of human rights, anti-imperialism, and racial solidarities during and after World War II. The year 1945 marked major international conferences of colonized peoples as well as deliberations at the San Francisco Conference over the place of the colonized world in the United Nations Charter. The fifth Pan-African Congress that met in Manchester, England, in October 1945 brought together Africans, including the future leaders of almost all of decolonized British Africa, as well as African-American and Afro-Caribbean delegates. The congress condemned imperial economic exploitation, but focused on political independence in the African context, calling colonial freedom “the first step toward and necessary prerequisite to complete social, economic and political emancipation.”²

Anticolonial leaders were a visible presence at the San Francisco Conference in June 1945 and sought language in the UN Charter that would directly advance the immediate prospects for colonial independence. While the charter fell short of guaranteeing self-determination for the colonial world, its guarantees of human rights, and the full elaboration of these rights in

1 For a discussion of Central America at the end of the Cold War, see John Coatsworth's chapter in volume III.

2 George Padmore (ed.), *The History of the Pan-African Congress* (London: Hammersmith Bookshop, 1963), 5.

the drafting of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provided a powerful new vocabulary for making anticolonial claims and imagining the new postcolonial world. The Universal Declaration and its promises of political, economic, and social rights were the product in large measure of the work of social democrats from Latin America as well as delegates from newly independent Lebanon, India, and the Philippines. Neither the charter nor the declaration included enforcement mechanisms, but they provided another source of legitimacy for efforts of colonized peoples to remake colonial societies and to gain the sympathy of world opinion.

These transnational aspirations were quickly tested in an international environment hostile to the rhetorical promises of decolonization. The transfer of political authority from the colonizers to the colonized was sometimes peaceful but often collapsed into protracted violence in the immediate postwar period. If Nehru marked the moment of Indian independence in August 1947 by claiming at “the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom,”³ the subcontinent was quickly fragmented by the partition of India and Pakistan and consumed by the religious and sectarian violence that followed in its wake. The proclamations of independence by anticolonial elites in Southeast Asia were greeted by imperial powers unwilling to give up their colonial possessions. Both the Dutch and the French sought to reclaim their empires in protracted wars beginning in 1946, with Dutch forces attacking Sukarno’s Indonesian republic and the French challenging Ho Chi Minh’s DRV. The British too sought to maintain their control of Malaya and Singapore as well as their territories in Africa and the Middle East.

In the fast-moving and chaotic environment that marked the first wave of decolonization in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the coming of the Cold War in the global South was an almost unimagined contingency for anticolonial and imperial actors as well as for the Soviets and Americans themselves. Preoccupied with events in Europe – the occupation of Germany, the reconstruction of Western Europe, the fate of Eastern Europe, and the Greek Civil War – Soviet and American policymakers initially saw decolonization as peripheral to their growing rivalry and antagonism. More concerned by the contours of his postwar relationship with the Western allies, Stalin offered little significant material support to the most important

3 J. Nehru, “A Tryst with Destiny,” August 14–15, 1947, in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, second series, vol. III (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984), 135.

Communist-led movements in this early period. Despite wartime Soviet interest in establishing friendly regimes in Kurdistan and Iranian Azerbaijan, Stalin withdrew his forces from Iran in May 1946 after significant American pressure and kept his distance from the Iranian Communist party, the Tudeh. In China, Stalin insisted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintain an alliance with Jiang Jieshi's Guomindang (GMD). He did not provide vigorous military or material support for the CCP in its ensuing civil war with the GMD. Given Stalin's distrust of what he saw as Ho Chi Minh's bourgeois nationalist proclivities and the lower priority he ascribed to developments in the colonial world, he provided almost no material assistance to the Vietnamese in their war against the French and only muted rhetorical support of their anti-imperial cause.⁴

The United States was also initially slow to cast events in the global South in Cold War terms. US policymakers increasingly recognized the radical nature of many movements for independence, and did not like it. But they remained wary of giving overt support to British, French, and Dutch efforts to maintain their empires in the postwar period. American policy favored anti-colonialism of a kind, but one in which racialized perceptions of backward non-Western peoples undercut support for immediate independence. A 1947 cable by Secretary of State George Marshall about Vietnam illustrates this larger American dilemma over its response to decolonization. While Marshall acknowledged that the United States had "fully recognized France's sovereign position" in Indochina, he could not understand "the continued existence of an outmoded colonial outlook" and the inability of the French to recognize the realities of a postcolonial future. Equally concerned by what he perceived as Ho Chi Minh's Communist connections, Marshall argued that it "should be obvious that we are not interested in seeing colonial empire administrations supplanted by a philosophy emanating from and controlled by the Kremlin." Confounded by the perceived impossibilities of choosing between a radical political regime and an archaic colonial one, Marshall could offer no clear American policy toward the French war in Vietnam.⁵

The character of diplomatic initiatives undertaken by Ho Chi Minh's DRV illuminates the fluid possibilities of this period and the marginality of the Cold War to it. In the face of unsuccessful efforts to win support from the Soviet

4 On Stalin's relationship with the emergent global South, see Vladimir O. Pechatnov's chapter in this volume.

5 Secretary of State to Embassy in Paris, February 3, 1947, in *US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1947*, vol. VI, *The Far East* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972), 67–68.

Union and the United States, the DRV hoped to capitalize on widespread professions of moral support from nationalist leaders in India and Southeast Asia. Through its diplomatic mission in Bangkok and later in Rangoon, the Vietnamese state tried to establish closer ties with Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, India, and the Philippines as well as more informal ties with radical nationalists in Malaya. Vietnamese diplomats were active in the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in India and participated in the establishment of the Southeast Asia League which aimed to formalize networks of nationalist regional cooperation. Although these efforts brought few immediate material rewards, they served to foster ties of nationalism and anticolonialism in the region that facilitated the organization of clandestine networks to obtain arms and military supplies and that provided a platform to mobilize international sympathy for their war against the French.

The Cold War in the global South

The rise of Mao's China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 brought the dynamics of the Cold War more fully into the processes of decolonization and increasingly influenced superpower politics toward the global South.⁶ In Vietnam, the Soviets largely ceded the field to China, whose military and economic support for the Ho Chi Minh government after 1950 was substantial. The United States came to fully support the French war effort in Vietnam, the result of Cold War pressures in Europe and Asia and their impact on domestic politics, ultimately paying for as much as three-quarters of the cost of the war. For the Americans and Chinese, however, the financial and military support of their allies was fraught with tension, illustrating the complex ways in which the Cold War could play out in the decolonizing world. American policymakers' contempt for French colonial methods and military abilities were matched by French fears that the United States was seeking to gain control of Vietnam for its own political and economic purposes. Their Cold War partnership was far from smooth or harmonious.

Tensions and hostilities also emerged in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. The massive influx of Chinese advisers, weapons, and supplies for the war effort, as well as a Chinese political advisory group that sought to involve itself in the making of DRV domestic policy, seemed to overwhelm the Vietnamese. Disputes over military tactics and strategy quickly emerged, deepened by the personal antipathies between senior Chinese and

6 On these developments, see Niu Jun's chapter in this volume.

Vietnamese military leaders. The fragile contours of Sino-Vietnamese relations in this period were also shaped by the manner in which Chinese national and geostrategic interests could sometimes clash with and supersede fraternal ideological ties. New evidence from Chinese sources suggests that Mao's willingness to support the Vietnamese against the French was prompted not simply by his ideological commitment to anti-imperialist solidarity but also by his fears of an American-led invasion into southern China at a time when Mao felt his fledgling regime remained vulnerable.⁷

The deep suspicions that colored the relationship between the Chinese and the Vietnamese did not prevent a Vietnamese victory in 1954 in which Chinese support played a key role in defeating the forces of French colonialism. The psychological resonance of the Vietnamese triumph was a powerful one in the decolonizing and postcolonial worlds, emboldening anticolonial actors elsewhere in their struggles against imperial powers. In its wake, the Soviet Union, the United States, and China became more deeply engaged with the processes of decolonization and postcolonial state-making.

Stalin's death in 1953 prompted a fundamental reassessment of Soviet diplomacy and the place of the global South in it. In his 1956 speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev emphasized that decolonization was a "postwar development of world-historical significance." He intended to support progressive non-Marxist movements for national liberation under the larger rubric of "peaceful coexistence."⁸ Confident that Soviet anti-imperialism and models of economic growth would appeal to decolonizing elites, Khrushchev began to donate billions of rubles in military and economic aid to states such as India, Indonesia, and Egypt, which would become leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, in an effort to draw them into the Soviet orbit.

For these early recipients of Soviet aid, the economic aspects of the Cold War were frequently more important than its political dimensions. The Soviet Five-Year Plans, along with centralized planning, huge new steel plants and dams, and the mechanization of collective agriculture, offered postcolonial elites alluring strategies for economic growth and rapid industrialization. Indian prime minister Nehru, who visited the Soviet Union in the late 1920s

7 Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), chs. 1–3; and Chen Jian, "China and the First Indo-China War, 1950–1954," *China Quarterly*, 133 (March 1993), 85–110.

8 Nikita Khrushchev, "Speech to a Closed Session of the CPSU Twentieth Party Congress," February 25, 1956, in *Khrushchev Speaks!*, edited by Thomas P. Whitney (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 259–65.

and was deeply impressed by Soviet industrial progress, strongly favored state planning as a model for India's economic development after independence. Accordingly, in the 1950s, Nehru deemphasized investment in agriculture and small-scale village industries and favored the development of heavy industry and the construction of major steel complexes. In drawing on Soviet models, advice, and money to launch these efforts, Nehru nonetheless rejected Soviet political ideology and pursued an independent diplomatic course. Indonesia and Egypt also received hundreds of millions of dollars in Soviet aid and welcomed aspects of Soviet economic models but remained cool to the bloc politics of the Cold War.

Developments in the global South were increasingly viewed through a Cold War lens in the United States. Like the Soviets, Americans were also actively engaged in efforts to promote development in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.⁹ Under the guise of modernization theory, US policymakers posited a spectrum from traditional to modern societies in which the American economy, society, and culture provided a universal model for development. Max Millikan, the director of a prestigious think tank, expressed the typical sentiment of the period: "A much extended program of American participation in the economic development of the so-called underdeveloped states can and should be one of the most important elements in a program of expanding the dynamism and stability of the Free World and increasing its resistance to the appeals of Communism."¹⁰

For US policymakers in the 1950s and the 1960s, billions of dollars in economic development – whether in the form of miracle rice and agricultural assistance or import substitution and the development of a consumer economy – appeared as a necessary bulwark against Communist-led political insurgency and social engineering in much of the decolonizing world. Despite its anti-Soviet cast, modernization theory shared key attributes with Soviet models. It mirrored the Marxist-Leninist formulation of a move upwards from feudalism, albeit to liberal capitalism rather than socialism; it also reflected the Soviet insistence on enlightened elites leading an inevitable historical progression. At the same time, more than a bit of racialized paternalism informed

9 On the intensification of these efforts after 1960, see Michael E. Latham's chapter in volume II.

10 Max Millikan, "Economic Policy as an Instrument of Political and Psychological Policy," cited in Nils Gilman, "Modernization Theory, the Highest Stage of American Intellectual History," in David C. Engerman *et al.* (eds.), *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 48–49.

American conceptions of the divide between developing states and capitalist modernities, recalling the Social Darwinian discourse of high imperialism that pitted non-Western barbarism against Euro-American civilization.


The impact of modernization theory and US economic assistance sometimes replicated the results of Soviet development projects and aid. In Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines, economic aid did sustain deeper political relations even if the impact of American development practices was generally uneven and sometimes disastrous. But for states that sought to remain outside the Cold War divide in the late 1950s and early 1960s – such as India, Indonesia, and Egypt – interest in American economic models did not usually extend to making political and diplomatic alliances.¹¹

Along with greater US attention to economic and social development, the intensification of Cold War pressures prompted a considerably more activist policy of direct intervention in the global South. In 1953, the Eisenhower administration orchestrated the overthrow of the government of Muhammad Mossadeq in Iran. The CIA-led operation was prompted by a number of factors, including Mosaddeq's nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its ramifications for Great Britain. But US officials also feared the Tudeh Party's Communist orientation, its seemingly growing strength, and its dependence on Soviet patronage. Although the Tudeh Party was far weaker and considerably more divided than the Americans understood at the time, and although the domestic political situation in Iran was far more complex than a Cold War lens would allow, the Soviet–American rivalry axiomatically shaped US perceptions and policy.

In Latin America, the postwar turn to democracy was reversed almost entirely by 1954 when dictators again came to rule most of the countries in the region. In 1947 and 1948, there was a regionwide crackdown on organized labor and local Communist Parties. Authoritarian governments repressed militant labor leaders, marginalized and disbanded some unions, introduced antistrike legislation and formally outlawed Communist Parties. In subsequent years, reformers and populist leaders who championed social democracy were contained and repressed.

The reemergence of conservative elites and their military allies in Latin America was not entirely driven by the Cold War. They had not been eviscerated by the rise of social democracy after World War II, but had

¹¹ See Nick Cullather, *Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States–Philippines Relations, 1942–1960* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994); and Bradley Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).



6. Decolonization in Africa and Asia since 1945.

been forced temporarily on the defensive. As the Cold War came to dominate US diplomacy in the global South, local developments intersected with the rising concern of American policymakers over Communism in Latin America. In some cases, US support for the military coups that brought illiberal conservative regimes to power was indirect. In others, direct involvement can be carefully documented, as was the case with the overthrow of the government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Although the relationship between the social democratic Arbenz, local Communists, and the Soviet Union was fluid, the Eisenhower administration insisted that the Arbenz government was a beachhead of Soviet Communism. The administration authorized Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support for the invasion of Guatemala from Honduras and put immense pressure on the Guatemalan army, which proved decisive in the collapse of the Arbenz government. It was followed by a reign of “Cold War terror,” in which supporters of Arbenz in the countryside were arrested, tortured, and killed.¹² This precursor of the “dirty wars” in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s drew directly on the advice and support of US intelligence operatives. The CIA supported repression in Guatemala through a variety of means, including manuals with detailed instructions on how to torture insurgents.

Bandung and revolutionary nationalism

An intensifying Cold War and its impact on global struggles for decolonization prompted many anticolonial leaders to rethink the terms of their engagement with the international system. In April 1955, leaders from thirty newly post-colonial states, along with observers from national liberation movements throughout the colonial world, gathered in Bandung, Indonesia. The meeting provided an opportunity for Third World leaders to discuss transnational anticolonial ideologies of regional, race, and class solidarities and to create an international space apart from both the imperial and the Cold War orders.

The speeches at Bandung focused on shattering the bipolarity of Cold War politics. The head of the Indian delegation, Prime Minister Nehru, argued, “If I join any of these big groups, I lose my identity ... If all the world were to be divided up between these two big blocs what would be the result? The inevitable result would be war.”¹³ Indonesian president Sukarno, who

12 Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America and the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), xiv.

13 J. Nehru speech, April 22, 1955, in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. XXVIII (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984), 124.

presided over the conference, called upon governments to follow “the highest code of morality and ethics” and warned against the urge to “indulge in power politics.” An alternative conception of global relations, Sukarno continued, rested on the commonalties that joined those gathered at Bandung: “Almost all of us have ties of common experience, the experience of colonialism ... Many of us, the so-called ‘underdeveloped’ nations, have more or less similar economic problems ... And I think we may say we hold dear the ideals of national independence and freedom.”¹⁴

What emerged at Bandung were the outlines of a nascent alternative international order made up of former colonial states and peoples that tilted neither to the Soviet nor to the American side in the Cold War. These leaders were deeply concerned with supporting ongoing independence struggles and realizing postcolonial political and economic justice. Their vision found more concrete expression in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement established in 1961 by India, Indonesia, Egypt, Ghana, Yugoslavia, and Algeria; within three years the movement had more than fifty members drawn from former colonial states.

In the mid-1950s, the spirit of Bandung inspired further challenges to the imperial and bipolar Cold War international orders. In Egypt, a military coup in 1952 by young army officers, intent upon reducing continuing quasi-colonial British domination and challenging social-economic inequality, brought General Gamal Abdel Nasser to power. He launched a radical program of economic nationalism. In 1956, Nasser challenged British control of the Suez Canal, a longstanding symbol for Egyptians of the limits on their sovereignty and a potential source of revenue for Nasser’s vision of economic development.¹⁵ Egypt’s stiff military resistance to a British-French-Israeli operation not only advanced Nasser’s domestic agenda, but also turned him and his revolutionary nationalist supporters into heroes in the colonized world. Nasser exploited his perceived dramatic victory over the British at Suez and capitalized on the neutralist sensibilities of Bandung to lead a pan-Arab movement. It supported oppositional politics in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan as well as Palestinian claims against Israel. The twin struggles against imperialism and Zionism catalyzed the formation of Nasserite parties in several Arab states, and, in 1958, culminated in a short-lived union between Egypt and Syria, a union that was envisioned as the basis for a single Arab state.

14 Sukarno speech, April 18, 1955, in *Asia–Africa Speaks from Bandung* (Jakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1955), 19–29.

15 See Douglas Little’s chapter in volume II.

Bandung, the Suez crisis, and Nasser's revolutionary nationalism further complicated and deepened the relationship between the Cold War and decolonization. Few American policymakers welcomed Bandung's emphasis on non-alignment but they viewed developments in Egypt and the Middle East with far greater alarm. The Eisenhower administration's opposition to the joint British-French-Israeli military campaign to retake the Suez Canal reflected both a sense of the passing of European empire in the region and a fear of Soviet intentions to gain regional advantage by supporting Nasser and the forces of Arab revolutionary nationalism. The perceived dangers posed by Nasser and pan-Arabism prompted Washington to intervene directly in the Lebanese civil war in 1958 and to offer substantial military and economic assistance to conservative, pro-Western leaders in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, and Iraq. Outside the Middle East, the Cold War prism heightened American fears of decolonizing and revolutionary challenges. In the late 1950s, these worries led to the massive influx of US support for the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam.¹⁶

While the Soviet Union and China greeted Bandung and Nasser more favorably than did the United States, their leaders disputed tactics and strategies for the decolonizing world.¹⁷ From the founding of the People's Republic of China, Mao had always directed more attention to developments in the global South than had Soviet officials, and he espoused aggressive support for movements of national liberation. His envoys played a substantial role at the Bandung Conference and consciously sought to build a "united front" with newly decolonizing states against Western imperialism. Although Mao's more public break with the Soviet Union in 1959–60 was largely driven by his domestic concerns, it also reflected his ideological tensions with the Soviets over policy toward the decolonizing world. In denouncing Soviet "revisionism" and "peaceful coexistence," Mao argued that imperialism could be vanquished only through armed struggle and class conflict. Thereafter, he vigorously supported Ho Chi Minh's struggle against the Americans in South Vietnam and nurtured deeper ties with radical regimes and movements in Africa.

China's international activism pushed the Soviets toward more sustained commitments in the global South, not only in the Middle East but in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean as well. The competition between them

¹⁶ See Fredrik Logevall's chapter in volume II.

¹⁷ On the Sino-Soviet split and its impact on the global South, see chapters by Shu Guang Zhang in this volume and Sergey Radchenko in volume II.



38. Leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement: from left, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Gamal Abdel Nasser of United Arab Republic, Sukarno of Indonesia, and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia.

meant their potential allies were faced with pressures from both states to side with one of the two parties. But for those who successfully navigated these treacherous shoals, such as the Vietnamese Communists, the material rewards could be very rich.

Decolonization and the global South

The late 1950s and the early 1960s marked the end of the great decolonizing wave of the first two decades of the post-World War II era. The outbreak of the Algerian war for independence against France, the Mau Mau rebellion in British Kenya, and Ghana's independence in the mid-1950s ushered in the beginning of what would become a flood of postcolonial states in Africa and the Caribbean. As many as seventeen formerly colonial African states gained independence by 1960. Others would follow in the early 1960s, as would Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Guyana. In 1959, Cuban revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro triumphed and their assertive anti-imperialism and calls for

revolutionary social and economic change became an inspiration for radical movements not only in Latin America but throughout the global South.

Cold War rivalries shaped these developments in critical ways, inspiring American efforts to overthrow Congolese prime minister Patrice Lumumba in 1960 and Cheddi Jagan's government in Guyana in 1964, prompting Soviet support for Castro's increasingly Marxist regime in Cuba, and motivating the Chinese to provide loans and advisers to newly independent African states. But countervailing currents, including legacies of imperialism and the inter-war anticolonial struggle along with others new to the postcolonial era, served to limit the impact of the Cold War and circumscribed the actions of the superpowers in the global South.

The pan-African movement of the first half of the twentieth century continued to exert considerable power over African decolonization. Nkrumah, the vigorous leader of independent Ghana, had been active in local and transnational anticolonial politics since the 1930s, and he advocated a strong pan-Africanism designed to assist independence movements and to foster solidarity among postcolonial African states. In 1958, in the spirit of Bandung, he helped convene an All-African People's Conference. It urged African states to close ranks against superpower Cold War politics and tried to promote mutual assistance in social and economic development. Subsequently, the overthrow and murder of Lumumba in 1961 accelerated the pan-African project. Lumumba had been a committed pan-Africanist, and the culpability of the United States in his death reinforced local and regional pressure for African unity. By establishing the Organization of African Unity in May 1963, pan-Africanists sought to institutionalize their transnational movement, but subsequent splits in the organization would diminish its regional impact.

Tensions with client states complicated superpower efforts to direct and manage the processes of decolonization and postcolonial state-making. In South Vietnam, the Eisenhower administration lavished money on the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in the late 1950s, lauding Diem as the "miracle man" of Southeast Asia. But with the rise of urban discontent against Diem's regime and a heightened Communist insurgency in the early 1960s, US policymakers increasingly worried about his refusal to take American advice and direction. In supporting the coup that led to Diem's murder in 1963, however, they ushered in a period of escalating chaos. Likewise, in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro backed away from his close relationship with the Soviet Union. Along with Che Guevara, he launched a competitive global campaign for influence with radical independence movements in Latin

America and Africa.¹⁸ And, at much the same time, the Sino-Indian border war complicated Chinese efforts to lead a united front of decolonizing states. Several years later, during their cultural revolution, the shrill insistence of Chinese leaders on the primacy of Maoist models abroad frayed their ties with many of the states and movements in the global South, whom the Chinese had so assiduously courted earlier in the decade.

Finally, the wave of decolonization in Africa and the Caribbean brought with it even larger forces that none of the superpowers could fully contain and control. As Matthew Connelly has argued, the Algerian war unleashed a “diplomatic revolution” that fundamentally challenged the state-based scaffolding upon which the Cold War international order rested. In part, this was the result of the Algerian liberation movement, the Front de Libération Nationale, assuming the attributes and legitimacy previously accorded only to states. This shift in perception of the power and significance of liberation movements contributed to the increasing importance of the African National Congress in South Africa, al Fatah in the Palestinian diaspora, and similar groups in Angola and East Timor in the international politics of decolonization after 1962. The diplomatic revolution of the postcolonial moment, Connelly argues, went even deeper. The wider processes of decolonization – population growth, environmental scarcities, supranational institutions, new media forms, and the conscious agency of colonized peoples to promote radical systemic change – severely weakened the Cold War system even at the height of superpower confrontation, and ultimately gave shape to the post-Cold War world.¹⁹

After 1962, the dynamics of the Cold War would continue to play a powerful role in the global South. Soviet, American, and Chinese intervention in postcolonial state-making took an increasingly intrusive and militarized turn, first in Vietnam and later in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Central America, and Afghanistan. As the leaders of the first wave of decolonization, such as Nehru, Ho Chi Minh, Nasser, and Nkrumah, passed from the scene, a generation of more militant local actors emerged – some radical such as Antonio Neto in Angola and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, others deeply conservative such as Augusto Pinochet in Chile or Joseph Mobutu in

18 On escalating Cuban–Soviet tensions and their significance for developments in the global South in the 1960s and 1970s, see chapters by James Hershberg and Piero Gleijeses in volume II.

19 Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 3–13, 276–87.

Zaire – whose worldviews heightened levels of confrontation and repression among and between states and peoples in the postcolonial world.

“The wars fought in the Third World during the Cold War,” writes Odd Arne Westad, “were despairingly destructive.” The violence and terror of war, and the authoritarian regimes of the Right and of the Left that emerged in their wake, destabilized and sometimes devastated many local societies. Significantly, if depressingly, the end of the Cold War has done little to ameliorate conditions. As Westad notes, when the Cold War ended fewer than one in four of the world’s population lived in areas with improving standards of living; today, that number is fewer than one in six.²⁰ In Africa alone, per capita gross national product is now lower in some states than it was in the 1970s, and poverty, famine, HIV/AIDS, genocide, and predatory regimes crush people’s hopes for a minimum standard of well-being.

The present moment, like decolonization itself, remains rooted in the complex interplay of the imperial, the postcolonial, and the Cold War. This constellation of historical forces, however, offers not only burdens but also opportunities. From the interior and intimate spaces of the family to the national visions of postcolonial leaders, new and often radical calls for more just, equalitarian, and humane societies have emerged. Anticolonial and postcolonial thought, with its rich and fluid nature, reaches beyond the boundaries of the nation and imagines transnational and global spaces in which its larger emancipatory project can be advanced. The present moment, therefore, contains the possibility of realizing the vision of a world in which social equity and justice prevail as naturally as inequality, poverty, and war.

20 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 400, 406.

Oil, resources, and the Cold War, 1945–1962

DAVID S. PAINTER

Control of strategic raw materials played a key role in the origins and outcome of World War II and continued to be a source of power and policy during the Cold War. Modern warfare generated an unprecedented demand for oil and other resources, and modern industrial society consumed massive amounts of energy and raw materials. The United States and the Soviet Union were continent-spanning countries rich in oil and strategic minerals, and their control of these resources helped underpin their power. Both also sought to gain access to resources outside their borders. The United States possessed the military and economic capability to look all over the world, especially to the Third World, for resources for itself and its allies. Lacking comparable power projection and economic capabilities, the Soviet Union was forced to look to its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe to meet its needs.

British, French, and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia possessed tin, rubber, tungsten, and oil, and European colonies in Africa contained several strategic minerals, including copper, cobalt, manganese, chrome, uranium, and industrial diamonds. Raw materials were an important source of dollar income for most European colonial powers, and the profits British oil companies made in the Middle East were essential to Britain's balance of payments and its ability to continue to maintain military forces in the region. Latin America was also rich in strategic raw materials, including petroleum, copper, manganese, nickel, tin, tungsten, and bauxite. Revolutionary nationalism in the Third World threatened Western access to vital raw materials, disrupted plans to draw on Third World resources to rebuild the economies of Western Europe and Japan, and weakened the overall Western position in the Cold War.

Rather than attempt to survey the entire range of strategic raw materials, this chapter will focus on uranium and oil. Access to uranium, the main ingredient in the atomic bomb, was an important strategic issue during the first decade of the Cold War. Oil was central to military power and economic

life, and control of oil was a key source of power and influence throughout the Cold War.

Uranium

Although uranium is one of the most common elements in the earth's crust, large deposits of high-grade ore are relatively rare. During World War II, the United States and Britain set up an organization, the Combined Development Trust, to gain control of the world's supply of high-grade uranium. By the end of the war, it controlled an estimated 97 percent of world uranium production and 65 percent of the world supply of thorium.¹ US forces also seized the bulk of existing German supplies of uranium and bombed facilities in Germany that processed uranium for the German atomic project. US policymakers believed that Western control of uranium would delay Soviet development of atomic weapons and limit the number of atomic weapons the Soviets could produce if they successfully tested a bomb.

Control of world supplies of uranium and thorium was also a key element in the US plan for the international control of atomic energy presented to the United Nations in June 1946 by Bernard Baruch. The Baruch Plan allowed the United States to retain its atomic arsenal until an international control system was fully functioning to US satisfaction, and called for sanctions for violations and for the permanent members of the Security Council to give up their veto on matters related to atomic energy. These provisions would preserve the US atomic monopoly while preventing other nations from developing atomic weapons. Aware of the Baruch Plan's implications, the Soviets blocked its adoption by the United Nations Security Council in December 1946.

Western control of uranium forced the Soviets to intensify efforts to find and develop uranium within the Soviet Union and the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Mines in Czechoslovakia had been an important source of uranium before World War II and, in March 1945, the Soviets signed a secret agreement with Czech president Edvard Beneš that provided for Soviet control of existing stocks of uranium in Czechoslovakia and future Czech production. The Soviets also found rich deposits of uranium in south-west Saxony in the Soviet occupation zone in Germany.

¹ Although not itself fissionable, thorium-233 decays into uranium-233, which is. See David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Weapons, 1939–1958* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 174.

Uranium from East Germany became a key source for the Soviet atomic project, supplying around 45% of Soviet demand by 1950, compared to 33% from within the Soviet Union and 15% from Czechoslovakia.² Although East German uranium helped fuel the Soviet atomic program, the methods used to extract the ore – forced labor and terrible conditions in the mines – undermined Soviet political goals in their occupation zone. Pay and working conditions improved by the early 1950s, but work-related disease and environmental degradation continued to plague the region.

The uranium that fueled the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima came from Belgian Congo, and Congo remained the main source of uranium for the United States until the early 1950s.³ Congolese ore, from Katanga province, was rich in uranium and cheap due to the low wages paid to native miners. Concerned that Congolese supplies would soon run out, the United States signed a supply agreement in 1950 with the Union of South Africa, which possessed around 60 percent of the world's significant deposits of lower-grade uranium ore. To cement its relationship with South Africa, the United States extended economic and military assistance to the apartheid regime.

The strategic importance of access to uranium lessened in the mid-1950s due to increased production in the Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada, the development of improved means to utilize low-grade ore, and the shift to thermonuclear weapons, which required less uranium.

Oil

World War II highlighted the vital role of oil in modern warfare. All the main weapons systems of World War II were oil-powered – surface warships (including aircraft carriers), submarines, airplanes (including long-range bombers), tanks, and a large proportion of sea and land transport. Oil was also used in the manufacture of munitions and synthetic rubber. Access to ample supplies of oil was a significant source of Allied strength, while German and Japanese failure to secure the same was an important factor in their defeat.

Although the development of nuclear weapons and later ballistic missiles fundamentally altered the nature of warfare, oil-powered forces remained central to military power. Despite the development of nuclear-powered warships (mainly aircraft carriers and submarines), most of the world's warships

2 *Ibid.*, 177. According to World Nuclear Association statistics, East Germany accounted for an even higher share of Communist world uranium production in this period.

3 Although the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki was fueled by plutonium rather than uranium, the plutonium was derived from uranium.

still relied on oil, as did aircraft, armor, and transport. In addition, each new generation of weapons required more oil, and more raw materials in general, than its predecessors, a trend that continued throughout the Cold War.

There was a symbiotic relationship between oil and the US global strategy of maintaining access to economically and strategically vital overseas areas, including overseas sources of raw materials such as oil. Although the strategic forces – air and sea power – necessary for maintaining access to these areas were dependent on oil, they could be used for other purposes and in other parts of the world.

Oil also played a central role in the world economy. Oil's economic importance increased after World War II as the United States intensified its embrace of patterns of socioeconomic organization premised on high levels of oil use, and Western Europe and Japan began the transition from coal to oil as their main source of energy. Oil was also an important energy source in the Soviet Union.

Supply, demand, and security

The Soviet Union was a net importer of oil (mostly from Romania) through 1953 as slow recovery of crude oil production combined with the need to import high-quality petroleum products led the Soviets to turn to Eastern Europe to acquire the necessary supplies. Damage, disruption, overuse, transportation problems, equipment shortages, and competing priorities led to a sharp decline in Soviet oil production during World War II. In addition, the Soviets lacked sufficient refinery capacity, especially for high-quality products such as aviation gasoline, diesel fuel, and kerosene.

A joint Soviet–Romanian oil company set up in 1945 gave the Soviets control of around 30 percent of Romanian production and refinery capacity, and in 1948 the Romanian government effectively nationalized the remainder of the oil industry. Romanian oil production, 34.7 million barrels in 1945, dropped to 32 million barrels in 1950, before rising to 78.6 million barrels in 1955 and 93.7 million barrels in 1965.⁴ Almost all Romanian oil exports went either to the Soviet Union or to other Communist-controlled states in Eastern Europe.

4 DeGolyer and MacNaughton, *Twentieth-Century Petroleum Statistics 2005* (Dallas, TX: DeGolyer and MacNaughton, 2005). Unless otherwise noted, all oil statistics in this chapter are from this source.

The Soviets also obtained oil from their occupation zone in Austria. In 1946, the Soviets confiscated the oil fields in their zone and put them under a Soviet Mineral Oil Administration. Austrian oil production, most of which was in the Soviet zone, rose from 3.1 million barrels in 1945 to 24.9 million barrels in 1955. According to Austrian statistics, the Soviets took 60–70 percent of Austrian oil production between 1947 and 1955.⁵

Soviet oil production expanded from 154.9 million barrels in 1945 to 509.7 million barrels in 1955 and 1.78 billion barrels in 1965. In 1945, around 80 percent of Soviet oil production originated in the Caucasus, mostly in the Baku region in Azerbaijan, but production shifted in the postwar period to the Volga–Urals region, which accounted for around 60% of Soviet oil production by 1955, and over 70% by the early 1960s. As Soviet oil production increased and transportation networks improved, oil and natural gas began to claim a larger share of Soviet energy consumption, rising from 17.4% of energy consumption in 1950 to around 30–35% by 1965. Soviet per capita consumption of petroleum products rose from 1.3 barrels in 1948 to 4.3 barrels in 1958.⁶

The Soviet Union became a net exporter in 1954, with the bulk of exports going to Communist-controlled countries, most of which were dependent on the Soviets for oil. Romania, Albania, and China were exceptions, a factor in their ability to take an independent stance toward the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Although the Soviets charged their allies somewhat higher prices than they charged Western customers, they provided markets for products that were unable to compete in other countries. The Soviets also used oil to support friendly regimes in the Third World; Soviet oil helped Cuba survive the cutoff of oil from Western companies after 1960.

The United States was the world's leading oil producer until 1974, accounting for around 66% of world oil production in 1945, 44% in 1955, and 25.8% in 1965. US domestic oil production expanded from 1.71 billion barrels in 1945 to 2.48 billion barrels in 1955, and 2.84 billion barrels in 1965. Proved reserves increased from 19.9 billion barrels in 1945 to 30 billion barrels in 1955, and 31.3 billion barrels in 1965. The postwar increases in production and reserves were achieved through development of already existing fields, greatly expanding drilling efforts, and the opening of offshore oil fields in the Gulf of

5 William Bader, *Austria between East and West, 1945–1955* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1966), 121.

6 Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, *The Soviet Union and International Oil Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 47, 48; Paul E. Lyndolph and Theodore Shabad, "The Oil and Gas Industries in the USSR," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 50 (December 1960), 474.

Mexico. Not only were more wells drilled, but they were, on average, deeper and more expensive than before the war. Discovery of new fields declined sharply, especially in the largest-size classes.

Following World War II, automobiles, trucks, buses, airplanes, and diesel-powered locomotives replaced steam and electric-powered modes of transportation. Neglect of public transportation and dispersed housing patterns, fostered by increasing suburbanization, encouraged increased automobile use, and the nation's truck population expanded sharply as trucks increased their share of intercity freight traffic. Oil also made inroads in the residential heating market, and industries and utilities began to turn to oil. The growth of the petrochemical industry further increased the demand for oil. US annual per capita consumption of oil rose from 13.3 barrels in 1945 to 18.7 barrels in 1955 and 21.3 barrels in 1965, and oil increased its share of total US energy consumption from 30.5% in 1945 to 44.1% in 1955, before falling to 43.6% in 1965.

Oil and the world economy

In the late 1940s, seven large oil companies controlled over 90 percent of oil reserves outside North America and the Communist countries. They accounted for almost 90 percent of world (as defined above) oil production, owned almost 75 percent of world oil-refining capacity, and provided about 90 percent of the oil traded in international markets. Known as the Seven Sisters because of their close ties and multiple joint ventures, they included five US companies – Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon), Socony-Vacuum (Mobil), Standard Oil of California (Chevron), the Texas Company (Texaco), and Gulf – as well as the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (British Petroleum) as well as and the Royal Dutch/Shell group, a 60 percent Dutch and 40 percent British partnership. The Seven Sisters, in cooperation with state regulatory authorities in the United States, were able to exercise informal control over the world oil economy, matching supply with demand and maintaining prices at highly profitable levels.⁷

The main oil-producing areas outside the United States and the Soviet Union were Venezuela and the Middle East. In 1945, Venezuela was the second-leading producer in the world and the leading exporter. Standard Oil of New Jersey, Shell, and Gulf dominated the Venezuelan oil industry, and US

⁷ US Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Small Business, *The International Petroleum Cartel: Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1952), 21–33. Although the British government held a majority share in Anglo-Iranian, it was run as a private concern.

military power assured access to its reserves. During World War II, the US government played a key role in facilitating a settlement between the major oil companies and the Venezuelan government. The agreement resulted in a fifty-fifty profit-sharing agreement and confirmed the companies' existing concessions, their extension for forty years, and the opening of new areas for exploration. Between 1945 and 1960, annual Venezuelan oil production increased from 323 million barrels to over 1 billion barrels. Venezuela was the world's second-largest oil producer until 1960, a leading exporter, and supplied more than half of US oil imports for most of the 1950s.

Following the lead of the major oil companies, the United States cooperated with both democratic and undemocratic Venezuelan governments as long as they did not challenge corporate control of the oil industry and Western access to Venezuela's oil. Between 1945 and 1948, American officials accepted demands by reformist governments to share profits more equally and to raise wages for oil workers. They did so because they viewed the social democratic *Acción Democrática* (AD) party as a bulwark against Communism. As the Cold War intensified, however, US Army officials became concerned about the AD government's ability to ensure the security of oil installations against sabotage and attack, and warned that the AD's nationalism represented a threat to US interests. Scholars have found no evidence that the US government was involved in the military coup that ousted the AD in November 1948, though the United States did little to prevent it and provided increased assistance and training to the Venezuelan military afterwards.

The new government repressed the AD and the oil workers' union, worked with US officials to strengthen plans to protect oil installations, and opened new areas to the oil companies. The military dictatorship increasingly lost support during the 1950s. After it fell to a popular revolution in January 1958, the United States recognized the new government once the main parties in the revolutionary coalition had pledged to respect US investments. Later in the year, American officials supported the election of AD leader Romulo Betancourt – even though he promised to raise taxes, restrict production, establish a national oil company, and ban new concessions. They believed that the AD provided a better barrier to Communism than the other possibilities.

Mexico also possessed large oil reserves and had been a leading exporter in the years around World War I. Production and exports began to decline in the 1920s, and in 1938 Mexico nationalized its oil industry. Although development of Mexico's nearby reserves could have enhanced US security, US policy-makers feared that assistance to the Mexican state oil company, *Petróleos*

Mexicanos (Pemex), would encourage other nations to take over their oil industries. Therefore, the United States tried to convince Mexico to reverse nationalization and open its oil sector to foreign companies. These efforts were unsuccessful, but the United States maintained its policy of providing no assistance to Pemex. Mexican oil production expanded gradually after World War II, but during most of the period 1945–60 consumption outpaced production, forcing Mexico to import oil to meet domestic demand.

At the end of World War II, Canada produced only enough oil to meet 10 percent of its domestic demand and had to import most of its oil requirements. Following the discovery of a major oil field in Alberta in 1947 and subsequent important discoveries, annual Canadian oil production rose from 8.4 million barrels in 1945 to 129.4 million barrels in 1955 and 292.5 million barrels in 1965. Over 20 percent of production in 1960 was exported, mainly to the United States. By 1965, Canada was supplying almost a quarter of US oil imports.

Middle East oil and the Cold War

During World War II, US policymakers began to turn their attention to the Middle East. The Middle East contained one-third of the world's known oil reserves and offered better geological prospects for the discovery of additional reserves than any other area. A US government-sponsored oil mission that surveyed the Middle East in late 1943 concluded that "The center of gravity of world oil production is shifting from the Gulf–Caribbean region to the Middle East – and is likely to continue to shift until it is firmly established in that area."⁸

Before World War II, the US government invoked the Open Door principle and provided diplomatic support to help private US oil companies gain concessions in foreign countries. Under wartime conditions, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration contemplated creating a government-owned Petroleum Reserves Corporation to take over concession rights in Saudi Arabia, where Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) and the Texas Company held the concession rights. It later proposed having the US government construct and own an oil pipeline stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean as a means of securing the US stake in Middle East oil. By the war's end, the US government had also worked out an agreement with Britain that called for guarantees for existing concessions, equality of

8 Quoted in David S. Painter, *Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of US Foreign Oil Policy, 1941–1954* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 52.

opportunity to compete for new concessions, and a binational petroleum commission to allocate production among the various producing countries.

SOCAL and the Texas Company refused to part with their valuable property, and the oil industry – except for SOCAL, Texas, and Gulf, which would benefit from the pipeline – opposed government involvement in that project. Oil companies whose operations were primarily domestic opposed the Anglo-American Oil Agreement because they feared it would allow cheap foreign oil to flood the US market. These concerns found support in Congress, and all three initiatives failed. Different segments of the oil industry could agree only on a return to Open Door diplomacy, according to the principles of which the government limited direct involvement in foreign oil matters but maintained an international environment in which private oil companies could operate with security and profit.

Utilizing private oil companies as vehicles of the national interest in foreign oil soon required the United States to take an active interest in the security and stability of the Middle East. During World War II, British and Soviet forces had jointly occupied Iran. At the same time, 30,000 US troops operated a supply route through Iran to the Soviet Union and American advisers assisted the Iranian government and military. Iran was important to Britain because it was a source of oil and because it was located astride the lines of communication of the British Empire. The Soviet Union's interest in Iran was scarcely less vital; Iran provided a back door to the Soviet Union and bordered on the center of Soviet oil production in the Caucasus. US leaders viewed Iran as a strategic buffer between the Soviet Union and US oil interests in the Persian Gulf. Writing to President Roosevelt in August 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull warned that "it is to our interest that no great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important petroleum development in Saudi Arabia."⁹

Efforts by the Iranian government to attract US oil companies to balance British and Soviet influence led to a scramble for concession rights in the fall of 1944. When the Soviets demanded exclusive oil rights in northern Iran, the Iranian government announced that it had decided to postpone its decisions on oil until after the war. Following the crisis, the British concentrated on protecting their position by increasing their interference in Iranian politics. The United States focused on getting foreign troops out of Iran, seeking to

9 US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), vol. IV, 377–79 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

provide the Iranian government with greater freedom of action. Determined to maintain some influence in this important border region, Soviet officials supported separatist movements in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, delayed withdrawing their occupation forces from northern Iran, and renewed their demand for oil rights in Iran's northern provinces. After the Iranian government promised to allow the Soviet Union to participate in oil development in northern Iran and to seek a peaceful settlement with the separatists, the Kremlin withdrew its forces in May 1946.

In a report sent to President Harry S. Truman in September 1946, White House Special Counsel Clark Clifford warned that access to Middle East oil was threatened by Soviet penetration into Iran, and argued that the United States should be ready to use force to guard its vital interests. Similarly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported on October 12 that it was "to the strategic interest of the United States to keep Soviet influence and Soviet armed forces as far as possible from oil resources in Iran, Iraq, and the Near and Middle East." According to the JCS, loss of access to Persian Gulf oil would force the United States and its allies to fight an "oil-starved war." Conversely, without access to the region's oil, the Soviet Union would not have sufficient oil to fight a major war.¹⁰

Circumstances differed greatly in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, but US officials interpreted events in all three as part of a Soviet plan to dominate the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal feared that, without Middle East oil, European recovery would falter and Europe would go Communist.¹¹ On March 12, 1947, Truman went before Congress and pledged that the United States would resist Communist expansion anywhere in the world. Although mention of oil was deliberately deleted from the president's address, concern over access to the region's chief resource played an important role in the shift in US foreign policy.¹²

Meanwhile, the Iranian government, with US support, had retaken control of its northern provinces and brutally crushed the separatist movements. Then, in October 1947, the Iranian parliament (the Majlis) rejected Soviet participation in oil development. The Majlis also forbade the granting of oil concessions to foreigners and prohibited foreigners from forming joint-stock

10 Arthur Krock, *Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), 419–82; *FRUS*, 1946, vol. VII, 529–32.

11 Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 143.

12 Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet–American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 198.

companies to develop Iranian oil. It also instructed the government to do whatever was necessary to recover Iran's rights to its natural resources, especially the oil concession held by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in southern Iran.

Iran's actions, coupled with US aid to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine, consolidated the American position along the northern tier of countries and protected US interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. By excluding the Soviets from the Middle East, the United States retained the region's oil for Western recovery. Likewise, by nurturing the development of Middle East oil production, the United States reduced the pressure on western hemisphere reserves. US policymakers also recognized the importance of the profits that British oil companies made in the Middle East for easing Britain's balance-of-payments problems. In addition, US and British strategic planners wanted to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East because the region contained the most defensible locations for launching a strategic air offensive against the Soviet Union in the event of a major war.

At the same time as the US government was announcing its determination to contain Soviet expansion in the Near East, the major oil companies secured their position in the region by joining forces with each other. The centerpiece of the "great oil deals" was the expansion of the ownership of the concession in Saudi Arabia to include Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum. In addition, Gulf contracted to sell its share of Kuwaiti production to Shell, and Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony signed long-term contracts to buy oil from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The result was a private system of worldwide production management that facilitated the development of Middle East oil and its integration into world markets. To help consolidate this system, the US government supported fifty-fifty profit-sharing arrangements between the major oil companies and host governments. The US tax code granted US corporations credits for taxes paid overseas. This solution to host-country demands for greater revenues transferred the cost of higher payments from the oil companies to the US Treasury.

The emerging postwar petroleum order underwent its first test with the Palestine issue. Truman's decisions to support the UN plan to partition Palestine in November 1947 and to recognize the new state of Israel in May 1948 went against the advice of the State Department, the military, and the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). They feared that US support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine could undermine relations with the Arab world and provide an opening for the Soviet Union to extend its power and influence at a time when the West needed Middle East oil for

European and Japanese reconstruction. Loss of access to Middle East oil, one study warned, would force the United States to choose between curtailing domestic consumption and making oil available to Europe to ensure the success of the Marshall Plan.¹³

US officials refrained from sending troops and arms to enforce the UN decision. They did not want to alienate the Arabs and provide an opening for Soviet influence. This strategy succeeded in minimizing the threat to US strategic and economic interests. While official relations with the Arab states suffered because of US support for Israel, the oil companies managed to maintain a degree of distance from government policy and thus escaped Arab displeasure.

Before World War II, Western Europe had depended on coal for over 90 percent of its energy requirements. Wartime destruction, dislocation, and overuse drastically reduced Western European and British coal production. Although oil accounted for a little less than 10 percent of Europe's total energy supply in 1947, it was the only source of fuel for aviation and road haulage and an increasingly important source of fuel for inland and ocean shipping and railway transport.

Soviet expansion into East Central Europe left the Soviet Union in control of most of Europe's indigenous oil reserves as well as important sources of coal in Poland. As a result, nearly half of Western Europe's oil in 1947 was supplied by US-owned companies and required payment in dollars. Oil was the largest single item in the dollar budget of most West European countries, and its sharp price rise largely accounted for the deterioration of Europe's dollar-denominated current accounts.

US leaders feared that the dollar shortage could lead to economic distress and Communist gains in Western Europe. To fuel economic recovery, the United States provided this critical area with the dollars it needed to purchase oil. From April 1948 to December 1951, the Marshall Plan provided more than \$1.2 billion for the purchase of crude oil and refined products, more than 10 percent of the total aid extended under the European Recovery Program. Over half (56 percent) of the oil supplied to Marshall Plan countries by US companies during this period was financed by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and its successor, the Mutual Security Agency (MSA).¹⁴

Oil increased its share of West European energy consumption from 13.5% in 1950 to 32.3% in 1960, and of Japanese energy consumption from 6.5% in

¹³ Painter, *Oil and the American Century*, 116–26.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 155–60.

1950 to 39.6% in 1960. Oil fueled the automobile industry, which played a key role in economic growth in Western Europe and Japan. Automobile registrations rose tenfold in Western Europe from 1950 to 1974 and at an even faster rate in Japan.¹⁵

Marshall Plan aid not only provided Western Europe with the energy it needed for recovery; it also helped maintain markets for US oil companies at a time when potential customers otherwise would not have had the means to acquire their oil. This aid was especially important to US companies with concessions in the Middle East since most of their oil went to markets in Western Europe.

Marshall Plan aid altered patterns of trade. Before World War II, Western Europe had relied on the western hemisphere for the bulk of its oil imports, with only 20% coming from the Middle East. By 1947, the Middle East supplied 43% of European oil imports, and by 1950 the figure was 85%. Although rising dependence on Middle East oil increased European and Japanese vulnerability to disruptions in supply, controlling access to essential oil supplies helped the United States reconcile its goal of German and Japanese economic recovery and integration into a Western alliance with that of ensuring against the recurrence of German and Japanese aggression.

Oil and Middle Eastern nationalism

The main problem facing the United States in the Middle East in the 1950s was how to maintain and defend Western interests in the region in the context of limited military capabilities and declining British power. The possibility of Soviet military action against the region, while always a danger, was not an immediate concern. Rather, the main threat to Western interests lay in instability and the growing anti-Western, particularly anti-British, orientation of Middle Eastern nationalism. US policymakers feared that these problems could provide an opening for the expansion of Soviet influence into the region.

Although the United States and Britain shared the goal of maintaining Western control of Middle East oil, they disagreed on how to deal with nationalism. US policymakers favored a strategy of coopting nationalists by meeting their demands for a greater share in the revenues generated by the oil industry as long as they did not threaten Western access and corporate

15 Steven A. Schneider, *The Oil Price Revolution* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 521, 522; Jean-Pierre Bardou, Jean-Jacques Chanaron, Patrick Fridenson, and James M. Laux, *The Automobile Revolution: The Impact of an Industry* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 197–200.



39. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refinery, Abadan, 1955. Nationalization of the British-owned company triggered a CIA coup that had long-lasting consequences.

control. The British, whose balance of payments and position as a great power were much more directly dependent on Middle East oil, distrusted nationalists and resisted their demands for a greater share of oil revenues. These divergent approaches shaped the US and British responses to the Iranian nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in May 1951.

Anglo-Iranian's operations in Iran were Britain's most valuable overseas asset, and the British feared that, if nationalization succeeded, all of Britain's overseas investments would be jeopardized. Although US policymakers shared British concerns about the impact of nationalization on foreign investment, they also feared that British use of force to reverse nationalization could result in turmoil in Iran, undercut the position of the shah, boost the prospects of the pro-Soviet Tudeh party, and might even result in intervention by the

Soviets at Iranian invitation. Moreover, the crisis broke out in the midst of the Korean War, making US policymakers reluctant to risk confrontation. Therefore, the United States urged the British to reach a negotiated settlement that preserved as much of their position as possible. Although US opposition derailed British military intervention, the British organized an international boycott of Iranian oil and intervened covertly in Iranian politics in an effort to reverse nationalization.

US efforts to mediate a settlement failed, as did attempts to convince the shah to remove nationalist prime minister Muhammad Mossadeq. By 1953, the oil boycott had sharply reduced Iran's export earnings and decimated government revenues. In addition, British and US intervention in Iranian internal affairs exacerbated the polarization of Iranian politics. Finally, the end of the Korean War and the completion of the US military buildup allowed a more aggressive posture toward Iran. Fearing that Mossadeq might displace the shah and that Tudeh influence was increasing, the United States and Britain organized, financed, and directed a coup that removed Mossadeq in August 1953 and installed a government willing to reach an oil settlement on Western terms.

Following the coup, the US government enlisted the major US oil companies in an international consortium to run Iran's oil industry. Cooperation of the major companies was necessary in order to fit Iranian oil exports, which had almost ceased during the crisis, back into world markets without disruptive price wars and destabilizing cutbacks in other oil-producing countries. The antitrust exemption required for this strategy undercut efforts by the Department of Justice to challenge the major oil companies' control of the world oil industry and strengthened the hand of the major oil companies, whose cooperation was needed to ensure Western access to the region's oil.

The new government of Iran also proved willing to cooperate with US plans to set up a regional defense organization. After Egyptian opposition frustrated successive plans to set up a Middle Eastern Command and a Middle Eastern Defense Organization, the United States focused on creating a smaller organization limited to the "northern tier" of countries bordering the Soviet Union plus Iraq. In February 1955, Turkey and Iraq signed a defense agreement known as the Baghdad Pact. Britain joined the pact in April, followed by Pakistan in September and Iran in October. The United States, concerned about Arab reaction, did not join, though US military planners worked closely with pact members.

While the Baghdad Pact focused on the Soviet threat, the Iranian crisis demonstrated that threats to Western access to Middle East oil could come

from within the region. In July 1956, Egyptian nationalist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the British- and French-owned Suez Canal Company. The Suez Canal was an important symbol of the Western presence in the Middle East and a major artery of international trade; two-thirds of the oil that went from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe passed through the canal. Viewing Nasser's action as an intolerable challenge to their position in the region, the British, together with the French, who resented Nasser's support for the Algerian revolution, and the Israelis, who felt threatened by Egyptian support for guerrilla attacks on their territory, developed a complex scheme to recapture control of the canal and topple Nasser through military action. The plan, which they put into action in late October, depended on US acquiescence and US cooperation in supplying them with oil if the canal were closed.¹⁶

The Egyptians closed the canal by sinking ships in it, Saudi Arabia embargoed oil shipments to Britain and France, and Syria shut down the oil pipelines from Iraq to the Mediterranean. Incensed by his allies' deception, concerned about the impact of their actions on the Western position in the Middle East, and embarrassed by the timing of the attack – just before the US presidential election and in the midst of the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt – President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to provide Britain and France with oil, blocked British attempts to stave off a run on the pound, and threatened to cut off economic aid to Israel. The pressure worked. Following the withdrawal of the British and French forces, the US government and the major oil companies cooperated to supply Europe with oil until the canal was reopened and oil shipments from the Middle East to Europe were restored.

By shutting off the flow of Middle East oil to Western Europe, the Suez crisis highlighted the danger that Arab nationalism posed to US plans to use oil to rebuild Western Europe and ensure its alignment with the United States. Nasser wanted Arab states to use their control of oil to further a political agenda that included Arab unity, the economic development of resource-poor Arab countries, and the destruction of Israel.¹⁷

Without Middle East oil, Eisenhower warned in early 1957, "Western Europe would be endangered just as though there had been no Marshall

¹⁶ See Douglas Little's chapter in volume II.

¹⁷ Gamal Abdel Nasser, *Philosophy of the Revolution* (Buffalo, NY: Economica Books, 1959), 71–74.

Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”¹⁸ Eisenhower pledged to protect Middle East states from the Soviet Union and its regional allies. To counter Nasser, who received military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union, Eisenhower sought to bolster conservative Arab regimes and reinforce their pro-Western alignment through economic and military assistance. Labeled the Eisenhower Doctrine, these policies marked the official assumption by the United States of Britain’s role as the guarantor of Western interests in the Middle East.

The key routes connecting Persian Gulf oil with markets in Western Europe ran through Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. The formation of the United Arab Republic in early 1958, joining Syria and Egypt, seemed to give Arab nationalism the “stranglehold” over access to Middle East oil that US and British policymakers had long feared.¹⁹

To make matters worse, the pro-Western monarchy in Iraq was overthrown in a bloody revolution in July 1958. At first, US and British leaders feared that Nasser and, behind him, the Soviet Union, had inspired the coup. They decided not to intervene militarily, however, believing that such action would be counterproductive. The coup had wiped out the royal family in Iraq, and Western intervention could easily radicalize the revolution and inflame the whole region. In addition, the coup’s leaders assured Washington and London that they would respect their oil interests. Instead, the United States and Britain sent troops to Lebanon and Jordan, respectively, and to the Persian Gulf to secure their position in the region and protect access to its oil.

Rather than increasing the threat from Arab nationalism, the Iraqi revolution exacerbated divisions within the Arab nationalist movement and reduced the danger to Western interests in the region. Although Nasser was popular in Iraq, General ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, who emerged as the leader of the revolution, distanced himself from Nasser, withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, and turned to the Iraqi Communist Party for support. Relations between Qasim and Nasser quickly deteriorated, and Nasser began issuing warnings that Iraq was becoming a tool of the Soviet Union and was undermining Arab unity.

From the US standpoint, either Arab nationalist or Soviet control of Iraq was a threat to US and Western interests. Communist control of Iraq, a Special

18 *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1958), 8.

19 *FRUS, 1958–1960*, vol. XII, 48–54, 64–71.

National Intelligence Estimate warned in February 1959, would put Soviet influence into the heart of the Middle East, bypassing Turkey and Iran. Arab nationalist control of Iraq could also threaten Western oil interests. Viewing Nasser as the lesser of two evils, the United States decided to let Egypt take the lead in opposing Communism in Iraq. The British, in contrast, saw Nasser as a greater danger, and stressed that a revolutionary Iraq split the Arab nationalist movement and lessened its threat to Western oil access.²⁰

The Arab reaction to the Iraqi threat to Kuwait in 1961 underlined how divisions among the Arab states lessened the threat from Arab nationalism. In June 1961, shortly after Britain turned sovereignty over to Kuwait, Qasim revived Iraq's claim to Kuwait, insisting that it was a province of Iraq. Kuwait was the fourth-largest oil producer in the world in 1961 and the largest single supplier of oil to Britain. Kuwaiti oil could be purchased in sterling and this, combined with British Petroleum's 50 percent stake in the Kuwait Petroleum Company and the £300 million in Kuwaiti government investments in Britain, made the small nation very important to Britain's international financial position. The British, with backing from the United States, took the lead in opposing Iraq's claim and sent troops to Kuwait to deter an attack. The other Arab states opposed Iraq's claims, quickly admitted Kuwait to the Arab League, and sent an Arab League Security Force composed of troops from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Republic, and Sudan to defend Kuwait. These forces allowed the British to withdraw their troops while maintaining their economic interests in Kuwait.

In December 1961, the increasingly radical Iraqi government repossessed almost all the territory the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) had acquired but not developed. Oil fields in production were not affected, but the IPC's directors, backed by the US and British governments, refused to accept the unilateral revision of their concession rights. The United States had been considering covert action to remove Qasim. The CIA may have been involved in the bloody coup in February 1963 that eliminated Qasim, brought the Baath Party to power, and led to the repression of the Communists.²¹

20 *Ibid.*, 114–34, 375–77, 381–88; Nathan J. Citino, “Middle East Cold Wars: Oil and Arab Nationalism in US–Iraqi Relations, 1958–1961,” in Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (eds.), *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 245–69.

21 Citino, “Middle East Cold Wars,” 254–59. The oil dispute continued until 1972 when Iraq nationalized the IPC.

Origins of OPEC

Changes in the world oil economy also reduced the threat from Arab nationalism. Beginning in the mid-1950s, increasing numbers of smaller, mostly US-owned, companies obtained oil concessions in Venezuela, the Middle East, and North Africa. Drawn by the lure of high profits, aided by the increasing standardization and diffusion of basic technology, reassured by the security provided by the Pax Americana, and unconcerned about reducing the generous profit margins available in international markets, the newcomers cut prices in order to sell their oil.

As Middle East oil displaced Venezuelan oil from European markets, US oil imports from the western hemisphere increased, putting pressure on prices and high-cost domestic producers. The question of oil imports presented US policymakers with a strategic dilemma. In an emergency, a rapid increase in domestic production could be achieved only if spare productive capacity existed. Too high a level of imports could undercut such capacity by driving out all but the lowest-cost producers. On the other hand, restricting imports and encouraging the increased use of a nonrenewable resource would eventually undermine the goal of maintaining spare productive capacity as a national defense reserve.

The President's Materials Policy Commission in its June 1952 report rejected national self-sufficiency in favor of interdependence, arguing that the United States had to be concerned about the needs of its allies for imported raw materials and about the needs of pro-Western less-developed countries for markets for their products. Although possible, self-sufficiency in oil and other vital raw materials would be very expensive and the controls necessary to enforce it would interfere with trade. Self-sufficiency would undercut the goal of rebuilding and integrating Western Europe and Japan under US auspices, and it would increase instability in the Third World by limiting the export earnings of oil-producing nations in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. The commission concluded that the United States should seek to ensure access to the lowest-cost supplies wherever located and that private investment should be the main instrument for increasing production of raw materials abroad.²²

As imports increased from 5.9% of US domestic demand in 1945 to almost 18.4% in 1958, domestic producers and the coal industry increased their

²² President's Materials Policy Commission, *Resources for Freedom*, 5 vols. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1952).

demands for protection against cheap foreign oil. Attempts to implement voluntary oil import restrictions failed, and in March 1959 Eisenhower imposed mandatory import quotas, with exemptions for oil that entered overland from Canada and Mexico. The Mandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP) constrained demand somewhat through higher prices, but also accelerated the depletion of US reserves because increases in US consumption during its operation were met mainly by domestic production.

By limiting US demand for foreign oil, MOIP put downward pressure on world oil prices. The reentry of Soviet oil into world markets in the late 1950s also affected oil prices. By 1961, Soviet oil met all of Iceland's oil needs, 80% of Finland's, around 35% of Greece's, 22% of Italy's, 21% of Austria's, and 19% of Sweden's. Japan also imported significant amounts of Soviet oil.²³ Soviet oil exports to non-Communist countries were the USSR's largest earner of foreign exchange and helped the Soviet Union obtain Western technology and other goods unavailable at home. Soviet sales also raised fears that the Kremlin could use Western dependence on oil as a political weapon.

US intelligence analysts concluded, however, that, although Soviet oil exports would "probably account for as much as seven percent of the total international movements into free world markets" by 1965, it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would be able "to upset the preponderant position of the Western oil companies or destroy the present overall pattern of the Middle East oil industry." Soviet use of oil for political purposes would "probably be limited to some degree by its desire to derive maximum economic benefits for itself from its oil exports."²⁴

Meanwhile, in September 1960, following two rounds of cuts in posted prices by the major oil companies, the oil ministers of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela met in Baghdad and formed the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Although OPEC eventually gained power over pricing in the 1970s, its formation subordinated the broader Arab nationalist agenda of using "Arab oil" for the benefit of all Arab states to the narrower economic goal of protecting the revenues of the major oil-producing countries by securing the best possible terms within the postwar petroleum order.²⁵

The breakup of the United Arab Republic in September 1960, coupled with the development of supertankers that could bypass the Suez Canal, further

23 Bennett H. Wall, *Growth in a Changing Environment: A History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) Exxon Corporation, 1950–1975* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), 342.

24 *FRUS, 1958–1960*, vol. IV, 671.

25 Citino, "Middle East Cold Wars," 259–61.



40. Dwight D. Eisenhower (left) and Richard M. Nixon (right) at dinner with King Saud of Saudi Arabia, 1957: with Arab nationalism burgeoning, Eisenhower embraced the Saudi monarchy as the key to ensuring oil supplies from the Middle East.

reduced the danger that Arab nationalists might cut off Western access to Middle East oil. In addition, the development of North African petroleum fields and the availability of Soviet oil made Western Europe less dependent on purchases from the Middle East. A December 1960 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that “the odds are against developments in regard to the Middle East that would be critically detrimental to US national interests in the next few years.” The Soviets were unlikely to try to seize any part of the Middle East “short of a general war,” and “even a Communist takeover in one of the producing countries would not necessarily result in a refusal to sell the country’s oil to the West.”²⁶

Resources and strategy

A focus on oil and other natural resources reveals important patterns in the Cold War and highlights the relationship between resources and strategy.

²⁶ *FRUS*, 1958–1960, vol. IV, 676–77.

Although US and British efforts to control world uranium supplies slowed the Soviet nuclear weapons program and raised the cost of the program to the Soviets, the Anglo-American quest for control of uranium “reflected and furthered” the transition of the Soviet Union from ally to enemy and thus contributed to the origins of the Cold War.²⁷ It also led the United States to support the continuation of white rule in southern Africa. The brutal methods the Soviets used to extract uranium, while broadly representative of their behavior in the early Cold War, nonetheless proved counterproductive in the long run.

Until Soviet oil production recovered from World War II, the Soviets looked to Eastern Europe for oil. After 1954, East European dependence on Soviet oil and natural gas strengthened Soviet influence in the region, but did not buy loyalty. Oil exports to the West became the Soviet Union’s largest generator of foreign exchange and allowed the Soviets to buy grain and Western technology, but oil revenues also propped up a system that was in serious trouble and diverted attention from the need to reform.

Control of oil played a vital role in establishing and preserving US pre-eminence in the postwar international system. Maintaining access to foreign oil, especially the vast reserves of the Persian Gulf, remained a key priority of US foreign policy throughout the Cold War. Oil fueled Western prosperity and enabled the United States to promote the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan while ensuring their international alignment. US efforts to maintain access to foreign oil led the United States not only to try to contain Soviet influence but also to oppose revolutionary nationalism in the Third World.

27 Jonathan E. Helmreich, *Gathering Rare Ores: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, 1943–1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 4, 249–53.

Bibliographical essay

The bibliographical essays in the three volumes of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* aim at being selective and critical overviews of the literature available in each subfield of historical investigation. The entries are written by the authors of the chapters in the main text, with additions, deletions, and crossreferences suggested by the editors. Readers may want to look at the bibliographical entries in more than one volume to get an overview of the literature on a particular issue or region.

1. The Cold War and the international history of the twentieth century

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(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002). On broader perspectives, see M. Malia, *History's Locomotives: Revolutions and the Making of the Modern World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), and R. Service, *Comrades! A History of World Communism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). For the United States in a comparative perspective, see T. Bender, *A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), and C. S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). For an excellent overview of ideological confrontations in Europe, see M. Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999). R. Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), is outstanding. For the Third World, see F. D. Colburn, *The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); B. Badie, *The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); and V. Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: New Press, 2007).

2. Ideology and the origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962

Recent works on the origins of the Cold War use declassified materials from Soviet archives; the most important of these include John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) – but see also Melvyn Leffler, “The Cold War: What Do ‘We Now Know’?,” *American Historical Review*, 104, 2 (1999), 501–24; Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Vladislav Zubok and Konstantin Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). While Soviet materials on later years have been harder to come by, three recent works provide important accounts: William Taubman, *Nikita Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War* (New York: Norton, 2006); and Vladislav M. Zubok, *The Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). A key work illuminating American policies in the early Cold War is Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); for a stronger focus on ideology in the eyes of a key American participant, see Anders Stephanson, *Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). Historians disagree over the extent to which “rollback” was a strategic objective vs. a rhetorical claim; see Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union* (New York: NYU Press, 1999) vs. Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

On the main lines of American liberalism, see the classic Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955), leavened with the incisive essays in James Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). See

also Dorothy Ross, "Liberalism," in Jack P. Greene (ed.), *Encyclopedia of American Political History*, vol. II (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1984). For discussion of a more diffuse American ideology, and its relation to foreign policy, see Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987).

Key explications on the origins and nature of Marxist ideology are two accounts by Polish philosophers: Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution*, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), and Andrzej Walicki, *Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise and Fall of the Communist Utopia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).

On the emergence of the ideological conflict during World War I, see Arno J. Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959), and N. Gordon Levin, Jr., *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968). On Wilson and his legacy, see also Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: US Foreign Policy since 1900* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

For US–Soviet perceptions, see Christopher Lasch's insightful first book, *The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). More exhaustive studies are Peter G. Filene, *Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917–1933* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); Eduard Mark, "October or Thermidor? Interpretations of Stalinism and the Perception of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United States, 1917–1947," *American Historical Review*, 94, 4 (October 1989), 937–62; and Norman Saul, *Friends or Foes? The United States and Soviet Russia, 1921–1941* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006). See also the relevant chapters in David C. Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Economic Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); and David S. Foglesong, *The American Mission and the "Evil Empire": The Crusade for a "Free Russia" since 1881* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Richard Day offers useful commentary on Soviet views: *The "Crisis" and the "Crash": Soviet Studies of the West (1917–1939)* (London: New Left Books, 1981); his *Cold War Capitalism: The View from Moscow, 1945–1975* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995) does the same for the Cold War.

On US–Soviet relations before World War II, see, on the Soviet side, Jon Jacobson, *When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1994); V. A. Shishkin, *Stanovlenie vneshnei politiki poslerevoliutsionnoi Rossii (1917–1930 gody) i kapitalisticheskii mir: ot revoliutsionnogo "zapadnichestva" k "natsional'no-bolshevizmu"* [The Formation of the Foreign Policy of Post-Revolutionary Russia (1917–1930) and the Capitalist World: From Revolutionary "Westernism" to "National Bolshevism"] (St. Petersburg: Bulanin, 2002); and Teddy J. Uldricks, *Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917–1930* (London: Sage, 1979). On the American side, see Lloyd C. Gardner, *Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1917–1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); and Mary E. Glantz, *FDR and the Soviet Union: The President's Battles over Foreign Policy* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005).

Some of the most interesting conceptualizations of the early Cold War rely on multiple national perspectives and often multiple archives. See, for instance, Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions*

and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and William Curti Wohlforth, *Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

Since the late 1990s, some historians and political scientists have sought to balance ideological and material factors in the Cold War. See, for instance, Nigel Gould-Davies, "Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics during the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1 (1999), 90–109; Jonathan Haslam, "The Cold War as History," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 6 (2003), 77–98; and Mark Kramer, "Ideology and the Cold War," *Review of International Studies*, 25, 4 (October 1999), 539–76. See also two broad overviews: David C. Engerman, "The Romance of Economic Development and New Histories of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, 28, 1 (January 2004), 23–54; and Odd Arne Westad, "The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms," *Diplomatic History*, 24, 4 (Fall 2000), 551–65.

3. The world economy and the Cold War in the middle of the twentieth century

For a general survey of political economy in the West throughout the era of the Cold War, consult Barry Eichengreen, *The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). For the major strand of Western postwar policies, see Peter A. Hall (ed.), *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). For influential analyses by contemporaries who sought a common logic underlying the contending economic and social systems, see Raymond Aron, *Sociologie des sociétés industrielles: esquisse d'une théorie des régimes politiques* (Paris: Centre de Documentation Universitaire [Sorbonne lectures], 1958); Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960); and John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (New York: New American Library, 1967). Walt Whitman Rostow's widely read *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960) suggested a common developmental logic and chronology for industrializing societies, which at a late stage might then choose either aggressive collectivist goals or more rational consumer-oriented welfare.

The orientation of labor movements appeared to be a crucial political stake that rested on economic outcomes. Among the numerous studies in many languages, see Anthony Carew, *Labour under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987); Federico Romero, *The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944–1951*, trans. by Harvey Fergusson, II (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Siegfried Mielke (ed.), *Organisatorischer Aufbau der Gewerkschaften 1945–1949* (Cologne: Bund Verlag, 1987); Peter Lange and George Ross, *Unions, Change, and Crisis: French and Italian Union Strategy and the Political Economy, 1945–1980* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982); and, for a view from Asia, Andrew Gordon, *The Wages of Affluence: Labor and Management in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). Post-1970 developments allowed a new perspective on the role of labor and mass production. For issues surrounding "Fordism" and its historical contingency, see Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds.), *Worlds of*

Possibility: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

In addition to early celebratory accounts, there is a large scholarly literature on how the Marshall Plan functioned. For the concepts behind the European Recovery Program, see Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); for mechanisms, see Imanuel Wexler, *The Marshall Plan Revisited: The European Recovery Program in Economic Perspective* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983); for the impact, see Alan S. Milward, “The Marshall Plan and German Foreign Trade,” in Charles S. Maier and Günter Bischof (eds.), *The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program* (Providence, RI: Berg Publishers, 1991), 452–87. For the European Recovery Program in the context of Cold War rivalry, see Robert A. Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and for a focus on a decisive resource, David S. Painter, *Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of US Foreign Oil Policy, 1941–1954* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). The transition from a decade of dollar shortages to one of dollar surplus and its consequences for American policy is the theme of Francis J. Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

For US influence on economic organization more generally, see John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999); the final chapters of Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 336–480; and Matthias Kipping and Ove Bjarnar (eds.), *The Americanisation of European Business: The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of US Management Models* (London: Routledge, 1998). For an early discussion of the politics of development assistance, see Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973).

For state socialist economics in general, see János Kornai, *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); for its history, see W. Brus, “Postwar Reconstruction and Socio-Economic Transformation,” in Michael Kaser and Lianne Radice (eds.), *The Economic History of Eastern Europe, 1919–1975*, vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 564–643. For early discussion of the cybernetic enthusiasm in state socialism, see V. G. Afanasyev, *The Scientific Management of Society*, trans. L. Ilyitskaya (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971; Russian original, 1967?). The Soviet role in postwar Germany was dispassionately treated in J. P. Nettl’s still valuable *The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945–1950* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), and is recently assessed by Norman Naimark in *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Andrew Port’s *Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) documents how state socialism managed to function on the local level during the Walter Ulbricht years, while the continuing failure to satisfy consumer demands is analyzed by Mark Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), and Jonathan Zatlin, *The Currency of Socialism: Money and Political Culture in East Germany* (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), as well as in Charles S. Maier,

Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). Across the world, Chinese rural catastrophes under Communism emerge from Dali L. Yang, *Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996).

For the burden of military expenses, see Till Geiger, "Economic Growth and National Security: National Income Analysis, Western Rearmament, and Cold War Strategy, 1950–1952," *International History Review* (2004); also Till Geiger, *Britain and the Economic Problem of the Cold War: The Political Economy and the Economic Impact of the British Defence Effort, 1945–1955* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004); Charles S. Maier, "Finance and Defense: Implications of Military Integration, 1950–1952," in F. H. Heller and J. R. Gillingham (eds.), *NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1992), 335–51. On Soviet military spending, see David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984). Environmental impacts of the Cold War are currently under scrutiny by John McNeill, who discusses the Green Revolution in that framework (see his chapter in volume III of *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*), while Arvid Nelson, *Cold War Ecology* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), sees both the forests and the trees in his unique study of woodlands management in the German Democratic Republic. For further suggestions, see the bibliographical essays in volumes II and III.

4. The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952

Memoirs, diaries, and printed letters vividly illustrate the thinking of US policymakers during the Truman era. See Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2 vols. (New York: Signet, 1955 and 1956); Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *Dear Bess: Letters from Harry to Bess Truman* (New York: Norton, 1983); Dean G. Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969); George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (New York: Bantam, 1967); Joseph M. Jones, *Fifteen Weeks* (New York: Viking, 1955); Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951); and Jean Edward Smith (ed.), *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945–1949*, 2 vols. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1974).

There are very useful "official" histories of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. See, for example, Steven L. Rearden, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years, 1947–1950* (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984); and James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945–1947* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996).

There are several excellent biographies of President Truman. For incisive criticism, see Arnold A. Offner, *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945–1953* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002); for an evocative and heroic portrait, see David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); for a scholarly and thoughtful analysis, see Alonzo L. Hamby, *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Truman relied heavily on his advisers and there are excellent biographies of the president's most important assistants. See especially Robert L. Beisner, *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945–1959* (New York: Viking, 1987); Kai Bird, *The Chairman*. John J. McCloy: *The Making of the American Establishment* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal* (New York: Knopf, 1992); Robert L. Messer, *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); David Allan Mayers, *George Kennan and the Dilemmas of US Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972); and Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).

Among the most important analyses of US policy and the origins of the Cold War are: Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper, 1972); Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet–American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3–145; and John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War* (rev. and expanded, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3–124.

There are important books and articles on the atomic bomb and its impact on the diplomacy and strategy of the Truman administration. See, for example, Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York: Vintage, 1965); Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance* (New York: Vintage, 1977); David Alan Rosenberg, “American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision,” *Journal of American History*, 66 (June 1979), 62–87; Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War* (New York: Knopf, 1980); Barton J. Bernstein, “Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender,” *Diplomatic History*, 19 (Spring 1995), 227–73; J. Samuel Walker, *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan*, rev. ed. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).

For excellent analyses of Truman's policies in different regions and countries, see Geir Lundestad, *The American Non-Policy towards Eastern Europe, 1943–1947* (Tromsø, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1978); Eduard Mark, “American Policy towards Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1946: An Alternative Interpretation,” *Journal of American History*, 68 (September 1981), 313–36; Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Carolyn Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in*

the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945–1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Thomas J. Christensen, *Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999); and Mark A. Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005).

For literature on the Korean War, see section 13 of this bibliographical essay; for literature on domestic political culture, see section 20.

5. The Soviet Union and the world, 1944–1953

There is a growing body of published primary sources on Soviet strategy and diplomacy in 1945–53 available in Russian. The most valuable collections of documents are: Grigori Kynin and Ioahim Laufer (eds.), *SSSR i germanskii vopros, 1941–1949: dokumenty iz Arkhiva vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi federatsii* [The USSR and the German Question, 1941–1949: Documents from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia, 1996–2003), 3 vols.; Galina Murashko (ed.), *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov, 1944–1953* [Eastern Europe in Documents from the Russian Archives, 1944–1953] (Moscow: Sibirskii Khronograf, 1997–98), 2 vols.; Grigori Sevost'ianov (ed.), *Sovetsko-amerikanskii otnosheniia, 1945–1948* [Soviet–American Relations, 1945–1948] (Moscow: Materik, 2004); and Sergei Tikhvinskii (ed.), *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia* [Soviet–Chinese Relations], 5 vols., vols. IV and V on the 1937–50 period (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi Mysli, 2000–2005). Published documents in English include: Giovanni Procacci (ed.), *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Milan: Fondazione Feltrinelli, 1994); *Stalin and the Cold War, 1945–1953: A Cold War International History Project Documentary Reader* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1999); and Kenneth Jensen (ed.), *Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan and Roberts “Long Telegrams” of 1946* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1991).

For useful diaries and memoirs, consult Georgi Dimitrov, *Dnevnik (9 mart 1933–6 fevruari 1949)* [Diaries, 9 March 1933–6 February 1949] (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Okhridski,” 1997); George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1967); Anastas Mikoian, *Tak bylo* [That Is How It Was] (Moscow: Vagrius, 1999); and A. Resis (ed.), *Molotov Remembers. Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993).

General accounts of Stalin's strategy and foreign policy of that period include John L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Vladimir Pechatnov and Earl Edmondson, “The Russian Perspective,” in Ralph Levering *et al.* (eds.), *Debating the Origins of the Cold War: American and Russian Perspectives* (Lanham, MD:

Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 85–153; Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2006); William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). The history of the Soviet atomic project and its impact on Stalin's strategy are detailed in David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1954* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994). The Kremlin's internal decisionmaking in the late Stalin years is best covered in Y. Gorlizki and Oleg Khleniuk, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

For Soviet policies in postwar Europe, see Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (eds.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–1953* (London: Macmillan, 1996); Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, *Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943–1956* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); Wilfried Loth, *Stalin's Unwanted Child: The German Question and the Founding of the GDR* (London: Macmillan, 1998); Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds.), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); and David Reynolds (ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).

Soviet strategy in Asia and the Near East as well as Cold War crises there are treated in Chen Jian, *China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Jamil Hasanli, *At the Dawn of Cold War: The Soviet–American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941–1946* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); Odd Arne Westad, *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); and Nagai Yonosuke and Arira Iriye (eds.), *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

For useful recent biographies of principal Soviet decisionmakers, consult R. Service, *Stalin: A Biography* (London: Macmillan, 2004); Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar* (New York: Knopf, 2004); Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Young Stalin* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007); and D. Watson, *Molotov: A Biography* (London: Macmillan, 2005).

For literature on the Soviet Union and East Asia, see sections 11 and 13 of this bibliographical essay; for Eastern Europe and the Balkans, see sections 9 and 10.

6. Britain and the Cold War, 1945–1955

The multivolume *Documents on British Policy Overseas* (Series I and II, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office and Whitehall History Publishing with Frank Cass, 1984–97)

series contains printed material and microfiches which are relevant to this period, although its coverage is topic-based rather than chronological. There is also the microform series *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print* (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1999–), which covers a number of post-1945 topics.

An overview of Britain's position in the world at the end of the war is in chapter 1 of the third volume of Alan Bullock's political biography of Ernest Bevin, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951* (London: Heinemann, 1983). See also, more generally, Tony Judt's *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London: William Heinemann, 2005), and Mark Mazower's *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London: Allen Lane, the Penguin Press, 1998), both of which also draw out the cultural and sociological dimensions of this period. The economic challenges of the time are covered with clarity by Alec Cairncross, *The British Economy since 1945: Economic Policy and Performance, 1945–1990* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). For general accounts of the domestic and foreign-policy developments, see Peter Hennessy, *Never Again: Britain 1945–1951* (London: Cape, 1992), and *Having It So Good: Britain in the Fifties* (London: Allen Lane, 2006), as well as Kenneth Morgan's *Britain since 1945: The People's Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). The plight of the political Left as the Cold War developed is analyzed in Jonathan Schneer's *Labour's Conscience: The Labour Left, 1945–1951* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

Major biographical studies include Geoffrey Best, *Churchill: A Study in Greatness* (London: Penguin, 2002); David Dutton, *Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation* (London: Arnold, 1997); and D. R. Thorpe, *Eden: The Life and Times of Anthony Eden, First Earl of Avon, 1897–1977* (London: Pimlico, 2004). Kenneth Harris's *Attlee* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995) remains the most comprehensive study of the Labour prime minister, while Bevin is covered by Bullock, and by Geoffrey Warner, "Ernest Bevin and British Foreign Policy, 1945–1951," in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.), *The Diplomats 1939–1979* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 103–34. Macmillan's earlier career is examined by Alistair Horne, *Macmillan, 1894–1956* (London: Macmillan, 1988). The three Conservatives also all wrote extensive memoirs or personal histories, while Attlee's relatively slender memoir, *As It Happened* (London: Heinemann, 1954), can be supplemented by Hugh Dalton's *High Tide and After: Memoirs, 1945–1960* (London: F. Muller, 1962), and *In the Midst of Events: The Foreign Office Diaries and Papers of Kenneth Younger*, edited by Geoffrey Warner (London: Routledge, 2005). The period is covered by an insider, John Colville, in *The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939–1955* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985).

For the international context of British Cold War policy, see Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), and John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). On the imperial context of postwar Britain, consult Wm. Roger Louis's definitive *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), as well as Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), and L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002). Coverage of Anglo-American relations in this period is authoritatively dealt with in David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century* (Harlow: Longman, 2000).

Alan S. Milward's volume in the UK Official History series, *The UK and the European Community*, vol. I, *The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy, 1945–1963* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), is exhaustive.

Archivally based specialized studies are essential for this period. David Reynolds (ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); Anne Deighton (ed.), *Britain and the First Cold War* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); and Melvyn Leffler and David S. Painter (eds.), *Origins of the Cold War: An International History* (New York: Routledge, 2005), between them cover most of the political and regional issues. Marshall aid and the creation of NATO respectively are given comprehensive treatment in Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and John Baylis, *The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942–1949* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993). On Germany, see Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1947* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); on France, see John W. Young, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944–1949* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990), and Claire Sanderson, *L'Impossible Alliance? France, Grande-Bretagne et défense de l'Europe, 1945–1958* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2003). On Empire and the Middle East, John Kent, *British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–1949* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), Yazid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (eds.), *The Cold War and the Middle East* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), and Louise Fawcett, *Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), contribute well-documented arguments. With regard to nuclear issues, the classic study remains Margaret Gowing, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952* (London: Macmillan, 1974). Churchill's second administration is covered by John Young in *Winston Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War, 1951–1955* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), and by Günter Bischof and Saki Dockrill (eds.), *Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).

For archivally based research on intelligence, on cultural aspects of the Cold War, and on the "secret state," see especially Richard Aldrich's path-breaking *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and the Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001); Tony Shaw, *British Cinema and the Cold War: The State, Propaganda and Consensus* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001); and Peter Hennessy, *The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War* (London: Penguin, 2002).

7. The division of Germany, 1945–1949

Some key West German documents for this period are available in Hans-Peter Schwarz (ed.), *Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989–). A useful introduction to the vast research on occupied Germany is Wolfgang Benz (ed.), *Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung 1945–1949/55: ein Handbuch* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1999). On the Allied Control Council, see Gunther Mai, *Der Alliierte Kontrollrat und Deutschland, 1945–1949: Alliierte Einheit, deutsche Teilung?* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995). The most thorough interpretation of the negotiations in the Council of Foreign Ministers is Hanns Jürgen Küsters, *Der Integrationsfriede: Viermächteverhandlungen über die Friedensregelung mit*

Deutschland, 1945–1990 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2000). The global background of the division of Germany within the framework of the Cold War is treated in Georges-Henri Soutou, *La guerre des Cinquante Ans: les relations Est–Ouest 1943–1990* (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 9–225.

A dominant characteristic of the research on the division of Germany has always been the national perspective. See the account of British policies in Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). The controversial reparation issue is superbly dealt with by Sir Alec Cairncross, *The Price of War: British Policy on German Reparations, 1941–1949* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). The best monograph on Ernest Bevin is Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945–1951* (London: Heinemann, 1983). For a German view of the relevant British policies, see Claus Scharf and Hans-Jürgen Schröder, *Die Deutschlandpolitik Großbritanniens und die Britische Zone 1945–1949* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1979).

There is an exhaustive literature on the American contribution to the division of Germany. Detlev Junker (ed.), *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1968: A Handbook*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), contains several succinct, up-to-date essays; see also Jeffrey Diefendorf, Axel Frohn, and Herman-Josef Rupieper (eds.), *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945–1955* (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1993). Carolyn Wood Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), believes that Germany's partition was fundamentally an American decision. Of remarkable impartiality in this field replete with sometimes overblown controversies is John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968). Of the numerous studies of former officials, the most useful is Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944–1955* (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1957). For an account of American economic policies with regard to Germany, see Wilfried Mausbach, *Zwischen Morgenthau und Marshall: das wirtschaftspolitische Deutschlandkonzept der USA 1944–1947* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1996). General Clay's decisive role has been analyzed in several well-documented studies with partially controversial conclusions: Wolfgang Krieger, *General Lucius D. Clay und die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1949* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988); John H. Backer, *Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1983); and Jean Edward Smith, *Lucius D. Clay: An American Life* (New York: Henry Holt, 1980). A critical assessment of George F. Kennan's changeable German policies is Wilson D. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 141–77. There are two significant memoirs that still deserve critical reading: George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1967), 415–28, and Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (London: William Heinemann, 1950). For the Berlin blockade, see Avi Shlaim, *The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948–1949: A Study in Crisis Decision-Making* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), and for the influential role of John J. McCloy, see Thomas Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

The contribution of France to the partition of Germany is discussed in the context of its general foreign policy by William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). For an informative account by a leading expert on Germany, see Alfred

Grosser, *Deutschlandbilanz: Geschichte Deutschlands seit 1945* (Munich: Hanser, 1970), 9–119. Policies in the French zone are covered in Volker Koop, *Besetzt: französische Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland* (Berlin: be.bra-Verlag, 2005). Still useful are Claus Scharf and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.), *Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die französische Zone 1945–1949* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983); Roy F. Willis, *The French in Germany, 1945–1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962) and John W. Young, *France, the Cold War, and the Western Alliance, 1944–1949: French Foreign Policy and Post-war Europe* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990). The best collection of essays on the important influence of de Gaulle in early French policies toward German unity is Claire Andrieu, et al. (eds.), *Dictionnaire de Gaulle* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2006).

Since the opening of the archives of the German Democratic Republic and the partial accessibility of Soviet archives, a relatively vast literature has appeared on Moscow's German policies. Indispensable collections of new sources are Jochen P. Laufer and Georgij P. Kynin, *Die UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948: Dokumente aus dem Archiv für Außenpolitik der Russischen Föderation*, 3 vols. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), and the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*. The best account of policies in the Soviet zone is Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). A comprehensive monograph on the Soviet Military Administration in Deutschland is Jan Foitzik, *Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland (SMAD) 1945–1949* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999). In spite of the rich harvest of new sources, interpretation of Soviet policies is still controversial. There are those who think that Stalin was bent on a united, pro-Soviet Germany: see, for example, Gerhard Wettig, *Bereitschaft zur Einheit in Freiheit? Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1949* (Munich: Olzog Verlag, 1999). For an alternative view, see Wilfried Loth, *Stalin's Unwanted Child: The Soviet Union, the German Question, and the Founding of the GDR* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), who believes that Stalin wanted to secure or restore "Germany's unity," and was ready to accept a neutral Germany and even a Western-style democracy. The thesis that Stalin had always secretly pursued the goal of "two Germanies" also finds a supporter: Jochen Laufer, "Stalins Friedensziele," in Jürgen Zarusky (ed.), *Stalin und die Deutschen* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2006), 131–58.

Good introductions to the role of the Germans under Allied occupation can be found in Antony Nicholls, *The Bonn Republic: West Germany 1945–1990* (London: Longman, 1997), 1–92, and Dennis L. Bark and D. R. Gress, *From Shadow to Substance, 1945–1963* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 1–227. A standard account from a contemporary German scholar is Theodor Eschenburg, *Jahre der Besatzung, 1945–1949* (Stuttgart and Wiesbaden: DVA and F. A. Brockhaus, 1983). Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der außenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft 1945–1949* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980), is my own interpretation of the interplay of Allied and German policies that gave rise to the division of Germany.

8. The Marshall Plan and the creation of the West

Several European countries now have their own series of published diplomatic documents; for France, for instance, see *Documents diplomatiques français*, published by the Ministère des affaires étrangères, Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français, or

for Italy, *Documenti diplomatici italiani*, published by the Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Commissione per la Pubblicazione dei Documenti Diplomatici.

Early accounts of the origins of the Marshall Plan, such as Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York: Viking, 1955), and the official history by Harry Bayard Price, *The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1955), are useful, though filled with reverence for Marshall and his team. A recent popular account of the American role in the design and implementation of the plan is Greg Behrman, *The Most Noble Adventure* (New York: Free Press, 2007). John Gimbel focuses chiefly on the Marshall Plan in the German context and opens up fruitful avenues of research in *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976). Imanuel Wexler, *The Marshall Plan Revisited* (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1983), gives careful attention to the Plan based on detailed statistics. The scholarly contributions of Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), and Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), frame the debate about the economic impact of the Plan by placing the European Recovery Program into the economic histories of the United States and Europe, and by exploring European sources about how the Plan was received. The essential points of contention are outlined in Milward's review of Hogan's book: "Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?," *Diplomatic History*, 13, 2 (1989), 231–53. A middle position is sketched by Charles Maier in his thoughtful essays in *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). John Killick gives a clear, brief survey in *The United States and European Reconstruction, 1945–1960* (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997). There is also an important collection of articles on various countries in *Le Plan Marshall et le relèvement économique de l'Europe* (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 1993).

Country studies abound. For Britain, see Henry Pelling, *Britain and the Marshall Plan* (New York: St. Martin's, 1988), though Hogan's work covers Britain thoroughly. On France, the best treatment is Gérard Bossuat, *La France, l'aide américaine, et la construction européenne, 1944–1954* (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 1992); the diplomatic context is ably treated in Irwin Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945–1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); for economic issues, see Frances Lynch, *France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome* (London: Routledge, 1997). Chiarella Esposito has made a detailed comparative study: *America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948–1950* (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1994). Ennio di Nolfo argues that Italy's participation in the Plan was motivated far more by domestic political considerations than by economic ones: "L'Italie et le Plan Marshall: aux origines de la participation italienne," in *Le Plan Marshall*, 59–68. For an excellent collection of essays that treats Italy in a European context, see Elena Aga Rossi (ed.), *Il Piano Marshall e l'Europa* (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1983). Werner Abelshauser downplays the effectiveness of Marshall aid in Germany; see his *Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945–1980* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983); and his article, "Wiederaufbau vor dem Marshallplan, Westeuropa Wachstumschancen und die Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik in der zweiten Hälfte der vierziger Jahre," *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 29 (1981), 545–78. Gerd Hardach, *Der Marshall-Plan: Auslandshilfe und Wiederaufbau in*

Westdeutschland, 1948–1952 (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1994), and Alan Kramer, *The West German Economy, 1945–1955* (New York: Berg, 1991), are useful, though the essays in Charles Maier and Günter Bischof (eds.), *The Marshall Plan and Germany* (Oxford: Berg, 1991), provide excellent detail and broad context, as does Karl Hardach, *The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980).

For the diplomatic calculations behind Marshall aid, see Carolyn Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Melvyn Leffler, “The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan,” *Diplomatic History*, 12 (Summer 1988), 277–306. For an interpretation of Soviet behavior toward the Marshall Plan, see Scott Parish, “The Marshall Plan, Soviet–American Relations, and the Division of Europe,” in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianski (eds.), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 268–90, and Scott Parish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, *New Evidence of the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports*, CWHIP Working Paper No. 9 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1994).

Accounts that stress Britain’s role in the origins of NATO are Martin H. Folly, “Breaking the Vicious Circle: Britain, the United States, and the Genesis of the North Atlantic Treaty,” *Diplomatic History*, 12, 1 (Winter 1988), 59–77; Bert Zeeman, “Britain and the Cold War: An Alternative Approach. The Treaty of Dunkirk Example,” *European History Quarterly*, 16 (1986), 343–67; and John Baylis, “Britain, the Brussels Pact, and the Continental Commitment,” *International Affairs*, 60, 4 (Autumn 1984), 615–29. More general is Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (Boston, MA: Twayne, 1988).

There is an extensive literature on Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and the origins of European integration. See Monnet’s own *Mémoires* (Paris: Fayard, 1976); William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett (eds.), *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity* (London: Macmillan, 1991); and John Gillingham, *Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Excellent introductions to the Americanization of Europe are Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); Volker Berghahn, *The Americanization of West German Industry, 1945–1973* (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1986); and Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). An excellent case study of one aspect of the transatlantic economic relationship in the Marshall Plan era is David S. Painter, “Oil and the Marshall Plan,” *Business History Review*, 58, 3 (Autumn 1984), 359–83. A broad economic assessment is offered in the essays in Barry Eichengreen (ed.), *Europe’s Postwar Recovery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). A recent (and inconclusive) attempt to synthesize the story of Americanization is Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). For a skeptical view of the concept of Americanization, see Rob Kroes, “American Empire and Cultural Imperialism: A View from the Receiving End,” *Diplomatic History*, 23, 3 (July 1999), 463–77.

9. The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, 1944–1953

New documentary collections continue to shed light on Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. Two vital sets of documents on the Soviets' deep involvement in the establishment of Communist regimes are G. P. Murashko *et al.* (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh Rossiiskikh arkhivov, 1944–1953* [Eastern Europe in Documents from the Russian Archives, 1944–1953], 2 vols. (Moscow and Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1997); and T. V. Volokitina *et al.* (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor v vostochnoi Evrope, 1944–1953* [The Soviet Factor in Eastern Europe], 2 vols. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999, 2002). An Italian-sponsored publication contains the transcripts of the first three Cominform meetings and very useful articles on aspects of Cominform history: *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994).

Country-specific collections include an updated edition of essential documents on the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany, Gennadii Bordiugov *et al.* (eds.), *Sovetskaia voennaia administratsiia v Germanii (SVAG): upravlenie propagandy (informatsii) i S. I. Tiul'panov 1945–1949* [The Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG): The Propaganda (Information) Administration and S. I. Tiul'panov, 1945–1949] (Moscow: AIRO-XX, 2006). For the establishment of Communist hegemony in Poland, see Gennadii Bordiugov *et al.* (eds.), *SSSR–Pol'sha: mekhanizmy podchineniia 1944–1949 gg.* [The USSR–Poland: Mechanisms of Subordination 1944–1949] (Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1995). For the Soviet takeover of Romania, see T. A. Pokivailova *et al.* (eds.), *Tri vizita A. Ia. Vyshinskogo v Bukharest 1944–1946 gg.* [Three Visits by A. Ia. Vyshinskii to Bucharest 1944–1946] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998).

Two highly influential early monographs are Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1965), which sets the framework for three generations of writing about the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), a foundational political science treatment of the subject. One of the best-documented and most reliable accounts of the origins of the Cold War in Eastern Europe from the pre-1989 period is Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). See also Mastny's study of Stalin's policies abroad, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Important recent studies of Stalin's foreign policy include Donal O'Sullivan, *Stalins "Cordon Sanitaire": die sowjetische Osteuropapolitik und die Reaktionen des Westens 1939–1949* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003); T. V. Volokitina *et al.*, *Moskva i vostochnaia Evropa: stanovlenie politicheskikh rezhimov sovetskogo tipa, 1949–1953* [Moscow and Eastern Europe: The Emergence of Political Regimes of the Soviet Type, 1949–1953] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002), an archive-based study of the Stalinization of Eastern Europe by leading Russian specialists; and Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

There are also several vital new collections of articles, including A. O. Chubar'ian *et al.* (eds.), *Stalinskoe desiatiletie kholodnoi voiny: fakty i gipotezy* [The Stalin Decade of the Cold War: Facts and Hypotheses] (Moscow: Nauka, 1999), including leading Russian specialists on the Stalin period; Stefan Creuzberger and Manfred Gortemaker (eds.), *Gleichschaltung unter Stalin? Die Entwicklung der Parteien im ostlichen Europa, 1944–1949* (Paderborn:

Schöningh, 2002), which comprises recent articles on Sovietization by German and East European scholars; N. I. Egorova *et al.* (eds.), *Kholodnaia voina, 1945–1963: fakty, sobytiia* [The Cold War, 1953–1963: Facts, Events] (Moscow: OLMA-PRESS, 2003), a reevaluation of the Cold War by Russian archival scholars. See also papers based on new research presented at a Moscow Academy of Sciences conference, collected in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds.), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).

Interesting new interpretations are offered by John Connelly, *Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945–1956* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), on the ways in which East Europeans were able to preserve their own traditions and institutional cultures during the process of Sovietization; and T. V. Volokitina *et al.*, *Narodnaia demokratiia: mif ili real'nost'* [People's Democracy: Myth or Reality] (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), an argument by leading archival scholars of Eastern Europe that “people’s democracy” had serious democratic content and intent in the immediate postwar period.

Studies on specific countries include Krystyna Kersten, *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943–1948*, trans. and annotated by John Micgiel and Michael H. Bernhard (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), the English translation of the first archive-based Polish study of the period of Communist takeover; Ivo Banac’s pioneering analysis of Yugoslav politics during the Tito–Stalin split, *With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), an archive-based examination of Soviet policy in Germany and the origins of the German Democratic Republic.

Robert Levy’s *Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001) is an important reevaluation of the Romanian Stalinist based on extensive interviews and archives. The premier Czech historian of Communism in that country, Karel Kaplan, studies the origins and course of the 1948 coup in *The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1987). See also his *Report on the Murder of the General Secretary* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1990), which, in addition to an account of the Slansky trial, includes a general history of the East European purges. On Hungary, see Charles Gati’s excellent series of extended essays, *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), and George H. Hodos, *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1987), the best available work on the East European purges by a former victim of Hungarian Stalinists.

Finally, there are several key published memoirs and diaries. The memoirs of the Yugoslav Communist Milovan Djilas remain one of the fundamental sources for understanding Stalin’s wartime and postwar thinking, *Conversations with Stalin*, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962). Likewise, many insights can be gleaned from the splendidly edited notes of the famous Bulgarian Communist Georgii Dimitrov, Stalin’s most trusted East European deputy during the war and after, *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949*, ed. Ivo Banac (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). Essential insights into the Sovietization of East European intellectuals are found in Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind*, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1981). Lastly, Teresa Toranska, *“Them”: Stalin’s Polish Puppets*, trans. Agnieszka Kolakowska (New York:

Harper and Row, 1987), contains striking interviews with Polish Stalinists by an unusually aggressive journalist.

See also sections 5, 7, and 10 in this bibliographical essay.

10. The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945–1956

The body of literature on the Balkans during the early Cold War, in particular in English, is far from impressive in spite of the explosion in the availability of documentary sources from Soviet and regional archives after 1989. By far the most comprehensive survey of the history of the region after 1945 can be found in Richard J. Crampton, *The Balkans since the Second World War* (New York: Longman, 2002). Although mainly focused on the first half of the century and the Second World War, an overview by Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), is a valuable contribution.

A more elaborate review of the literature on the Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe in the early Cold War is already given in the entries in this bibliographical essay, sections 5 and 9. However, works such as *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949*, ed. Ivo Banac (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), and the most recent book by Vesselin Dimitrov, *Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Foreign Policy, Democracy, and Communism in Bulgaria, 1941–1948* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), provide invaluable insight into Stalin's attitudes toward the Balkans. See also Artiom Ulunian, *Balkany: goriachii mir kholodnoi voiny. Gretsia i Turtsiia mezhdz Zapadom i Vostokom, 1945–1960 gg.* [The Balkans: Hot Peace, Cold War. Greece and Turkey between West and East, 1945–1960] (Moscow: Rossiiskie vesti, 2001).

Among the country-specific literature, Dimitrov, as well as R.J. Crampton's *Bulgaria* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), offer exceptional insight into developments in Bulgaria. For US policy, Michael M. Boll, *Cold War in the Balkans: American Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Communist Bulgaria, 1943–1947* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), is still useful.

For an overview of the history of Turkey during this period, one should consult Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd ed. (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), and William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000). For relations between London and Ankara, see Mustafa Bilgin, *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era* (London: Tauris Academic, 2008), and between Moscow and Ankara, Bulent Gokay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920–1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism* (London: Routledge, 2006). A useful overview of domestic politics in Turkey is John M. VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938–1950* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005).

From a relatively large body of literature on the Greek Civil War, two edited volumes deserve special mention, as they provide a comprehensive general overview of the conflict with its many complexities: John O. Iatrides (ed.), *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1981), and John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley (eds.), *Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1995). On the American role in the conflict, one should consult Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949* (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1982). On the subject of the Greek Communists' goals and tactics in the Greek Civil War and Soviet policies, a very good overview can be found in Peter J. Stavrakis, *Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944–1949* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). Additional insights can be gleaned from more recent articles that have benefited from the opening of the Soviet archives, such as John O. Iatrides, "Revolution or Self-Defense? Communist Goals, Strategy, and Tactics in the Greek Civil War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7, 3 (Summer 2005), 3–33, and Thanasis D. Sfikas, "War and Peace in the Strategy of the Communist Party of Greece, 1945–1949," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3, 3 (Fall 2001), 5–30. A rare and thus valuable comparative analysis of Soviet and British attitudes in the conflict is provided in the article by Thanasis D. Sfikas, "Toward a Regional Study of the Origins of the Cold War in Southeastern Europe: British and Soviet Policies in the Balkans, 1945–1949," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 17 (1999), 209–27. For Greece after the civil war, see Euanthes Chatzevasileiou, *Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952–1967* (London: Routledge, 2006). The scarcity of published Greek documents on the Greek Civil War is somewhat compensated for by the inclusion of relevant documents in series from the US and British governments.

Among English-language books on Yugoslavia during this period that focus on the Tito–Stalin split and its aftermath, see the excellent analysis of Western policies and the dilemmas of policymaking in Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997), and Beatrice Heuser, *Western "Containment" Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948–1953* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989). A still unsurpassed insight into the Yugoslav side of the conflict and an accurate reading of Stalin's mindset is provided in Vladimir Dedijer's *The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia 1948–1953* (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1978), and in the documentary collections he edited in Serbo-Croatian, the three-volume *Dokumenti 1948* [Documents on 1948], (Belgrade: Rad, 1979). Interesting aspects of the Tito–Stalin split and its ramifications are discussed in Ivo Banac, *With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).

Several memoirs and biographies are particularly important for the understanding of the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict and the process of normalization after Stalin's death, most notably Vladimir Dedijer's documentary biography of Tito, *Novi prilozii za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* [New Supplements to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito], vol. III (Belgrade: Izdavačka radna organizacija Rad, 1984), as well as Nikita Khrushchev, *Vremia, liudi, vlast'* [Times, People, Power], vols. III and IV (Moscow: Moskovskie novosti, 1999), Veljko Mićunović, *Moskovske godine, 1956–1958* [Moscow Years, 1956–1958] (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber, 1977), and Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče: memoari* [The Continuous Revolution: Memoirs] (Belgrade: Komunist, 1971). For the process of Soviet–Yugoslav reconciliation, see Svetozar Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War, 1953–1957* (London: Routledge, 2010).

See also entries in section 9 of this bibliographical essay.

II. The birth of the People's Republic of China and the road to the Korean War

The documents pertaining to the Guomindang government's policies were published after the 1970s, such as Qin Xiaoyi (ed.), *Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian – duiRi*

kangzhan shiqi, di san bian, zhanshi wajiao II [First Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China – The Anti-Japanese War Period, vol. III, War-time Foreign Relations, II] (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang dangshi weiyuanhui, 1981). Some of the Soviet documents pertaining to China for this period have been published by Shen Zhihua and others; see Shen Zhihua *et al.* (eds.), *Sulian lishi dang'an xuanbian* [Collection of Selected Soviet Historical Documents] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 2002); and *Chaoxian zhanzheng: Eguo dang'anguan de jiemi wenjian* [The Korean War: Declassified Documents from Russian Archives], 2 vols. (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 2003).

This chapter uses historical documents that have been published in China since the 1980s. Major archives in China, such as the Central Archive, remain inaccessible to independent research projects, and therefore it is at present difficult to give China the role in the history of the period that the country deserves.

Zhongyang dang'anguan (ed. and comp.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* [Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee], 18 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao, 1989–92), vols. XV–XVIII covering the postwar period; *Mao Zedong wenji* [A Collection of Mao Zedong's Works], 8 vols. (Beijing: Renmin, 1993–97; *Mao Zedong zai qida de baogao he jianghua ji* [Collection of Mao Zedong's Reports and Speeches at the Seventh CCP Congress] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1995); and *Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi* (ed. and comp.), *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian* [A Selection of Important Documents since the Founding of the People's Republic of China], 17 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1992), are of key importance to scholars. For military affairs, see *Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi* (ed. and comp.), *Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan* [Selected Military Papers of Zhou Enlai], 4 vols. (Beijing: Renmin, 1997). *Zhongyang dang'an guan* and the CCP Department of United Front (eds. and comps.), *Zhonggong zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng shiqi tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian* [A Selection of Documents on the CCP Central Committee's United Front during the Liberation War Period] (Beijing: Dang'an, 1988), is crucial for understanding the policies of the CCP.

There is now a large literature in many languages dealing with this period. For an overview of research in China, see Yafeng Xia, "The Study of Cold War International History in China: A Review of the Last Twenty Years," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 10, 1 (Winter 2008), 81–115. Steven Levine, *Anvils of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), was among the first to explore the complex interrelations between the CCP's postwar development in Manchuria and Soviet and American policies. Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet–American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), provides an original explanation of the Chinese Civil War by placing it within the context of the emerging Soviet–American confrontation. Chen Jian's classic *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) transformed our understanding of the domestic causes of China's entry into the war, while his *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001) offers a convenient framework for understanding many of the issues discussed in the present chapter. Shu Guang Zhang's work, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), emphasizes "strategic culture" as a tool for understanding Chinese policies. Niu Jun, *From Yan'an to the World: The Origin and Development of Chinese*

Communist Foreign Policy (Norwalk, CT: Eastbridge, 2005; Chinese original 1992), studies how the CCP handled and manipulated its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. For a contrasting view, underlining CCP enmity toward the United States, see Michael M. Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). For an overview of the debate, see "Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China," *Diplomatic History*, 21, 1 (Winter 1997), with contributions from Warren Cohen, Chen Jian, Odd Arne Westad, John Garver, and Michael Sheng. Yang Kuisong, *Mao Zedong yu Mosike de enen yuanyuan* [Mao Zedong's Gratitude toward and Grievances against Moscow] (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin, 2005), meticulously presents Mao's complex relations with the Soviet Union. Shen Zhihua, *Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu chaoxian zhanzheng* [Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin, 2003), carefully reexamines the connections between the Sino-Soviet alliance and the outbreak of the Korean War.

For other aspects of China's foreign policy during this period, see Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), and Qiang Zhai, "Tibet and Chinese-British-American Relations in the Early 1950s," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8, 3 (Summer 2006), 34–53. On the latter issue, see also Michael M. Sheng, "Mao, Tibet, and the Korean War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8, 3 (Summer 2006), 15–33. On Mongolia, see Xiaoyuan Liu, *Reins of Liberation: An Entangled History of Mongolian Independence, Chinese Territoriality, and Great Power Hegemony, 1911–1950* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).

Some important memoirs and biographies have been published since the early 1980s; see, for instance, Peng Dehuai, *Peng Dehuai zishu* [Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Renmin, 1981); Nie Rongzhen, *Nie Rongzhen huiyilu* [Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen] (Beijing: Jiefang, 1984; Engl. transl. 1988); Wu Xiuquan, *Zai waijiaobu banian de jingli* [Eight-Year Experience in the Foreign Ministry] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1983; Engl. transl. 1985); and, not least, those of Mao's Russian interpreter Shi Zhe, *Zai lishi juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu* [Together with Historical Giants: Memoirs of Shi Zhe] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1991).

See also sections 13 and 17 of this bibliographical essay.

12. Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945–1960

There are several overviews of US–Japanese relations that also examine alliance relations during the early Cold War. Roger Buckley's *US–Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945–1990* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) is one of the earliest monographs that highlights the political, military, and economic aspects of the emerging alliance. In his magisterial book, *The Clash: US–Japanese Relations through History* (New York: Norton, 1997), Walter LaFeber devotes about half of the text to an analysis of the post-World War II period. Michael Schaller's *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) is also a well-balanced survey of the bilateral relationship focusing on the postwar period. John Hunter Boyle's *Modern Japan: The American Nexus* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1993) contains useful chapters on postwar US–Japanese relations and covers questions surrounding the atomic bomb.

Biographies of individuals who played a critical part in US-Japanese relations during the early Cold War abound. John Dower's classic *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience 1878-1954* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979) is a critical portrayal of the postwar prime minister who laid the groundwork of the US-Japan Cold War alliance. Michael Schaller's *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) is a clear-eyed probe into the career of the ambitious general who shaped the contours of postwar Japan. Richard Finn's *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992) highlights these key individuals and their work during the Allied occupation. *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis* (London: Heinemann, 1961) provides a rare look into the inner thoughts of a politician who faced a powerful American overlord. Howard Schonberger's *Aftermath of War: American and the Remaking of Japan 1945-1952* (Kent, OH: Kent University Press, 1989) highlights American politicians and strategists who directed the course of the US occupation of Japan.

The literature on the origins of the Cold War in East Asia with a focus on Japan is also rich. Akira Iriye's *The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice, 1974) remains a classic. A collaborative volume of American and Japanese scholars, edited by Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977), examines the coming of the Cold War in a regional framework. Michael Schaller's *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), along with William S. Borden's *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery 1947-1955* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), shaped the early scholarly debate on the links between American occupation policy and Japan's postwar economic recovery. Marc Gallicchio's *The Cold War Begins in Asia: American East Asian Policy and the Fall of the Japanese Empire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) provides a concise summary of the US-Asian policies that shaped Cold War policies in the immediate postwar years.

The dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has generated a spirited debate among historians. J. Samuel Walker's *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atom Bombs against Japan* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997) offers the most updated and balanced analysis of the momentous decision. Ronald Takaki's concise volume, *Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1995), places greater emphasis on the racial aspect of the American decision. Based on a special issue of *Diplomatic History*, Michael Hogan's *Hiroshima in History and Memory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) highlights various historical questions arising from the atomic bombing.

Among the earliest accounts of the Allied occupation of Japan are Kazuo Kawaii, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), and Frederick S. Dunn, *Peacemaking and the Settlement with Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960). Thomas W. Burkman (ed.), *The Occupation of Japan: The International Contest* (Norfolk, VA: MacArthur Memorial, 1982), and Robert E. Ward and Frank Joseph Shulman (eds.), *The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952: An Annotated Bibliography of Western-Language Materials* (Chicago: American Library Association, 1974), are useful references. Eiji Takemae's *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002) explains well the structure and workings of the occupation administration. Robert Wade and

Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds.), *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), contains many useful chapters on American reform efforts.

For more recent studies on the occupation, see Ray Moore and Donald Robinson, *Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). John Dower's *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999) offers a panoramic view of Japan's social and cultural landscapes during the American occupation. For a general appraisal of occupation policies, see Carol Gluck, "Entangling Illusions: Japanese and American Views of the Occupation," in Warren I. Cohen (ed.), *New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations: Essays Presented to Dorothy Borg* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 169–236. Yukiko Koshiro's *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the US Occupation of Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) discusses race in the context of US–Japanese relations.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Warren Cohen and Akira Iriye hosted several international conferences that resulted in collections of well-balanced essays based on recently declassified government documents and memoirs of key decisionmakers. See especially Iriye and Cohen, *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1989), and Cohen and Iriye, *The Great Powers in East Asia 1953–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

The literature focusing on the 1950s has grown in the last decade. Aaron Forsberg's *America and the Japanese Miracle* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000) and Sayuri Shimizu's *Creating People of Plenty: The United States and Japan's Economic Alternatives, 1950–1960* (Kent, OH: Kent University Press, 2001) both focus on the Eisenhower administration's policies for Japanese economic recovery. Burton Kaufman's *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953–1961* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) is rich in information regarding the Eisenhower administration's trade and aid policies during the early Cold War years. John Swenson-Wright's *United States Security and Alliance Policy toward Japan, 1945–1960* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005) examines the military aspects of US–Japan relations between 1945 and 1960. *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001) by Gavan McCormack analyzes postwar Japan and social and cultural transformation.

For further guidance, see the bibliographical essay in volume III.

13. The Korean War

Numerous US documents on Korea, 1945–1953, are available in published form in the series US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969–88). For numerous translated documents from China and the former Soviet Union, plus commentaries by leading scholars, see *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 3 (Fall 1993), 5 (Spring 1995), 8–9 (Winter 1996/97), and 11 (Winter 1998). Evgeniy P. Bajanov and Natalia Bajanov, "The Korean Conflict, 1950–1953: The Most Mysterious War of the Twentieth Century – Based on Secret Soviet Archives," is an unpublished manuscript, widely circulated among Korean War scholars, that includes lengthy quotations of documents (in English translation) from the Soviet Presidential Archives strung together by a spare narrative. For other Russian overviews,

see Anatolii Torkunov, *Zagadochnaia voina: koreiskii konflikt 1950–1953 godov* [Mysterious War: The Korean Conflict 1950–1953] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000), and the official study made by the Soviet General Staff, *Voina v Koree: 1950–1953* [War in Korea, 1950–1953] (St. Petersburg: Poligon, 2000). For materials in Chinese, see the entries in section 11 of this bibliographical essay.

The best-known scholarly work on the origins and early stages of the war is Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981, 1990). However, this magisterial study appeared before much documentation became available from the Soviet and Chinese sides. Cumings's criticism of the United States and Syngman Rhee remains defensible, but some of the analysis regarding interactions among the North Koreans, Chinese Communists, and the Soviet Union has been disproved. The argument that the war was essentially civil in nature is hotly contested, especially by William Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), ch. 3. Other important works on the origins of the war include James I. Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), on the US side; Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), and Soon Sung Cho, *Korea in World Politics, 1940–1950* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1967), on the US and South Korean sides; Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), and Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), on the Chinese side; Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), on the Chinese and Soviet sides; Erik Van Ree, *Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy toward Korea, 1945–1947* (Oxford: Berg, 1989), and Andrei Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945–1960* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), on the Soviet and North Korean sides; and Charles K. Armstrong, *The North Korean Revolution 1945–1950* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), on the North Korean side.

For one-volume syntheses of the war, see Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), Burton Kaufman, *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command* (New York: Knopf, 1986), Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987), and David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (New York: St. Martin's, 1964), a classic. On the diplomacy of the war and its international implications, see William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). For a briefer topical study, see Stueck's *Rethinking the Korean War*.

The best studies focusing on US policy during the war include Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950–1953* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Foot, *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War," *International Security*, 13 (Winter 1988/89), 61–89; Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset'? American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949–1954," *International Security*, 13 (Winter 1988/89), 5–49; Conrad Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in Korea 1950–1953* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000); and Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., *Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War* (Columbia,

MO: University of Missouri Press, 1999). See also Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 24 (December 1980), 563–92.

For a comprehensive treatment of the Chinese side of the war, see Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995). Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), ch. 4, provides the most up-to-date treatment of China's strategy in the armistice talks. Zhang Xiaoming, *Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea* (College Station TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), covers the Communist side of the air war, especially the Chinese perspective.

For a collection of essays on the war by leading scholars with an editor's introduction and conclusion placing them in historiographical context, see William Stueck (ed.), *The Korean War in World History* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2004). Particularly useful are Kathryn Weathersby's summary of "the state of historical knowledge" on the Soviet side, Chen Jian's chapter on China, and Michael Schaller's chapter on the impact of the war on Japan.

14. US national security policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy

Especially important on the overall national security strategy of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration are Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Saki Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); and the relevant chapters in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Reappraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) and *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Robert Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), provides a succinct, and highly favorable, early assessment of Eisenhower's Cold War policies; Blanche W. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981), offers a more critical perspective. Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006), makes a strong case for the centrality of psychological warfare and public diplomacy in Eisenhower's Cold War strategy. See also Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), on cultural factors shaping Eisenhower's foreign policy. David Snead, *The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1999), provides a penetrating analysis of the conflicting assessments of the Soviet threat in the late 1950s.

A useful examination of Eisenhower's approach to leadership and decisionmaking is Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982). On the different decisionmaking styles of the Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy administrations, consult Meena Bose, *Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy: The National Security Decision Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1998).

For valuable studies of Kennedy's overall strategy, which feature detailed explorations of different regions of the world and topical issues, see the essays in Thomas G. Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Diane Kunz (ed.), *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations during the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). Other important studies include Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Michael Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991); Timothy P. Maga, *John F. Kennedy and New Frontier Diplomacy, 1961–1963* (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 1994); and the relevant chapters in Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* and *We Now Know*.

For nuclear strategy and European issues during the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), is indispensable. Other important studies include Campbell Craig, *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); David A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960," *International Security*, 7 (1983), 3–71; Marc Trachtenberg, "'A Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance," *International Security*, 13 (1988/89), 5–49; H. W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," *American Historical Review*, 94 (1989), 963–89; Peter Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Christopher Preble, *John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap* (De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004); Andreas Wenger, *Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997); and Jeffrey Glen Giauque, *Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955–1963* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

On Third World strategy and issues, the scholarly literature is now quite voluminous. The following works are particularly useful: Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (eds.), *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006); H. W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Robert J. McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," *Political Science Quarterly*, 101 (1986), 453–73; Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982); Madeleine G. Kalb, *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa – From Eisenhower to Kennedy* (New York: Macmillan, 1982); David L. Anderson, *Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Kathryn C. Statler, *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2007); Gordon H. Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy–Matsu Crisis," *International Security*, 12 (1988), 96–123; Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945–1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Douglas Little, "Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945–1958," *Middle East Journal*, 44 (1990),

51–75; and Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

15. Soviet foreign policy, 1953–1962

Some of the most important documents on Soviet foreign policy in this period are published in Aleksandr Fursenko (chief ed.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964: chernoye protokolnye zapisi zasedanii, stenogrammy, postanovlenii* [Presidium of the CC of the CPSU 1954–1964: Preparatory Session Protocol Minutes, Reports, Resolutions] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003–2008). For an overview of the literature, see Andrea Graziosi's online bibliography at www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/resources.htm.

Different views on alleged missed opportunities for East–West accommodation after Stalin's death are presented in Kenneth Osgood and Klaus Larres (eds.), *The Cold War after Stalin's Death: A New International History* (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). Amy Knight's biography, *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), uses all the fragmentary evidence that is ever likely to surface on his foreign-policy deviation.

For evidence of changes in Soviet policy on Germany, see Elke Scherstjanoi, "Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik nach Stalins Tod 1953: neue Dokumente aus dem Archiv des Moskauer Außenministeriums," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 46 (1998), 497–549. The Soviet handling of the East German crisis is documented in Christian Ostermann, *Uprising in East Germany 1953* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001).

Nikolaus Katzer, "Eine Übung im Kalten Krieg": *Die Berliner Außenministerkonferenz von 1954* (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1994), gives the most detailed account of Soviet conduct at the abortive Berlin conference. Soviet initiatives on European security are examined in Marie-Pierre Rey, "L'URSS et la sécurité européenne 1953–1956," *Communisme*, 49/50 (1997), 127–30.

William Taubman's magisterial biography, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), is most thoughtful of its subject's foreign policy. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: Norton, 2006), the first to make use of the long-hidden records of the Soviet party presidium meetings, adds many important details. James G. Richter, *Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), focuses on the crucial domestic determinants of Khrushchev's foreign policy.

On the Austrian State Treaty and the origins of the Warsaw Pact, see Vojtech Mastny, "The Launching of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Grand Strategy," in Arnold Suppan, Gerald Stourzh, and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), *Der österreichische Staatsvertrag 1955: internationale Strategie, rechtliche Relevanz, nationale Identität* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005), 145–62. Günter Bischof and Saki Dockrill (eds.), *Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), is the best on the subject.

Using extensive revelations from the archives, Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 33, 2 (1998), 163–214, is partly updated by Aleksandr Stykalin, "The

Hungarian Crisis of 1956: The Soviet Role in the Light of New Archival Documents,” *Cold War History*, 2, 1 (October 2001), 113–44. The growing influence of the Chinese factor on Khrushchev’s foreign policy is best explained in Lorenz Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Matthew Evangelista, “Why Keep Such an Army?:” *Khrushchev’s Troop Reductions*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 19 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997), makes the best of new sources. Donald R. Falls, “Soviet Decision-Making and the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Romania,” *East European Quarterly*, 27, 4 (1993), 489–502, clarifies that puzzling episode. On the wider implications of Khrushchev’s security policy, Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945–1970* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), has withstood the test of time remarkably well.

Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths, *Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1954–1964* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966), remains valuable for the understanding of Khrushchev’s disarmament initiatives, as does Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), for his missile deception.

In her account of the Berlin crisis, Hope M. Harrison, *Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet–East German Relations, 1953–1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), attributes a major role to Walter Ulbricht as “the tail that wagged the dog,” whereas Michael Lemke, *Die Berlinkrise 1958 bis 1963: Interessen und Handlungsspielräume der SED im Ost–West-Konflikt* (Berlin: Akademie, 1995), stresses the East Germans’ limitations in influencing Soviet policy. Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), remains an essential study.

For the U-2 incident and the breakdown of the Paris summit, see Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair* (New York: Harper, 1986).

For bilateral Soviet–American relations, Georgii M. Kornienko, “Upushchennaia vozmozhnost’: vstrecha N. S. Khrushcheva i Dzh. Kennedi v Vene v 1961 g.” [A Missed Opportunity: The 1961 Khrushchev–Kennedy Meeting in Vienna], *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, 1992, No. 2, 97–106, offers the view of a knowledgeable high-ranking insider from the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Aleksandr A. Fursenko, “Kak byla postroena berlinskaia stena” [How the Berlin Wall Was Built], *Istoricheskie zapiski*, 2001, no. 4, 73–90, benefits from privileged access to the Kremlin archives.

The first to call attention to the significance of the “Buria” exercise for Moscow’s planning for a Berlin confrontation is Matthias Uhl, “Storming on to Paris: The 1961 Buria Exercise and the Planned Solution of the Berlin Crisis,” in Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West* (London: Routledge, 2006), 46–71.

On the path from the Berlin to the Cuban crisis, Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and John C. Ausland, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin–Cuba Crisis, 1961–1964* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996), are as illuminating on the Soviet as they are on the American side.

Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: *Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964* (New York: Norton, 1997), makes the best use of the substantial though selective archival documentation the Russian authorities chose to provide to the authors. Dimitrij N. Filippovich and Wladimir I. Ivkin, “Die strategischen Raketenstruppen der UdSSR und ihre Beteiligung an der Operation ‘Anadyr’ (1962),” in Dimitrij N. Filippovich

and Matthias Uhl (eds.), *Vor dem Abgrund: Die Streitkräfte der USA und UdSSR sowie ihrer deutschen Bündnispartner in der Kubakrise* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 39–63, presents revealing new evidence about the scope of the operation. Svetlana V. Savranskaya, “New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28, 2 (2005), 233–59, shows how close was the danger of a nuclear confrontation at sea. See also James H. Hansen, “Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *Studies in Intelligence*, 46, 1 (2002), 49–58.

16. East Central Europe, 1953–1956

While we are still awaiting a comparative archive-based study of East Central Europe in the mid-1950s, two classical works of Kremlinology are still useful guides to the historical debate over the de-Stalinization process: Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), and Francois Fejtő, *A History of the Peoples' Democracies*, 2 vols., translated by Daniel Weissbort (New York: Praeger, 1971).

Among the several available general histories of the region in the postwar period, one of the most illuminating works is Ivan T. Berend, *Central and Eastern Europe, 1944–1993: Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

On Soviet–East European relations in the transition period after Stalin's death, three articles by Mark Kramer are the best sources: “The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal–External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making,” parts 1–3, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1, 1 (Winter 1999), 3–55; 1, 2 (Spring 1999), 3–38; 1, 3 (Fall 1999), 3–66.

While several German-language books were published for the fiftieth anniversary in 2003, the best documentary coverage and concise history of the 1953 Berlin uprising, covering the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak revolts as well, is Christian F. Ostermann (ed.), *Uprising in East Germany 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2001).

Relatively few publications are available in English on the Polish October in 1956. The most informative, archive-based studies are Leo Gluchowsky, “Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka and the ‘Polish October,’” *CWIHP Bulletin*, 5 (1995), 40–43; Pawel Machcewicz, “Social Protest and Political Crisis in 1956,” in A. Kemp-Welch (ed.), *Stalinism in Poland 1944–1956: Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 1995* (London: Macmillan, 1999), 99–118; and Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, 33, 2 (1998), 163–214.

The 1956 Hungarian revolution is one of the most extensively covered Cold War topics: several hundred books have been published on that event since 1956, and many archive-based volumes and publications have appeared since 1989, mostly in Hungarian. For a full bibliography, see www.rev.hu. Among the most important English-language studies are György Litván, János M. Bak, and Lyman H. Legters (eds.), *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt and Repression, 1953–1963* (New York: Longman, 1996); Csaba Békés, *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 16 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1996), the first archive-based comprehensive study of the international context of the 1956 revolution. A combination of archive-based essays by

Hungarian and Russian military historians and the recollections of J. Malashenko, deputy commander of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, is in Jenő Györkei and Miklós Horváth (eds.), *Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956*, trans. by Emma Roper-Evans (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999). Charles Gati, *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Stanford University Press, 2006), provides a provocative and inspiring analysis of what happened and what could have happened differently during the revolution of 1956. Victor Sebestyen, *Twelve Days. Revolution 1956: How the Hungarians Tried to Topple Their Soviet Masters* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), is a well-written, basically reliable history of 1956. An imposing 956-page volume of essays on all aspects of the revolution by leading historians in Hungary and abroad is Lee Congdon, Béla K. Király, and Károly Nagy (eds.), *1956: The Hungarian Revolution and War for Independence* (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs and Highland Lakes: Atlantic Research and Publications, 2006).

The most important documentary collections on 1956 are Paul Zinner (ed.), *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe: A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary, February–November, 1956* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), the first and fullest publication of publicly available documents in English; “The ‘Malin notes’ on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956,” translated and annotated by Mark Kramer, *CWIHP Bulletin*, 8–9 (Winter 1996–Spring 1997), 385–410, showing the view from inside the Kremlin; and Elena D. Orekhova, Viacheslav T. Sereda, and Aleksandr S. Stykalin (eds.), *Sovietskii Soiz i vengerskii krizis 1956 goda: dokumenty* [The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis in 1956: Documents] (Moscow: Rossiiskaya politicheskaya entsiklopediia, 1998), is the most comprehensive collection of Soviet documents on 1956 in Russian.

Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, and János M. Rainer (eds.), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2002), contains 600 pages of documents covering the period 1953–58 from ten countries’ archives and a concise history, based on the research of the 1956 Institute in Budapest.

Relevant chapters of the following recent books provide archive-based analyses of the events in individual countries of the region in the mid-1950s: Hope M. Harrison, *Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet–East German Relations, 1953–1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Andrzej Paczkowski, *Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom*, trans. by Jane Cave (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003); Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003); László Borhi, *Hungary in the Cold War, 1945–1956: Between the United States and the Soviet Union* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2004); Muriel Blaive, *Une déstalinisation manquée: Tchécoslovaquie 1956* (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 2005); and Richard Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

17. The Sino-Soviet alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954–1962

Among the first generation of scholarship on the Sino-Soviet estrangement, Donald S. Zagoria’s *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962) is the most balanced in examining all aspects of the relationship. Others include

G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York: Praeger, 1961); Raymond L. Garthoff (ed.), *Sino-Soviet Military Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1966); and John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics, 1963–1967* (New York: Oxford University, 1968). Jack L. Snyder, in his 1978 RAND Paper “The Psychology of Escalation: Sino-Soviet Relations, 1958–1963” (P-6191), offers an interesting analytical framework. He uses a cognitive-process model of decisionmaking to explain the Soviets’ choice of a strategy for pursuing their interests, which, he concludes, caused the Sino-Soviet alliance to collapse.

With Chinese material becoming more available and some Russian archives opened to scholars since the late 1980s, there have emerged sequential reexaminations of how the Sino-Soviet alliance fell apart. Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Odd Arne Westad, “Unwrapping the Stalin–Mao Talks: Setting the Record Straight” *CWIHP Bulletin*, 6–7 (Winter 1995/96); Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); and Shu Guang Zhang, *Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), show how Russian and Chinese – as well as American and British – records can be integrated into one database, thereby to explore the political, economic, and military as well as personal and cultural aspects of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s and 1960s.

To trace ideological differences between Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders in the pre-People’s Republic of China period, see John Garver, *Chinese–Soviet Relations, 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet–American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Michael M. Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

The best interpretations in English of the Sino-Soviet estrangement from a Russian perspective are G. Ganshin and T. Zazerskaya, “Pitfalls Along the Path of ‘Brotherly Friendship’: A Look at the History of Soviet–Chinese Relations,” *Far Eastern Affairs*, 6 (1994); William Taubman, “Khrushchev vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the Sino-Soviet Split,” *CWIHP Bulletin* (Winter 1996/97), 243–48; Vladislav M. Zubok, “‘Look What Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp!’: Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1956–1963,” *CWIHP Bulletin* (March 1998), 152–62; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); M. Y. Prozumenshchikov, “The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” *CWIHP Bulletin* (Winter 1996/97), 251–57; and David Wolff, *One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events: New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948–1959*, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 30 (2002).

Important works from a Chinese perspective are Ronald C. Keith, *The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989); Jaser Becker, *Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine* (New York: Holt and Co., 1996); Mercy Kuo, *Contending with Contradictions: China’s Policy toward Soviet Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1953–1960* (New York:

Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); and Shen Zhihua, Yang Kuisong, Yu Minling, Lin Yunhui, Mori Kazuko, Dai Chaowu, and Li Danhui, *The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations* at php.isn.ethz.ch/publications/areastudies/sinosov.cfm. In Russian, see Boris Kulik, *Sovetsko-kitaiskii raskol: prichiny i posledstviia* [The Sino-Soviet Split: Causes and Consequences] (Moscow: Institut Dalnego Vostoka RAN, 2000), and Vladimir Fedotov, *Polveka vmeste s Kitaem: vospominaniia, zapisi, razmysleniia* [A Half-Century with China: Memoirs, Reports, Reviews] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005); both are overviews by participants at the time. See also the memoirs of former Soviet foreign minister Dmitrii Shepilov, *The Kremlin's Scholar: A Memoir of Soviet Politics under Stalin and Khrushchev*, edited by Stephen V. Bittner, translated by Anthony Austin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007). In Chinese, Liu Xiao, *Chushi Sulian banian, 1955–1962* [Eight Years of Serving as Envoy in the Soviet Union, 1955–1962] (Beijing: Zhongyang dangshi chubanshe, 1998), and Wu Lengxi, *Huiyi Mao zhuxi* [Remembering Chairman Mao] (Beijing: Xinhua, 1995), are useful memoirs. Shen Zhihua (ed.), *Zhongsu guanxi shigang, 1917–1991* [An Outline History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1991] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2007), is a good introduction to scholarship in China.

See also sections 11 and 12 of this bibliographical essay for further suggestions.

18. Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962

McGeorge Bundy's *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988) provides a sophisticated account of the key decisions. Lawrence Freedman's *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3rd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) remains the best survey of thinking about nuclear weapons. Lawrence S. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1945–1970* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), provides a thorough account of antinuclear movements throughout this period.

Bernard Brodie's *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959) remains one of the most astute analyses of nuclear strategy. Thomas C. Schelling's *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960) explores deterrence and the politics of threats with great acuity. Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), shows just how important accidents have been in nuclear history.

Several books examine Harry S. Truman's decision to use the bomb and its implications for US–Soviet relations: Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy. Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power*, updated ed. (New York: Penguin, 1985), is the classic revisionist text, first published in 1966; Martin Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance* (New York: Knopf, 1975), explores the impact of the bomb on US relations with Britain and the Soviet Union; Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), looks at the decision to use the bomb in the context of the Pacific War and US–Soviet rivalry. Barton Bernstein has published a number of important articles on this topic, and a summary of his views may be found in his “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1995, 135–52.

On US nuclear weapons policy, the three volumes of the official history are fundamental resources: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, vol. I, *The New World, 1939/1946* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1962); Richard G. Hewlett and F. Duncan, *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, vol. II, *Atomic Shield, 1947/1952* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1969); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989). Herbert York provides a lucid account of the development of the hydrogen bomb in *The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb* (San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman, 1976). An important article by David Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” *International Security*, 7, 4 (Spring 1983), 3–71, describes the incorporation of nuclear weapons into US military strategy. Greg Herken explores the impact of the bomb on US policy after World War II in *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945–1950* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982). Dwight Eisenhower’s policies are examined in Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

On Soviet nuclear weapons policy, see the documents now being published under the editorship of L. D. Riabev with the general title *Sovetskii atomnyi proekt* [The Soviet atomic project]. Since 1998, seven volumes have appeared (from various publishers) and several more are due. The documents cover the period up to 1954. David Holloway’s *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994) examines the development of Soviet nuclear weapons and the Soviet response to US nuclear weapons policy. A detailed analysis of the development of Soviet nuclear forces can be found in Pavel Podvig (ed.), *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, in *Khrushchev’s Cold War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), examine Nikita Khrushchev’s policies on the basis of the latest archival material.

For British nuclear policies, the official histories are indispensable: Margaret Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy 1939–1945* (London: Macmillan, 1964); Margaret Gowing assisted by Lorna Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952*, vol. I, *Policy Making*, and vol. II, *Policy Execution* (London: Macmillan, 1974); and Lorna Arnold, *Britain and the H-Bomb* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). A detailed account of the development of British strategic nuclear forces is given by Humphrey Wynn, *The RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces: Their Origins, Roles, and Deployment 1946–1969: A Documentary History* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1997). John Baylis, *Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945–1964* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), provides a very clear analysis of the issues involved in the development of nuclear strategy in Britain.

Dominique Mongin, *La Bombe Française 1945–1958* (Brussel: Bruylant, 1997), gives a good account of the decisions leading to the French bomb. Maurice Vaisse (ed.), *La France et l’atome: études d’histoire nucléaire* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994), contains some helpful essays on French nuclear history. His *La Grandeur: politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958–1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), is excellent on the Gaullist years.

Marc Trachtenberg’s *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), provides a good account of nuclear weapons issues in Europe, and of the Berlin crises, in this period. Hope Harrison’s *Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet–East German Relations, 1953–1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 2003) examines the Berlin crises in the context of Soviet–East German relations. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, in *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), discuss different ways of thinking about the crisis. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, in *“One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958–1964* (New York: Norton, 1997), provide a detailed analysis of Soviet policy. Sheldon M. Stern’s *Averting “The Final Failure”: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003) carefully analyzes the tapes of the crucial meetings in the White House.

19. Culture and the Cold War in Europe

Scholars interested in European–American cultural relations can draw on a plentiful literature. For a general assessment of US cultural diplomacy, see Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Hans Tuch, *Communicating with the World: US Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990); Randolph Wieck, *Ignorance Abroad: American Educational and Cultural Foreign Policy and the Office of Assistant Secretary of State* (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1992); and Laura A. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: US Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

For US cultural diplomacy in Europe, see Henry J. Kellermann, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange Program between the United States and Germany* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1978); and Manuela Aguilar, *Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy: German–American Relations, 1955–1968* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996).

Cultural imperialism and transmission since 1945 are the topic of Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997); Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1994); Rob Kroes, Robert W. Rydell, and Doeko F.J. Bosscher (eds.), *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions: American Mass Culture in Europe* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1993); and Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “Cultural Transfer,” in Michael Hogan and Thomas Patterson (eds.), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 257–78. In *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), Victoria de Grazia argues that American consumer society constitutes the key conquest of the twentieth century.

Reeducation and high culture in the media are at the heart of Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1999); and David Monod, *Settling Scores: German Music, Denazification, and the Americans, 1945–1953* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005). Klaus Arnold analyzes East German broadcasting in *Kalter Krieg im Äther: der Deutschlandsender und die Westpropaganda der DDR* (Münster: LIT, 2002).

For analyses of US cultural diplomacy since the 1970s, see Hans Tuch, “Die amerikanische Kulturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik,” in *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten*

Krieges: ein Handbuch, vol. II, ed. Detlef Junker in collaboration with Philipp Gassert, Wilfried Mausbach and David B. Morris (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2001), 420–29.

The role of nongovernmental organizations is the subject of Hermann-Josef Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993). Historians haggle over the question of whether governments, NGOs, and secret services departed from a strict interpretation of “freedom” in order to funnel funds clandestinely to pro-American organizations. See Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 1999); Scott Lucas, *Freedom’s War: The US Crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945–1956* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Postwar American Hegemony* (London: Routledge, 2002); and Hugh Wilford, *The CIA, the British Left, and the Cold War* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003).

For European reactions to American cultural efforts, see Robert Hewison, *In Anger: Culture in the Cold War, 1945–1960* (New York: Oxford, 1981); for reactions to the Marshall Plan, see Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); Brian McKenzie, *Remaking France: Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005); David Ellwood, “The Propaganda of the Marshall Plan in Italy in a Cold War Context,” in Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (eds.), *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–1960* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 225–36.

Assessments of German youth culture in the 1950s are offered by Kasper Maase’s *BRAVO Amerika: Erkundungen zur Jugendkultur in der Bundesrepublik der fünfziger Jahre* (Hamburg: Junius, 1992); and Axel Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten: Freizeit, Massenmedien und “Zeitgeist” in der Bundesrepublik der fünfziger Jahre* (Hamburg: Christians, 1995). For an introduction to the role of Hollywood, see David Ellwood (ed.), *Hollywood in Europe: Experiences of a Cultural Hegemony* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994). The role of American popular culture in East and West Germany is covered by Uta Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).

The number of comparative research projects on the cultural dimension of the Cold War remains small. For a methodological discussion, see Patrick Major and Rana Mitter, “East Is East and West Is West? Towards a Comparative Socio-Cultural History of the Cold War,” in Rana Mitter and Patrick Major (eds.), *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 1–22. Though critical, Frederick Charles Barghoorn’s *The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976) praises the imagination and efficiency of Soviet cultural diplomacy. A regional approach is offered by David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany, 1945–1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). David Caute’s *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) is excellent. The *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 4, 1 (Winter 2002), offers a special issue on *Culture, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War*. On Soviet exchange programs, see Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003). For East European interpretations of the cultural struggle between East and West, see Bradley Abrams, *The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

20. Cold War mobilization and domestic politics: the United States

General syntheses of the postwar era usually address the Cold War's domestic politics, but several collections give the topic full treatment and debate the particular question of whether there was a distinctive Cold War culture. Anthologies offer the best sampling of the scholarship. Lary May, *Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), was one of the first collections to debate the issue. Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert (eds.), *Rethinking Cold War Culture* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), take up the question with fresh perspectives from a variety of subfields. Christian G. Appy (ed.), *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945–1966* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), looks at the cultural underpinnings of Cold War diplomacy in a variety of world areas. Rana Mitter and Patrick Major (eds.), *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), adds an important international perspective to US scholarly debates. Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), is an adequate survey of the excesses of American Cold War culture. Michael S. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), is one of the best syntheses of the postwar era, offering an original interpretive framework through which to assess all dimensions of the early Cold War experience (and beyond).

Works that examine the domestic Cold War through the career of Senator Joseph McCarthy are plentiful; many are journalistic, but academic historians have tried to place McCarthy and his crusade in a broader historical context. One of the earliest collections to probe McCarthyism as more than the man himself is Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis (eds.), *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974). More recently, Richard M. Fried has written two useful chronicles of McCarthyism's political and cultural impact: *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), is a good synthesis of McCarthyism as part of twentieth-century political history; *The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming! Paganry and Patriotism in Cold-War America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), is one of the few to detail how grassroots organizations practiced anti-Communism locally. Ellen Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1998), argues a "many McCarthyisms" thesis, offering fresh insights on the American Communist Party's postwar activities and exhaustive research on the government's myriad modes of political repression.

Recent studies have broadened our understanding of the ideological and political crosscurrents surrounding the creation of the national security state. On the Harry S. Truman years, see Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Jonathan Bell, *The Liberal State on Trial: The Cold War and American Politics in the Truman Years* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), looks at the fate of postwar liberalism through analysis of state and local elections in the Cold War's first decade. For an analysis of how American antistatism shaped both the Truman and the Dwight Eisenhower administrations' domestic policy, see Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State:*

America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

The rise of a Cold War nuclear culture has been examined by social critics, historians, cultural-studies scholars, and linguists. An excellent introduction to the topic is Paul Boyer, *Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America's Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1998). Margot A. Henriksen's *Dr. Strangelove's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997) uses a cultural studies approach to reveal a nascent "culture of dissent" emerging in response to the pursuit of nuclear supremacy. Laura McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), examines the political debates and social movements that gave rise to the "duck and cover" programs of the 1950s. Allan M. Winkler, *Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Atom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), offers a good survey of postwar nuclear culture, extending the narrative to Ronald Reagan's presidency.

Scholars have explored how the Cold War intersected with and was shaped by other domestic political phenomena. Mary L. Dudziak was one of the first to suggest a connection between the race problem in the United States and its Cold War foreign policy. See her path-breaking article, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," *Stanford Law Review*, 41, 1 (November 1988), 61–120, and her *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). For a broader sampling of the scholarship on race and Cold War foreign relations, see Brenda Gayle Plummer (ed.), *Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). See also Plummer's own study, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and US Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). The Cold War's effect on gender and family ideals has received even more scholarly scrutiny. Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), was the first to suggest that "containment" might apply to postwar gender and family relations. Joanne Meyerowitz (ed.), *Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945–1960* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1994), offers essays that challenge or reconfigure May's thesis on domestic containment. Similarly, Susan Lynn, *Progressive Women in Conservative Times: Racial Justice, Peace, and Feminism, 1945 to the 1960s* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993), reveals a robust women's movement pushing liberal reform at the height of the Cold War. Helen Laville, *Cold War Women: The International Activities of American Women's Organisations* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), highlights women's engagement in Cold War politics at home and abroad, despite the emphasis on domesticity.

21. Cold War mobilisation and domestic politics: the Soviet Union

The postwar Stalinist period is still a relatively unresearched area, but a lively literature is emerging. The fullest account so far of high politics is Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). See also A. A. Danilov and A. V. Pyzhikov, *Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy: SSSR v pervye*

poslevoennye gody [The Rise of a Superpower: The USSR in the Early Postwar Years] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001). For Stalin's thinking about politics, see E. Van Ree, *Stalin's Political Thought* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).

A general overview of Stalinist economic policy is provided in Timothy Dunmore, *The Stalinist Command Economy: The Soviet State Apparatus and Economic Policy, 1945–1953* (London: Macmillan, 1980). On defense spending, see N. S. Simonov, *Voenno-promyshlennyy kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950-e gody* [The Military-Industrial Complex of the USSR from the 1920s to the 1950s] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996); on consumption, see Julie Hessler, *A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917–1953* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). Don Filtzer analyzes the effects of harsh economic policies on the working class, in D. Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

The importance of nationalism in postwar Soviet ideology is analyzed in D. Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Russian National Identity, 1931–1956* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); and A. Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). For the “patriotic” campaigns, see Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace*; for the “anticosmopolitanism” campaign, see G. V. Kostyrchenko, *Tainaia politika Stalina: vlast' i antisemitizm* [Stalin's Secret Policy: Power and Anti-Semitism] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2001). The effects of these campaigns on science are analyzed in Nikolai Krementsov, *Stalinist Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); D. Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); and E. Pollock, “Stalin as the Coryphaeus of Science: Ideology and Knowledge in the Post-war Years,” in S. Davies and J. Harris (eds.), *Stalin: A New History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 271–88. On the relationship between *politika* and *tekhnika* between the wars, see David Priestland, *Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization: Ideas, Power, and Terror in Inter-War Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

For accounts of foreign policy under both Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev, see Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). Mark Kramer has produced a detailed analysis of the relationship between foreign and domestic politics the year after Stalin's death: Mark Kramer, “The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal–External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1, 1 (1999), 3–55; 1, 2 (1999), 3–38; 1, 3 (1999), 3–66. See also Amy Knight, *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

For the politics of the Khrushchev years, see W. Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (London: Free Press, 2003); and G. Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982). James G. Richter analyzes the links between foreign and domestic politics in his *Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). Helpful collections of essays include P. Jones (ed.), *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era* (London: Routledge, 2006); and W. Taubman, S. Khrushchev, and A. Gleason (eds.), *Nikita Khrushchev* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000). See also D. Filtzer, *Soviet*

Workers and Destalinization: The Consolidation of the Modern System of Soviet Production Relations, 1953–1964 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), for a study of industrial relations.

On the popular culture of the postwar period, see Richard Stites (ed.), *Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995); S. Frederick Starr, *Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, 1917–1991* (New York: Limelight Editions, 1994); and Richard Stites, *Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). For discussions of youth culture, see J. Fürst, “The Importance of Being Stylish: Youth, Culture and Identity in Late Stalinism,” in J. Fürst (ed.), *Late Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention* (London: Routledge, 2006), 209–30; and J. Fürst, “The Arrival of Spring? Changes and Continuities in Soviet Youth Culture and Policy between Stalin and Khrushchev,” in Jones (ed.), *Dilemmas of De-Stalinization*, 135–53.

For popular attitudes toward politics and the regime, see E. Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945–1947* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); Mark Edele, “More than Just Stalinists: The Political Sentiments of Victors,” in Fürst (ed.), *Late Stalinist Russia*, 167–91, on the views of veterans; J. Fürst, “Prisoners of the Soviet Self? Political Youth Opposition in Late Stalinism,” *Europe–Asia Studies*, 54, 3 (2002), 353–75; P. Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to De-Stalinization,” in Jones (ed.), *Dilemmas of De-Stalinization*, 41–63. For opposition during the Khrushchev period, see Vladimir Kozlov, *Massovye besporiadki v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve (1953–nachalo 1980-kh gg.)* [Mass Disorder in the USSR under Khrushchev and Brezhnev (from 1953 to the Beginning of the 1980s)] (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1999). Discussion of popular views of foreign policy in the latter part of the period can be found in A. G. Airapetov, “Politika razriadki i obshchestvennoe mnenie (opyt mikroissledovaniia)” [The Policy of Détente and Public Opinion (the Findings of Micro-Research)], in N. I. Egorova and A. O. Chubar’ian (eds.), *Kholodnaia voina i politika razriadki: diskussionnye problemy (sbornik statei)* [The Cold War and the Policy of Détente: Discussions and Problems (Collection of Articles)] (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 2003), 54–66. Interviews conducted by the Harvard Interview Project can be accessed online at hcl.harvard.edu/collections/hpss/index.html.

Useful memoirs include: F. I. Chuev, *Molotov Remembers. Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Feliks Chuev*, ed. Albert Resis (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993); N. S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974); and N. S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*, foreword by Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed. by Jerrold Schecter and V. V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990).

22. Decolonization, the global South, and the Cold War, 1919–1962

The starting point for all efforts to consider the relationship between the Cold War and decolonization is now Odd Arne Westad’s magisterial *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), which explores the perceptions and policies of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the

People's Republic of China along with a host of actors in the global South across the twentieth century. Also critical for their larger and probing analytical sweep are Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korea War*, vol. II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America and the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

On high imperialism and its discontents, David B. Abernathy's *Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000) is a useful overview. For pioneering explorations of imperial order that place the colonizers and colonized in the same interpretative frame, see Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993); Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Timothy Mitchell, *Colonizing Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

On the global dimensions of anticolonialism after World War I, Erez Manela's *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) is essential. On pan-Africanism and other forms of transnational solidarities, see Imanuel Geis, *The Pan-African Movement: A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe, and Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1974); Rebecca E. Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); Penny von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Mary Ann Glendon, *World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: Random House, 2001). The Bandung Conference awaits the attention of an international historian, but suggestive for its immediacy is Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference* (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing Company, 1956).

On the larger contours shaping American, Soviet, and Chinese Cold War intervention in the global South, see Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy J. Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: Norton, 2006); and Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

On the role of high modernism and economic development in the Cold War and decolonization, the following are essential starting points: James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); David C. Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); David C. Engerman et al. (eds.), *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development and the Global Cold War* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); and Michael Adas, *Domination by Design: Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

On Southeast Asia and India, see Mark Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and the United States: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina

Press, 2000); Mark Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: European and American Commitment to Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005); Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Mary P. Callahan, *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Robert J. McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–1949* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961); and Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).

On the Middle East, see Wm. Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Nigel Ashton, *Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955–1959* (London: Macmillan, 1996); Nathan J. Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa‘ūd, and the Making of US–Saudi Relations* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002); Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004); and Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

On Latin America and the Caribbean, see Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough’s *Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944–1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Nick Cullather, *Secret History* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); and Stephen G. Rabe, *US Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

On Africa, see Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); David N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and US Policy in the Congo Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., *The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940–1960* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (New York: New York University Press, 1957); Robert Tignor, *Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Decolonizing Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); and Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt, 2004).

23. Oil, resources, and the Cold War, 1945–1962

Many of the volumes of US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, various years; also available at digital.library.wisc.edu), contain documents on oil and natural resources. Ian O. Lesser, *Resources and Strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1989), relates control of resources to overall strategy. Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., *The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals* (Austin, TX: University

of Texas Press, 1979), and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, *When Nations Clash: Raw Materials, Ideology, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1989), are useful overviews.

Jonathan E. Helmreich, *Gathering Rare Ores: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, 1943–1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), details British and American efforts to control world supplies of uranium. Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), explores how uranium affected US policy toward southern Africa. David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Weapons, 1939–1958* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), is valuable on the Soviet atomic project. Ralf Engeln, *Uransklaven oder Sonnensucher? Die Sowjetische AG Wismut in der SBZ/DDR 1946–1953* (Essen: Klartext, 2001), and Norman H. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), cover uranium mining in the Soviet occupation zone in Germany.

The parts of this essay that deal with oil draw on David Palmer, *Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of US Foreign Oil Policy, 1941–1954* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Nathan J. Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ud, and the Making of US–Saudi Relations* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002), is very helpful on the 1950s.

Overall studies of the oil industry include Simon Bromley, *American Hegemony and World Oil: The Industry, the State System, and the World Economy* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1991); Neil H. Jacoby, *Multinational Oil: A Study in Industrial Dynamics* (New York: Macmillan, 1974); Edith Penrose, *The Large International Firm in the Developing Countries: The International Petroleum Industry* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968); George Philip, *The Political Economy of International Oil* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994); US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *Multinational Oil Corporations and US Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975); and Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

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